Originally Created 19 MAR 2009
Revised 25 OCT 2021

HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF PACIFIC

CINCPAC
3121
Ser 00023
26 January 1961

TOP SECRET

SPECIAL HANDLING REQUIRED
NOT RE LEASABLE TO FOREIGN NATIONALS

From: Commander in Chief Pacific
To: Distribution List

Subj: CINCPAC Operation Plan No. 1-61 (General War Plan) (U)

1. CINCPAC Operation Plan No. l-61 is a unilateral capabilities plan for General War. It is effective for planning purposes upon receipt, and for execution when and as directed by the Commander in Chief Pacific. The portions of this plan that pertain to the Joint Chiefs of Staff Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP 62) will be effective for execution after 31 March 1961.

2. This Plan supersedes CINCPAC General Emergency Operation Plan No. 1-58 (GEOP 1-58). GEOP 1-58 will be destroyed in accordance with appropriate Service instructions.

3. Commanders concerned will prepare and keep under revision the necessary supporting plans, coordinating directly with other commanders as required, and will submit supporting plans to CINCPAC for approval.

The submission of plans to CINCPAC will not preclude concurrent distribution to subordinates for their planning and execution.

4. Authority is granted to make extracts from this plan as necessary for the preparation of supporting plans. Extracts shall be classified by content, but the classification of this plan as a whole is Top Secret. The officer directing that extracts be made shall be responsible for the security control thereof. Reproduction of this document, or parts thereof, for other purposes without permission of this or higher headquarters is prohibited.

5. Distribution of this plan will be limited by addressees to U.S. officers who require it in the performance of their duties.

6. This document contains information affecting the security of the United States within the meaning of the espionage laws, Title 18, U.S.C. , Sec. 793 and 794. Transmission or revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.

/S/
H. D. FELT

Distribution:
Annex Z

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Headquarters
Commander in Chief Pacific
Camp H. M. Smith, Hawaii
26 January 1961

TOP SECRET

Operation Plan
CINCPAC No. 1-61

APPENDIX I TO ANNEX B

SIOP OPERATIONS

1. Objectives. Specific objectives of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy are:

a. Destroy or neutralize the Sino-Soviet Bloc strategic nuclear delivery capability and primary military and government controls of major importance.

b. Destroy the major urban-industrial centers of the Sino-Soviet Bloc to the extent necessary to paralyze the economy and render the Sino-Soviet Bloc incapable of continuing war.

2. A National Strategic Target List (NSTL) is a list of all installations under attack in the SIOP grouped together by major TDI reference number. The list of such installations that meet the specific objectives set forth in paragraph 1. is the minimum NSTL. Targets on these lists are reflected in Annex E.

3. A Single Integrated Operations Plan (SIOP), incorporating the objectives of the National Strategic Targeting and Attack Policy, has been prepared in consideration of the several possible ways in which hostilities may be initiated and:

a. Governs all attacks on all targets listed in the NSTL.

b. Determines the targets to be attacked based on the capabilities and limitations of committed forces.

c. Determines the effort against each target consistent with the worth of the target and specified damage and assurance criteria.

d. Integrates individual strikes for mutual support through the establishment of attack corridors, timing, ECM, etc.

Appendix I to Annex B - SIOP Operations

4. The provisions of the SIOP are reflected throughout this plan. The following relevant aspects of the SIOP Concept of Operations apply to CINCPAC forces committed to support the SIOP:

a. Definitions:

(1) Tactical Warning. The estimated warning time under conditions of surprise that the operational commanders can expect before their alert forces will be brought under attack.

(2) Strategic Warning. The time which permits a commander to prepare and position his force to execute his war plan.

(3) Initial Strike. The total SIOP effort against preplanned NSTL assignments. This does not include recycle assignments.

(4) Alert Force. That force which can be prepared and launched under conditions of tactical warning, on strike assignments against the NSTL within the following time limits after E-Hour.

Fixed base ........ 15 minutes
Mobile base........2 hours

(5) Follow-on Force. That portion of the SIOP force other than the alert force that is generated after receipt of a preparation order (A-Hour), or execution order (E-Hour) to execute a preplanned NSTL assignment.

(6) Generated Force. The portion of the strike force that is prepared for launch after receipt of an A-Hour.

(7) "A" Hour. The time from which aircraft and/or missiles preparation is computed. This time is designated as a 6-digit date-time group, Zulu time; it will be used as the base time for preparation of the force to a ready status.

(8) "E" Hour. The time determined and declared by the JCS for the execution of the SIOP. It will serve as the common reference time for all SIOP strike forces. This time will be designated in the execution order for the SIOP as a 6-digit date-time group, Zulu time.

(9) Option. Execution options are sub-plans of the total SIOP which are concerned with timing problems inherent in changing numbers of launchable delivery vehicles. As increasing numbers of delivery vehicles become generated, a different launch timing schedule must be used if all available attack forces are to be launched at any point in time. Execution options provide the JCS the capability of launching the optimum strike force consistent with the preparation time.

b. Readiness.

(1) The SIOP Alert Force will be maintained in a sustained condition of readiness.

(2) The SIOP Follow-on Force is that portion of the SIOP force other than the Alert Force. Generation of the Follow-on Force will be initiated upon receipt of an A-Hour or, if E-Hour precedes A-Hour, automatically upon receipt of an E-Hour. The immediate launch capability of the Follow-on Force is directly proportional to the amount of generation time available prior to execution. Full strategic warning is required for total SIOP force generation.

c. Execution.

(1) The Alert Force represents the maximum force normally available for launch under peacetime conditions or minimum warning. As more preparation time becomes available, additional SIOP forces are generated.

(2) All SIOP forces are assigned missions in each option.

(3) The SIOP may be executed under one of fifteen available Options. Option 1A and Option 1 are predicated on no preparation time. Options 2 through 13 are a function of preparation time. Option 14 is the full "strategic warning option and includes the time in excess of fourteen hours for all SIOP forces to be generated and all committed CINCLANT forces to be on station for a SIOP laun....

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amount of deck preparation time from SIOP "A" hour designation to "E" hours will be considered in option selection. The SIOP Alert Force is the same numerical strength in all options.

(4) Relationship of DEFCONs and SIOP "A" Hour Declaration and SIOP Options.

(a) The JCS and commanders of unified and specified commands are authorized to declare DEFCONs. Under DEFCONs 5, 4, and 3, SIOP alert forces will be prepared to execute Option 1. Upon declaration of DEFCON 2 or 1, for a general war situation, an automatic JCS emergency-conference will be convened to determine an A-Hour.

(b) The JCS may also direct a combination of DEFCONs and/or a SIOP "A" hour as indicated below;

1. A change in DEFCON 5, 4, or 3 for all commanders of unified and specified commands, or any specific commander of a unified or specified command without declaring a SIOP "A" hour.

2. A declaration of DEFCON 2 or 1 for SIOP forces will be accompanied by a declaration of a SIOP "A" Hour. This "A" Hour will be the base reference hour for generation of additional SIOP forces.

3. In the event of execution, the option selected will be predicated on the amount of preparation time available subsequent to declaration of the SIOP "A" Hour. The relationship of options to preparation time is as follows;

(5) Positive Control Procedure.

(a) Positive control is an emergency launch procedure to get aircraft of the alert force airborne and on the way to the target when the operational commander considers his force to be insecure at its base. Positive control is executed prior to the receipt of E-Hour.

(b) Aircraft launched under positive control will not penetrate enemy territory. Whenever possible, they will avoid the periphery of the early warning radar net without further positive instructions to proceed on to the strike.

(c) In order to implement the positive control concept, it is necessary that each sortie have a positive control point, beyond which no sortie will continue unless a properly authenticated execution order has been received.

(d) Operational commanders executing a positive control launch will notify immediately CINCPAC and other commanders concerned.

d. Tactical Concept. Upon receipt of E-Hour, SIOP forces and forces coordinated with the SIOP will be launched against assigned targets. This attack will be continued until the selected strike option schedule has been accomplished.

(1) Weapons Application. Weapons will be applied to targets as specifically directed by Annex E - Nuclear Operations.

(a) Alert Force. Targets will be attacked progressively in the order of their degree of threat to the survival of the United States, Allied territories, and their overseas forces. Weapons will be applied against defenses where applicable and as necessary to establish penetration areas. Mutual Mass Support and Mutual ECM Support will be developed whenever possible for area penetration.

(b) Follow-on Force. Penetration areas that were developed by the alert force will be used, expanded, and further sterilized. ECM and Mutual Mass Support will be employed wherever possible.

(c) Penetration. The following penetration procedures and techniques will be used singly or simultaneously to optimize force application. An evaluation of the en route defenses and the selected weapon systems low level capability dictates the mission profile. Low level capability will be used to the maximum in the areas where the target defenses present the greatest threat.

1. Penetration areas will be established as required. Peripheral and en route defenses will be degraded to increase the assurance of weapons delivery on selected NSTL targets.

2. Mutual Mass Support will be used for the purpose of degrading the enemy's defenses. This is the timely confluence of forces in designated areas to take advantage of the principles of mass and crossing tracks.

e. Recycling. No recycle of a weapon delivery vehicle has been or will be planned in the SIOP.

f. Constraint Policy.

(1) To avoid the alienation of potentially friendly populations in the satellite areas and fringe areas adjacent to the USSR and China, it in desired to minimize civilian casualties and civil destruction. The following countries in the PACOM are currently considered satellites:

(a) North Korea
(b) North Vietnam

(2) The employment of surface-burst high-yield weapons in the USSR and China adjacent to satellite, friendly and neutral countries is planned so that the total residual radiation resulting from programmed weapons of CINCPAC and CINCSAC will not exceed the "expected dose" limits set forth for the key areas listed below. In implementing this constraint policy for SIOP-62 weapons, the mode of delivery and height of burst will be as shown in the SIOP.

[POSSIBLE DELETED SECTION]

Surface bursts of non-SIOP-62 weapons are programmed to the extent that the total expected doses obtained by adding the expected dose contributions from these weapons to the expected doses from SIOP-62 weapons do not exceed 150R for the key areas listed:

(a) Seoul
(b) Northern Japan
(c) North Central Japan
(d) Hong Kong
(e) Saigon
(f) Formosa Straits
(g) Hanoi – Haiphong
(h) Nome

(3) The preplanned employment of surface burst weapons in the satellite areas and the yields of all weapons are restricted to the minimum demanded by military necessity. This same restriction is applicable to the planning of additional strikes in these areas. Particular consideration is given to the protection of populations and urban areas with a view toward achieving the levels of damage essential to CINCPAC's mission with a minimum of civilian casualties. To the extent feasible, and consistent with their assigned tasks, commanders subordinate to CINCPAC should plan to further limit atomic attacks in Satellite countries where it is desirable to capitalize on opposition to the USSR or Communist China by the country's government, military forces or population. Current plans of CINCPAC and his subordinate commanders include specific provisions which permit the flexible withholding of scheduled strikes in accordance with the Joint Chiefs of Staff execute orders (War Messages EM-1 and EM-1A, Annex U - Dissemination of War Emergency Directive).

(4) When the use of nuclear weapons has been authorized by the President, the U.S. component commander of ground forces in an area of operations is authorized to approve low yield, tactical surface bursts inside the agreed nuclear bombline. He may exercise this authority without reference to CINCPAC when the fallout affects operations in only his own area of responsibility. In the event the fallout affects operations in the area of responsibility of another commander, the concurrence of the commander concerned will be obtained or the matter will be referred to CINCPAC for decision.

/S/
H. D. FELT
Admiral, U.S. Navy
Commander In Chief Pacific