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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

25 JUN 1969


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Authority: EO 12958 as amended
Chief, Records & Declass Div, WHS

MEMORANDUM FOR: Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
SUBJECT: Review of US Contingency Plans by Washington Special
Actions Group

3354
- KDRGW 381

On June 20, 1969, you requested the preparation of background material for discussion on Korean contingencies by the principals of the Washington Special Actions Group (WSAG).

Three copies of a summary of military contingency options for Korea are provided for the principals concerned. The fourth and fifth copies have been retained by Assistant Secretary Nutter and Vice Admiral Nels Johnson, respectively.



Downgraded to Secret
Date: 01 JUN 2005
Chief, Declassification Branch, WHS

EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec 3.4(a)(5)
OSD F.S. 212 Date: 15 August 2002
Review/Declassify On: 31 Dec 2027
Other Agency Equity: TBD

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24 June 1969

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

Preface

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1. This book contains summaries of the military contingency options which have been developed by the Commander in Chief, Pacific Command (CINCPAC), the Commander in Chief, Strategic Command (CINCSAC), and the Joint Chiefs of Staff to support the attainment of United States politico-military objectives in a potential crisis situation involving the Republic of Korea. These summaries have been prepared for a meeting of the principals of the Washington Special Action Group, on 27 June 1969, at the request of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs in his memorandum of 20 June 1969, subject: "Review of U. S. Contingency Plans by Washington Special Action Group."

2. The options described, of which there are more than twenty-five, cover a broad range of possible responses to a crisis in the Korean area, thereby supporting great flexibility in the choice of an appropriate course of action which may be pursued by the United States. Where appropriate, the range of situations for which each option is applicable is indicated. Additionally, it is emphasized that the plans which have been prepared to support the various options are constructed to permit implementation of multiple variations, both qualitative and quantitative, to tailor the military response to the particular situation obtaining at the time.

3. In addition to the options contained in this book, there are more than a dozen others that are currently under consideration by CINCPAC and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. These additional options range from selected US or ROK abrogations of DMZ restrictions through US or ROK forays against North Korea by units of various sizes, conducting a pacific blockade of selected North Korean ports to a major but limited offensive against North Korea. It is anticipated that examination of these further alternatives will be completed in the near future. Upon completion, planning will have been conducted for more than forty options, each of which is inherently capable on short notice of being varied further.

EXEMPT PER EO 12958, Sec. 1.4
OSD FS 212 Date 28 July 2002
Review/Declassify On 31 Dec 2027
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4. The military contingency options are of two types, those which are major CINCPAC contingency plans and those which have been developed as a result of recent North Korean provocations. The former serve more general or broader purposes (Tabs A, B, D, E, F, L and M) while the latter are designed for a more specific situation (Tabs C, G, H, I, J, and K).

5. As this book contains very sensitive defense information, holders are requested to restrict access to those with an absolute need to know.

24 June 1969

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

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L	Nuclear Contingency Plan for North Korea (FREEDOM DROP) (Three options) (S)
M	Defense of Korea (S)

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TAB A

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Non-Combatant and Emergency Evacuation (U)

PURPOSE: To provide forces, transportation, communications and other logistic support to assist the Department of State in the emergency care, protection and evacuation of US non-combatants and certain designated aliens from the Republic of Korea in the event of imminent or actual hostilities or civil disturbance.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: In coordination with the Chief of Diplomatic mission, use US forces and resources located in Korea, augmented by military and/or civil resources from adjacent areas as may be made available, assist the Chief of Diplomatic mission in providing emergency care, protection and evacuation of US non-combatants and certain designated aliens.

FORCES: US military forces and logistic resources in the ROK, augmented by forces and resources as required and available from adjacent areas.

TIMING: Initial actions under this option can be initiated immediately.

FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: None anticipated.

FLEXIBILITY: The scope of this option can be varied to support operations in one locality or country-wide as required.

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TAB B

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Preclude Communist Coup, Korea ~~(S)~~

PURPOSE: To conduct US military operations in coordination with loyal ROK forces to prevent seizure of the ROK by dissident factions dominated by identified communist or other anti-US elements.

CONCEPT OF OPERATION - The defensive mission in Korea will continue. After it is clearly evident that a potential takeover of the ROK Government is communist-inspired and the current ROK Government is not capable of handling the situation, necessary authority for commitment of US forces will be obtained. Operations will be conducted, including employment of US forces in concert with loyal ROK forces, under control of a US commander to assure a ROK Government friendly to the Free World. Operations involving US forces will be designed to seize and/or secure critical government agencies, facilities and individuals. Efforts of US and ROK forces not conducting operations under this plan will be intensified toward maintenance of an effective defensive posture against possible initiation of hostilities by North Korea. The concept of operation involves three phases.

Phase I - Preparatory: Normal situation, threat is evaluated. Phase terminates when authority to intervene is requested.

Phase II - Alert: Phase starts when authority to intervene is requested and extends until authority is received or an alternate course of action is directed.

Phase III - Implementation: Phase extends from time authority to intervene is received until threat of takeover is dissipated and ROK Government is restored and in control.

FORCES:

1. United States Forces located in the ROK:

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Tab B

- a. Army - 2 Infantry Divisions
3 Artillery Battalions
4 Missile Battalions (ground support)
5 Missile Battalions (air defense)
 - b. Air Force - 151 Tactical jet aircraft
2. ROK Forces:
- a. ARMY - 19 Inf Div
2 Armored Bde
1 AAA Bde
 - b. NAVY - 6 DD, 24 patrol
12 Mine warfare
205 Misc
 - c. AIR FORCE - 2 FIS
8 Day Dtr Sqdns
1 Tac Recon Sqdn
3 Transport Sqdns
1 Air Rescue Sqdn
 - d. IRREGULARS - Korean National Police
(43,000) Homeland
Reserve Force (2 million)

TIMING: Initial provisions of this option can be initiated immediately upon notification or, as is more likely, will be initiated immediately upon approval of recommendations forwarded by COMUSKOREA/CINCPAC.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:
None anticipated except as a result of clashes which could develop in Phase III.

FLEXIBILITY: Implementation of this option can be tailored in size and scope on short notice as required to meet the threat.

TAB C

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Seizure of North Korean Fish Factory Ship
(FRINGE SWOOP) ~~(S)~~

PURPOSE: To provide for the seizure and impounding of any North Korean fish factory ship operating under the North Korean flag outside the claimed 12 nm territorial waters of North Korea or third-country nations.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The plan consists of the following three phases providing for the location, interception, seizure and impounding of a North Korean fish factory ship:

1. Phase I - Surveillance. This phase consists of intelligence reporting of North Korean fish factory resources, and is in effect at the present time.

2. Phase II - Intercept and Seizure. This phase commences with the order to seize a North Korean fish factory ship, and terminates with actual seizure of the designated ship. All operations in this phase are conducted within specified geographical limitations.

3. Phase III - Transit and Impoundment. This phase extends from seizure of the specified unit to its delivery at a specified US port.

FORCES: A naval task force composed of a surface action task group suitable for intercepting, boarding, and seizing the fish factory ship; supported by a CVA task group to provide appropriate air surveillance and defense; would be required.

TIMING: If it is necessary to assemble the requisite naval task force from SEA resources, a minimum of 96 hours will be required after receipt of the execution order. This time limitation would be reduced proportionately if seizure can be accomplished by TF 71 elements now operating in the vicinity of the Sea of Japan or if prior intelligence and a statement of intent provide adequate warning time to position the task force.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: None anticipated.

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FLEXIBILITY: This plan provides flexibility of action in that some degree of geographical choice will likely be available in the event that North Korea resumes operation of fish factory ships. It also allows limiting the operations to harassing or surveillance activity up to the time of decision and order to seize the ship.

TAB D

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Pacific Mining Plan (U)

PURPOSE: To provide a plan for offensive and defensive mining operations in the Pacific Ocean and waters contiguous thereto, including significant North Korean ports.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Mining operations against selected targets in the Pacific Command will be conducted by naval ships and/or naval aircraft and submarines, assisted and supported, when required, by US Air Force aircraft and/or Allied Forces. The extent of Air Force support will depend upon decisions as to the size of the mining campaign to be conducted, the possible requirement to supplement primary delivery capabilities, and the availability of these aircraft for mining missions.

FORCES: Forces required for this plan vary, dependent upon the number of targets to be mined, the number and size of minefields at each target, and the extent of reseeded required to maintain the field(s). As an example, one of the included options provides for establishment of six minefields at Wonsan. A total of 246 mines, requiring 197 aircraft sorties, would be utilized.

TIMING: The governing factor for this plan will be the preparation of the required mines and their logistic movement. This time for the Wonsan option is estimated to be 72 hours. Increased time would be required to include additional targets.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

1. Friendly Losses
 - A. Mines delivered by ships or submarines: None anticipated
 - B. Mines delivered by aircraft: less than 3 percent.
2. Civilian Casualties: None anticipated.

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FLEXIBILITY: Within timing constraints, the plan for mining selected North Korean ports provides flexibility both in the choice of targets and in the vehicle selected to establish the field. The air option(s) can be supplemented or replaced by submarine-laid fields. Selective use of ship counters, combination activating devices, sterilization provisions and reseeded options provide additional flexibility within the field itself.

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TAB E

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Control of Maritime Traffic ~~(S)~~

PURPOSE: To provide for the control of maritime traffic in those portions of the Pacific Ocean and its tributaries contiguous to the Asian mainland affected by the situation in Korea, both during periods of heightened tension and under conditions of conflict.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: The plan consists of the following three phases, providing for the imposition of graduated degrees of control on shipping engaged in trade or support of North Korea. The degree of control to be imposed is related directly to the political/military situation in Korea. Execution of the operational phase(s) that will best accomplish the desired result would be ordered:

Phase I - Surveillance and Intercept

Phase II - Blockade

Phase III - Control and Denial

FORCES: Forces required for implementation of this plan are dependent upon the phase executed and the scope desired within the phase. Phase I actions and a selective, pacific blockade of specified ports can be accomplished by forces currently assigned to operate in the vicinity of Korea. A belligerent blockade and all Phase III actions would require augmentation from SEA resources. Belligerent blockade of all of North Korea would require approximately 36 destroyer-types with supporting air and naval elements.

TIMING: Timing required for execution of a given portion of this plan range from approximately eight hours to initiate the surveillance portion of Phase I up to 96 hours to move resources required for a belligerent blockade in Phase II or Phase III operations from SEA to positions off the North Korean mainland.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: None anticipated.

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FLEXIBILITY: The variety of situations under which US military forces may be required to initiate measures affecting maritime shipping serving North Korea requires that the concept of operations be flexible and adaptable to the situation at the time this plan is executed. It may be implemented concurrently with and to complement other military courses of action against North Korea, or independently to apply regulated military force to counter North Korean threats, political power moves and other actions that are inimical to the interests and prestige of the United States.

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TAB F

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Antisubmarine Warfare and Control and Protection of Shipping (U)

PURPOSE: To provide for antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and the control and protection of shipping in those areas of the Pacific Ocean affected by the conduct of military actions in Korea. In recognition of the applicability of a submarine threat to all possible levels of conflict, this option provides for ASW operations and the control and protection of shipping in a variety of military contingencies.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: This plan provides for execution concurrently with other contingency plans against North Korea or for independent implementation. The variety of circumstances under which ASW operations and the control and protection of shipping could be initiated in connection with Korean contingencies requires that the concept of operations be flexible and adaptable to the situation at the time of execution. General courses of action provided include:

1. For a cold war situation; provisions for investigation of unknown submarine contacts, protection of US and Allied (when directed) shipping and forces from harassment and attack by unknown submarines, and surveillance and reconnaissance operations.

2. For military contingencies; the conduct of operations necessary to assure control of key sea areas and defense of US and Allied shipping and forces from enemy attack.

FORCES: The requisite air and naval forces to meet the level of conflict in being will be provided from Pacific Command air and naval resources.

TIMING: The timing required for provision of the requisite ASW support and control and protection of shipping in Korean waters is dependent upon the scope of the operation to be supported. Sufficient resources to protect forces now operating in the area are organic to the CVA task group assigned to operate in or adjacent to the Sea of Japan. If the extent of the effort is increased to a point requiring augmentation from SEA resources, reaction time will range up to 96 hours.

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ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: None Anticipated.

FLEXIBILITY: The plan is designed to provide ASW operations and control and protection of shipping of any scope desired within Pacific Command resources.

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TAB G

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: TALOS Missile Strike (FRACTURE PINE) ~~(S)~~

PURPOSE: To provide for the employment of TALOS missile ships for the surprise destruction of North Korean military aircraft over Wonsan and Songdong-Ni airfields.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Two TALOS missile ships would be stationed approximately sixty miles east of Wonsan to shoot down any North Korean military aircraft operating from, to or between Wonsan and Songdong-Ni airfields. The ships would be units of a naval task force with a sufficient organic defense capability. The two TALOS ships and supporting units would be dispatched during hours of darkness in time to make a high-speed transit to stations off the North Korean mainland. Since most North Korean air activity has been observed to occur during daylight hours, the arrival on station is timed to permit an early daylight firing. An approximate on-station time of four hours is planned. ASW and air protection will be provided to the missile ships.

FORCES: A naval task force, including a minimum of two TALOS missile ships, with sufficient organic defensive resources to protect the task force and its detached units would be required.

TIMING: Since redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia would be necessary for execution of the plan, a minimum of 72 - 96 hours would be required for force generation.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: None Anticipated.

FLEXIBILITY: This plan offers the flexibility of selection of time of execution of the TALOS shoot, with a high probability of attaining surprise whenever executed. The availability of the carrier task force within range of North Korea also allows for its use in other roles if desired.

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TAB H

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Air Strike on One North Korean Airfield by B-52 Aircraft (Minimum Force) (Two Options)

PURPOSE: To provide a "quick strike" capability for attacking one North Korean military airfield using a minimum force of B-52 aircraft (3 aircraft). This option could be implemented in response to a North Korean provocation ranging from a small North Korean air or ground attack on US or ROK force elements in the ROK to an air or naval attack on elements of US forces (such as reconnaissance ships/aircraft) operating in the Korean area.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Strike one North Korean military airfield at night without warning with conventional munitions carried by three B-52 aircraft.

1. Option One - Strike Pyongyang East Airfield and Air Defense Headquarters with aircraft launched from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa or Andersen Air Base, Guam.
2. Option Two - Strike Saamcham Airfield with aircraft launched from Andersen Air Base, Guam.

FORCES:

3 USAF B-52 aircraft
3 USAF KC-135 aircraft
SAR elements available in ROK.

TIMING:

1. Option One:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT ^{1/} Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Kadena	H+8:00 ^{2/} _{3/}

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<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Recall Decision ^{4/}	Washington	H+8:00
Time on Target	Target	H+10:40
Recovery	Kadena	H+12:50
2. Option Two:		
ARC LIGHT ^{1/} Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Andersen	H+21:00 ^{2/}
Recall Decision ^{4/}	Washington	H+24:45
Time on Target	Target	H+26:45
Recovery	Andersen	H+32:00

- ^{1/} In order to generate aircraft, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties at this time.
- ^{2/} If aircraft and crews are placed on alert, the targets can be struck from Kadena within four hours of notification and from Guam within seven hours.
- ^{3/} For launch from Guam, this and subsequent times should be increased three hours.
- ^{4/} Recall decision by National Command Authority would be required not later than this time.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

- 1. Friendly Losses: No more than one aircraft.
- 2. Civilian Casualties: Less than five as there are few if any civilians on these airfields at night.

FLEXIBILITY: With little change in timing, this option can be modified on short notice to strike different targets or to permit modest increase in the force size, if desired.

TAB I

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Air Strike on Changjin Power Plant in North Korea (Four options) (MS)

PURPOSE: To attack, on short notice, vulnerable targets in the Changjin Power Plant complex using B-52 aircraft based on Okinawa or Guam; tactical aircraft based in the ROK or on Okinawa or carrier-based attack aircraft from the Sea of Japan/Yellow Sea. This option could be implemented in response to a North Korean provocation ranging from a limited air or ground attack on US or ROK forces elements in the ROK to an air or naval attack on elements of US forces (such as reconnaissance ships/aircraft) operating in the Korean area.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Strike two key targets of the Changjin Power Plant complex without warning using air-delivered conventional munitions.

1. Option One - Conduct the attack at night at low-level with B-52 aircraft launched from Kadena Air Base, Okinawa or Andersen Air Base, Guam.
2. Option Two - Conduct the attack at last light at low-level with tactical aircraft based in the ROK.
3. Option Three - Conduct the attack at last light at low-level with tactical aircraft positioned in Okinawa.
4. Option Four - Conduct the attack in daylight or at night at low-level with attack aircraft launched from one CVA located in the Sea of Japan, the Yellow Sea or the Tsushima Straits.

FORCES:

1. Option One -
 - a. Eight USAF B-52 aircraft

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b. Eight USAF KC-135 aircraft (only if strike launched from Guam).

c. SAR forces available in the ROK.

2. Option Two -

a. Thirty-two USAF F-4 aircraft.

b. One USAF KC-135 aircraft.

c. SAR forces available in the ROK.

d. Air defense aircraft available in the ROK.

3. Option Three -

a. Twenty-four USAF F-4 aircraft.

b. Twelve USAF F-105 aircraft.

c. Nine USAF KC-135 aircraft.

d. SAR forces available in the ROK.

e. Air defense aircraft available in the ROK.

4. Option Four -

a. One USN CVA with protective screen.

b. One USN guided missile ship.

c. One USN cruiser.

d. Night attack:

(1) Fifteen USN A-6A aircraft

(2) Remaining operational aircraft for CAP, SAR, ECM, EW, and refueling support.

e. Day attack:

(1) Nine USN A-6A aircraft.

(2) Sixteen USN A-7/A-4 aircraft.

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(3) Remaining operational aircraft for CAP, SAR, ECM, EW, AAA/SAM suppression and refueling support.

TIMING:

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1. Option One:

a. Launch from Okinawa:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch Decision ^{1/}	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Kadena	H+11:00
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	H+11:00
Time on Target	Target	H+13:45
Recovery	Kadena	H+16:30

b. Launch from Guam:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch Decision ^{1/}	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Andersen	H+11:00
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	H+13:45
Time on Target	Target	H+17:00
Recovery	Andersen	H+22:30

^{1/} In order to generate aircraft required, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties at this time.

^{2/} Recall decision by National Command Authorities would be required not later than this time.

2. Option Two:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour

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<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch	Korea	H+17:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+18:00
Recovery	Korea	H+19:00

^{1/} With prior notification this and subsequent times could be reduced by twelve hours.

3. Option Three:

Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Okinawa	H+30:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+33:00
Recovery	Okinawa	H+36:00

^{1/} With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by twelve hours. Launch time includes twelve hours to position aircraft on Okinawa.

4. Option Four:

a. Day attack:

Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	At sea	H+16:00 ^{1/} ^{2/}
Time on Target	Target	H+17:00
Recovery	At sea	H+18:00

^{1/} With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by twelve hours.

^{2/} Assumes CVA in position in the Sea of Japan. If not, an additional 12-24 hours may be required to position the CVA.

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b. Night attack.

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	At sea	H+18:00 ^{1/} ^{2/}
Time on Target]	Target	H+19:00
Recovery	At sea	H+20:00

^{1/} With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced two hours. Launch time includes twelve hours to fly additional A-6 aircraft aboard.

^{2/} Assumes CVA in position in the Sea of Japan. If not, an additional 12-24 hours may be required to position the CVA.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

1. Friendly Losses: Less than 10 percent.
2. Civilian Casualties: Less than five.

FLEXIBILITY: With little change in timing, these options can be modified on short notice to strike different targets or to permit moderate alterations in the size of the force employed if desired.

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TAB J

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Air Strikes on One to Four North Korean Airfields or Up to Four North Korean Military Targets Other Than Airfields (Seven Options) ~~(S)~~

PURPOSE: To provide a capability for attacking one to four North Korean airfields or up to four North Korean military targets other than airfields with B-52 aircraft, land-based tactical aircraft or carrier-based attack aircraft. This option could be implemented in response to a North Korean provocation ranging from a North Korean air or ground attack on US or ROK force elements in the ROK to an air or naval attack on elements of US forces (such as reconnaissance ships/aircraft) operating in the Korean area.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Attack a North Korean military target(s) without warning using conventional munitions.

1. Option One - Strike Wonsan Airfield at night at low-level with B-52 aircraft launched from Andersen AB, Guam.
2. Option Two - Strike Wonsan Airfield at first light at low-level with three waves of USAF tactical fighters launched from bases in the ROK.
3. Option Three - Strike Wonsan Airfield at low-level at night or in daylight with USN attack aircraft launched from a CVA in the Sea of Japan/Yellow Sea.
4. Option Four - Strike up to four airfields (Wonsan, Songdong Ni, Pyongyang East, Saamcham) at night at low-level with B-52 aircraft launched from Kadena AB, Okinawa, and Andersen AB, Guam, or Andersen AB, Guam only.
5. Option Five - Strike up to four airfields (Wonsan, Songdong Ni, Pyongyang East, Saamcham) in daylight at low-level using USAF tactical fighters launched from bases in the ROK.
6. Option Six - Strike up to four airfields (Wonsan, Songdong Ni, Pyongyang East, Saamcham) at night or in daylight at low-level using USN attack aircraft launched from up to three CVAs in the Sea of Japan/Yellow Sea.

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Tab J

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7. Option Seven - Strike up to four military targets other than airfields (Munchon Naval Base, Mayang Do Submarine Base, Hamhung POL Supply, Songjon Pando Missile Support Base) at night or in daylight at low-level using B-52 aircraft, USAF tactical fighters launched from bases in the ROK, or USN carrier-based attack aircraft launched from up to three CVAs in the Sea of Japan/Yellow Sea.

FORCES:

1. Option One:
 - a. Fourteen USAF B-52 aircraft.
 - b. Fourteen USAF KC-135 aircraft.
 - c. SAR forces in ROK and Sea of Japan.
2. Option Two:
 - a. Forty-eight USAF F-4 strike aircraft.
 - b. Forty-eight USAF F-4/F-105 aircraft for AAA/SAM suppression.
 - c. Six USAF KC-135 aircraft.
 - d. SAR forces in ROK and Sea of Japan.
3. Option Three:
 - a. One CVA, with protective screen.
 - b. One guided missile ship.
 - c. One cruiser.
 - d. Night attack: 6-12 A-6A attack aircraft.
 - e. Day attack: 20 A-6/A-7/A-4 attack aircraft.
 - f. Support: Remaining available aircraft for CAP, SAR, ECM, EW, and refueling support. Aircraft for AAA/SAM suppression would be required for daylight attack.

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- 4. Option Four (for four airfields):
 - a. Thirty USAF B-52 aircraft.
 - b. Thirty USAF KC-135 aircraft.
 - c. SAR forces available in ROK and Sea of Japan.
- 5. Option Five (for four airfields):
 - a. Forty-eight USAF F-4 strike aircraft.
 - b. Forty-four USAF F-4/F-105 tactical fighters for CAP and AAA/SAM suppression.
 - c. Eight USAF KC-135 aircraft.
 - d. SAR forces available in ROK and Sea of Japan.
- 6. Option Six (for four airfields):
 - a. Three CVAs with protective screen.
 - b. Two guided missile ships.
 - c. One cruiser.
 - d. Night attack: 24 A-6A attack aircraft.
 - e. Day attack: 72 A-4/A-6/A-7 attack aircraft.
 - f. Support: Remaining available aircraft for CAP, SAR, ECM, EW, and refueling support.
- 7. Option Seven:
 - a. Forces as described for options one through six.

TIMING:

- 1. Option One:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch decision ¹ /	Washington	H-Hour

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<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch	Andersen	H+18:00
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	H+20:30
Time on Target	Target	H+23:30
Recovery	Andersen	H+29:00

1/ To generate aircraft required, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties at this time.

2/ Recall decision by National Command Authorities required not later than this time.

2. Option Two:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Korea	H+48:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+48:30
Recovery	Korea	H+49:00

1/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by 24 hours.

3. Option Three:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	At sea	H+8:00 ^{1/} _{2/}
Time on Target	Target	H+9:00
Recovery	At sea	H+10:00

1/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by four hours.

2/ Assumes CVA in optimum launch position. If not, an additional 12 - 24 hours would be required.

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4. Option Four:

a. Launch from Okinawa:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch Decision ^{1/}	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Kadena	H+18:00
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	H+18:00
Time on Target	Target	H+21:00
Recovery	Kadena	H+24:00

b. Launch from Guam:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch Decision ^{1/}	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Anderson	H+18:00
Recall Decision ^{2/}	Washington	H+21:00
Time on Target	Target	H+24:00
Recovery	Andersen	H+30:00

^{1/} To generate aircraft required, it is necessary to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties at this time.

^{2/} Recall decision by National Command Authorities would be required not later than this time.

5. Option Five:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Korea	H+48:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+49:00
Recovery	Korea	H+50:00

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1/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by twenty-four hours.

6. Option Six:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	At sea	H+8:00 <u>1/</u> <u>2/</u>
Time on Target	Target	H+9:00
Recovery	At sea	H+10:00

1/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by four hours.

2/ Assumes CVAs are in optimum launch position. If not, up to 96 hours additional time would be required for assembly of a three CVA task force.

7. Option Seven: Timing for this option would be comparable to other options, depending on the forces used.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

1. Friendly Losses: Less than five percent.

2. Civilian Casualties:

a. Day attack: Less than ten per target.

b. Night attack: Less than five per target.

FLEXIBILITY: A large number of variations are available within the options described to tailor the response to the situation at the time. These variations include changes in launch bases/positions (in some cases), use of a daylight or night attack, the size of the force, the mix of the force, and the targets struck.

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TAB K

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Air Strikes on the North Korean Air Order of Battle (Five options) (FRESH STORM) ~~(TS)~~

PURPOSE: To neutralize the North Korean air order of battle (AOB). This option could be implemented as a pre-emptive attack in the face of continued, significant North Korean provocations or as a retaliatory measure in response to a significant North Korean attack on US/ROK forces and bases in the Korean area.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Conduct air strikes on all North Korean airfields containing significant AOB with non-nuclear munitions.

1. Option Alpha: Strike airfields which contain highest AOB with USAF tactical fighters launched from bases in Korea at first light. Follow-up with successive attack waves. (Preemptory)
2. Option Bravo: Strike airfields which contain highest AOB with USAF and ROKAF tactical fighters launched from bases in Korea at first light. Follow-up with successive attack waves. (Preemptory)
3. Option Coco: Strike airfields which contain highest AOB with USAF and ROKAF tactical fighters at last light. Follow-up with A-6/B-52 strikes during the night. Follow-up with successive attacks as required. (Preemptory)
4. Option Delta: Strike North Korean airfields with B-52/A-6 aircraft at night followed by strikes on residual AOB by USAF and ROKAF tactical fighters at first light. Continue attacks as required. (Preemptory).

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- 5. Option Echo: Strike North Korean airfields with all available USAF and ROKAF tactical fighters, carrier-based attack aircraft and B-52 aircraft. (Retaliatory)

FORCES:

- 1. Option Alpha:

151 USAF tactical fighters in Korea (50% in first wave)

- 2. Option Bravo:

151 USAF tactical fighters in Korea (50% in first wave)
200 ROKAF tactical fighters (50% in first wave)

- 3. Option Coco:

151 USAF tactical fighters in Korea (50% in first wave)
200 ROKAF tactical fighters (50% in first wave)
75 B-52 aircraft
USN A-6A aircraft from all available CVAs.

- 4. Option Delta:

Same as Option Coco.

- 5. Option Echo:

Same as Option Coco.

TIMING:

- 1. Options Alpha and Bravo:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch Decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Korea	H+48:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+49:00
Recovery and Begin Preparation for Successive Strikes	Korea	H+50:00

1/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by twelve hours. Added to these times, however, would be the time required to posture US/ROK forces in Korea and adjacent areas against a North Korean response.

2. Options Coco and Delta:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
ARC LIGHT/ Launch Decision ^{1/}	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Korea, Kadena, Andersen, At Sea	H+43:00 ^{2/}
Time on Target (Option Coco)	Target	H+49:00 ^{3/}
Time on Target (Option Delta)	Target	H+54:00 ^{4/}
Recovery	Korea, Kadena Andersen, At Sea	H+55:00 ^{5/}

1/ To generate required B-52 aircraft, a decision to discontinue an equal number of ARC LIGHT sorties would have to be made at this time.

2/ With prior notification, this and subsequent times could be reduced by up to 12 hours. Conversely, this time could be increased by the time required to position additional naval forces and to posture US/ROK forces to withstand a possible North Korean response.

3/ First wave of tactical fighters launched from Korea.

4/ First wave of B-52 aircraft launched from Guam. If launched from Okinawa, this time would be reduced by three hours.

5/ Approximate only. Would depend on launch/recovery bases concerned.

3. Option Echo: Being a retaliatory measure, these attacks would be mounted as quickly as possible. It is estimated that with no prior warning, initial strikes could be carried out within four hours.

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ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

1. Friendly Losses: Less than ten percent.
2. Civilian Casualties: Confined to civilians on airfields.
Estimate less than ten per target.

FLEXIBILITY: These options could be varied to accommodate a modest change in the mix of forces used.

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TAB L

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Nuclear Contingency Plan for North Korea
(Three Options) (FREEDOM DROP) ~~(TOP SECRET)~~

PURPOSE: To provide pre-coordinated options for the selective use of tactical nuclear weapons against North Korea short of implementation of the plans for the Defense of Korea (See Tab M). By varying weapon yield, these options could be implemented in response to a wide range of North Korean actions from a limited to a major attack by North Korea on US/ROK forces in the Korean area.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: Conduct strikes against military targets in North Korea employing one nuclear weapon on each target.

1. Option I: A punitive attack against up to twelve military targets with nuclear weapons with a yield of .2 to 10 kt delivered by USAF tactical fighter aircraft launched from bases in Korea, by carrier-based attack aircraft or by US Army Honest John/Sergeant missiles or a combination of the three. Targets include command control centers of major enemy ground forces, three airfields, two naval bases and a missile support facility.

2. Option II: An attack with nuclear weapons with a yield of 70 kt each to neutralize the North Korean air order of battle in response to a North Korean air attack on South Korea. Weapons would be delivered by USAF tactical fighter aircraft launched from bases in the ROK or by carrier-based attack aircraft, or a combination of the two. All sixteen major North Korean airfields can be struck under this option.

3. Option III: An attack with nuclear weapons with a yield ranging from 10 kt to 70 kt designed to diminish greatly the North Korean offensive capability. Weapons would be delivered by USAF tactical fighters launched from bases in the ROK, carrier-based attack aircraft and US Army Honest John/Sergeant missiles. Targets struck would include all those in Option I and II plus twenty-two additional military targets.

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FORCES:

- 1. Option I (Up to 12 strikes):
 - a. 12 USAF F-4 aircraft maximum.
 - b. 12 USN attack aircraft maximum.
 - c. 5 USA Honest John missiles maximum.
- 2. Option II (Up to 16 strikes):
 - a. 16 USAF F-4 aircraft maximum.
 - b. 16 USN attack aircraft maximum.
- 3. Option III (Up to 47 strikes):
 - a. 37 USAF F-4 aircraft maximum.
 - b. 16 USN attack aircraft maximum.
 - c. 8 USA Honest John missiles.
 - d. 2 USA Sergeant missiles.

TIMING:

<u>Event</u>	<u>Place</u>	<u>Elapsed Time</u>
Launch decision	Washington	H-Hour
Launch	Korea, At sea	H+4:00 ^{1/}
Time on Target	Target	H+4:15 to H+5:00 ^{2/}
Recovery	Korea, At sea	H+5:15 to 6:00

^{1/} Estimated maximum time for all options. In some cases, time would be less, e.g., USAF tactical fighters armed with nuclear weapons are on 15-minute alert in ROK to strike airfields in North Korea. Assumes CVA in optimum launch position. If not, for the option requiring use of naval aircraft (Option III), would require 12-24 hours to position CVA.

^{2/} Times enroute vary. Strikes would be timed to provide simultaneous detonations.

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ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES:

- a. Friendly losses: Less than 10 percent.
- b. Civilian casualties: Dependent on size of attack, would range from approximately 100 to several thousand.

FLEXIBILITY: Inherent in these options is the ability on short notice to vary the yield of the weapons employed, the size of the force, the number of targets struck and the mix of delivery vehicles used. Directing strikes to other targets would require an additional four to eight hours to complete planning.

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TAB M

Military Contingency Options - Korea (U)

TITLE: Plan for the Defense of Korea

PURPOSE: This plan provides for US military action in the event of a renewal of communist aggression against the Republic of Korea (ROK). It is designed to counter aggression against South Korea, employing such US and ROK forces as may be available.

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: CINCUNC will maintain a posture that will deter aggression, will defeat or contain initial communist attacks, and, as soon as possible, will launch a counteroffensive to destroy or neutralize enemy forces and means of enemy resistance on the Korean peninsula. In the event that the UN Resolution is abrogated, terminated, or not invoked, CINCPAC, with US and such ROK and other allied forces as are made available, will be prepared to counter any renewal of communist hostilities in Korea. Initial defense will be conducted as far forward as possible. The concept will be implemented in two phases:

Phase I - Initial operations. This phase extends from the initiation of hostilities until US, ROK, and UN or other allied forces are prepared to launch a counter-offensive.

Phase II - Counteroffensive operations. This phase extends from the time US, ROK, and UN or other allied forces launch their counteroffensive until the cessation of hostilities.

FORCES:

1. Forces immediately available in Korea.

a. Republic of Korea

- (1) Army - 17 Infantry Divisions
 - 1 AAA Brigade
 - 2 Armored Brigades
 - 10 Reserve Divisions

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Tab M

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- (2) Air Force - 215 jet aircraft
- (3) Navy - 6 Destroyer/Destroyer escorts
 - 21 Amphibious ships
 - 88 Amphibious craft
 - 120 various other ships and craft

b. United States

- (1) Army - 2 Infantry Divisions
 - 3 Artillery Battalions
 - 4 Missile Battalions (ground support)
 - 5 Missile Battalions (air defense)

(2) Air Force - 151 Tactical jet aircraft

(3) Navy - No assigned naval forces

2. Forces required not immediately available in Korea.

a. Republic of Korea

(1) Requires redeployment of 2 ROK infantry divisions from South Vietnam.

(2) Mobilization of:

- 3 Infantry Divisions (Ready Reserve) - estimate D + 3
- 1 Air Defense Battalion (Reserve) - by D + 91
- 7 Rear Area Security Divisions - by D + 5

b. United States - Requires limited deployment of US Forces from Southeast Asia and deployment of regular and reserve forces from CONUS. Source and number will vary depending upon situation.

(1) Ground Forces

(a) 5 Infantry Divisions (3 from RVN, 2 from CONUS)

(b) 1 Airborne Division (from CONUS)

(2) Naval

(a) Six to nine attack aircraft carriers (5 in WESTPAC, 4 EASTPAC)

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(b) Up to two and two thirds Marine Division/Wing Teams. (1 MEF from EASTPAC/MIDPAC/WESTPAC, 2/3 MEF from LANTCOM, 1 MEF CONUS mobilization)

(3) Air - Approximately 59 Tactical Fighter Squadrons (TFS) (10 from PACOM, 12 SEASIA, 17 CONUS including ANG/Res)

TIMING: This plan can be implemented on short notice with the forces in place in Korea. However, the degree of risk will diminish and the effectiveness of the defense will increase as forces close in the ROK. The closing times will vary depending upon the worldwide situation. The three US infantry divisions from RVN will close D + 45, D + 60, and D + 90. The CONUS infantry divisions will close D + 175 and D + 190. The Marine Division/Wing Teams will close D + 30 to D + 90. The attack aircraft carriers in EASTPAC will close between D + 14 and D + 30. Twenty-eight tactical fighter squadrons could close by D + 15 with the remaining TFS closed by D + 38.

ESTIMATED FRIENDLY LOSSES/CIVILIAN CASUALTIES: Variable, depending on scope and duration of conflict.

FLEXIBILITY: This plan provides for either a conventional or nuclear warfare situation. It makes provision for either a UN operation or a US/ROK operation. The plan provides for partial implementation in the event of nonavailability of reinforcements or supporting forces; however, the attendant risk must be considered. Should the level of resources preclude offensive operations, holding action will be conducted as far forward as possible. The plan considers pull back positions, use of nuclear weapons to offset Communist superiority in forces, and withdrawal if required.