Cold War/World War III (1945-1992)
Documents

Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Reading Room

Chronology of the Development of Ballistic Missile Defense (1955 to Current FY) (14 July 1970) (2.3 MB PDF) – This document details the history of ABM from the NIKE-II study in 1955 to July 1970. Included in this rather lengthy document is a tabular list of all SPRINT and SPARTAN missile tests up to that date.

ABM Research and Development at Bell Laboratories (October 1975) (21.7 MB PDF) – This rather thick document was written up by Bell Laboratories for the US Army in 1975, covering development from the initial NIKE-II concepts in 1955 up to 1975 and SAFEGUARD.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program Report (Cover Letter Only) (10 Dec 1958) (8.4 MB PDF) – This is just a cover letter for a report I don't have yet but it has some thin details.

Risks involved in the Nike-Zeus Program (Killian to McMillan) (3 Dec 1958) (PDF) – This memo details when NIKE-ZEUS could be plausibly bought to operational status to protect SAC bases.

President's Science Advisory Committee -- AICBM Panel Meeting Report (17 Dec 1958) (PDF) – A rather thin report summarizing what's new in the ABM program.

President's Science Advisory Committee -- AICBM Panel Meeting Report (21 May 1959) (PDF) – A rather thin report summarizing what's new in the ABM program.

WSEG #45: Potential Contribution of NIKE-ZEUS to Defense of the U.S. Population and its Industrial Base and the U.S. Retaliatory System (25 Sep 1959) (5.3~ MB PDF) – This rather detailed report on NIKE-ZEUS goes into heavy detail in just how advanced the system actually was and rebuts many claims made about the system by others.

Anti-Ballistic Missile Weapon System Program Summary (23 Apr 1960) (PDF) – A rather thin report summarizing what's new in the ABM program.

NSC Memorandum - U.S. Policy on Continental Defense (14 July 1960) (1.6~ MB PDF) – This includes some information on ABM efforts, and includes several tables that were censored in WSEG #45 on fallout shelter protection.

President's Science Advisory Committe -- Memorandum for the Record: Nike-Zeus (18 Oct 1960) (PDF) – This memo by PSAC advises against the deployment of NIKE-ZEUS.

President's Science Advisory Committe (AICBM Panel): Memorandum on Limited Deployment, NIKE-ZEUS (21 Oct 1961) (PDF) – Once again, this memo by PSAC advises against NIKE-ZEUS' deployment.

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #29 Excerpts (18 Jan 1962) (1.21 MB PDF) – This OCR excerpt has some ABM/Penetration stuff as well as Polaris weights.

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #35 Excerpts (21 Mar 1963) (5.43 MB PDF) – This OCR excerpt has a large amount of documentation on early Polaris SSBNs, reliability, and some ABM/Penetration stuff.

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #45 Excerpts (30 Sep 1964) (PDF) – I've excerpted the Re-Entry Body Committee Discussion, as it's got heavy details on what the USN's FBM people were thinking regarding ABM; and penetration aids.

President's Science Advisory Committe (Strategic Military Panel): Report on the Proposed Army-BTL Ballistic Missile Defense System (Oct 1965) – Once again, this memo by PSAC advises against the deployment of NIKE-X, with the usual names signed off on the report.

JCSM-807-65 Nike-X Deployment Study (DEPEX)(6 Nov 1965) – This is the Joint Chiefs of Staff's formal reply to the Secretary of Defense regarding the October 1965 PSAC Report on NIKE-X.

Defense Science Board Task Force Report on Ballistic Missile Defense (15 Sep 1966) (PDF) – This semi-sanitized report recommends the deployment of the NIKE-X system.

Production and Deployment of the NIKE-X (Draft) (2 December 1966) (PDF) – This draft memorandum prepared by Robert McNamara's office for LBJ on NIKE-X is a very instructive look into how McNamara used his ability as SecDef to selectively release or withhold information to get the desired outcome in the ABM debate.

If the Soviets have to achive a successful nationwide attack resulting in 66M dead to deter the US, the cost ratio changes to $1.66 Soviet Cost to Penetrate against $1 US Cost to Defend as the entire NIKE-X system is placed into action. This document wasn't partially declassified until 2005, so for nearly forty years, the pro-ABM side couldn't rebut McNamara's claims.

Production and Deployment of the NIKE-X (Draft) (10 December 1966) (1.3 MB PDF) – This "second" draft, written about a week (10 December) after the first draft of 2 December, is largely the same, but the censor has redacted the "fun" parts. The content is largely the same, but a few passages have changed their wording -- one of the reasons to deploy ABM is now "to protect our cities against a Chinese Communist missile attack in the 1975 to 1985 period."

JCSM-111-69: SENTINEL Program Review (26 Feb 1969) (PDF) – This sanitized report which contains only the first few pages, is about Deployment Model 1-69 for the SENTINEL ABM system.

Memo to Deputy SecDef on Sentinel Deployment (14 May 1969) (PDF) – This memorandum advises that the SENTINEL program be delayed one year.

Colonel Wood's ABM Study (22 May 1969) (PDF) – This study of ABM by (apparently) USAF Colonel Archie L. Wood of the Office of Secretary of Defense (SA) was found in the CIA's online reading room.

Special SALT Briefing Notes (May 1972) (PDF) – This memorandum was apparently prepared by Kissinger's advisors in advance of the 1972 Moscow Summit where the ABM and SALT I Treaties were signed, to have talking points ready to forestall Congressional criticism of the agreement. It's very crucial for understanding why the US agreed to the ABM Treaty.

MemCon - Discussion of UK SLBM, WH Situation Room (10 Aug 1972) (PDF) – This memorandum of a conference held in the White House situation room in 1972 between the UK Minister of Defence and several US national security personnel over US support for future British SSBN programs has this interesting line: "There has been, as you are aware, much discussion of the possibility of the Soviets upgrading their SAM’s to an ABM role. The Poseidon RV, being a beta RV, can go past any upgraded SAM. The Polaris A-3 RV could be vulnerable." by Dr Schlesinger.

British SLBM Upgrade (18 April 1973) (PDF) – This memorandum and it's summary of discussions with the UK on the upgrade for the British SSBN force has a lot of rather interesting tidbits dropped in it, even if the most interesting tidbits are redacted by the censor. For one, SUPER ANTELOPE (Chevaline) can only reliably penetrate early "first generation" ABM systems with mechanically scanned radars (i.e. NIKE-ZEUS or ABM-1 GALOSH) due to traffic limitations. Simply adding a "modern" phased array radar with no traffic limits and discrimination capabilities reduces the effectiveness of SUPER ANTELOPE by 50%.

SAFEGUARD Data-Processing System: Introduction and Overview (3 Jan 1975) (9.1~ MB PDF) – This manuscript details the SAFEGUARD computer system.

National Security Directive 119 - Strategic Defense Initative (6 Jan 1984) (PDF) – This document, signed by President Reagan, was the beginning of the SDI "Star Wars" program, which eventually led into our current ABM system.

The Soviets and SDI (25 Nov 1986) (PDF) – This speech was given by Robert M. Gates, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence to the World Affairs Council of Northern California in 1986 and lays out how the Soviets have been edging the ABM Treaty, thus its only proper that the US respond, etc.

Technology speeds the Strategic Defense Initative Timetable (13 Jan 1987) (PDF) – This rather sparse press release includes some details on the program lineages of Exoatmospheric Reentry Vehicle Interceptor Subsystem (ERIS), High Endoatmospheric Interceptor (HEDI), Small Radar Homing Intercept Technology (SR-HIT), Flexible Lightweight Agile Guided Experiment (FLAGE) and Low Endoatmospheric Interceptor (LEDI).

Defense Science Board Task Force (Subgroup on Strategic Air Defense) - SDI Milestone Panel (May 1988) (18.7 MB PDF) – This rather disjointed document contains 800+ pages going back to the Defense Science Board Summer 1981 study on Strategic Defenses; most of which is redacted.

Ballistic Missile Reading Room

MINUTEMAN Information obtained from Rand Corporation and BMD, USAF (27 Mar 1959) (PDF) – This memorandum for the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) lays out the data that a US Navy team gathered on Minuteman while at RAND and the USAF's Ballistic Missile Division; such as the fact that RAND expected that only 2/3rds of early Minutemen would fly "hot, straight and normal if [the] button were pushed", while the USAF specification of reliability was 0.905, but the USAF was willing to accept missiles with as low a reliability as 0.59(!).

Preliminary Views on POLARIS in Relation to Recent Events (24 Oct 1957) (PDF) – In this, the writer argues that other POLARIS concepts (on carriers, cruisers and merchantmen) be deferred in favor of the FBM (aka SSBN).

ICBM Force Objectives (21 February 1958) (PDF) – This memo lays out the recommended force for FY63/64 to reach the Gaither Committee's recommendation of 600 ICBMs, while keeping in mind that first-generation ICBMs are "expensive and complex" and should be replaced with "simpler, less expensive" solid propellant ICBMs.

Rationale for Concurrent Development of Titan ICC [ICBM] Force and Minuteman System (20 Mar 1958) (PDF) – This memo by the USAF's Ballistic Missile Division lays out why Titan should go ahead alongside Minuteman -- it's more conservative than Minuteman, has much greater growth potential as far as warhead weight or range goes; and can be used as a space booster.

Cost Effectiveness of POLARIS vs. MINUTEMAN (Dec 1958) (PDF) – Another USN paper attacking Minuteman. Of note is that the USN claims that land-based ICBMs will: "Promote a spiralling arms race which the controlled Soviet economy can much better afford than ours.".

BuNavWeps Special Projects Office Report #008800.1: A Comparison of the Polaris and Hardened and Dispersed Minuteman Weapons Systems (Jan 1961) (PDF) – This document by the USN costs out the 15-year lifecycle costs of Polaris versus Minuteman and makes many of the same arguments against ICBMs that are still used to this day (attacks on them would cover the US in fallout, etc).

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #29 Excerpts (18 Jan 1962) (1.21 MB PDF) – This OCR excerpt has some ABM/Penetration stuff as well as Polaris weights.

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #35 Excerpts (21 Mar 1963) (5.43 MB PDF) – This OCR excerpt has a large amount of documentation on early Polaris SSBNs, reliability, and some ABM/Penetration stuff.

SPO-STG FBM Meeting #45 Excerpts (30 Sep 1964) (PDF) – I've excerpted the Re-Entry Body Committee Discussion, as it's got heavy details on what the USN's FBM people were thinking regarding ABM; and penetration aids.

Nuclear War Plans Reading Room

(This reading room's collection is centered around documents relating to war planning, the plans themselves, or documents that explain why the plans were the way they were)

Atomic Bomb Production (15 Sep 1945) (53.5 MB PDF) – This appears to be the very first Atomic War Plan developed by the United States against the Soviet Union. The planners concluded that several hundred atomic bombs would be needed on "M-Day".

Army Air Forces Chemical Warfare Policy (1946) (4.3~ MB PDF) – This memoranda - written about 1946 - is the Chemical Warfare Service's attempt to stay important after the Atomic Bomb in the post-war era. Notable is their claim that five B-29 bombloads of CG (phosgene) gas bombs would have greater effect on enemy personnel on a half mile front than an atomic bomb at the same blast radius. They also mention the "newer agents" which are 25 times more effective than phosgene.

MEMCON of Dinner conversation with General LeMay at Secretary Forrestal's house by RADM W.S. Parsons (8 Nov 1948) (PDF) – This memorandum was written by "Deak" Parsons after attended a dinner with General LeMay; it is notable for LeMay's view(s) on how a possible war would go in the "early" era of Strategic Air Command as well as Parson's own views of how an Atomic Offensive would be conducted.

The "Harmon Report" (12 May 1949) (9.2 MB PDF) – The "Harmon Report" was an evaluation of the then-current war plan (TROJAN) which contemplated dropping atomic bombs onto 70 Soviet cities over 30 days. It's been heavily excised, but enough remains to let you figure out some of the assumptions the planners used.

SAC Presentation (Prepared) - USAF Commander's Conference (25 Apr 1950) (PDF) – This was the (prepared) presentation by SAC at the USAF's Commander's Conference at Ramey AFB from 25 to 27 April 1950. It's a basic rundown of SAC's war plans to execute War Plan OFF-TACKLE, the overall US general war plan at the time. Over 120 target areas would begin to be struck by SAC some six days after the order was given, with strikes continuing for up to thirty days, if USAF bases in the UK "remain[ed] tenable".

SAC Presentation (Actual) - USAF Commander's Conference plus post-briefing Transcripts (25 Apr 1950) (PDF) – This was the (actual) presentation by SAC at the USAF's Commander's Conference at Ramey AFB on 26 April 1950. Also preserved is the post-briefing discussion in transcripts, where LeMay laments the lack of the XF-12 Rainbow "we had the reconnaissance airplane – the F-12; it wasn’t perfect; it was pretty expensive for the times, too; but if we had bought it, then we would have something now. We could have used that airplane."

Excerpt of General LeMay's Diary (22 Jan 1951) (PDF) – General LeMay arrived in Washington DC in January 1951 for a commander's conference on establishing ground rules for targeting. LeMay pointed out that given the power of an atomic bomb, even if the bomb missed it's target, there would still be significant "bonus" damage which would go a long way towards meeting the original objective, citing his experience in WWII with the Tokyo Fire Raids.

Briefing on SAC given at Offutt AFB (18 Mar 1954) (PDF) – This briefing was given at SAC HQ about the then-current war plans (c.1954) and attended by General LeMay who did a short Q&A period after the briefing. This document is the source of the line "virtually all of Russia would be nothing but a smoking, radiating ruin at the end of two hours." There is a lot of specific details here, such as the number of DGZs (1700) and the number of bombers to be used (150 x B-36s plus 585 x B-47s).

Briefing of WSEG Report No 12 (1955) – This briefing document was written circa 1955 by a USN officer to brief other USN officers on the just-released WSEG #12 "Evaluation of an Atomic Offensive in Support of the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan". Notable tidbits: 175 weapons in Europe are used against troop targets, the USSR loses 118 out of 134 cities and suffers 77 million casualties.

Capabilities of Entire USAF Considering Atomic vs H.E. Weapons - Specific Inference to Matsu and Quemoy Applications (31 Mar 1955) (PDF) – This document points out that its significantly more efficient to use nuclear weapons than conventional for war-fighting tasks. For the early phase of deterring an invasion of Taiwan, 70 targets would have to be struck (60 gun emplacements, 4 ports and 6 airfields). Destroying these conventionally would require 19,580 tons of bombs and 19,580 conventional sorties by six Fighter-Bomber Wings (450 a/c) over 30 days. By contrast, just two medium bomb wings equipped with B-47s (90 a/c) could destroy all 70 aimpoints in a single night's operation utilizing 70 atomic bombs.

Memorandum for General Twining on the ability of Aircraft Carriers to contribute to the SAC Offensive (6 Jun 1955) (PDF) – This document points out that the ability of the USN to contribute to any General Nuclear War plan is limited by the small numbers (less than 100 heavy attack craft that can carry 70> KT weapons) and short ranges (800~ mile penetration) of the US Navy's aircraft force.

LeMay to Twining on FY56 Weapons Allocation (6 Jun 1955) (PDF) – In this memo, CINCSAC LeMay argues for priority in nuclear weapons allocation to SAC; and that no tactical aircraft be given nukes until SAC's bomber force has been allocated weapons.

LeMay to Armstrong on the B-47 Force (26 July 1955) (PDF) – In this document, LeMay expresses doubt in the capability of [European] TAC to carry out war plans - "I consider SAC to be a backup force for the limited [European] theater capability with the probability SAC will conduct a great majority of the active operations in winning the air battle." and as well in the concept of forward deployment of the B-47 force to North African bases, expressing a preference to keep the units in CONUS, as one years' deployment to North Africa degrades the quality of the units sent there.

CSAFM-72-58: Launching of the Strategic Air Command Alert Force (10 Mar 1956) (PDF) – This was the formal notification to the Joint Chiefs of Staff by CSAF Thomas D. White of SAC implementing the "Alert Force" concept, where SAC aircraft would be pre-armed and pre-briefed and launched under a "Fail Safe" concept to return to base if not given a positive command to proceed to their targets.

SM 129-56: SAC - Atomic Weapons Requirements Study for 1959 (15 Jun 1956) – This rather thick spreadsheet was partially declassified about ten years ago; and it includes a significant amount of detail on how SAC planned out its war. For one, enemy airfields would all receive surface bursts to ensure they were 100% inoperational during a General War. This also includes an attempt by the Future of Life group to transcribe all the DGZs available. It's not 100% there, but it's better than nothing. Another point of note is that it describes a "constrained" scenario where "only" 69,000 kg of Oralloy Equivalent is available for US Nuclear Weapons. With the W47 warhead consuming 60~ kg, this works out to about 1,150 US Nuclear weapons.

An Air Force Concept for an Optimum Military Strategy (7 May 1957) (PDF) – This appears to be a briefing of one proposed USAF overall strategic plan to the other services, as shown by the statement: "It undoubtedly differs in certain respects to the strategies presented by the Army and Navy."

General Power describes SAC's Alert Force to USAF Chief of Staff Thomas White (21 Oct 1957) (PDF) – In this memorandum, Power goes into specific details for SAC's Alert Force on 1 October 1957 and some details on the planned January 1958 Alert Force.

Commanders' Conference 4-7 November 1957 (19 Nov 1957) (PDF) – On 14 October 1957 the USAF Chief of Staff summoned certain Major Commanders and retired officers to a HQ USAF Conference to run from 4 November to 7 November 1957. This is a brief precis of what was discussed; from a condensed SAC Briefing to a very condensed summary of the wrapup discussion between the commanders on 7 November 1957.

British Aide Memoire on the Launching of Nuclear Reprisal (14 May 1958) (PDF) – This agreement details some of the agreed understandings on how the US/UK "joint" strategic force composed of SAC + Bomber Command would be launched.

Report to the President and Prime Minister: Procedures for the Committing to the Attack of Nuclear Retaliatory Forces in the United Kingdom (7 June 1958) (PDF) – This agreement (released a few months after the earlier Aide Memoire of April 1959, goes into some more details on the agreed understandings on how the US/UK "joint" strategic force composed of SAC + Bomber Command would be launched.

Memorandum on SAC Dispersal (7 Apr 1959) (PDF) – This memorandum is part of the beginning of the SAC dispersal program, where bombers would be dispersed to nearby civilian airfields in times of crisis.

Army participation in the NSTL/SIOP (1 Nov 1960) (PDF) – Written by a US Navy officer, this document argues an aggressive Army presence is needed on JSTPS. The big tidbit in this one is that the damage criteria on some 200 DGZs in the current SIOP are as high as 97% in some cases.

An Evaluation of Some Feasible 1969 U.S. Strategic Force Compositions (16 Mar 1961) (PDF) – This document involves some evaluations of the B-70 in a hypothetical future war, and provides some meaty details on said future war. It does, however severely overstate the capabilities of Soviet Air Defenses (SA-2 Improved to counter B-70) when we know (from SR-71 experience) that even SA-5's are challenged by Mach 3.0 aircraft

CINCPAC Operation Plan 1-61 (General War Plan) (26 Jan 1961) (PDF) – This is a extremely brief copy of CINCPAC's SIOP-62 supporting plan. A significant amount of attachments have been excised, but there are a few interesting tidbits: The number of execution options for the SIOP and constraints on surface bursts -- for example, Japan and South Korea cannot get more than 150R (per hour? or total?) of radiation fallout.

JCS 2056/281 - The JCS Single Integrated Operational Plan - 1962 (SIOP-62) (13 Sep 1961) – This is a summary of the briefing of the SIOP that was given to President Kennedy in September 1961. At the time, SIOP-62 contained 3,729 installations over 1,060 Designated Ground Zeroes. The SIOP was broken down into 14 "execution options" based on the amount of warning; from none at all to 14+ hours with varying levels of weapons available for each execution option.

Consequences of Thermonuclear War Under Various Conditions of Outbreak (Draft) (28 Oct 1961) (PDF) – This draft document is incomplete as it's missing it's Appendixes, but there's a significant amount of details on casualties expected and how many Soviet retaliatory forces would survive to be used against the US/NATO.

JCS memorandum on General Format for SIOP-63 (17 Apr 1962) (PDF) – This details how SIOP-63 (the plan in operation during the Cuban Missile Crisis) would have been laid out. Even though it's nothing but a table of contents, the titles of each section can tell you much; like the fact there are only up to five attack options (the previous SIOP-62 had fourteen options).

Summary of Population Fatalities from Nuclear War in 1966 (17 Feb 1962) (PDF) – This rather thin document details the estimated population fatalities in 1966 with an attached appendix providing the number of Soviet Bloc targets for mid-1967 and the assigned warheads for each target -- 467 aim points for ICBMs with 1,501 warheads (3.21 per) assigned.

Notes of President Johnson's Meeting with the JCS over Project FUTHERANCE (14 Oct 1968) (PDF) – This rather prosaic minute reveals that up until October 1968, the US plan (FUTHERANCE) in the event POTUS was killed or missing after a nuclear attack (presumably against Washington DC) was to immediately order a full retaliatory response onto both the Soviet Union and China. An even more interesting note is the deliberate misspelling (FUTHERANCE) in the code name (it should be FURTHERANCE). Presumably this was a "barium meal" to find/locate leakers.

Washington Special Action Group Review of North Korean Contingency Plans (25 Jun 1969) (PDF) – This review of contingency plans for North Korea ranges from a simple seizure of a North Korean Factory Ship (FRINGE SWOOP) to Tactical Nuclear Strikes on North Korean Targets (FREEDOM DROP).

DOD Strategic Targeting Study Briefing [for Kissinger] (27 Jul 1972) (PDF) – This gives some details of how SIOP-4 Revision K (January 1972 to 30 June 1972) was targeted. There are now four Major Attack Options and twelve Selected Attack Options. But the biggest takeaway from this document is this phrase: "Its only objective is to win the nuclear war by destroying the enemy. There is no effort to control escalation or plan for limited options."

(Click HERE for a full size image of the Oozlefinch)

Air Defense Reading Room

NIKE-HERCULES Blue Book (10~ MB PDF) – This "blue book" contains a useful chronology of the NIKE-HERCULES system, as well as uncommon technical specifications.

Chronological Histories of Army Surface-to-Air Missiles as of 1 March 1958 (PDF) – This (incomplete) chronology covers: HAWK, Land-Based TALOS, NIKE-AJAX, NIKE-ZEUS and NIKE-HERCULES.

Historical Overview of the NIKE Missile System (December 1984) (3.8~ MB PDF) – This document provides a simple high level overview of NIKE-AJAX and NIKE-HERCULES, with a listing of sites as well as of maps of sites.

Defence of the North American Continent (30 Nov 1953) (PDF) – This speech was given to the Defence Research Board of Canada by Ellis A. Johnson, the Director of the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University.

Statement Concerning the Army's Role in Air Defense by General Maxwell Taylor (22 May 1959) (PDF) – This public statement by then-Chief of Staff Maxwell Taylor in 1959 shows the view of the US Army at the time concerning Air Defense.

Civil Defense Reading Room

ORNL 5041: Survival of the Relocated Population of the US After a Nuclear Attack (June 1976) (16.4 MB PDF / 12.2 MB PDF) – This rather detailed study looks into the likely effects of a 6,559 MT attack on CONUS at 1,444 designated ground zeroes broken down as:

• 229 x 1 MT groundbursts
• 614 x 1 MT airbursts
• 1 x 2 MT groundburst
• 183 x 2 MT airbursts
• 176 x 3 MT airbursts
• 241 x 20 MT groundbursts