EXCERPTS OF
Proceedings of the
Special Projects Office
Task II - Monitor and Sponsor the Fleet Ballistic Missile Development Program
36th Meeting - 21, 22 March, 1963

Page 2:

"We have received from the Office of the Secretary of Defense a directive to restudy our A2 procurement program with the possible objective of economizing. To this effect, the Secretary asks if the operational problem would be satisfied should additional A2 missiles be procured and the A2 be retained in 13 submarines with the A3 in 28.

"We are investigating the question and pointing out what is involved. Such a plan would incur some additional costs in the extra tooling needed to continue the A2 production.

"The decision to proceed with the retrofit of those first five boats in the 598-Class is now clear. We have been trying to get this decision for a long time and we will go ahead with the retrofit. The A2 will be passed over and the 598-Class will be outfitted to receive the A3; the first of those boats will be the USS GEORGE WASHINGTON.

Pages 3 to 4

"I would like to discuss our ORRT program. If you remember the tests, four missiles per operational submarine were fired. The USS GEORGE WASHINGTON had two proven successes out of her four. There is a question that one of the other missiles may have been more successful than we think, but we can only claim two.

"In the SSB(N)599 tests that followed, we ran into considerable difficulties. These tests were conducted during the rough weather period, but that did not in itself create the problem. Out of her four shots only one was effective. It was an accurate shot, but the only one out of four. More serious than that, however, is the fact that it took a long time to get these four shots off; in fact, it took over 24 hours because of some problems in the launching and the countdown of the missile, including some range trouble and an overnight wait. This 24-hour period does not represent a continuous attempt to fire. Nevertheless the SSB(N)599 was not able to respond on the immediacy of its readiness requirement.

"As a result of that experience, we accelerated our examination of what is happening to the A1 in the Fleet. We have known that there is some degradation with time of some elements; there also seems to be a growth in the separation of propellant from the case and a degradation in some of the rubber goods and electrical appurtenances.

"The effect of this examination was that we had a program to update these missiles, and we conducted a very searching analysis of every -thing connected with this including the training of the crew, the launch procedure, and the missiles themselves. What we now have in effect is a recodification program, a program that was already in vogue, but has now been accelerated so that by this August all the deployed A1 submarines will be outfitted with recertified A1 missiles. They have been called back radiographed, checked for evidence of unacceptable separation, and examined to ensure that any work done in the Fleet on these missiles has been thoroughly checked out. By August we will have a new standard for these missiles and a much more reliable set of deployed missiles.

"After the experience of firing four shots with only one success, the USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT was sent out with these recertified missiles and was instructed to shoot as many as four, but to stop when she got two successes. The first shot was fully successful; the second was not; and the third was successful. Two out of three shots were completely successful both in time of firing, accuracy and so on, so we are back to battery on this.

"I think that we are well on top of this situation, but I would like to mention what effect this may have on the retrofit of the 598-Class. We now know that deployed missiles need very close scrutiny and that our training must be constantly kept alive. We are looking at the 598-Class retrofit to see if it might be desirable to accelerate the schedule and in this way introduce into the Fleet an A3 which would be more reliable, hopefully, than the A1 is at that time. This plan has to be examined very critically because we do not want an ‘out of the frying pan into the fire’ situation here. By that time we will have a much higher level of confidence in the A1 because of the greater number of firings, whereas the A3 will certainly be in its deployed infancy. For these reasons we are not being stampeded into anything and we are looking at it critically with continuing emphasis on system reliability — not just in-flight reliability — but the launch reliability and all the other aspects that go with it. This problem is not peculiar to POLARIS. While we have better performance and reliability than other systems, we must work to keep it that way, and we will all admit that the A1 is not our most reliable missile.

[there may have been some deletions here, but not sure – OCRer]

"The measures we are taking will bring the A1 to a quite respectable level of at least 50 per cent system reliability with a high level of confidence because of the greater number of firings we will be doing. In the later missiles, the A2 and A3, we will increase that level of reliability well beyond 50 per cent.

Pages 9 to 18

"Figure 1 depicts the current ISP and burnout situation and compares it with the situation as predicted in last June's STG meeting," said Captain Dubyk.

Figure 1

Stage

STG ISP

STG Inert Burnout

Current ISP

Current Burnout

Range

1st

260.0

0

260.5

250

17

2nd

274.5

50

276.8

130

77

"Regarding the first stage range increase, the additional ISP contributes 6.8 miles to the total gain in range. Inert weight contribution is a linear situation and therefore, not applicable. To figure the" range increase resulting from the 250-pound loss, the figure was divided by three and multiplied by the range decrement for inert weight loss which is 0.14 pound per mile. This weight then, contributes 10 miles to the total 17-mile gain.

"The first stage gains, of course, are not very large. Gains become much more significant on the second stage. There, the contribution for every 1 per cent increase in ISP is 53.7 miles. The difference here is 2.3 per cent and that equals 45 of the 77 miles. The increase due to the additional 80-pound inert weight burnout using a linear approach contributes 32 miles."

"Is that figure based on more than one flight test?" asked Admiral Smith.

"The figures are based on the two flight tests, A3X-7 and A3X-8 plus the data from the ABL static firings and post-firing examination on the two flights," answered Captain Dubyk.

Captain Sanger asked whether these were optimistic or pessimistic estimates of the range increase and Captain Dubyk explained that the estimates were probably slightly on the pessimistic side because dividing the burnout increase by three probably was a conservative approach.

"Our best estimate of the situation is that the effect of ISP on range might be ±1 of the estimated figure," Captain Dubyk said. "On the first stage I do not think that it would vary more than a few tenths of a point, but on the second stage it might quite easily be +1 point. On the inert weight burnout, I feel that the amount of burnout probably is not going to change much but the rate of burnout may change. This difference may have a 10- or 15- mile effect on range."

"Could you put some upper and lower limits on this total range increase?" asked Captain Sanger.

"I would say a minimum gain of 60 miles and a maximum gain of 130 miles," said Mr. Fuhrman.

"We plan to use these range improvements in our discussions," Captain Dubyk explained. "The range improvements will undoubtedly change from time to time as more flight information is obtained, but the +17 miles is probably not going to be too sensitive unless it sees an extreme variation. The 77-mile increase in the second stage is more likely to change, but I think a minimum 60 miles increase is about as low as we will possibly go.

"Figure 2 is a summary of the weight changes and status for the A3P missile. Figure 3 summarizes weight and range status for all A3 models. On the first stage propellant, the original estimate from June of last year has been increased by 16 pounds for a current weight of 20, 816 pounds. This weight is for the A3 and does not include the 415 pounds of instrumentation associated with the A3X or A3E flights. This 16-pound increase is an actual weight based on the SECOR motors which will be introduced with the A3X-12 flight.

"The inert weights have increased 99 pounds from 3040 to 3139 pounds. Most of this increase has been in the nozzles which turned out to be heavier than expected. The ballistic shell weight has also increased by 10 pounds from the original 116-pound estimate. An addition of brackets in the interstage to take separation and underwater launch loads resulted in a weight increase, but the flight controls have decreased 9 pounds. The electrical system has not changed.

"Except for the rather substantial increase attributed to increases in inert weight, the estimates have been fairly accurate in the first stage.

Figure 2.
POLARIS A3 PERFORMANCE STATUS
19 MARCH 1963

Item

STG
Jun 1962

Sep 1962

Dec 1962

Mar 1963

Current Status

1st Stage

24242

+ 141

+108

+113

24358

Propulsion

23840

+ 52

+ 125

+115

23955

Propellant

20800

0

+ 21

+116

20816

Inert

3040

+ 52

+104

+ 99

3139

IT x 106

5.406

+ 0.002

+0.007

+0.020

5.426

Ballistic Shell

116

+ 2

+1

+ 10

126

Flight Control

172

-12

-16

-9

163

Electrical

114

-1

-2

0

114

2nd Stage

10305

-15

-1

+ 50

10355

Propulsion

9536

+ 9

-1

-36

9500

Propellant

8876

+ 4

-11

-32

8844

Inert

610

+ 7

+10

+ 11

621

Potting Compound

50

0

0

-15

35

IT x 106

2.436

-0.014

+0.004

+0.012

2.448

Ballistic Shell

260

+ 9

0

+ 6

266

Nose Fairing

137

+ 8

+ 3

+ 3

140

Equipment Section

123

+ 1

-3

+ 3

126

Flight Controls

323

+ 4

+22

+24

347

Electrical

88

-5

-5

+11

99

Guidance

80

+ 1

+ 1

+ 1

81

Cont. & Trim

18

-6

-18

+ 34

52

Re-entry System

1050

+ 23

+ 34

+ 30

1080

Basic R/S

1023

+ 20

+ 25

+ 19

1042

Heat Shield

27

-3

+ 9

+11

38

PX-2/PY-2

246

+ 20

+14

+22

268

R/S

228

+14

+4

+17

245

Electrical

18

0

+ 4

-1

17

PY-2

0

+ 6

+ 6

+6

6

Missile Gross






With PX/PY

35843

+ 98

+ 155

+218

36061

Without PX/PY

35597

+ 78

+ 155

+178

35775

Range






With PX/PY

2160

-14

-10

-10

2150

Without PX/PY

2500

-75

-50

-8

2492



Figure 3.
POLARIS A3 PERFORMANCE STATUS
19 MARCH 1963

ITEM

STG
Jun 1962

CURRENT STATUS

A3P

CURRENT STATUS

A3X-11

CURRENT STATUS

A3E

1st Stage

24242

24358

23980

24380

Propulsion

23840

23455

23587

23955

Propellant

20800

20816

20509

20816

Inert

3040

3139

3078

3139

ISP

260.0

260.5

260.0

260.5

IT x 106

5.406

5.426

5.340

5.426

Ballistic Shell

116

126

122

126

Flight Controls

172

163

164

163

Electrical

114

114

107

114

Exercise/ORRT

19

2nd Stage

10305

10355

10460

10517

Propulsion

9536

9500

9544

9500

Propellant

8876

8844

8832

8844

Inert

610

621

662

621

Potting Compound

50

35

50

35

ISP

274.5

276.8

275.4

276.8

IT x 106

2.440

2.448

2.432

2.448

Ballistic Shell

260

266

267

266

Nose Fairing

137

140

140

140

Equipment Section

123

126

127

126

Flight Controls

323

347

477

347

Electrical

88

99

88

99

Guidance

80

81

84

81

Contingency and Trim

18

52

0

12

Exercise/ORRT

182

Re-entry System

1050

1080

1192

1060

Basic R/S

1023

1042

1120

1042

Heat Shield

27

38

72

38

PX-2/PY-2

246

268

--


R/S

228

245

--

--

Electrical

18

17

--

--

PY-2

0

6

--

--

Instrumentation Weight

--

--

417

201

1st Stage

--

--

71

19

2nd Stage

--

--

346

182

Missile Gross Weight





With PX/PY

35843

36061



Without PX/PY

35597

35775

35534 *

35974

Range 1





With PX/PY

2160

2150



Without PX/PY

2500

2492

2360 *

2275

* – Without instrumentation, i.e, equivalent tactical version.

"In the second stage the propellant weight has gone down 32 pounds — again a situation where the weights are based on actual values. The main reason for this decreased propellant weights that the insulation is thicker than planned. At the previous meeting, this point was discussed and it was decided that rather than going into the very substantial effort required to change the material and retest it, we will keep using the present insulation, the actual weight of which appears to be between 157 and 162 pounds. This thicker, denser insulation accounts for an 11-pound increase in the inert weight.

"The potting weight is being reduced from 50 to 35 pounds; this is a scheduled change which will be tested in the A3X-18. The static firings have indicated that eliminating this potting will be a safe change.

"The second stage thrust has gone up by 0.012 to a new value. This change is tied in primarily with the ISp increase that has been discussed before combined with slightly less propellant.

"We have actual weights for the nose fairing and the equipment section. The increase in the nose fairing weight is attributable to the fact that the glue was a little heavier than anticipated. In the equipment section the flight controls show that a very substantial increase of 24 pounds was incurred. Fourteen pounds of this 24 is due to use of the older style rubber bladder in the Mod 2 thrust vector control system. As discussed in the last STG meeting, it is possible to use a lighter metal ballonct in this system but the Group felt at that time that the development program associated with the change would be sufficiently complicated to make the change undesirable. The assurance that we have with a heavier bladder was worth the extra weight; thus, 14 of the 24 pounds are caused by use of this bladder. Ten pounds of the increase result from heat protection which is going to be required on the Mod 2 thrust vector control system.

"The second stage electrical weight is 11 pounds greater than planned due to the standard firing units that will be used. These firing units have been standardized throughout the missile and are being designed at Lockheed. They will be more reliable and certainly will make the maintaining of this system much easier since the accessibility will be much improved. Associated with the increase in second-stage electrical weight, we have had increases due to the pads put in for the guidance system. These occasioned a one-pound increase and it probably is not critical at the moment. This figure again is an actual weight. Due to this one change, we now have a contingency of 52 pounds."

"How much of that is contingency and how much is planned for trim?" asked Admiral Smith.

"About 14 pounds is for trim," answered Captain Dubyk.

"At present there are four pounds of trim ballast with the PX-2 and 14 pounds without it," Mr. Fuhrman stated.

"Why has the trim increased since last December?" asked Admiral Smith.

Dr. Wilson answered, "There is a tradeoff between trim requirement and fluid requirement because if the missile is balanced by trim, less fluid is needed to correct for roll caused by unbalance. Similarly, if excess fluid for TVC is carried it can correct for unbalance and therefore not require trim weights."

"I would like to point out," continued Captain Dubyk, "that the contingency figure was derived from the increases in ISP. We arbitrarily chose 2150 miles as" the range because it is well above the rock-bottom minimum and used the differences in ISP to increase the contingency. The range could be increased if we do not need that contingency, but with the flight test problems still ahead, it is a good anchor point to stay well above the minimum.

"Re-entry system increases have totaled 19 pounds above the Juno estimated weight of 1023 pounds. Twelve pounds of the additional weight is in the local heat protection area on the re-entry system. While further flight test information is needed to determine the heat environment, the initial tests have shown that there are some hot spots in the re-entry area.

"The A3X-7 produced some particularly good flight test data and showed that Lockheed was being overly pessimistic on the heating problem in some spots, but in others the heat environment was as bad as had been predicted.

"Of this re-entry system weight increase, 12 pounds was attributed to the heat protection and 5 pounds to AEC changes."

"Why is the total still less than the December weight estimate for the re-entry system?" asked Admiral Smith.

"A year ago we requested change in the weight of the re-entry system to 1050 pounds," answered Commander Julian. "The new 1023-pound weight actually represents a manipulation with the weight of the heat protection and the flare and so on. I do not think this weight is attributable to AEC changes.

"The heat shield weight is not firm," he continued. "The 38-pound figure will depend on our getting a strong enough diaphragm at that weight."

"Two pounds of the 19 extra pounds are caused by a heavier firing unit and the cabling associated with it," said Captain Dubyk.

"From information obtained from the pressure-loading on the A3X-7 and A3X-8 flights, the heat shields are 11 pounds heavier than predicted. There is a very definite indication that if there is to be any kind of predictable separation and/or post-second staging control, there has to be a fairly substantial structure there. We feel that we can effectively beef up the structure with the final weight only 11 pounds over the estimated 27 pounds. This change would take care of the heat effects which have been noticed in the central area of the diaphragm particularly, and also accommodate the pressure-loading problem."

"Is the post-staging the only environment of concern?" asked Captain Sanger.

"No," replied Captain Dubyk. "I feel that the original weights would be enough to take care of only the second staging, but to take care of the separation and post separation, there simply has to be a better blast-resistant structure."

"Has anyone considered diverting the second stage at the time of staging?" asked Captain Sanger.

"This is a feasible solution," Captain Dubyk said, "but it could not be accomplished until several seconds after the staging when the reentry bodies go off, and the added protection would still be needed to protect the guidance package and permit this kind of maneuver. The added protection in the diaphragm is required at staging."

"It would not help in this situation," observed Admiral S[iLLEGIBLE] "because the maximum force is incurred when the separation rockets are ignited. The force comes from the jets of those rockets and the re-entry system and the second stage have to be together at the time the jet is created. This solution would not really help the problem.

"That maneuver, however, has been suggested as a use [ILLEGIBLE] as a result of some findings on the Trinidad Radar tests," said Captain Dubyk, "Apparently, if the bodies remain together, [ILLEGIBLE] something that the radar can home in on and use to start discriminating. Getting it out of the way and out of the cloud would be a good use of this maneuver that Captain Sanger has suggested."

"This is applicable only to A2," said Commander Julian. "The A2 is thrust terminated but normally the A3 second stage would be over flying unless it were being employed at extreme maximum range."

"Might it also be desirable to have this kind of maneuver in the A3?" asked Captain Dubyk.

"It might be, particularly if this stage could somehow be fragmented, " commented Commander Julian. "This possibility will be investigated with tests on six rejected A3X chambers."

Continuing his report, Captain Dubyk said, "The PX portion of the re-entry system has increased 17 pounds over the weight estimated last June and is 13 pounds heavier than the December estimates. The weight changes are due to the fact that the earlier estimates were based on general designs and we now have detailed designs. Consequently, the latest estimates probably have a great deal more validity than the previous ones."

"What other areas are still undefined?" inquired Admiral Smith.

"The firing unit and the velocity sensor for the PX-2 are still loosely defined," answered Dr. Wilson.

"The weights I have quoted include the standard firing unit," added Captain Dubyk. "The use of a single case and having three in there reduced the weight by one pound at that point. The PY-2 is an addition since the June meeting and adds a straight 6 pounds to the total. "

Pages 35 to 63 – RE-ENTRY BODY COMMITTEE REPORT DISCUSSION

"The first item on my agenda," said Commander Julian, "is the status of the Y2 warhead which is an improved-yield version of the Mark 47 warhead to be carried on both A1 and A2 missiles. As the AEC promised, the first production unit was completed in February. Four units have now been produced. Three have been delivered and are at NWA Charleston, while the fourth is in the new materials test program at Medina. Present status of this program is shown in figure 1.

"All of the product change proposals were completed, two of which were particularly important: first, a change in the pit material to a different allotrope of plutonium which will decrease the neutron vulnerability of the warhead; second, the relocation of the boosting gas reservoir to a point outside the warhead seal which will simplify future problems of bottle exchange.

"Until February, there was some doubt as to whether the AEC would be in a position to certify a four-year stockpile life for this new system. On the basis of previous partially successful nuclear tests, they could not specify what the fill for the reservoir should be with the new pit. The doubts have now been resolved by a successful test called CASSELMAN; the system is certifiable for the normal four-year stockpile period. The formal requirement now exists for the AEC to deliver 67 of these new warheads to the DOD by the end of this fiscal year. They evidently will have no difficulty in meeting this peg point number, but we have asked them to let us know officially if they foresee any difficulty. We have already informally talked with the Fleet people, and it appears that we could accept the lower number without perturbation to deployment requirements.

"The system is probably intended to be first deployed on SSB(N)-618. There is another possible problem area, for we understand that CINCLANT intends to place this new high-yield warhead in all A1-A2 boats in the ratio of 50 per cent Y2's and 50 per cent Y1's. We hope to get some firm guidance on this point by the end of next month."

In response to a question from Admiral Smith, Commander Julian explained that the fifty percent figure is based on release of the Y1 warheads from the 598-Class at overhaul, as then there would be about 151 or 152 of each of the model warheads and the fifty-fifty division would seem quite natural.

Figure 1

MK 47 Y2 WARHEAD STATUS

1. FEB 1963. FPU MET 4 UNITS ( 1-NMST, 3 IN NAVY CUSTODY) PCP CHANGES INCORPORATED

2. FEB 1963 - SUCCESSFUL TEST DELTA PIT PERMITS RESERVOIR FILL SPECIFICATION 4 YEAR STOCKPILE LIFE CERTIFIABLE OFFICIAL YIELD 1.1 MT.

3. 1 JULY 1963 - EXPECT 67 Y2'S ON HAND NO DIFFICULTY IN MEETING REQUIREMENTS OFFICIALLY KNOWN

4. 30 AUG 1963 - SSB(N) 618 DEPLOY

5. DEPLOYMENT LOAD - OUT PLANS NEED FIRM DEFINITIZATION

"Figure 2 covers in some detail the results of the re-entry system participation in the A3X flight program," continued Commander Julian. "The IH refers to inert heads which carry no instruments, only SOFAR bombs. The DH heads carry 5 kmc. tracking body instrumentation and the NOL-AFD portion of the FAF system, but will not carry any warhead electronics. The DW head, that shows up with the A3X-7, is a warhead prototype test body which includes both the NOL and AEC portions of the firing system. On the A3X-7, A3X-8 and A3X-9 we had environmental rather than functional flight-test units, but the fourth one, A3X-11, was a functional unit.

"We have expended over 20 of the inert heads, quite a few of the DH heads, and 4 of the DW units, including all of the flight test environmental units. From all this, we have obtained about ten seconds of flight data from the A3X-7.

"Our situation is not good, particularly because of the large uncertainty in our knowledge of where the bodies on A3X-7 impacted. We are still in need of some idea of what the actual impact pattern is. As of the day before yesterday, it appeared as though the re-entry impacts were essentially in a line. The bearing on the line of bodies was about 30 to 40 degrees off the trajectory axis.

"Early this morning we had a new reading, purportedly more correct, indicating a large 2-sigma tolerance ellipse around at least one of the bodies. If we can believe this, then we can roughly fit in our desired impact triangle."

"Did I understand you to say that you only had ten seconds of data for the re-entry environment?" asked Admiral Smith.

"We have no data for the re-entry environment," replied Commander Julian, "because the DW body had difficulty in telemetry and only provided data for ten seconds prior to actual re-entry. From this, we saw what is essentially a free-flight environment, the temperature, vibration, spin, and so on.

Figure 2
RE-ENTRY SYSTEM PARTICIPATION
A3X FLIGHTS


HEADS



DATA

A

B

C

A3X-1

IH

IH

IH

SELF DESTRUCT

A3X-2

IH

IH

IH

DESTRUCT

A3X-3

IH

IH

IH

DESTRUCT

A3X-4

IH

DH

IH

SELF DESTRUCT

A3X-5

IH

DH

IH

DESTRUCT

A3X-6

IH

DH

IH

SELF DESTRUCT

A3X-7

IH

DW

IH

3 BODY IMPACT

A3X-8

IH

DW

IH

2 BODY IMPACT

A3X-9

IH

DW

DH

DESTRUCT

A3X-11

IH

DH

DW

DESTRUCT

"We also have no re-entry environment data from DH or DW flights at this time, but as yet, I am not too concerned. I think our design is sufficiently conservative, particularly in the structure, that it will survive the re-entry heating environment. What bothers me most is the fact that this FAF is a single-channel system, as opposed to the redundant two-channel system that we have in the Mark 1. It must be highly reliable; thus the more flight data we get on its performance, the better we can identify and fix any difficulties we see. In this sense, our situation is not good.

"The next shot, A3X-12, will be the first Code 3 and will carry three instrumented DH bodies. We certainly hope that this is a successful firing."

"We had a telemetry failure on A3X-7, but did we get impact information on A3X-8?" asked Captain Sanger,

"A3X-8 was a missile failure," answered Commander Julian. "The two-body impact means that we saw two SOFAR signals, but there was a very tight pattern right around second stage, indicating that they did not get properly separated.

"Figure 3 is our planned participation in the next five A3X flights. You will see some new nomenclature: AH is the new Azusa tracking body, and IH is the Lockheed-instrumented body containing 240 megacycles of telemetry. The DW and IH will be the same. A3X-12 is the first Code 3 with three instrumented bodies. A3X-20 is another.

"During the PX-1 flight test program in PMR we had difficulty establishing the performance of our chaff packages properly. We saw motion-picture film showing at least two clumps but not the third. The volume subtended by the two clumps we saw was not adequate to cover the center part of the tube. In particular, we think we have been looking between the two clumps and seeing the second stage and the re-entry body.

Figure 3
RE-ENTRY SYSTEM PARTICIPATION
PLANNED


HEADS

REMARKS

A

B

C

A3X-12

DH

DH

DH

1ST CODE 3

A3X-18

AH

XH

DW

1ST MOD 2 TVC

A3X-14

DH

IH

IH

FIRST EAG

A3X-20

DH

DH

DH

EAG

A3X-15

IH

DH

DW

AMR

"The two packages supposed to cover this particular region were designed by Leesoona Moos Laboratories. We have checked the design of these packages and are satisfied that the vapor pressure of the silicone liquid was not properly selected for the actual flight environment temperatures. It was too sensitive to the temperatures, for one thing, so that the vapor pressure resulting when the lid came off the package was not sufficient to disperse the wires far enough. Another problem was possibly in the can itself coming off too slowly, so that some of the pressure leaked out. By the time the can came "fully" off," permitting the wires to actually move, we had less vapor than we needed.

"We are in the process now, after some extensive ground testing, of flight testing a new vapor technique which uses a heptane-pentane mixture. For the time being, we are going to flight-test packages that contain some 6-mil wire mixtures, but not 6- and 12-mil wire mixtures. We have changed some of the cover materials to Teflon. We hope that with these changes, including increasing the mounting rigidity of the primer in the Nortronics package, that we can demonstrate that the three chaff packages will cover the tube with the three envelopes of chaff.

"To demonstrate this in flight, we have gone to the White Sands Missile Range with a small rocket called SPEEDBALL. They are buying eight of these at a cost of $6500 each. The launch program and the safety studies are being conducted for Lockheed by the Physical Sciences Laboratory of New Mexico State University. The SPEEDBALL, shown in figure 4, is launched as a sounding rocket, almost vertically from a fixed launcher, and the package that is carried is a two-stage solid rocket with an apogee of over one million feet.


Figure 4 – SPEEDBALL PROFILE AND PARAMETERS

"Figure 5 shows the configuration of the payload section which carries several range appurtenances. The de-spin mechanism stops a spin of around ten revolutions per second by a technique that is essentially cancellation just prior to ejection of the working package. The figure also shows the Leesoona Moos package which is ejected on the way up, around 400,000 feet, as shown in figure 6. We will have the opportunity to observe the dispersion of the chaff both on the way up and on the way down.


Figure 5 – SPEEDBALL PAYLOAD


Figure 6

"The first shot of this rocket for our program was conducted last week and was unsuccessful because the nose fairing did not separate. For some reason the rocket overflew its predicted impact point by about 50 miles which caused some concern in terms of range safety.

"We chose eight rockets on the basis of three for the Leesoona Moos packages, three for the Nortronics, and two for a temperature survey. The selection was based on the availability of rockets; some of the SPEEDBALL's were already in existence at the range and the organizations that owned them said we could, because of our commitment to a program like this, use theirs with a promise of paying them back. We were able to procure six rockets under these terms.

"The design changes needed are not very significant at present and I hope they remain so.

"Figure 7 is the representation of that part of the White Sands Missile Range where our firings will be conducted. The impact dispersion is quite large — over 20 miles cross range. We have C-band, S-band, and the whole NIKE-ZEUS radar complex, including the discrimination radar, looking at these packages. The NIKE-ZEUS discrimination radar (DR) and other ZEUS radars will be operating on the range until late May or so, and then will be temporarily deactivated for modification. At that time the discrimination radar is going to be shipped out to Kwajalein.


FIGURE 7

"The first firing was supposed to have gone 50 miles; it went a hundred according to the explanations given to me. I do not know what the impact point was, but the package was located by air search. They were trekking in to recover it the last I heard. The shot has been rescheduled and I presume the safety people were satisfied.

"One of the areas in which we and the other services are concerned is the blast vulnerability of re-entry systems, as defined in figure 8. Many questions exist in this area. If you accept the rather scanty theoretical work that is available and the even more scanty experimental data and plot the vulnerability radii from this data against the different kinds of nuclear defense phenomena, it usually turns out that the blast vulnerability radii far exceed the others. Part of the reason is the lack of precision in our calculations. We have very large uncertainties in both the blast effects and the response of the body to a given effect.

"Because of that concern, there has recently been an even more marked interest in blast vulnerability tests of both nuclear and non-nuclear types. In figure 8 I have listed a few that we are either being directly or peripherally involved in, and basically for a Mark 2 blast response.

"In one test to occur somewhere in the vicinity of Yuma, a large HE charge is going to be detonated. The project is sponsored by DASA for the Army, but they have invited our participation. We hope to get some scale models into the test with very minimal instrumentation.

We have proposed to DASA, for their funding — and I do not think they will totally fund it — another kind of HE simulation test in which we would mount full-scale Mark 2 instrumented bodies on a sled to be run at NOTS. The total project cost would be two or three million dollars. It turns out that our re-entry body is. about the only one in the arsenal that you can conceive of accelerating up to Mach 3 on this kind of sled. We plan, if this program is approved, to fly these bodies off the sled after some tests in which we retain them captive to the sled.

Figure 8 – BLAST VULNERABILITY PROGRAM PROPOSALS

TEST

SPONSOR

TYPE

REMARKS

YUMA

DASA/ARMY/SP

HE

SCALE MODEL MACH 3 NO BODY RESPONSE

SLED TEST

DASA/SP

HE

FULL SCALE MACH 3 BODY RESPONSE

BLUE ROCK

DASA/SP

NUCLEAR

FULL SCALE MACH 10

SLEIGH RIDE

DDRE/USAF

NUCLEAR

FULL SCALE 3,000 MILES

"While this Mach 3 will occur at sea level, these conditions are not too unlike the actual blast environment and shock wave conditions for the rather low altitudes which are most critical to blast vulnerability. We intend to put an HE charge off to one side; and then, by appropriate timing, detonate when the body reaches full velocity, intercepting the body with the HE shock wave. We will measure body response, loads, and pressure fields. This test is much better, from our point of view, than others of this kind that have been proposed because we can recover the body after the test.

"Two further full-scale nuclear tests have been proposed — one called BLUE ROCK, which involves two nuclear detonations of around 200 kilotons each in the vicinity of Johnston Island. This test is proposed somewhat politically as the DASA answer to the Air Force-proposed SLEIGH RIDE test. I think it has some credibility as a test to provide generalized data for the use of all kinds of re-entry system designs. The plan here is to use THOR vehicles fired from one of the two pads now in place at Johnston. The THOR's would carry four pods that in effect would be instrumented re-entry vehicles. The THOR would be launched almost vertically, and the pods would be ejected after apogee with the appropriate velocity. A second rocket, NIKE-HERCULES, with the nuclear warhead aboard, will then be programmed for launch from Johnston Island to intercept the pod bodies at the desired altitude and at the desired vector distance between them.

"At our suggestion, Lockheed has made a proposal to DASA to look into the blast vulnerability of all kinds of re-entry bodies. With only a little additional dressing up, Lockheed and DASA can conduct the negotiations almost independently of us. They have asked us, and we have agreed, to act as technical monitor if the project is funded; of course, we do have some special interests in the project.

"The last change proposed by the DASA people was to use two re-entry bodies of the Mark 2 type and two of a more advanced sphere-cone design on the THOR. Now, if we can go with bodies that look like Mark 2, we can indeed get data which is germane to our own design."

On questions from Admiral Smith, Commander Julian explained that the test program would be directed at determining blast vulnerability of representative re-entry systems, that four systems could be sent up in one flight by special pod attachments to a THOR vehicle, and that the re-entering bodies could then be attacked by a NIKE-HERCULES type of interceptor. Commander Julian added that some modification would be required on both the THOR and the intercepter.

"Basically, it is a DASA project," continued Commander Julian, "but they would presumedly use a Lockheed-designated project officer. They wish us to be in the loop somewhere because we generated the proposal initially. I want to be in the loop because two of the bodies proposed for the test are specifically Mark 2-type bodies."

Admiral Smith observed that BLUE ROCK, in attempting to examine vulnerabilities of re-entry bodies at Mach 10 at 60,000 feet, should be a very interesting experiment.

"It will be interesting," replied Commander Julian, "but there is also another experiment underway called SLEIGH RIDE, for which BLUE ROCK is the rebuttal. This is a full-scale nuclear test to be launched on an ATLAS missile from Vandenberg using the Mark 11 MINUTEMAN re-entry vehicle.

"The intercept was originally to be performed by carrying the nuclear warhead on the same vehicle that carried the instrumentation. It would have a Broad Ocean Area impact in the Pacific some place. Originally, the experiment provided no means of getting diagnostic data on the detonation or any means, except recovery of the bodies themselves, to determine the effects of the blast interaction. It was very narrowly oriented to the vulnerability of a very specific re-entry vehicle — the Mark 11. Since the original plan met with some objections from DDR&E, the program has been reoriented so that is will not be Broad Ocean Area impact but about a 3000-mile range impact.

"The significant thing is a memorandum dated 27 February in which Dr. Brown has invited the Navy to tell him what the feasibility, the desirability, and the cost factors are for POLARIS participation in this test. At present we are drafting an answer that says participation is feasible but not necessarily desirable. It would be difficult to simulate our re-entry conditions and our Mach number at re-entry is quite different. Finally, it will cost more than the BLUE ROCK test."

Dr. Hartmann expressed some surprise at not having been informed about this projected SLEIGH RIDE test. Commander Julian explained that Lockheed had undoubtedly gotten in touch with NOL people about it.

"Figure 9 is an artistic representation of BLUE ROCK THOR launch from the THOR pad up to its apogee," continued Commander Julian. "On the way down, the four bodies eject at the appropriate velocity so that at about 60,000 feet radar-track will have been established on the trajectories of these bodies. You have launched the NIKE-HERCULES with its nuclear warhead and computed the distance vector and you then detonate the 200 kiloton warhead when the bodies are at the spacing you want. It sounds easy, but it isn't.

"The altitude tolerance on this would have to be about plus or minus a thousand feet, plus or minus two seconds to intercept, so there are problems remaining to be worked out.

"Let me briefly run through some recent changes in our PX-2 program, as scheduled in figures 10 and 11. About four weeks ago, the Admiral approved the shift of A3X-41 and A3X-46 vehicles to the Pacific for PX-2 guidance and missile development objectives, thus increasing the PMR program to six A3X vehicles for PX-2 shots. A few days ago we asked DDR&E to provide the services of the DAMP ship to the AMR during the PX-2 program. We do not intend to buy the ship and crew for this operation but we would like better down-range coverage. As I recall, we asked specifically for the ARIS ship although we do not actually expect to get it."


Figure 10


Figure 11

Captain Jacobs stated that the request specified "a ship" because there is considerable need for ship support for this down-range radar data ia the PX program, and there is only one ship at present that can provide it.

"The DAMP, or whatever ship it is," continued Commander Julian, "will supply the impact area radar data to provide two important things for us in the PX-2 program; first, to assist us in selecting between two different decoy designs that we plan to fly on our partial flights; and second, after selection, to examine the flights of the selected decoys, plus the chaff in conjunction with the observations, like TRINIDAD tracker and possibly FQ-6 radar.

"For example, one is a dart, while the other is a dielectric standard configuration decoy. They both have rather large base plates for providing the required cross sections. AMR has made a rather strange finding that they would no longer provide at their expense, data reduction for penetration aid flights; in other words, we have to commit quite a large sum of money to getting the data back from AMR flights of PX-2."

Captain Jacobs clarified this point as follows: "This attitude is not the AMR position, but there is a faction within AMR that wants to handle the data reduction and analysis. We are not certain that the range has this ability, or can gain the ability within the time frame; we do not have to pay AMR for this service. After talking with Lockheed, General Electric, Collins and Federal about the kind of confidence that is needed in the range information, we recommended that the Range not be used for tracking data reduction. We feel that RCA can handle this by themselves."

"The Air Force has an annual budget of approximately $180,000,000 for Advanced Re-entry Systems Research," continued Commander Julian, "This program does not have any definite goals except a hope that, as time goes by, the Air Force will be able to separate the things that drop out that look good. Both this program and their big BMRS program, which also has a large budget, have penetration aids developments in force.

"We feel that PX-1 penetration aids for the A2 missile were certainly not as sophisticated as they could be, had we elected to take more time to do it. The technology improves as time goes on. Similarly, PX-2 for A3 will not be as sophisticated as we could have made it, given more time and a better technology. However, for B3 and any other advanced systems that POLARIS will send to sea, we will need rather advanced and sophisticated penetration aid techniques and hardware. For that reason, we are proposing the long-term penetration aid upgrading program shown in figure 12. Much of what you see here has been approved by Admiral Smith.

Figure 12
PENETRATION AIDS
UPGRADING PROGRAM

I ELECTRONIC DEVICES

A. R&D- NEW BROAD BAND NOISE TUBES (UHF, L, S, BANDS)
B. BASIC RESEARCH - NEW DECEPTION TECHNIQUE

II CHAFF/INERT RESOLUTION CELL SATURATION TECHNIQUES

A. IONIZING PELLETS
B. CHAFF PARTS
C. PX-1C WSMR FLIGHT TESTS
D. PX-2C PMR FLIGHT TESTS

III OTHER EFFORT

A. FULL SCALE ANACHOIC CHAMBER AND OUTDOOR CROSS SECTION FACILITIES - LMSC
B. GASL THERORETICAL WORK: WAKE PREDICTION - CROSS SECTION CORRELATION/NOL
C. NWL COMPUTER ENGAGEMENT MODEL
D. NESCO-ADVANCED CONCEPT FEASIBILITY
E. NOL AERO BALLISTIC WORK - 1000' RANGE
F. CONDUCTION CROSS SECTION REDUCTION TECHNIQUES

"In the PX-1 package we have two jammer packages which are radiating at L- and S-bands to jam the acquisition and tracking radars of our assumed defense model. There are improvements we can make in the cavity resonators which provide the noise spectrum: we can improve their band width; we can improve their power density, that is, the total number of milliwatts or watts radiated per megacycle; and we can extend the band width to cover a broader band at some central frequency. We can and will do this at L- and S-bands because we are still convinced it is in that region that acquisition and tracking will probably be conducted.

"We are concerned as well about the UHF threat. There are tubes now under development which can give us a UHF band jamming capability. By duplexing the present tube, we can cover from 250 to 600 and possibly up to 800 megacycles. With new antenna and system designs it is hoped that we can increase the power density to levels four and five times greater than our present system, PX-1E, possesses. This development is going ahead as also is the basic tube development to prove the new tube designs. We will do breadboard and prototype system development.

"I should like to recommend that we proceed carefully with this development. It is possible that some severe system design changes may result from these efforts, and if we go to tactical hardware, we would then have to underwrite a T&E program with some expensive flight testing in it."

"Just a minute," said Admiral Smith. "If you are convinced the Russians are using L- and S-band radar, why all this concern about UHF? Will they be using both?"

"Evidently they will," replied Commander Julian, "for there are some UHF radars apparently around Leningrad now operating in the region from 200 up to 800 or 1000 megacycles. Now this is a troublesome region if there are radars there, because we have no capability at these low frequencies. It is difficult to make good chaff at such low frequencies. The design problem is difficult there as well.

"The Russians have problems too, because at low frequencies there may possibly be a severe radar problem due to nuclear blackout. Perhaps they will make some compromise in the choice of frequency on the basis of nuclear blackout and what they hope a UHF system will do. If we can develop a UHF system with a band width from 200 to 800 megacycles, a new L-band system from 900 up to 1600 megacycles, an S-band from 2300 to 3600, we will almost be able to cover the whole radar spectrum from 200 megacycles up to C-band. I think this is a very desirable goal.

"I do not think we should go into production on these systems as yet, not even when the tube development and the system prototype have been proven, until we know more from the defense intelligence people about the frequencies we should be jamming."

Captain Sanger observed that a hole in the coverage existed between 1600 and 2300 megacycles, and Commander Julian explained that this was an area that had not as yet been used for radar coverage.

"You mean, an area that we have not used," "replied Captain Sanger.

"I grant you that there is no reason why it might not be used," replied Commander Julian, "but these defense models are basically predicted upon our abilities and the assumption that the Russians have the same abilities.

"Getting back to the data on that last figure, we have a small research contract out on a very new signal delay technique. If it proves successful, we will be able to package deception devices which will be able to give 50 to 100 false targets and respond to a pulse-to-pulse frequency change to the interrogating signal. I do not want to say more about that at this time.

"We have a promising proposal on hand to use ionizing pellets instead of chaff as an inert resolution cell saturation technique. I think I showed you one of these foil-type arrangements about six months ago.

We feel that wires are somewhat inefficient to use for this type of coverage. There may be a way of combining the characteristics of chaff wire and a light decoy for better coverage of resolution cells to a lower altitude. With wires alone, this is very difficult.

"As I explained earlier, we have these White Sands tests proceeding" now with the SPEEDBALL rockets. This summer we are planning some flight tests with the PX-2 chaff packages at PMR, because the ZEUS complex will have been shut down at White Sands in late May. We can not mount these tests before June or July; by that time we will no longer have ZEUS radar at White Sands, and particularly no L-band coverage there.

"We are proposing to give the PMR tests to the ZEUS people as a target vehicle project and let them run it for us. The rockets are cheap, the logistics is only a little more complex than at White Sands, and we will have the two important radars there — UHF on both PRESS and ZEUS, L-band on the Tradex, and C-band on the ZEUS."

In response to questions from Admiral Smith, Commander Julian explained that the PMR tests would involve chaff packages flown on the PHOENIX rocket and would take place in the Kwajalein area.

"They will launch vertically from Roi," continued Commander Julian, "and come down vertically on the south end of Kwajalein. We are pretty well forced to this, because they are shutting down the radars at White Sands that would give us valuable information.

"We are providing increased radar cross-section facilities as a part of this general program of updating penetration aids. This will be a full-scale anechoic chamber which will be able to measure cross-sections over a wide frequency band. We also have theoretical work proceeding on the prediction of the frequency content and electron density of wakes. The General Applied Science Laboratory is working on this and will try to develop a radar cross-section correlation based upon wake prediction.

"Initial tests at NOL suggest a close agreement between the wake patterns and GASL's predictions for a body, which supports the idea that theoretical prediction will have some value here. The Naval Weapons

Laboratory is working up a computer engagement model for our defense studies which will give us a much more sophisticated working model than we could get working these problems out by hand. They have already worked up some basic pieces of the model program.

"NESCO (National Engineering Science Company) is studying advanced penetration techniques. They will investigate these concepts up to the point of engineering feasibility which will be handled separately by Lockheed.

"We intend to use the NOL aero-ballistic range and personnel for an improved decoy development. We have a small contract with Conductron Corporation to try out the ferrite absorbers that they are developing. We can possibly reduce radar cross-sections several orders of magnitude by the use of this material. I think it is worth looking into, as does the Air Force, which has backed this program with a good deal of money.

"Dr. Siegel claims that this material can be effective across very broad bands. He is also developing a design that will look like an Eaton lens to any radar. Such a technique would show an identical zero cross- section to any radar at any frequency. It seems a bit hard to believe.

"The design would be incorporated into the re-entry body structure, so it is a matter of several years lead-time — as much as would be needed to develop an entire new re-entry body structure."

"This will not require any agreement with the Russians about the exact radar band frequencies they will be using in three years, will it?" inquired Admiral Smith.

"Not at all," replied Commander Julian, "for Dr. Siegel is developing composite layers, and each layer will be sensitive over a very broad band.

"One thing more on PX-1: I mentioned earlier that we need some firm guidance on how to put the Y2 warhead to sea. We also need firm guidance on how to put the PX-1 system to sea. Our present plan is to buy 221 tactical PX-1 systems to equip all A2P missiles in the Fleet. This figure includes new submarine loads and the retrofit of all others. At a recent meeting with the Fleet, we learned that they did not want to go to sea with a total load of PX-configured missiles. They were thinking in terms of having a few tubes per boat configured with PX missiles and this would be on top of the 50-50 split of Y-1 and Y-2 warheads. We need to know what to tell NWA to do beginning with SSB(N)618 and SSB(N)616. We intend to bring this question up at a new meeting proposed for April.

"We have a serious problem here," said Dr. Wilson, "and we have not laid plans to attack it adequately. We have a potentiality of eight different configurations of the A2, considering two different warheads with and without PX and with and without PY. We have got to do some paper work to provide information to the submarine commander on fire control because he will be forced to set targetting on a tube-by-tube basis. I realize the Y1 and Y2 choice will not affect fire control except in the selection of target. Handling this problem at the spot knob may be an unnecessary complexity.”

"I am more concerned," said Admiral Smith, "with the problem in interchanging Mod 0 and Mod 1 warheads."

"When I wrote the report," answered Commander Julian, "we could not do the interchange. The problem is one of flare interchange. We have asked Lockheed to develop an adapter kit that will make the interchange possible. This adapter is the minimum step needed if we are going to respond to the need for an option to put on all or none."

"Will this mean two logistic alternatives for the tender?" asked Captain Thompson,

"We are going to propose it," replied Commander Julian, "We can treat the PX kit as a wooden system assembled at NWA or we can build a new container which will accept a totally assembled Mark 1 Mod 1 system including an extension ring, all assembled parts, and AFD. Once aboard the tender, it might be removed and stored bare,

"This has not yet been discussed thoroughly by the Safety group. They have looked at transportation of the assembled system, but I do not believe that they would approve long-term storage of a Mark 1 Mod 1 system with the AFD installed which contains the battery and all the pyrotechnics in place and connected.

"This is just one possibility. This is a wooden technique because the tender people do not have to do anything to the system in order to exchange a Mod 1 for a Mod 0. If they take anything apart when they get it, then they will need all kinds of alignment tools and checkout procedures; the operation will get very complicated.

"Another possibility is to do it as we originally planned: ship them a Mark 1 Mod 1/2 re-entry body which will have the AFD and the equipment rack in, but not the pyrotechnics. We also would ship them at the same time the extension ring in its own container, and we would ship the pyro-technics and the decoys and so on in separate containers. When these get to the ship, we would provide some storage for a certain few components When the time comes to make an exchange, the re-entry body shop in the ship will then have to build up a system. This is not an easy job, as we discovered during the logistic evaluation; it is a very time-consuming and demanding job. The tender skipper and COMSUBRON 14 do not like this idea at all. The solution depends on what the Fleet wants to do with the system. We will present both these two logistic proposals at the meeting in April."

Asked about the flare interchange, Commander Julian explained that it would be a fairly simple alteration that could be handled easily at NWA or on the tender. Captain Dubyk observed that the last time this problem was discussed, there was concern about an interfering bracket, and Commander Julian said that he would produce the design as soon as possible for Admiral Smith's consideration.

"How much time is needed to make the change," asked Admiral Smith, "once a decision has been made about the numbers of each type needed?"

"The modification will take about one working-day per re-entry body," replied Commander Julian, "working in a single-line REB shop."

"Once we get all these kits," observed Admiral Smith, "NWA will still need about one month's notice before the outloading of a submarine or an AK shipment."

"There is also a problem at the other end," added Commander Julian, "when the submarine comes in for a total fit-out. There is a great deal of work to be done, and it does not seem possible to transfer 16 PX systems and get all the other work done during a normal 30-day availability period at the tender."

"The Fleet docs not want 16 in any one hull," added Captain Thompson, "but only 3 or 4."

"Basically, I think the Fleet wants as much ability as they can get in changing these things," observed Admiral Smith.

"The only easy plan we have seen on this change requires that the SSB(N) return to NWA for retrofit," said Commander Julian in concluding his report.

After a very brief review discussion of some of the points in the report, Admiral Smith called a luncheon recess.

PAGE 76 TO 80 – FIRE CONTROL AND GUIDANCE COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

At this point, Captain O'Neil introduced Mr. Mitchell for a discussion of the target card computer system.

"The Target Card Computer System is a device that we propose to add to the 598-Class," began Mr. Mitchell, "to generate the target cards at sea. It will replace the rather cumbersome technique of rotating cards or microfilm from Dahlgren which we now use.

"The target card is used to supply target input functions to the Fire Control System Mark 80 in conjunction with certain hand-set quantities on the target data input units. The card performs a vital function in the parity checks that are necessary for the target set-ups. Each card contains data for one target based upon a launch reference square of 20 miles on a side. The library problem associated with these cards at present is becoming unmanageable with the increased number of targets assigned to POLARIS submarines and the increasing numbers of launching positions. With these two increases, it becomes rather desirable to generate the cards at sea for all targets that the submarine might strike.

"The card generation involves the use of a computer to handle the rather complex guidance equations together with a good memory system to store all the target data required for burst height, and the longitude and latitude of the reference point, launch point, and target point.

"Each target card contains 28 printed and 10 punched quantities which will be determined and placed on the card by this new card system. These 38 entries are based upon the initial input of target number and launch reference point, supplemented by the burst height and the various latitude and longitude data. All the storable data will be recorded on the target data input tape. At present we are using an aluminum-backed Mylar tape for this purpose; the tape is eight columns wide and can contain all the target data necessary for slightly less than 1000 targets per reel. We will probably be carrying more than one reel of this tape.

"The information on the mylar tape is entered into the program of the target card computer by transfer to a program tape by an ordinary punch tape reader. This program tape will also contain entries that do not come from the tape storage bank. The missile type, for example, is a function applied to the program tape in order to introduce the appropriate ballistic equations for a specific missile type.

"Once the program tape is entered, it is removed from the tape reader and the information on the target tape is entered through the same tape reader to the memory system. The operator merely [ILLEGIBLE] the target number, launch reference point, and the longitude and latitude data for as many as eight target cards at the same time. The limitation of eight is imposed by the memory system in part, but it is also the maximum number of target data input units available on the Mark [ILLEGIBLE] fire control system.

"Following storage of this data in the computer memory, the computer then types out the contents of its memory on a check [ILLEGIBLE] This allows the operator to verify that the computer understands [ILLEGIBLE] input information and has it correctly stored. We have designed several such checks in this system.

"As soon as the check is completed, the computer begins a forward search of the target data on the perforated tape to obtain the burst heights and the longitude and latitude readings for each of the eight targets specified to the computer by the operator. Next, the computer begins the calculations of the various quantities that are printed and punched on the target cards; these calculations are made with the appropriate guidance equations for the specific missile type.

"The operator then places a blank target card in the computers typewriter output. He waits for an indicator on the console to show him that the printed matter has already been computed; when the indicator appears, the operator switches the typewriter to ON and the computer types out the target data on the card. This is the same material that normally appears on the target cards today. This typewriter has an echo capability which sends each printed digit or letter back into the computer where the computer verifies that the symbol is the same one that was sent out. We hope in this manner to prevent any chance of garbled data by verification at this point,

"The operator now pulls the card from the typewriter and places it in the card feed of a punch device where the computer will punch the entries required on the card. (While this is going on, other areas of the computer arc solving for the other card inputs.) Then the first card is read back into the computer for verification and completion of an inverse check calculation. This calculation is very much the same as that in the Fire Control System Mark 84; the results of the computations will be read back into the computer, whereby they, as independent variables, are used in a set of equations stored in the memory circuits, to arrive at the input quantities, which now have become the dependent variables. These computations are read out and checked against the original inputs.

"Now as soon as the inverse check of the first card is finished the computer then types out material for the next target number, launch reference point and so on. The operator will remove the first card and either put it into a finished target card file or send it ahead to the Missile Control Center.

"We have specified that the computer be able to generate one checked and proven card per minute. This is generous because a skilled operator will be able to increase the speed substantially. The target cards themselves, of course, do not have to be stored unless this is desired; they can be destroyed as storage space is needed because it is a reasonably small matter to print up another one at any time."

"Will this computer be able to give you target cards for targets that had not previously been planned?" asked Captain Thompson.

"Yes," it will," replied Mr. Mitchell, "for it will be able to handle data taken from microfilm or even from radio transmission. One of its greatest virtues is its ability to create target cards under such circumstances."

Dr. Craven asked about the ability to check from the target number as typed on the final target card back through the system. Mr. Mitchell did not have the information to answer that question at that time. Later it was determined that such a check was entirely possible and would be incorporated into the system.

"How about procurement on this?" asked Captain Styer.

"We plan to use available equipment to make up this system," explained Mr. Mitchell. "The computer and the arithmetic and memory system of the proposed computer subsystem will be adaptations of presently established computer devices. These will be specified according to their availability in the Navy Supply System. We have been considering items of the Mark 84 system hardware, such as the DGBC computer or something like the NTDS as an over-all system. We feel that the development will not be more than 10 per cent of the over-all effort.

"Similarly, the peripheral equipment will largely be already developed items. The original design work will encompass only the console, interconnecting cables, and the installation arrangement.

"The space required will be about the same as is now required for target card stowage. The console itself will be very small. The operator panel will present a duplex system for the two separate and distinct target card computer systems. It will not have any elaborate operator panel arrangement. The system itself will be completely duplexed, i.e., two computers, two operator panels, and the like, each having the capability of generating the requisite number of cards per minute.

"Two of the first four systems produced will be supplied for training purposes; one will be sent to Dam Neck and the other to New London."

Asked about functional interfaces, Mr. Mitchell explained that there were none except for a power supply, space requirements and weight; if necessary the equipment could be installed by the tender although this would be a big job for the tender crew to handle. The entire computer package has been designed to pass through a 25-inch hatch.

With no further discussion, Admiral Smith called upon Commander Hammerstone for presentation of the Launching Committee Report.

Page 82 – LAUNCHING COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

“Figure 1 shows the operational status of the first 29 ships. The 598-Class ships are deployed with the Mark 15 launcher. They have made a total of 38 patrols as of 10 March. There are three ships of the 608-Class deployed for a total of 8 patrols.

Figure 1

LAUNCHER

SSBN

NO. OF PATROLS COMPLETED

PRESENT STATUS

MK 15 MOD 0

598

9

OUT ON 10th PATROL

599

9

OUT ON 10th PATROL

600

7

7th UPKEEP IN PROGRESS

601

7

OUT ON 8th PATROL

602

6

OUT ON 7th PATROL

MK 17 MOD 0

608

4

OUT ON 5th PATROL

609

2

2nd UP KEEP IN PROGRESS

MK 17 MOD 1

610

1

OUT ON 2nd PATROL

611

1

1st UPKEEP IN PROGRESS

618

0

AT SDAP

MK 17 MOD 2

616


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

617


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

619


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

620


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

MK21 MOD 0

623


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

624


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

625


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

626


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

MK 21 MOD 1

627


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

628


UNDER CONSTRUCTION

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Pages 104 to 106 – COMMAND COMMUNICATIONS COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

"A second area in which we do not as yet have a CNO requirement is the Extremis program to let an operational commander know that one of his submarines has gone to the bottom. Here again we face a problem of designing something that CNO may not want."

"We have been struggling with this thing for five years, " Admiral Smith. "How close to production are we?"

"Not only have we been struggling, " replied Captain Dudley," "we have also been spending a lot of money. Right now the system is being redesigned as a result of the tests held last fall."

"The system should be in production in Fiscal 1964, " added Lt. Commander Watkins, "so we should have systems by summer of 1964. It is planned to put them on the SSB(N) 624 for test."

"How close are you to a production contract?" said Admiral Smith.

"We should be ready after the tests this fall, sir,” answered Lt. Commander Watkins.

"The system involved," explained Captain Dudley, "is designed to pass a message that a submarine has been lost either by accident, damage, enemy action, or some other catastrophe. The system must be able to function without specific activation from the ship's personnel."

"I think the most useful thing would be a Ship Characteristic Change," observed Admiral Smith.

"We will need that ultimately in any case," replied Captain [ILLEG] "and you can go directly to one if you have a working system."

"The system that we are now testing," said Captain Dudley [ILLEG] three buoys, one located forward, one aft topside, and the third [ILLEG] of being launched from a torpedo tube. If the submarine is smashed, one of the buoys will be released to go to the surface, either by [ILLEG] action or by an automatic release once the submarine has sunk to a specified depth. The buoy goes to the surface to broadcast a code message to the effect that one submarine is sunk."

"What are these tests you plan?" asked Admiral Smith.

"We are doing a surface ship test now," replied Lit. Commander Watkins, "in which we have been launching the device and running propagation tests. It is a small buoy, and its antenna is close to the water. We need sea tests in order to test the distance and reception. We are also running more of the shake-rattle-and-roll tests at NEL and there will be further tests at UERD."

"When will you get results from the propagation tests?" asked Admiral Smith.

"Certainly by 1 May," replied Lt. Commander Watkins, "and by that time we should also have the results of the tests of the improvements made after we failed the earlier tests."

"The equipment failed miserably on the test series last fall," added Captain Dudley, "and had to be completely redesigned."

Dr. Hartmann recalled that Aerojet was possibly developing something to accomplish the same in extremis message by use of explosive charges.

SUBMARINE DESIGN COMMITTEE EXCERPTS

Page 107

"Since the last STG meeting, the Bureau of Ships has been spending a great deal of its effort and energy on the depth control problem. For purposes of review I would like to go over the facts that were presented to the Steering Task Group at the last meeting, as reported in the CINCLANTFLT message of 23 January; in this message CINCLANTFLT stated that the first winter patrols of the 608-Class provided conclusive evidence of a serious depth control problem. The message emphasized four major points. First, that in a sea state greater than 3, at slow speed and shallow depth, depth control was gravely deficient. Second, this deficiency jeopardizes the ability to continuously maintain the prescribed posture of readiness during patrol. Third, that control at periscope depth is precarious, if not impossible. The upper rudder is exposed and ships have broached. Fourth, that control at launch depth leaves much to be desired.

PAGES 108 to 114

"I think I can summarize very briefly, and I hope fairly, the problem as we saw it when we left this conference. First, in the area of depth control at periscope depth, the depth at which the Type 11 or 8B periscope is used, they stated that at a speed of 6 knots and at a sea state of 3 to 5, depth control cannot be maintained with absolute assurance. The incidence of broaching is unacceptably high, and exposure of the top of the sail is estimated to exist 10 to 25 per cent of the time. Once a ship has broached, it is very difficult to submerge again and reorient to get Type 11 sights.

"Depth control at launch depth was a problem in sea states estimated at 3 to 5 because it was difficult to slow from speeds of 6 knots and achieve a level trim, ready-to-launch posture, at zero speed in the required 15 minutes. This occurred primarily because in slowing from 6 knots to about 3 knots, the planes became ineffective, and the depth control system, using the depth control tanks, did not become effective until they reached a speed of 1 knot or less. There was a transitional area from 3 knots to 1 knot in which they occasionally lost depth control, and had to speed up and then slow down again.

"Roll of the ship affected this depth control problem at launch depth greatly. The USS THOMAS EDISON, however, had no problem with roll. This ship was different from the others in that it had installed non-roll sensitive instruments giving them the depth sensing readout that feeds into the depth control circuit for the depth control tanks. The tank level indicators in the depth control tank were not roll sensitive. In other words, a pair of depth gauges had been installed on either side of the ship which gave them an average depth; the other ships of the class had only one depth gauge off the center line. As the ship rolled, this one depth gauge gave them erroneous readings of their actual depth, and the system tried to correct for what was a change in depth only due to roll and not a change in depth of the center of the ship.

"Hovering control, once they had achieved this launch depth, was good in all ships and there was little problem reported here in sea states up to 5. There was, however, some problem occasioned by this roll effect and again the SSB(N) 610 reported that they did not have the problem because their instrumentation was different from the other ships.

"Some concern was expressed about the ability to continuously hover during a 16-missile launch in high sea states; I think this stemmed primarily from difficulties encountered during SDAP ripple firings. Apparently, this problem arose perhaps because the system was not peaked up nor properly groomed.

"All ships had the general problem of sail plane banging. This was associated with shallow depth operation, but had been experienced down to depths of 90 feet, at which depth we are not concerned about sea states. When this occurred, it was estimated that the sail planes were not actually being exposed to the air. In other words, it was not the wave height that would expose the sail planes at 90 feet depth but we did have the sail planes banging. We had instrumented the USS THOMAS EDISON in order to establish the source of the sail plane banging problem or correlate the various factors that can cause the sail planes to bang.

"This test had failed rather miserably. We were unable to identify the source of the problem, and unable to correlate the various aspects that affect sail plane banging, or could affect sail plane banging. Such aspects would be position of wave trains over the ship, lifting of the stocks in the bearing, hydraulic system pressure shock, tilting of the planes, cavitation of the planes, and resonance of the surrounding structure in the way of the planes. We could not get any correlation from the findings or from the test results.

"All ships reported the problem of upper rudder exposure occurring in high sea states; this loss of control resulted in a down angle trim by the bow and occurred at an angle by the bow of as little as three degrees.

"General comments were made that near-surface operations are required on the average, of once a day. This is based on the total patrol experience of the SSB(N) 598 — they have to get up on the average of once a day during a 60 day patrol. They strongly encouraged further efforts to develop equipment and systems to remove this dependence on the surface. In other words, they want to be able to operate for longer periods submerged, and to avoid the necessity of rising to the surface at least once a day.

"The Type Commanders strongly emphasized that the problem was so serious that positive improvements by over-correction must be ensured, and that the broaching in SSBN(N)'s is more serious than in SSN's since the SSB(N) deployment sites can be determined [ILLEGIBLE] occurs frequently.'

Mr. Eyestone asked if the reasons for coming to the surface had been classified into categories, and Captain Kern replied that the reason was primarily for Type 11 sights. Captain Styer pointed out that the ships did not come to the surface for communication purposes. "Some of the recent 608-Class patrols have not used the VLF buoy at all," he continued. "They have used the floating wire entirely and the USS THOMAS EDISON used it all the way from test depth up to launch depth.

"There is no operational procedure that requires the ships coming up once a day to take a Type 11 sight. Another reason to come up might be to confirm or classify contacts the ship has on his sonars, for example, trawlers.

"Principally, these ships come up to confirm platform rotation results and to keep their azimuth as error-free as possible so that they can squeeze down the CEP."

A discussion followed in which it was noted by Dr. Craven that this was one instance where the SIOP (Single Integrated Operating Targeting) was different from the TDP, and this created a problem because if the SIOP requirement is beyond the TDP specification, it would be much better to know what some of these requirements were in order to design things differently. Admiral Smith stated that it was necessary not only to tell the targeting people what the [ILLEGIBLE] was, but also to prove it, and that proving it was becoming very difficult as it was taking more and more data to justify or support the use of the sighted accuracy in targeting.

"We are finding," said Mr. Morton, "that the value of the Type 11 is not so much just adjusting the azimuth or making the azimuth bias correction itself, but in making computations of of problems such as roll, pitch errors in the system and vertical [ILLEGIBLE] in the platform. This is coming from the use of the Type 11 by multiple sights and multiple headings rather than just the one [ILLEGIBLE] correction that the Type 11 was originally assumed to make as a means of correcting headings. This has shown up very dramatically in the last couple of patrols, and this is the benefit of the Type 11."

"You do not have to validate the SIOP data," said Admiral Smith. "You take a small enough number of readings to validate that it is between one and two miles and then use the two-mile data. The only trouble is that this is not satisfactory — people want to get credit for 1.03 n. m. CEP and then they require the data to justify this figure."

Dr. Craven remarked that the number of missiles required to cover a particular target was smaller in the 1.03 n.m. mode and that from the additional cost-effectiveness standpoint the gain might be worth while if indeed all one has to do is demonstrate 1.03 instead of 2.

"There is no question of a direct solution to this problem of surfacing," said Captain Kern. "The simple approach in BuShips is to avoid the surface, but the SSB(N)'s on patrol need to get to surface and use a periscope once a day."

Another reason for coming to the surface," remarked Commander Slonim, "is that the VLF transmitting stations were down in a tactical situation and backup communications would require a near surface operation."

"That is a good point, " said Captain Kern, "because if we decided against going to periscope depth at all to solve the problem, we would be criticized for using, say, LORAN C, with only the floating wife. " We operate a redundant navigation system that depends on the Type 11 and the depth sounder, BQN-3, and I think we would be missing a bet not to use the Type 11 as it is designed.

"To summarize the actions that we have initiated since we received that message from CINCLANTFLT, we feel that the best approach to the near surface depth control problem is to build a higher sail and increase the height of the mast in order to maintain depth in high sea states. If we put the ship bodily deeper in the water so that it can operate in high sea states, it could take the Type 11 sights from a deeper depth. Essentially, we are talking about doing this to the last 12 submarines."

"What is the practical change in keel depth?" asked Dr. Mechlin.

"At the moment," replied Captain Kern, "we have examined in detail a 10-foot increase in keel depth which would give us a considerable reduction in the Cummings, or suction, force. We also based this 10-foot estimate on past experience, namely, the actual work that was done on the USS GROWLER, an SS(G) type of submarine that had a serious depth control problem similar to the one that has been reported — in fact probably more serious.

"The sail was heightened ten feet and the USS GROWLER now has satisfactory depth control under near surface conditions. I might read a portion of the USS GROWLER letter on this to PACFLT.

‘The recent ten foot extension of the sail has vastly improved depth control, both at periscope and snorkel depth. The ship successfully snorkel charged in state 6 to 7 seas, an impossible feat before modification. Some difficulty maintaining depth is still experienced when heavy seas, primarily long swells, are coming either from ahead or astern.’

"In the THRESHER-Class, where a similar depth control problem exists under near-surface conditions because of the very low sail and short mast, we have put in a higher sail and lengthened the mast to get the ship bodily deeper in the water.

"The problem with this approach is, of course, that it requires extensive change and is not readily backfitted on such ships as the 608-, 598-, or 616-Classes. We have now started with the Electric Boat Division a detailed design study of raising the sail on the 640-Class. We have not stopped the design work to go ahead with the lower sail, but we have these parallel studies under way to provide a detailed set of plans for a higher sail. We are looking at the weight implications, the naval architecture, and type of stability control implications of the change.

"Actually, three approaches are being examined. One is to increase the mast and sail heights ten feet, and our study shows now that this is feasible; second is to provide a conning tower or pods above the pressure hull that would permit retaining the same mast height, but would raise the mast the additional 10 feet required to get the ship bodily deeper in the water. The third approach is to increase the height of the tail six feet and the height of the mast 10 feet, while swallowing 4 additional feet of mast that would protrude above the sail if there is room below the existing mast to do this. This last approach appears right now to be the most attractive. The conning tower study does not require a new mast design, but the other two that appear more feasible do require a new design of the Type 11 mast. We have asked SP to investigate what is involved in giving an increase of 10 feet in the Type [ILLEGIBLE] mast."

"You said this design change would start with the 640-Class," said Admiral Smith, "but equipment for the 640-Class was ordered last summer."

"The design change would have to proceed on a high priority basis to get equipment delivered in time for the 640-Class," said Captain Kern. "The times we got were a year and one-half from 'Go' to delivery of an extended length Type 11."

Pages 118 to 128

Admiral Smith asked if they could add 10 feet to all the periscopes other than the Type 11, and Captain Kern answered that there were only four penetrating masts involved in the lengthening, the Type 11, the 8B, 2D and ECM masts.

Captain Kern said that the 2D did not have to be larger because it was taller than the 8B and gave great operating depth now. "It is taller than the Type 11, so in getting the Type 11 depth, the 2D sticks farther out of the water, and it is not very useful because it is not faired. Going at 6 knots it cannot be used because it vibrates too much,"

Mr. Cestone felt that it would never work to lengthen the Type 11 mast because of the optics problem involved. "We are looking at other programs such as the use of viticones." Admiral Smith noted that this would require a new program starting nine months behind schedule. Mr. Cestone said that raising the sail and lengthening the mast might indeed require a new program.

"We will have the two designs," continued Captain Kern, "but we are not stopping the design progress to accommodate the present length of the Type 11. We feel that it is most urgent to get on with the tall sail design. Once we get a date when the Type 11 will be available, the design will be married into the shipbuilding schedule."

Mr. Cestone noted that Sperry and Electric Boat Division were investigating the problem of moving the bearing mounts up in the sail area, and he felt concerned about the problems involved in doing this.

"Before Captain Kern leaves the depth control problem," said Mr. Eyestone, "I wonder if there is a rational possibility of monitoring the azimuth performance with the available bottom data and platform rotation. Compared to the monitoring that you can get in a state 5 sea with the Type 11 periscope, perhaps we already have at least as good an ability to know what the system is doing. In other words, you have two ways of monitoring azimuth — perhaps Type 11 monitoring is unnecessary, I am assuming that there is going to be a deterioration of what you can get from Type 11 monitoring in a state 5 sea for two reasons. One is that the presence of cloud cover obscuring stars must be considerably higher in a state 5 sea. The second reason is that there are more strains put upon the periscope at that time and there is a higher computation process then to resolve through the pitch and roll angles."

"To provide an immediate improvement for the 608- and 616-Classes," resumed Captain Kern, "for the near-surface depth control problem, we have a detailed design study under way at Electric Boat Division which moves the sail planes out of the sail and lowers them by transposing them to the bow of the ship. This means that the planes, the operating cylinders, the ram and its associated gear are put in a capsule up on the bow of the ship, getting them considerably deeper in the water, and at the same time giving a much improved trimming moment for the action of the planes.

"We spent years convincing people that the bow of the ship was not the place for planes because they would interfere with sonar there. We now are coming 180 degrees around, at least on a trial basis. We feel that there is some chance of this working without interfering with sonar, based on our tests of the hindsight sonar pod that was very large and mounted right above the BQR-7 sonar. That gave no interference with the BQR-7 sonar in our various trials of that configuration on the 608-Class.

"The pod that is on the BQR-7, put there for hindsight, is bigger than the pod we will need for mounting the planes on the bow, so we have at least some degree of assurance that we will not have a noise problem with the pod. The next question is will we have a noise problem as far as the planes and action of the planes, and the hydraulic system that drives the planes are concerned. What we are proposing here is a trial installation. We are going to use a set of the planes and cylinders "from the 616-Class ships, build and mount a pod on the bow of the ship, blank in the holes in the side of the sails where the planes come off, and try it at sea. We can have the plans in four to six weeks but we have no date yet for production of the trial installation; we hope to get to sea with it sometime this summer. If it is feasible, we think we can build a kit that could be installed by a team from the tender and could at least be installed on ships on the way, hopefully, without delaying delivery of those ships.

"Lowering the sail planes bodily in the sail creates an interface problem within the sail, disturbs the mast alignment, and involves considerable delay in ship construction. We could eliminate that part of the problem if the kit does not interfere too much with the sonar suit. Again, we think it is worth a try and we have a detailed design study going at Electric Boat Division to convert the present auxiliary tanks to depth control tanks.

"As you may know, the depth control tanks in the 608-Class are located at center buoyancy. They were put there purposely because they are used at launch depth and we wanted to be able to add and subtract weight without any trimming moment.

"Now we have a slightly different problem. We hope by using the forward auxiliary tanks to get a pair of depth control tanks that will give us weight change plus trimming moment capability. Here again we can design a kit, jury-rig a temporary piping set up, that will enable us to fit this on the 616-Class ship and try it at sea. It will tie into the existing depth control tank sensing system and control system; we are running computer studies at Electric Boat to check the effectiveness of this approach and at the same time make a detail design for the approach. David Taylor Model Basin is being directed to arrange for the instrumentation of the sail planes on the SSB(N)6xx

If we miss the 618-Class, we will try the next available ship for at-sea tests in a further effort to pinpoint the source of sail plane banging.

"We will use the Electric Boat test results from the USS THOMAS EDISION as the starting point to do a better job of instrumentation and testing to see if we can get some results this time. We also have at Electric Boat a system of pre-loading sail plane bearings which can be installed in a ship also as a trial installation, if we can get 618-Class test results on their sail planes. It is indicated that the problem stems from stock slamming in the bearing. We have this pre-load device that will keep the stock pressed up against the after side of the bearing and prevent it from slopping around. It is an added complication, though."

Dr. Craven asked if the banging were caused by the sail plane coming out of the water. Captain Kern replied that it had not been determined. "It could be as the ship drops because of vertical motion of the water by the plane, that the water is cavitating, causing the bubble formed above the planes to collapse and slam against the upper surface of the planes.''

"Is there phenomenological data beyond this?" asked Dr. Mechlin. "For example, can you correlate the loudness of the noise with the depth or the heading of the ship, or anything?"

"The report is here in detail," replied Captain Kern. "It is unfortunate, which is the only way I can describe it. We were unable to correlate any of these pieces of information. On the USS THOMAS EDISON we had microphones mounted on the trunk; we had accelero-meters mounted on the side of the sail, on top of the planes, on top of the stock, on top of the bearings. We had pressure transducers mounted around, and when we got a bang in one instance there was no change in the pressure transducer in the hydraulic system, and no apparent change in the accelerometers on the sailplanes. Then we got a bang in another instance and there would be a pressure fluctuation in the hydraulic system, but at that point we had some considerable depth of water over the planes, as measured by the pressure transducer. This just did not correlate. We could not find the source of the banging."

"You need a water velocity of about 25 knots to get decavitation at that depth," noted Dr. Craven.

Captain Thompson asked if this could be model tested where repeatability was possible, and Captain Kern replied that stock slamming could not be model tested but some hydrodynamic features could be tested this way. "Can you vary your clearances, say, between the bearing and the stock in the model?" asked Captain Thompson. "It is a matter of ten thousandths of clearance, and this is pretty difficult to scale down in the model and then simulate banging," replied Captain Kern.

Captain Kern reiterated that they could determine nothing from the tests in the USS THOMAS EDISON except that the test was inadequate. "We plan to leave the instrumentation on in patrol. We have model tests under way at the David Taylor Model Basin to determine the effect on depth control and other ship characteristics such as blade rate, snap roll and turn, stability and control aspects involved when we heighten the sail, and the keel depth of the ship.

"Comparison tests will be run using the existing 608-Class sail design, the existing 640-Class sail design which is the same height as that of the 608-Class but with lowered sail planes, and the existing 608-Class sail plane height with 5-, 10-, and 15-foot increases in the height of the sail. We will examine depth variations of 55, 65, and 75-foot keel depths.

"Model tests and studies have now been completed relative to the effect of reducing the height of the rudder. We have found that directional stability is still satisfactory after we reduce the height of the rudder by some 30 inches, so it is equivalent to the directional stability of the 598-Class. The turning circle is decreased slightly by reducing the height of the upper rudder. We are now examining the cost of incorporating this change to get 30 inches off the top of the rudder.

"We have participated with SP and Westinghouse in study groups to examine the possibility of using ULCER equipment to assist in the depth control problem. We understand that it appears feasible to make the ULCER usable at the 50-foot keel depth vice the 70-foot limit that exists now. It appears reasonable that we could expect to use ULCER as a tool for predicting the suction forces by using the cross deck velocities. This then would be used as an input to a control circuit that would drive the planes and/or depth control tanks. We hope this would give us better use of these control features by actually predicting what the surface suction forces are doing to the ship.

"We do not know when this task is expected to be completed, but I understand it is being handled at high priority within SP.

"On the problem of roll affecting depth control at launch depth, we have already taken action to get Electric Boat to build the kits necessary to install the non-sensitive roll depth-sensing equipment in the ships by the tender. We ought to have all the 608-Class fitted very soon, the same as the 610-Class.

"The Commanding Officers of the ships have requested us to give them some information on how the Cummings or surface suction, forces operate. They want to know the best orientation of ship and the optimum operating conditions in order to improve their ability to maintain depth at near-surface conditions. We will have a report ready for them within the next two weeks."

"Apropos of that orientation," said Dr. Craven, "the curve you have on the Cummings Report shows that for beam seas the suction force is very much lower than it is for head and following seas."

"We have also asked the Type Commanders to give us a report on where and when they have encountered high sea states on past patrols," said Captain Kern, "We intend to use this information by asking the Hydrographic Office for a hindcast of the sea state in full at the time the Commanding Officers were reporting the problem. Since the Type

Commanders readily admit that this is a matter of looking at the ULCER and eyeballing the sea through the periscope, they feel this is not a very accurate determination. So we would like to find out if we are dealing with a state 5 sea, or a 6 or 7 sea, on the occasion that gave the problem. The Hydrographic Office has been contacted and has agreed that this can be done fairly accurately and they will accommodate us when we get the information from the Type Commanders.

"We are attempting to optimize the near-surface depth keeping ability of the automatic maneuvering control system that is already installed in these submarines. They have a maneuvering control system that is automatic, in that it reads depth error and has an input to the plane control circuit that directs the planes to keep the ship within +/- 6.0 inches of depth. It works well away from the surface and the surface effects; it has not worked well near the surface.

"Sperry is studying this system and advising the Type Commanders of the various factors that affect the ship at near-surface conditions. The Commanding Officers are attempting to optimize their automatic maneuvering patrol system to do a better job at the near-surface condition."

"What limits are there on the rate of movement of the sail planes ?" asked Admiral Smith.

"It is between 4 and 5 degrees per second," said Captain Kern. "At Sperry they designed for this, and you do not know what you have until you get out there and test it. It has come out as high as 7 degrees. I do not recall the exact numbers from these ships. I think it would be nearly correct in saying 5 degrees per second.

"Over the past couple of years the Bureau has been looking at the hover jet approach. The Model Basin has studied this and has indicated that it showed some promise. Unfortunately, practically all the studies that we have run in the Bureau or at the Model Basin are aimed at using the hover jet at the launch depth condition rather than the near-surface condition. We have one set of hover jet equipment that is on procurement and is scheduled to be delivered in 1964 for test at the Engineering Experiment Station. I think if this works out in test, we can get it to sea and test it in a submarine.

"One of the problems at the moment with the use of the hover jet system is that it has four jets with 2000 pounds of thrust per jet. There is a total availability of about 8000 pounds of thrust which is sufficient for the launch depth control problem. It would be perhaps minimal for the near-surface problem, and we have not run any computer studies as to .the effect of speed on this hover jet system when it is in operation at ship's speed. So we have to get some computer studies that will investigate the hover jet system on the 608-Class at, say, 6 knots."

"I might comment here," said Dr. Craven, "that one of the things we are concerned about is not overcoming the entire suction force with the hover jet, because there is a mean suction force that goes with the sea state. What we are concerned about is the rapid fluctuations with the hover jet system so the hover jet in combination with the ballast system can provide large mean forces with a very substantial 8000 pounds. Eight thousand pounds, for example, would take care of the entire mean force we can expect at a 60-foot keel depth in the lower side of a state 5 sea.

"The only point I was making is that the fast response time of the hover jet coupled in a loop with the ballast tank, together with a measure of the loop in which the Cummings force is measured, certainly shows promise of resolving this problem.

"Vitro has completed some studies of hovering not at near surface, indicating" that the use of hover jets can well exceed the present hovering requirements if a combination of the hover jet and ballast tanks is used."

Captain Kern stated that the depth control tanks were adequate at depth, but Dr. Craven said the hover jet exceeded the requirement at depth. "The other comment I would like to make," continued Dr. Craven, "is that I think the 1964 time scale on the hover jets is not as short a time scale as one could bet for a hover jet system."

Captain Styer asked if the hover jet system were feasible as far as space and weight limitations were concerned for the periscope depth. "You have limitations in thrust on the hover jet because of the size of the pump, propeller, motor, and ducting inside the ballast tanks. Without completely redesigning our ballast tank area to take a much larger unit, we are limited to 2000 pounds thrust per jet. However, if you are going into a new design and orienting your tankage around the use of a hover jet, you could probably go to a much higher thrust.

"We have considered only two systems inside the tanks. One is four ducts with individual motors and propellers in each duct. They penetrate from top to bottom of the ballast tanks, port and starboard, forward and aft. The other system uses a single motor and propeller, and the four ducts are openings — port and starboard, forward and aft. This system uses a means of diverting the flow by hydraulic valving to keep it running all the time. At neutral it puts as much water out at the top as it does at the bottom. When you want to get a thrust action of one direction or another, you can divert the flow to the bottom jets or the upper jets."

"Are we doing any cross comparison studies between this installation vis-a-vis the extension of the sail and other proposed solutions?" asked Dr. Craven.

"We do not have costs on the extension of the sails yet, and it will be some time before we can get them," answered Captain Kern.

"The question was raised about the possibility of hover jet installation in the 598-Class during retrofit. The 598-Class retrofit includes, for reasons of depth control improvements, a set of ballast control tanks equal in capacity to the 608-Class ballast or depth control tanks with the same control system for these depth control tanks. Since the 598-Class is a smaller ship, we would expect equal or better depth control at launch depth in the 598-Class after this modification.

"This improvement can be accommodated as far as space and weight are concerned in the 598-Class retrofit. It may be possible to get the hover jet as a contender to the depth control tanks. However, it would be risky because this hardware is not tested and developed and the lead time for procuring it would put us very close to the stop date of the 598-Class overhaul. The problem is whether we would have tested the system such as this at sea, and whether we would want to commit the ship to go out without the depth control tanks, expecting that the hover jet was going to work out since the depth control tank system is a proven system at this point."

"Was it observed that there was any difference in the performance of the automatic depth control aboard the submarine which apparently had depth sensors which are insensitive to roll?" asked Mr. Lockwood.

"I cannot answer that," said Captain Kern. "I do not recall that the information was furnished."

"The ships that claimed the greatest problem were those that did not have the new sensors," remarked Commander Slonim. "In other words, the SSB(N)610 claimed the least near-surface problem of all. "

"That is sensitized into the automatic maneuvering control system," said Captain Kern. "The sensor does them absolutely no good since they were controlling the ship in manual during the near-surface phase.

The report was that they did not find any ability to control the ship with the automatic maneuvering control system- I do not know how the new sensors would help in this situation. They might get a better readout on the depth gauge."

Admiral Smith stated that he now accepted Captain Kern's opening comment that BuShips and submariners had spent their full time on this problem. He then adjourned the conference at 5:10 p.m.

Page 151 – SYSTEMS APPRAISAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

“On the other hand hand, the committee suspects that anyone who talks about a CEP of less than 0.5 n. m. has been smoking illegal tobacco.”
– Doctor Craven.

Pages 183 to 186 – SYSTEMS APPRAISAL COMMITTEE DISCUSSION

"You mentioned several times," observed Admiral Smith, "that you had not looked into the need for your end result. I have a letter from CNO which specifies a need from which we can derive, in different terms, our CEP. It states:

‘Provision of a hard target capability which will provide 50 per cent probability of severe damage to point targets hardened to 300 psi.’

For a large warhead — three megatons — this would come out to a 0.5 n.m. CEP. In terms of the 1.1 megaton warhead, it means a CEP of 0.4 n. m.

"We also have another paper from CNO which speaks about 20 per cent of the FBM force and another paper which says that 20 per cent of the missiles should have this hard target capability. It is difficult to see whether they mean eight submarines, or a percentage of mixed-load missile submarines, or what."

"I think the idea was to have submarines with a mixed load," replied Commander Clifford. "The statement was based upon the premise that 20 per cent of the targets would require the hard-target capability."

"Using eight submarines with the hard-target load would not answer the problem then," replied Admiral Smith.

"My understanding is that a mix of missiles in the total FBM force is what they desire," said Commander Clifford. "Twenty per cent of the available missiles should have this capability. The CNO letter examined two courses of action to provide this ability."

"I am interested in the distribution," responded Admiral Smith, "in terms of the necessary operational distribution of these missiles. There are many ways by which we could accomplish this, starting with eight submarines and continuing to 41 submarines with many points in between."

"This answer will probably have to go back to CNO," replied Commander Clifford, "for the point of the original communication would be to determine the technical feasibility of the plans suggested on it.

Admiral Smith interrupted further discussion to declare a luncheon recess.

Afternoon Discussion of the Systems Appraisal Committee Report

Admiral Smith convened the afternoon session by stating that he had talked further with Commander Clifford during the luncheon recess. "I found that, as I expected, putting all these 20 per cent hard-target missiles in eight submarines is not operationally reasonable. On the other hand, although desirable to spread them over all 41 submarines, this is extreme Quite possibly 20 or 30 submarines would take care of the operational problem. This means backfitting them into the 627-Class and possibly into the 616-Class.

"In any case, as soon as we go to more than eight submarines we are talking about having both A3's and the new missile on the same submarines. This means that we have to have a fire control scheme that can look at either one, or have guidance systems that can be used in both.

"This could be either a modified guidance system or a new guidance system. This then raises the question of backfitting a major portion of A3 missiles. We may then get into complications if missiles for the 598-Class, for instance, are not modified. This could result in the 598-Class requiring its own special A3 missiles."

After further discussion of how such a development would affect backfitting plans, Admiral Smith stated that the CNO letter that he [ILLEGIBLE] did not mention any time to accomplish this. Questioned by Mr. F[ILLEGIBLE] Admiral Smith conjectured that such a program would be a deliberate program, as opposed to a crash program, and would probably be to be operational about 1970 or later.

Dr. Wilson asked if there were any requirements for penetration associated with this.

"The CNO letter says that it is desirable that there also be penetration aids, if feasible," Admiral Smith replied.

"It is my personal opinion that we will not sell a token kind of compromise for ineffective penetration aids to OSD. I think in the light of that, we might look at what would be a reasonable all-over program. Considering that we are talking about an improvement on a system whose general characteristics we will not know until about three years from now, and in view of the figures that Dr. Craven has presented, I personally feel that it would be completely unreasonable to anticipate an accuracy of this sort without essentially all of the changes that Dr. Craven has talked about.

"A 3-megaton warhead," continued Admiral Smith, "reduces our range down to about 1500 nautical miles."

"Yes," agreed Commander Julian, "that assumes you can build the 3-megaton system in a 1550-pound total re-entry system weight."

Admiral Smith asked if a 1500-nm range changed the CEP figure.

Dr. Craven replied that about 0.8 is a rule of thumb multiplier between the figure he gave for 2500 and for 1500 n.m's. So, if you have 0.5 n.m. CEP at 2500, you have about 0.4 n.m. CEP at 1500.