Originally OCRed 17 JUL 2010
Slightly Revised 26 OCT 2021

STUDY S-467

THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. STRATEGIC COMMAND AND CONTROL AND WARNING, 1945-1972 (U)

PART ONE
1945-1953

I. THE SETTING

It has been said that although the United States emerged from World War II with unrivaled power and prestige, only a few years later it found itself less secure militarily than at any time since 1815. The events of only three or four years led the United States to reverse its long-standing traditions and to begin the building of a large, permanent military establishment.

It was the appearance of atomic energy that transformed the American military establishment, and the story of the years from 1945 to 1953 is one, in its most crucial essence, of grappling with a host of totally new problems deriving from the fabulous new force. Walter Millis has described the situation well. Referring to the outlook in the fall of 1945, he wrote:

This background of confusing and conflicting issues, all interrelated yet all unavoidably having to be met on a more or less piecemeal basis, should be kept in mind in any assessment of the decisions of the time. To most in those days the greatest of all was the awesome, the mysterious and the wholly novel issue of atomic energy. It had been presented suddenly and shockingly with the fall of the bombs on Japan in the last days of the war. Nobody understood it, had any grasp of its implications or of what to do about the startling new facts which it had apparently injected into the international world of war and policy. But it was an issue in which clearly military (or strategic) considerations appeared to come most directly into conflict with clearly non military (diplomatic, economic, social and civilian) considerations.¹

[Footnotes for Part One begin on p. 125.]

Atomic weapons had to be given a place in overall national strategy. A concept for their use had to be developed.

Doctrine on when and how to use them had to be created, along with the war plans to be implemented. A system of administrative control and custody to safeguard the weapons had to be devised. A military force had to be established to use atomic weapons. Finally, in anticipation of the eventual Soviet acquisition of nuclear weapons, a warning system had to be created.

These are the threads that will be pursued in this study of the growth of command and control of strategic offensive forces and of warning against strategic attack. In these early years, command and control must be construed very broadly to include all the efforts to get a grip on atomic energy for military purposes.

The struggle to fit atomic weapons into the national armory took place against a backdrop of long-term developments that both influenced that struggle and, in turn, were influenced by it. These included the following:

(1) The process of unification of the Armed Forces and, most particularly, the creation of an independent US Air Force. This process, especially between 1945 and 1948, occupied much of the attention of the Air Force leadership.

(2) Service rivalries, especially between the Air Force and the Navy, which quickly became involved with the nuclear weapon issue. The rivalry was both the cause and the product of broader issues that fundamentally impinged on strategy and force structure.

(3) The changing perception and reality of the Soviet threat. The real watershed of the period was the first Soviet nuclear explosion in August 1949. The steady growth of Soviet capabilities provided the background for US developments.

(4) The erratic pattern of military budgets in this period. The years 1945-46 saw a tremendous contraction in the military budget; 1947-48 a modest expansion; 1949 to mid-1950 a contraction; mid-1950 to 1952 a huge expansion; and 1953 on, the end of the Korean war and the Eisenhower New Look with its projected economies. To be sure, the budget for strategic forces never fluctuated as much as the budget as a whole; the strategic nuclear striking capability showed a steady, if surprisingly slow, increase.

(5) The continuing battle over resource allocation between offensive striking forces and air defense. While the JCS disagreed bitterly among themselves on the issue of overall budget allocations, they usually stood together in supporting the primacy of a strategic offensive capability over a strategic defensive capability and tended to resist the expenditure of large funds on air defense and warning.

In terms of the breadth and speed of US developments, the eight-year period divides into two parts, from 1945 to the outbreak of the Korean war in June 1950, and from mid-1950 through 1953. Through most of this period a military stalemate existed between the American atomic bomb and the Soviet ground forces. Soviet forces held Western Europe hostage against American pressure on the Soviet Union, while, in turn, American atomic airpower held Soviet cities and industry hostage against any Soviet attempt on Western Europe. Yet, the US Armed Forces grew slowly from a 1946 demobilization low point. By June of 1950 there were only 10 understrength Army divisions and 48 air wings. Nevertheless, Winston Churchill articulated the generally accepted truth when in March 1949 he declared that it was certain that Europe would have been communized and London under bombardment some time ago but for the deterrent in the hands of the United States.

The Soviet development of the nuclear bomb in mid-1949 threatened to undermine this balance. Henceforth, American cities would be at risk. The Korean war provided another shock, for the war seemed to make perfectly clear to US decisionmakers the Soviet willingness to use force. In all the crises of the preceding three or four years, the Soviets had been cautious. Now it appeared that they might be changing, Thus, Korea led to a major expansion of the active forces and especially of the strategic atomic forces. The first step, in concert with the creation of NATO, was aimed at building something of a counterbalance to the Soviet ground forces in Europe. The second was designed to increase the probability of deterrence by making the atomic striking forces sufficiently strong to absorb any Soviet atomic attack. The great growth of the strategic offensive forces and increasingly elaborate machinery to control them came after 1950.

The incompatibilities between the two efforts soon became obvious, however. Advocates of strategic airpower pointed out that the United States was attempting to maintain a precarious and very costly balance between two basically distinct concepts of war—atomic deterrence and containment with ground forces large enough to block the Soviets in a land battle. Achievement of the latter objective was turning out to be much more problematical than achievement of the first, both financially and politically. This fundamental disagreement over broad strategic concepts permeated the second part of the period into the Elsenhower administration, when the disagreement reached its peak.

The chapters that follow cover two main topics. The first, Chapters II-VI, deals with the efforts to develop an offensive capability. The second, Chapters VII-IX, concerns certain of the defensive measures taken by the United States in response to the Soviet atomic offensive capability.

II. THE IMPACT OF ATOMIC ENERGY AND THE CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR ITS MILITARY EMPLOYMENT

The abrupt ending of the war in the flash of two atomic bombs gave the military leadership of the United States little time to contemplate the new force. While the political leadership clearly recognized the new dimension in war and national power equations, as was evidenced by the activity to establish some international control of atomic energy, the leadership of the Army Air Forces (AAF), those most immediately concerned among the military, was generally much more conservative in its approach. For many, the real remaining question for the future was how to perfect a better delivery system in the form of a very long -range bomber.

In 1945-46 and, to a lesser degree, even into early 1948, there were two groups of strategic thinkers in the AAF/ USAF. The majority held that the atomic bomb, despite its power, did not fundamentally transform the nature of war or its strategy. Furthermore, it was a relatively unknown weapon and was and would be scarce. The minority view held that the potential of atomic weapons was immense and incalculable.

It was not until 1948 that there was a general awakening to the significance of atomic weapons.¹ Even then, ambivalence continued to exist in some surprising quarters. For example, the Chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), David Lilienthal, recorded that at a 30 June 1948 meeting with Secretary of the Army Royall, Secretary of Defense Forrestal "said again that the American public has a mistaken idea of the value of atomic weapons. In his view they are powerful but not decisive." Royall felt they might be decisive.²

General Arnold, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, in September 19^5 had appointed a board under General Spaatz to consider the impact of atomic weapons on the AAF, its deployment, size, organization, and composition. The findings and recommendations (for the period 1945-55) were quite conservative. The board found that atomic energy did not warrant a major change In the nature of the postwar AAF or in the concept of the strategic air offensive. It stressed the need for all types of air forces with nonnuclear weapons and for outlying bases. However, the report did stress, as an assumption, a fundamental change—that the United States would not have the time to arm after a war began, and thus required a force in-being.³ The board's conclusions actually dealt mostly with air defense, the need for an intelligence warning system of unprecedented effectiveness, and the need for a large R&D program. Curiously, the Spaatz board failed to recommend specifically the creation of an atomic striking force, although it did state that the United States would have to be prepared to take retaliatory or preventive action.⁴

By early 1946, the more farsighted of the AAF leaders had come to recognize the fundamental change in strategic concepts that was required. No longer could the United States rely upon a small military force in-being that could be enlarged after war began. Both offensive and defensive forces had to be war-capable at all times.

Among political authorities and scientists, the initial reaction in late 1945 and early 1946 to atomic energy was one of grave concern. The wartime relationship with the Soviet Union was rapidly breaking down, and while international controls were generally favored, the US secret could not be given up until such controls were certain. Even General Spaatz at this time advocated world government and international control of atomic energy.⁵

In view of Soviet hostility and the unlikelihood that the United States could continue to maintain a nuclear monopoly, the prospect of an atomic arms race with the Soviets was soon anticipated. Accordingly, AAP leaders began to plan on the basis of three key assumptions: that the atomic bomb was essentially a strategic weapon; that the United States would have to maintain undisputed leadership in strategic air weapons development; and that such primacy would depend on major pro-grams of R&D.

The Bikini tests of mid-1946, Operation CROSSROADS, led to significant results. The final JCS evaluation did not become available until June 1947, but its findings were earlier apparent. The report stated three main theses: (1) that US security required a policy of instant readiness to defend the United States against atomic attack, until it became certain that there would not be an atomic war, presumably because of international controls; (2) that offensive strength would be the best defense; and (3) that as long as atomic bombs could be used against the United States there ought to be a continuing production of fissionable material and an R&D program in all phases of atomic war.⁶

The CROSSROADS tests indicated to the AAF leadership the need for an effective means of delivery in the form of a specialized atomic striking force, a coordinated development of weapons and delivery vehicles, and a greater involvement of the AAF in the atomic energy program. Lt. General Curtis LeMay even felt that the JCS evaluation of CROSSROADS suggested both a need to redefine an aggressive act and a US readiness to launch a striking force to prevent another and greater Pearl Harbor. This was one of the rare instances when a senior air officer seemed to suggest the possibility of preemptive attacks, although the Spaatz board had hinted at the point as well.⁷

A. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS: DETERRENCE

It was early sensed that an atomic striking force, no matter how powerful, could not guarantee the nation security from attack. With few exceptions, both political and military leaders recognized that the United States would never strike first in an atomic war and that a determined enemy could get through any air defense system. As for the defense of Europe, there was no assurance that atomic destruction of Soviet cities and industry would hamper or prevent a Soviet advance to the English Channel.

The dilemma grew with time. Because there appeared to be no real alternative, military planners seemed to find a solution in the concept that a US capability to strike with great force and speed would deter an enemy from attacking in the first place—the costs ultimately would outweigh any expected benefits. A concept of "deterrence" had first been mentioned during the war and began to appear in formal JCS papers by early 1946. By the following year, it had gained wide acceptance in the AAF.

The concept received final sanction as national strategy at the highest levels of government with the publication of NSC 20/2 on 25 August 1948. The document, a statement of US objectives concerning relations with the Soviet Union, stated that "the US defense effort must be based on the principle of the deterrent."⁸ Another NSC document, NSC 20/4, approved 24 November 1948, also declared that attainment of US security required military readiness, maintained as long as necessary "to act as a deterrent to Soviet aggression."⁹ While deterrence thus became the keystone of US national strategy, the concept did not go unchallenged. Linked as it was to the concept of atomic blitz, it came under attack by the Navy in the interservice controversies that culminated in the B-36 hearings of late 1949 (see Chapter V). In a sense, the concept was predicated to a considerable degree on wishful thinking about a preferred course of enemy action. Theoretically, deterrence should have been most effective during the period of the US nuclear monopoly. In reality, the US atomic capability was so small that the US ability to destroy the Soviets in an exchange for Western Europe was very questionable. An intriguing question can be raised on this point. Did the Soviets have knowledge of the weakness of SAC in these years and of the smallness of the atomic stockpile?

As the weakness in the concept of deterrence was overcome, a second was to appear with the development of a Soviet nuclear capability and the inevitable growth of a situation of mutual deterrence.

B. CONCEPTUAL DEVELOPMENTS: THE ATOMIC BLITZ

Little was done by the AAF in 1946 and early 1947 to develop operational concepts and procedures for the fledgling atomic strike force. Neither specific war plans nor target lists were readied. Organization of the atomic energy program in the Air Force had yet to be accomplished by early 1948. An Air Force study in January 1948 called for the enunciation of a policy giving atomic warfare an overriding priority and for steps to ensure that the Air Force would acquire the necessary knowledge of atomic affairs.

The weakness of the overall atomic program was due in large part to the fact that some program elements had been deleted in earlier budgets, apparently because they were not considered of sufficient priority to retain. On 1 March 1948, the Air Force Aircraft and Weapons Board, in a report to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) stated that:

the USAF has not established complete strategic and operational plans for carrying out its mission of strategic atomic warfare, and does not have an integrated high priority program for its own development which is based on these plans.¹⁰

The report further stressed that atomic warfare must become the business of the Air Staff and the commands and not be relegated to one agency, such as the Air Force Special Weapons Group.

The surprisingly slow movement toward the creation of an atomic doctrine (and fighting force, too, for that matter) was the result of many factors, such as widespread ignorance about atomic matters among the military because of tight civilian control; the greater emphasis placed on the R&D part of the overall atomic program; the often difficult relations with the Manhattan Engineering District (MED), which had created the bomb during the war and controlled the program until the establishment of the AEC in 1946; and the confused organizational picture of those early years. Because of the widespread belief in 1945-46 that control of atomic energy should be removed from the military, the JCS themselves were somewhat isolated from the process of atomic energy policymaking until late 1946.

The number of AAF officers familiar with atomic affairs in 1946 was very small, and the tight security of the Manhattan Engineering District made it difficult to start training programs. For the Bikini tests, only one AAF bomb commander was selected and trained; five senior and five junior officers were trained in bomb assembly, preparation, testing, loading, and dropping.¹¹ This hesitant approach to atomic energy matters was typical and very self-defeating. Curiously, the Navy reportedly played a surprisingly active role in the atomic weapon training program in these early years, and Navy weaponeers were perhaps more numerous than those from the AAF.¹² In both cases, of course, the numbers were extremely small. Even in the newly created Strategic Air Command, most attention was being given to developing logistical programs.

There also was apparently confusion within AAF headquarters over just who had the responsibility for writing and promulgating doctrine for the new weapon and for determining the extent to which that doctrine differed from ordinary strategic bombing doctrine and procedures.

Prior to 1947, the AAF had only a very hazy view* of war operations. There were no war plans either at AAF headquarters or at SAC. It was during late 1946 and early 1947 that the AAF began to develop a concept of bombing with atomic bombs, which were regarded as purely strategic weapons to be used only when they could contribute decisively. For several years, the stockpile of weapons was to be limited by the availability of fissionable material. It was not until the demonstration of new technologies at the Eniwetok nuclear tests in early 1948 that it began to appear that scarcity of weapons might be only a passing problem. The early shortages, nevertheless, dictated targeting policy for some years, as will be described later, so that only the most critical enemy targets would be hit.

A pioneer study by the AAF War Plans Division in April 1947 on "Strategic Implications of the Atomic Bomb on Warfare" foresaw the long-range bomber carrying atomic weapons as the surest way to fight an atomic war for the indefinite future, although the study prophetically foresaw the ultimate replacement of the bomber by a long-range guided missile. The study enunciated what came to be known as the Spaatz principle, a concept of mass attack at the beginning of hostilities with a sufficient number of atomic bombs to achieve the complete defeat of the enemy. The report stressed the need for adequate intelligence and for a citizenry prepared to face the results of such an atomic blitz.

While the scarcity of weapons and the concept of atomic blitz were to influence all atomic planning, it was recognized that an atomic blitz would in actual fact not be a practical objective for some time because of the lack of adequate logistic arrangements, such as the availability of personnel trained to handle atomic bombs. It was soon clear that solution of these problems would have to precede detailed war plans.

It was also recognized that target studies would be particularly significant in atomic operations, because of the limited number of bombs and the need for a decisive campaign to avoid an extended atomic war. The first major target study prepared by the Air Staff in the summer of 1947 consisted of a list of cities in Europe and Asia on which the Soviet Union relied for military supply and equipment. Forty-nine of the most important targets, a combination of industrial areas and the oil industry, were chosen as the basis for calculating the number of atomic bombs required. The results showed a requirement for 100 bursts. The Air Staff, however, allowing for heavy operational losses (possibly up to 50 percent), felt that 200 bombs would actually be required. This estimate was used later in the year by the JCS In a report to the AEC on military stockpile requirements.

The atomic campaign was not expected to begin until sometime after actual hostilities had begun, possibly as much as six months later, after a period of Soviet advance into Western Europe. Bases from which the atomic campaign would be launched would be located in the United States and around the Eurasian periphery. The provision of escort fighters for the atomic bombers would not be possible because of the required depth of penetration and the enormous numerical superiority of the Soviet fighter defenses. Therefore, darkness and bad weather would have to be relied upon as the chief defenses of the bombers. No simultaneous massive assault—-no atomic blitz--was considered possible at the time or in the near future because of the technical limitations of the atomic bombs. As a result, the atomic campaign would likely follow the pattern of a drawn-out series of moderate-scale missions, with tactics based primarily on single aircraft sorties. An all-out effort would be made to launch the maximum number of aircraft, both diversionary aircraft and actual bomb carriers, each night and to compress the entire campaign as much as possible.

The Air Force Tactical and Technical Liaison Committee developed three tactical delivery plans using B-29s. The first called for night saturation, which involved single atomic attacks at night against a general area and the employment of many diversionary aircraft that would fan out from a central point to maximize confusion and disruption of the defenses. The second plan used extremely long-range attacks past the point of no return, with the crews either ditching their aircraft or bailing out.¹³ The third tactical plan involved a daylight formation attack by a single bomb carrier with B-29 escorts or a multiple bomber attack on a single target.

During the winter of 1947-48, planners in the Air Force Directorate of Planning developed the concept of "killing a nation" in the process of drawing up target lists. Recognizing the depreciation of World War II AAF population attacks in the US Strategic Bombing Survey reports, the planners concentrated instead on industrial targets. These were found to be located in 70 Soviet cities, and this led to the suggestion that the attacks be against cities as a whole rather than against specific targets therein. The concept then grew that the objective might well be to destroy not just specific industrial targets but the governmental control mechanism and the industrial mobilization base.

The "nation-killing concept" was also implied in a letter by the first commanding general of SAC, General Kenney, in August 1947. His letter is interesting not only as a reflection of his thinking but as a criticism of the slowness of the Air Force to think hard about the problem.

A war in which either or both opponents use atomic bombs will be over In a matter of days, so our target analysis system should change. Bombing of targets which will affect enemy production in a few months is meaningless. There is no time to destroy the enemy air force. The air force that is superior in its capability of destruction plays the dominant role and has the power of decision. The inferior air force has no role. Before it can be built up, the war will be over.

The advantage accruing to the aggressor who makes a surprise attack has become so great that it can almost be considered decisive. I believe this should be studied, analyzed, and discussed far more than we are doing today.¹⁴

Nation-killing, however, was strongly opposed by elements within the government and was rejected by senior military authorities. General Spaatz, too, did not subscribe to the concept; he felt that it should be possible to cripple Soviet industrial power by precision bombing of a few hundred square miles of industrial areas in a score of Soviet cities. For this decisive application of atomic power, Spaatz stressed the need for secure forward bases.¹⁵

C. EARLY ATOMIC WAR PLANS

On 21 January 1948, the Joint Chiefs approved JCS 1745/5, which stated a requirement for 53 atomic bombs (20 kilotons each) by that month. The document also enunciated the principle that best results could be achieved by the earliest delivery of bombs on target rather than by a protracted campaign. The JCS paper stimulated a buildup of nuclear forces and the preparation of the first formal atomic emergency and intermediate war plans.

The target date for the intermediate plan, DARK HORSE, was 1 January 1951. The plan emphasized the atomic strike as the first and decisive phase—an embodiment of the "Spaatz concept." Operations were to begin with a massive blow against the Soviet urban-industrial complex immediately upon the opening of hostilities, if possible, within less than 48 hours. Thereafter, the atomic campaign would continue at maximum possible pace for six months, during which time a decision could be expected or hoped for. (A less definite third phase of the plan involved the forward movement of US forces to seize bases and lines of communication preparatory to occupying strategic centers of the Soviet Union. The plan was to be changed continually as capabilities changed.)

The bases required for the atomic campaign were to be primarily in the United Kingdom and Okinawa. Later use would be made of Alaska, the Mediterranean area, Iceland, the Near and Middle East, India, and Spain.

The attrition rates presented in the plan were lower than previously projected. The plan called for masking the bomb carrier with 10 other bombers for a probability of bombs-on-target of 70 to 80 percent. The number of targets was reduced to the 20 most vital, for which a total of 53 bombs, their delivery insured by the launching of 83 bomb carriers, would be sufficient. It was felt that if completely successful, the attack would be decisive in ending the war, and even if only partly successful, would be so devastating and disruptive as to halt the westward advance of Soviet ground forces.

Work on the current/short-range emergency war plan, HARROW, also began in early 1948, but the plan was much more problematical than the intermediate one. . Given current capabilities, it was thought that 30 bombs could be delivered by D+30. It was later decided to aim for 50 bombs by D+46, given the continued availability of forward bases. The most critical problem in this regard was the availability of bomb-assembly teams. Only two were available for the immediate future, and the estimated turnout rate was one bomb per team per 24-36 hours. The plan called for loading all operational aircraft in the United States, flying them with bombs in a ready state to the forward areas, and delivering the bombs from there. The limited life of ready-state bombs would demand delivery within a short time after arrival at the forward bases.

On 19 May 1948, the JCS approved a Joint Emergency War Plan, called HALF MOON, for the period 1 July 1948-1 July 1949, and HARROW became the Air Force portion of it.

The commander of SAC, General Kenney, called at this time for planning to be geared to a capability to mount a single massive attack of 200 bombs delivered simultaneously. He pointed out that there would be a delay of up to 5 days before a single bomb carrier could take off, and a delay of up to 30 days before an attack by a full bomber group was possible Kenney stressed that solution to the problem lay in simplification of the bomb, fabrication of a stockpile of 200 bombs, training of sufficient USAF bomb-assembly teams, and control of the stockpile by the USAF.

The last suggestion, as will be seen later, reflected an issue that would become a matter of controversy among the services and between the AEC and the Armed Forces. Kenney's efforts did lead to increased training of bomb-assembly teams and a much increased expected rate of assembly by the following year.¹⁶

Early in 1949, the USAF rewrote its intermediate war plan, now called COWLICK, for a war during FY52. The plan called for the greater part of the atomic campaign to be completed before D+45. Atomic bombing on a greatly reduced scale would continue throughout hostilities, depending on the effect of the initial assault. Non-atomic bombing would continue until Allied forces could invade Europe. The atomic offensive would be launched from the northeast United States, Alaska, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom. The latter would be heavily used for the attack.¹⁷

These early plans for atomic war came under question from the political authorities. Apparently on 23 and 25 October 1948, Defense Secretary Forrestal had asked the JCS for their evaluation of the probable success of strategic bombing operations. Secretary of the Air Force Symington assured him that the Chief of Staff, General Vandenberg, was "absolutely certain" that the Air Force would be able to drop the atomic bomb when and where it wanted. Porrestal was well aware that the Navy thought differently and asked that the studies go on.

On 20 April 1949, the President was briefed by General Vandenberg on SAC plans. He then sent a request to Defense Secretary Johnson:

Yesterday afternoon I listened with interest to an Air Force presentation of plans for strategic bombing operations, in the event of war, against a potential enemy. I should like to examine an evaluation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the chances of the successful delivery of bombs as contemplated by the plan, together with a joint evaluation of the results to be expected by such bombing.¹⁸

On 27 April 1949, Secretary Johnson notified the JCS that he had received the request from the President on 21 April for a joint evaluation of strategic bombing operations. Reminding the JCS of the earlier Porrestal request, the Secretary urged expedited studies and periodic reports for the President, since the JCS had claimed that such an evaluation would take considerable time.¹⁹

The Secretary reported to the President on the matter. and informed him of the earlier Forrestal request and that an interim report of 17 February 1949 indicated a serious difference of opinion among the several Chiefs, not necessarily with respect to the appropriate conclusions, but rather with the type of evaluation which should be attempted and the validity of the intelligence data on which to base such an evaluation.

On 14 April 1949, the Secretary continued, the JCS had informed him that it was their unanimous conclusion that a very thorough evaluation of the intelligence data on which strategic air offensive plans were based must be undertaken and that the plans had been referred to the newly created Weapons Systems Evaluation Group (WSEG) for such joint evaluation. (The JCS had said the evaluation would take a full year.²⁰) However, WSEG was not formally tasked by the JCS to undertake the evaluation until 1 September 1949, ^and the report finally appeared in February 1950.

WSEG Report 1, Evaluation of Effectiveness of Strategic Air Operations, was carefully hedged; the JCS request for the study had "specifically excluded from consideration the effect such bombing would have upon USSR military capabilities and upon its will to wage war." The basis for WSEG's evaluation was the emergency war plan, OFFTACKLE, which was then being considered by the JCS. The OFFTACKLE plan called for the main weight of the attack to be delivered by medium bombers (a total of 370 B-29s and B-50s), mostly from UK bases; more distant targets would be struck by the heavy bombers (54 B-36s) from bases in US territory. The B-50s would go for 51 percent of the targets; the B-29s for 35 percent; and the B-36s for the remainder. The major portion of the atomic bombs was to be delivered in the first 30 days, and delivery and evaluation of results were to be completed within three months. The plan revealed the total dependence of SAC upon overseas bases, primarily the British ones. Yet British bases were very vulnerable, and the British would need 30 days warning to set up an antiaircraft defense for the bases. Coupled with the physical vulnerability of the British bases was the lack of a firm political agreement with Britain on base use.

The WSEG report was pessimistic. The findings were that logistics deficiencies and expected bomber attrition precluded an offensive on the scale called for in OFFTACKLE. In view of the infeasibility of carrying out the OFFTACKLE bombing program as a whole (including the conventional, high-explosive portion), the report recommended a re-examination of the whole target system.

The report stated that the atomic portion of OFFTACKLE could be carried out, provided Soviet air defense capabilities were not substantially better than the higher level assumed in the study and that actions were taken:

(1) To acquire both operating and staging bases, especially in the United Kingdom. (These would have to be defended, too. The study stressed that it had not yet been demonstrated that refueling techniques could obviate the need for bases in the near future.)

(2) To prepare to employ nearly all available military airlift to support the bombing offensive.

(3) To establish major aviation gas stocks in operating areas, since present stocks were not sufficient to support the needs of the offensive.

The WSEG report also stressed heavily the serious inadequacy of good intelligence on Soviet capabilities and target systems.²¹ This problem was to remain for the next dozen years. Air Force planners had so little data that in considering Soviet capabilities and strategies they were compelled to rely upon simple projections of US experience.

By the time of the publication of WSEG 1, more bombs were becoming available and separate low- and high-yield families of weapons were being developed. The anticipated availability of fissionable material seemed to indicate the eventual end of the scarcity problem that had conditioned previous campaign strategies.

Despite the watershed of the Soviet atom bomb explosion in August 1949 and the opening of the Korean war in June 1950, US strategic forces ended 1950 still weak. Decisions aimed at a huge buildup had not yet begun to take effect. The Air Force realized it could not prevent attack on and damage to the United States and that NATO could not hold Europe. There was also widely expressed doubt in Air Force circles that current capabilities could indeed deter a major Soviet attack on the United States.

During a general war starting in 1950, Air Force planners believed they could complete only the atomic phase of the strategic air offensive outlined in the OFFTACKLE plan, which would require about three months because of the lack of proper aircraft, prepared overseas bases, and overseas stocks of fuel. While it recognized that for shock effect it would be best to strike massively and quickly, the Air Force felt that It could do no better at the time.²² In these opinions, the Air Force agreed with the findings of the WSEG report.

The Air Force problem was complicated, too, by the additional requirement laid on SAC. Until the summer of 1950, the limited atomic capabilities had been committed solely to a strategic air campaign against war-supporting targets within the Soviet Union. The North Korean attack, however, generated concern that the Soviets might use Korea as a distraction under cover of which they would attack NATO. It was recognized that some form of direct atomic support for the defense of Western Europe would have to be found. Following Air Force instructions, SAC sent a revised atomic war plan to the Air Force on 12 August 1950. It set up three tasks:

(1) The BRAVO campaign to blunt the Soviet long-range air capability.

(2) The ROMEO campaign to retard the advance of Soviet ground forces into Western Europe.

(3) The DELTA campaign to destroy vital elements of the Soviet war-making capability.

The requirements of the retardation effort would clearly degrade severely the capabilities for executing the other two missions, and SAC assumed the mission with misgivings, The atomic stockpile was still modest and the nature of some of the targets was such that aircraft would be at serious risk in searching for them, aircraft that SAC preferred to preserve for the strategic attack. Retardation targets, however, had not been selected or even given some order of magnitude. An incident a year and a half later illustrated the problem. During a December 1951 visit to Europe, General LeMay, the commanding general of SAC, discussed retardation targets with General Norstad, commander of the Allied Air Force Central Europe. They first considered giving General Eisenhower, then SACEUR, certain stockpile data to assist him in evaluating the military significance of retardation targets, but they decided against the step. LeMay asked Norstad how many retardation targets might develop in Europe and was told that the Army was thinking in large numbers, but that Norstad would initially recommend to Eisenhower about 20.²³

A new factor entered the equation at this point, in that the retardation plan made provision for eventual Navy participation in an expanded atomic offensive.²⁴

The development of war plans was easier than the creation of an instrument to execute them, but even paper progress was slow. For example, no standard operating procedure (SOP) for the atomic striking force as part of a coordinated national emergency procedure was in effect as late as August 1948. A tentative SOP had been prepared in SAC in November 1947 for an exercise, but it never became official. The situation remained complicated by the fact that the AEC held actual custody of the weapons while the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project (AFSWP) would accept, assemble, and deliver them to the Air Force.

A commentator described the painful process of creating the doctrinal and procedural basis of an atomic air force in these words:

The development of plans and techniques for employing atomic weapons proved to be so slow that air leaders worked in a continuous state of alarm. In 1945-46 the AAF found itself in possession of a revolutionary weapon it was not prepared to employ. In addition to having only a few planes modified to carry the bomb and only six weaponeers to arm it, the AAF had no realistic plans or programs for exploiting the potential of atomic energy. This situation resulted from the extreme secrecy surrounding development of atomic weapons that allowed the AAF little familiarity with what was destined to be its primary weapon. Secrecy remained a difficult problem and hampered the AAF in achieving a thorough understanding of the implications of atomic energy as they related to strategy, tactics, development, and planning.²⁵

While certain aspects of problems mentioned above did improve by mid-1950, the overall capability of SAC to carry out its concept of an atomic blitz remained dubious. Almost five years after the appearance of atomic energy, the United States was still not prepared to use it effectively as the weapon on which US strategy was based. Neither the forces, facilities, doctrine, tactics, nor communications had been adequately developed. However, rapid development was to occur in the next three years.

III. CUSTODY OF ATOMIC BOMBS AND THE AUTHORITY TO USE THEM

The organizational and procedural problems deriving from the issue of custody of atomic weapons were among the earliest and most difficult encountered in the development of an atomic striking force. They presented a very special and, indeed, unique command and control problem, but one that, unlike many of the other early problems in command and control of strategic forces, has since disappeared. The controversies and problems in regard to custody were not only between the AEC and the DoD, but also within DoD itself at times, between the Executive and Legislative branches of the government, and lastly, between the United States and its allies.

The degree of control to be exercised by the newly created AEC aroused serious controversy. The McMahon Bill of 1946 required a purely civilian AEC, and this seemed to be favored by both the public and Congress. Nevertheless, it seemed clear that the limited supply of fissionable material, the unique military value of atomic energy, and the deteriorating international situation would combine to concentrate atomic energy activities in the weapons field for the foreseeable future.

.In order to coordinate AEC activities with the military, the Atomic Energy Act of 1946 established the Military Liaison Committee (MLC), which enabled the military to monitor the AEC without being a member of it. The AEC was directed to advise and consult with the MLC on all military applications of atomic energy.

The issue of custody arose during negotiations in December 1946 between the War Department and the AEC over the transfer of the assets of the Manhattan Engineering District. The military asked that some bombs and fissionable material be transferred to them for storage, but the AEC did not feel it necessary to decide the matter then.¹

The next month, when the AEC began to function, the Joint Armed Forces Special Weapons Project was established to assume the purely military functions of the old MED. The AFSWP, responsible to the service chiefs of staff individually, was to consolidate the technical atomic energy functions of the National Military Establishment.² The AFWSP was charged with the security of nuclear weapons, but the AEC held custody. It should be noted that the separate service command and control arrangements for the AFSWP were also to lead to an interservice controversy over the same issue of control of the stockpile.

The military argued for custody on the basis of a need for centralized responsibility for atomic weapons in order that they be readily available for Instant use. What was urgently needed was that the bombs be placed in locations where the military could reach them quickly.

A. EARLY ATTEMPTS TO CHANGE THE CUSTODY SYSTEM U

With the rise of tension over Berlin in early 1948, which was to culminate in the blockade, the issue of custody became a paramount one. The Air Force still faced the triple problem of obtaining a better designed bomb, training more assembly crews, and building storage sites for bombs, and the Military Liaison Committee had to admit that the Armed Forces were not yet adequately staffed or trained to assume responsibility for the weapons. The military were nevertheless determined to try to gain custody of the atomic bombs through an Executive Order of the President. In the course of three or four months of discussion, the major elements in the debate were delineated.

The military based their case on two main arguments:

(1) that the user of the bomb should have custody of it, and

(2) that centralization of authority was necessary.

The AEC, on the other hand, in the person of Chairman Lilienthal, based its objection to the transfer of custody on the general theory that the atomic bomb was not just another weapon but a unique instrument of war that carried the widest international and political implications; that the law that created the AEC dealt with certain constitutional relationships and prerogatives of the President; and that greater efficiency in terms of surveillance and R&D could be achieved by leaving custody with the AEC.

Lilienthal saw the dispute in broad terms. He felt that by forcing the technical issue of custody, the military were also looking for answers to very broad issues of policy, such as whether or not the bomb would be used, against what targets, and under what general circumstances. As will be seen, these questions remained unresolved and continued to hamper efforts to develop an atomic war capability. Apart from the fact that the question could not be answered with any precision, the President also clearly thought it inexpedient, for both domestic and international political reasons, to attempt to codify atomic war policy.

The President made no secret of his sentiments. White House Counsel Clark Clifford raised the custody issue with Truman on 30 June 1948 and was told "as long as I am in the White House I will be opposed to taking atomic weapons away from the hands they are now in, and they will only be delivered to the military by particular order of the President issued at a time when they are needed." The AEC, however, felt it expedient to allow a full airing of the issue in company with the representatives of the military.³

Defense Secretary Porrestal met with the President and Secretary of State Marshall on 15 July 1948, and in the course of the meeting asked the President for another hearing on the custody issue. Forrestal recorded that the President said that he wanted to go into the matter very carefully and proposed to keep in his own hands the decision to use the bomb, that he did not propose "to have some dashing lieutenant colonel decide when would be the proper time to drop one."⁴ Forrestal replied that the military had no thought of denying him freedom of action on the subject, but that there was a serious question as to the wisdom of relying upon an agency other than the user of such a weapon to assure its Integrity and usability. At Forrestal's suggestion of a general meeting, the President set 21 July to hear both sides of the custody Issue.

Secretary Forrestal and AEC Chairman Lilienthal presented their cases to the President as scheduled on 21 July. Forrestal's memorandum to the President reviewed the current custody arrangements and recommended, "with the support of the JCS and the Service secretaries, that the AEC be directed to deliver the atomic stockpile to the custody of the Armed Forces," as provided by law, to be held in readiness for instant use by the President.⁵

Forrestal's reasons were several. First, present arrangements resulted in a basic division of authority and responsibility. Custody and control lay with the AEC, but responsibility for final assembly and delivery lay with the National Military Establishment. Prompt transfer of the weapons to the Armed Forces was essential to full military preparedness. An enemy attack in force would expose the United States to unreasonable risk of mistake, confusion, and failure to act with necessary speed and precision. This risk could be removed by the transfer of custody to the Armed Forces.

Second, those who were charged with delivery of the bomb should be familiar with it. They must know its possible defects and the alterations that might be necessary under emergency conditions. They must have confidence in the weapon and In their own ability to use it. Custody was required for the training of atomic units. Third, custody would permit storage in the most favorable strategic locations, thus speeding up prep-arations when needed. Fourth, military custody would further R&D possibilities as the users became familiar with the weapon and its characteristics. Forrestal concluded by stating that the Armed Forces needed four months to prepare to assume custody and maintenance.

Lilienthal then presented the AEC case against military custody, as outlined above, after which the President made the observation that the responsibility for the use of the bomb was his and that was the responsibility he proposed to keep.⁶

The President decided two days later against the military case and gave as his reason "considerations of public policy," the necessarily close relation between custody and weapon research, the efficiency of existing methods of custody and surveillance, and the world situation.⁷

According to Forrestal's diary, the President told him personally that his negative decision was based upon political considerations connected with the forthcoming election. He said, however, that after the election it would be possible to take another look at the question.⁸ The President made a public statement on the issue the next day.

As a result of the President's decision, steps were taken by the military, through the AFSWP, to have more people trained for custody, and means for rapid transfer were revised. The presidential veto did not end military efforts to gain custody, however, but only temporarily suspended them. The political authorities clearly felt no great incentive to change the existing system. Forrestal raised the issue again at a meeting with the President and Secretary Marshall on 16 September, but Truman deferred it.⁹

Truman remained adamant on the issue of military custody David Lilienthal reported being told by Robert Oppenheimer of a meeting between the President and the General Advisory Committee to the AEC (of which Oppenheimer was a member) on 6 April 1949. Truman said he had received the day before a letter from Senator Tydings In which the Senator recommended military custody and military control of weapon production. The President told the General Advisory Committee explicitly that he had decided both of those questions and that they would stay decided that way so long as he had anything to do with it. He stated that he firmly believed in civilian control and had no reason to believe he would change his mind.¹⁰

Truman's attitude on the custody issue may well have been adversely affected by the swirl of interservice controversy that marked the first two years after the 1947 Defense reorganization legislation. A revealing episode was reported to Lilienthal by Director of the Budget James Webb. On 25 May 1948, Webb had attended a White House meeting with the President, Forrestal, and the Joint Chiefs. The President had previously given instructions that Forrestal apparently had been unable to enforce on the Chiefs and so Truman had called them in and given each Chief written Instructions containing a reprimand. Webb found the situation very disturbing and said to Lilienthal, "with that kind of situation, the idea of turning over custody of atomic bombs to these competing, jealous, insubordinate Services, fighting for position with each other, is a terrible prospect."¹¹

B. LATER DEVELOPMENTS : OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENT OF ATOMIC WEAPONS AND THE DIVISION OF CUSTODY

In these years, all atomic weapons were of the capsule ball type in which the nuclear component was separate from the nonnuclear component and mating was necessary before use. This technological feature actually was the key to the ultimate resolution of the custody issue, in that it permitted the problem to be divided and to be resolved on a more gradual basis.

Until the spring of 1950, both nuclear and non-nuclear components remained under AEC custody, except for short periods of maneuvers or training. By this time, however, there was no longer any doubt about the technical competence of the military in surveillance, inspection, and maintenance activities because the military were in fact already performing the three functions. They carried out most of these functions as a demonstration of competence at the storage sites. The AFSWP by then had 1,500 trained personnel. Consequently, in March 1950 the AEC proposed that it turn over to the DoD custody of the stockpile of nonnuclear components, and on 14 June 1950, 90 nonnuclear components of the Mark 4 bomb were transferred to the DoD for training purposes.¹²

At this time the question arose of overseas deployment of weapons. The first step in this direction had really occurred in July 1946 when General Spaatz had arranged with the Royal Air Force to have two airfields in Britain equipped for the storage of special weapons.¹³ After the outbreak of the Korean war, the DoD requested and received presidential authority to receive nonnuclear components from the AEC for storage at overseas bases. The deployment of medium bomber wings to overseas bases logically imposed a requirement that the largest element in the bomb, the nonnuclear component, be immediately available. By authorizing the transfer, a partial forward step had solved a most difficult logistical problem.¹

The nonnuclear components were transferred to DoD and from there to specific services for custody. The nuclear components for them remained under AEC authority within the continental United States and were to be flown to the overseas bases when needed. By the end of July 1950, 89 sets of non-nuclear components were in place in Britain to support SAC units there, and the following month 15 sets were sent to the aircraft carrier USS Coral Sea. The JCS recommended this action in September for the vessel bound for the Mediterranean.

The Air Force had concurred reluctantly in this action and expressed opposition to further storage aboard carriers unless they were placed under the control of SAC.¹⁵ However, non-nuclear components were authorized also for storage abroard the carriers USS Franklin Delano Roosevelt in May 1951 and the USS Midway in December of that year.¹⁶ Following a request by the JCS in November 1951, the President in January 1952 also authorized the storage of nonnuclear components at the SAC bases in French Morocco.¹⁷ (The French were not to be informed of the move.)

The first transfer of complete bombs—nine in number— was authorized by the President on 6 April 1951 under unusual circumstances. The weapons were assigned personally to General Vandenberg, who was designated the personal representative of the President for custody of the weapons, acting as executive agent of the JCS.¹⁸

By this time, the custody issue had become quite clouded, to the extent that the Chairman of the AEC stated at an AEC-Milltary Liaison Committee meeting in March 1951 that the concept of AEC custody was empty since the military were already doing so much in the custody area. He felt that the real issue remaining was the proper division of responsibility in view of existing realities.

The next month the AEC and Military Liaison Committee jointly proposed the transfer to DoD of nuclear components in numbers to match the nonnuclear components already under -DoD custody. However, the JCS—without explanation—disapproved the proposal as untimely.¹⁹

In December 1951, after the Chairman of the JCS had reopened the custody issue with the Chairman of the Military Liaison Committee by recommending an effort to delineate more clearly the responsibilities of the AEC and the DoD, the JCS put forth their views to the Secretary of Defense. In a memorandum of 11 December 1951, they expressed the view that the current system of divided responsibility was not in the best interests of the nation, and that the Armed Services should have a sufficient number of atomic bombs in their custody to assure operational flexibility and military readiness.

The proposal was forwarded to the President, who in turn requested a study by the NSC's Special Committee for Atomic Energy. The study, entitled "Agreed Concepts Regarding Atomic Weapons," was approved by the President on 10 September 1952. The new guidelines provided that DoD would have custody of any stocks of atomic weapons outside the continental limits of the United States and of any such numbers of weapons within the continental United States "as might be required to assure operational flexibility and military readiness." The rest of the stockpile was to remain under the custody of the AEC.²⁰

The matter of overseas deployment of nuclear components was first raised by the Navy in January 1952 and led to a lengthy JCS dispute. By October 1952, the JCS agreed it was an essential step and on 8 May 1953 they recommended to the President that nuclear components be deployed along with non-nuclear sets to overseas locations where the decision to deploy rested solely with the United States. After consideration by the NSC's Special Committee for Atomic Energy, the proposal was approved by President Eisenhower on 20 June 1953. Nuclear components equal in number to the nonnuclear sets abroad would be deployed and would be transferred to the custody of the DoD. The President's approval meant that nuclear components went to Guam and to carriers, the only locations that met the prescribed restrictions and where storage facilities were available.²¹

Authority to deploy complete weapons to Britain and Morocco was obtained in April 1954, and storage of both nuclear and nonnuclear components was approved for West Germany two months later. Only nonnuclear components, however, were authorized for Japan.²² By mid-1954, half the authorized 183 weapons had been dispersed abroad.

The following tabulation Illustrates the slow growth of custody-sharing in terms of nuclear weapons in possession of the AEC and the DoD:

Despite the advances made In the custody situation in regard to overseas deployments, there still remained problems in regard to the main AEC stockpile within the United States. In March 1953, the Secretary of the NSC, Robert Cutler, forwarded to Secretary of Defense Wilson the AEC's "Plan for Action by the AEC for Emergency Transfer of Atomic Weapons to the Department of Defense." Cutler reported discussing the plan and the transmittal letter from the Chairman of the AEC with the President. Cutler was clearly concerned over what seemed an AEC optimism about the responsiveness of the transfer system:

I have been informed that the AEC advises that it takes twelve minutes from the time the President acts until the order to transfer arrives at the storage plant and that the mechanics of the plant are regularly tested. I assume the President would like to have the opinion of the Department of Defense as to whether in an emergency this plan would successfully operate or whether some other plan or modification of this plan would be better. ²⁴

A month later, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roger Kyes reported to Cutler on the DoD review of the AEC plan. Kyes stated that the elements required for the transfer of atomic weapons from the AEC to the DoD were issuance of a presidential directive; notification of the principal AEC and DoD field agencies; further notification by those agencies to storage sites; and the physical transfer of the weapons at the storage site.

The AEC plan constituted the AEC portion of the second element and merely outlined a notification procedure whereby principal AEC field agencies would be directed to initiate existing atomic weapons transfer plans. As such, Kyes reported, the DoD found the plan satisfactory and had similar plans for notifying its field agencies. The plans by which atomic weapons were transferred physically at storage sites were worked out in great detail among the Santa Pe Operations Office, the APSWP, and the Air Materiel Command, and at each storage site between the local AEC custodian and the service agency operating the site

Kyes' chief concern with the AEC plan also concerned its optimism:

The estimate of the AEC of twelve minutes from the time the President acts until the order to transfer arrives at the storage plant is apparently based on ideal conditions. For planning purposes, such estimates should take into consideration, among other things, the difficulties involved in notifying many individuals at widely scattered locations under emergency conditions.²⁵

Kyes pursued his concerns a few days later, categorically telling Cutler that the DoD considered the transfer of all completed weapons to be necessary for the assurance of the operational-readiness flexibility so essential to war plans and that the current division of responsibility was not responsive to that need. He presented what he termed cogent reasons for for DoD's position: atomic weapons were part of a larger weapons system and should not be separated from the whole; the current custody arrangements involved much duplication of effort; there were always possibilities under divided responsibility for a security leak of war plans; and with the number of weapons increasing, current arrangements would become more complicated.^{2 6}

A meeting of the NSC to discuss the issue was planned for 11 May, but was postponed.

It is interesting to note that the arguments raised by the Deputy Secretary of Defense were the same as those raised by Defense Secretary Forrestal five years before. But, while the basic problems were the same, they had become more acute with the changed strategic context. The Soviets by 1953 had both a stockpile of atomic bombs and the means to deliver them, so that the danger of a surprise nuclear attack was real instead of theoretical. Because of this, the time available to reach a decision had been compressed and the DoD was clearly not convinced that the existing arrangements could be accommodated to the new situation.

C. THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRESIDENTIAL CONTROL OF ATOMIC WEAPONS

If ... [the] problems and issues in military doctrine were not enough, there was overhanging all of them the possibility that, in the actual event of war, the President might decide for political reasons not to let the A-bomb be used at all. The services, it must be remembered, did not even have physical possession of the weapon that bulked so large in their disputes. It was in the hands of a civilian agency subject only to the authority of the President, but not the military, and the only clear national policy with regard to the bomb was that, under proper conditions, it would be given up.²⁷

Thus has an analysis of the times described one of the underlying dilemmas of planning and command in those years. Early in 1948, uncertainty about the use of the atomic bomb had begun to grow, creating the novel situation in which the weapon that seemed central to US strategic policy and planning was wrapped in ambiguity as to the time and circumstances of its use.²⁸ Custody and the issue of weapon release were basically two parts of the same broad issue, the unprecedented tight civilian control over a crucial weapon and thereby over the entire body of doctrine and the organization that had been created to use it.

The sole authorization that specifically placed the responsibility for control of nuclear weapons in the hands of the President was the provision of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946:

The President from time to time may direct the [Atomic Energy] Commission (1) to deliver such quantities of fissionable material or weapons to the armed forces for such use as he deems necessary in the interest of national defense or (2) to authorize the armed forces to manufacture, produce, or acquire any equipment or device utilizing fissionable material or atomic energy as a military weapon.²⁹

This provision was interpreted as constituting a special authority vested in the President for the use of atomic weapons. This could be viewed as redundant, since that authority was already vested in the President as Commander in Chief. The uncertainty at any rate was probably increased by a statement the President made on 30 November 1946:

Consideration of the use of any weapon is always in the very possession of that weapon. However, it should be emphasized that, by law, only the President can authorize the use of the atomic bomb, and no such authorization has been given. If and when such authorization should be given, the military commander in the field would have charge of the tactical delivery of the weapon.³⁰

Although strategic war planning could and did go on, the final decision as to whether the prime weapon would be used remained with the President. Truman insisted on keeping the decision-making power on atomic use to himself; he made clear his willingness to employ atomic bomt:.,—but under circumstances he refused to define in advance. The special command prerogative attached to atomic bombs was recognized by the military leadership from the start. Lt. General Vandenberg, then the assistant chief of the Air Staff, in a memorandum in early 1946 on "The Establishment of a Strategic Striking Force," stated:

Without doubt the times of attack and targets for atomic bombs will be determined at a very high level—probably by the President— and the Strategic Air Force Commander will be charged with the responsibility of carrying out the operations. Actual operational instructions as to time and place will doubtless come from Washington.³¹

Discussion by the National Security Council of possible use of atomic weapons occurred for the first time at the ninth NSC meeting, 2 April 1948, but the Council deferred further consideration. Secretary of the Army Royall, who was apparently among the most concerned with the problem, sent a memorandum on the subject to the NSC in mid-May, noting with alarm its recent deferment of the issue and stressing that the US position on atomic weapons and proper organization for expeditious application of atomic weapons required an early and careful review in the interest of national security. Royall urged that a decision be made as to the intention of the United States to use atomic bombs in the event of war, pointing out that there was much doubt about whether the use of atomic bombs was indeed a "firm" policy of the United States, given that issues other than military ones were of prime importance. Part of the ambiguity arose over the question of who should authorize their use and against what targets. Still another Important issue was how the military should organize their relatively limited resources for possible atomic war. Also unresolved was the kind of command structure that could best provide for use of the atomic bomb.³² Royall's efforts to secure a decision evoked no response,

Illustrative of the doubts on the part of the military concerning the certainty of the use of atomic bombs, even in clear case of need, were comments made by Secretary of State Marshall before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1948. Marshall pointed out that strategic bombing meant the killing of noncombatants but that the United States had countenanced such actions in the war because of prior actions by Japan and Germany. He said, in the context of atomic weapons:

it was a terrible thing to have to use that type of power. If you are confronted with the use of that type of power in the beginning of the war you are also confronted with a very certain reaction of the American people. They have to be driven very hard before they will agree to such a drastic use of force.³³

Lilienthal, the AEC chairman, recalled a meeting in early March with Defense Secretary Forrestal, Air Force Secretary Symington, and Army Secretary Royall that illustrated the confusion in thinking on the potential role of the bomb. Royall stated that the thought of using atomic bombs disturbed him greatly, while Symington commented that the American public was completely misinformed about "how quickly we could go into action and what we could do."³⁴

The implications of such concerns were clear to the military planners. If the sentiments of Marshall, Symington, and Royall were correct, the concept of the atomic blitz seemed very questionable. What should the services plan for? In July 1948, Forrestal told Marshall that in view of the Berlin Blockade he wished a "resolution of the question of whether or not we are to use the A bomb in war." Forrestal seems to have assumed that the services would continue to make some plans on the assumption that atomic weapons would not be used, although the first priority would be given to plans depending on their use. When the matter finally reached the President in the September consideration by the NSC, Truman said he would not shrink from the decision if he felt he had to use the bomb. This apparently satisfied Forrestal, despite its very conditional nature.³⁵

On 10 September 1948, the Executive Secretary of the NSC finally submitted a report (NSC 30) to the NSC on "US Policy on Atomic Warfare." It dealt with the feasibility of formulating at that time policies in regard to the use of atomic weapons. The analysis stated that the "US has nothing presently to gain, commensurable with the risk of raising the question, in either a well defined or an equivocal decision that atomic weapons should be used in event of war." However, in the absence of an established system of international control, the United States should make no commitment to deny Itself the use of atomic weapons. The report concluded that "(1) in event of hostilities the National Military Establishment must be ready to utilize all appropriate means including atomic weapons and must plan accordingly, and (2) the decision as to the employment is to be made by the President."

In view of these two hardly unexpected conclusions, no action was taken at that time (a) to obtain a presidential decision either to use or not to use atomic weapons in any possible future conflict; or (b) to obtain a decision as to the time and circumstances under which atomic weapons might or might not be used.³⁶ The JCS, it might be noted, concurred in this decision not to decide.³⁷

No further steps were taken on the matter for more than two years. In December 1950, a great deal of attention was given to a statement by Truman that he would not rule out the use of atomic bombs in Korea, this at the time of the US defeat and the retreat from the Yalu. In April 1951, the Executive Secretary of the NSC forwarded an NSC staff study entitled "Procedures with Respect to a Presidential Decision to Use Atomic Weapons" to the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the AEC as members of the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy. The purpose of the study was to "outline the procedures whereby the President can effectively obtain advice whenever he is called upon to decide in what circumstances atomic weapons should be used."

The paper documented the earlier NSC consideration of the problem in September 1948. It pointed out that in the succeecing two years it had become the practice to refer atomic energy matters that required presidential decision and that affected the State Department, DoD, and the AEC to the NSC Special Committee on Atomic Energy for consideration and for such recommendations as it saw fit to the President. This procedure had been underscored by a letter of the President of 25 August 1950. The occasion arose in regard to the strategic deployment of nonnuclear components overseas, a preparatory move approved by the President, but which did not include any authority to use atomic weapons. This letter had requested that the Special Committee pass on the directives that the President had to make that affected all three agencies, and it had instructed the Secretary of Defense that those actions must be considered by the Special Committee before the President would^approve further actions.

The 1951 staff study pointed out that the issue had also been involved in the US-UK discussions on atomic energy in 1948 and again in the December 1950 meetings between Truman and Prime Minister Attlee. At the latter meetings, the United States had refused to permit any restraints on its ability to use the atomic bomb, restricting its commitment to a promise to inform the United Kingdom of any decision to use the atomic bomb and not to use the bomb from UK bases without UK permission.

Responsibility for advising the President on the military desirability of using the bomb, the staff study continued, rested with the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, that for political effects primarily with the Secretary of State. The final decision, of course, rested with the President. Once the decision to use the bomb was made, the President would give the necessary directives to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the AEC for implementation. However, the staff study went on, the means whereby the President promptly received the advice of the Special Committee needed to be Identified.

In its analytical section, the staff study suggested that unless there was to be an initial determination by the JCS that the use of atomic weapons In a given situation was desirable, it was difficult to see how the question could arise in any realistic way. In the event that pressures were to build up for the use of atomic weapons in other quarters, it would be obvious that the first question to be asked would be whether its use would be militarily desirable. Accordingly, the matter should originate with or be referred to the JCS. And when the JCS made such a recommendation, the President would want the advice of the Special Committee. If the President were to meet with the Special Committee and the JCS to make his decision, additional procedures would be needed to identify the extent, nature, and timing of consultations with, notifications to, or requests for action by other Departments of government (e.g., Civil Defense), the public, and other governments.³⁸

If time and circumstances permitted, the Congress should pass and the President approve a Joint Resolution declaring war and giving the President the right to use all US forces. This would clearly restate the President's authority to use atomic weapons. In the event of surprise attack, it might be necessary to launch an immediate counterattack, and the President would then take action under his constitutional powers as Commander in Chief, consulting Congress as soon as possible. In contingencies short of a surprise attack, the President would doubtless want to consult Congress.

The JCS rejected the NSC staff study as attempting to impose restrictions on the authority and duties of the President, as well as the JCS. These restrictions, the JCS asserted, would interfere with the proper exercise of military command in war or national emergency. They objected to suggestions as to the form and manner in which the JCS should present their military views to the President.³⁹ With this effort, further consideration of the issue apparently died.

Another aspect of the issue of control of nuclear weapons was revived in February 1953, when Foreign Minister Eden visited Washington. It was understood that Eden wanted to discuss with the new Eisenhower administration two aspects of the nuclear problem. He wanted a reaffirmation of the understanding previously arrived at that US bases in Britain would not be used for the delivery of nuclear weapons without prior agreement of the United Kingdom. He also sought a new commitment that the United States would not employ atomic weapons anywhere from any base without the prior agreement of the United Kingdom. Both the State Department and the JCS concurred that there should be a reaffirmation of the existing commitment but a complete refusal to tie US hands on the second point,^1,0 and such was the outcome of the meeting.

The concern of the military planners over whether they would be able to count on the use of atomic weapons dragged on into the Eisenhower administration,. The matter came up as part of the extensive review of military programs under the so-called "New Look." The CJCS, Admiral Radford, expressed the impact of the dilemma over nuclear weapon availability in an NSC meeting on 13 October 1953. He stressed that in the absence of an authoritative determination of the extent to which the military might plan on the use of nuclear weapons, the JCS were forced to plan for several contingencies—all-out nuclear war or conventional war, limited nuclear war, or limited conventional war. To prepare for all four was very costly. Radford suggested that if the military could be told the type of war on which to concentrate, and especially if they were able to count on the use of nuclear weapons whenever it was technically advantageous to do so, defense costs could be drastically lowered, as could manpower requirements. The Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Carney, and the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Ridgway, both disagreed with the Radford thesis, as did their civilian service secretaries, their feeling being that it was not time to put all the defense eggs in one basket. Furthermore, they felt, nuclear weapons on both sides might cancel each other out and return the situation to one dependent upon conventional forces.

Nevertheless, the Radford thesis did seem to win out when on 30 October 1953 the President approved NSC 162/2, the major NSC paper that laid down the essential policy basis for the "New Look." The paper decreed that the JCS could plan on using nuclear weapons, tactical as well as strategic, whenever their use would be desirable from a military point of view. While the President kept firmly in his own hands the authority to release the weapons to the military, the directive represented in effect a promise or at least a formal assumption that such presidential release would be forthcoming upon the request of the military.⁴¹

The effect of the decision, however, was less than was expected. Certainly, It did not end the sharp differences among military leaders on military priorities. Nor did it, indeed could it, relieve the underlying concern of the military that the President might not after all give them authority to use nuclear weapons. There would simply never be an absolute solution to that problem, a problem that was to grow more acute as Soviet nuclear capabilities increased.

IV. THE CONTROL OF ATOMIC OPERATIONS

The issues of custody and authority to use atomic weapons represented half the question of overall control of atomic operations. This half involved, as we have seen, the President, the AEC, and the DoD. The other half involved only the military and concerned the operational issues of who would control nuclear delivery operations and the planning for them and how the nuclear stockpile would be allocated among the services and the commands. A process had to be created at the JCS level to handle what yearly became a more complicated problem under the impact of technological advances. The development of such a process was not simple, since the matter of control of atomic operations became enmeshed in larger issues of controversy among the services.

While activity in the atomic weapons field did increase year by year, there was little organized effort between the JCS CROSSROADS report in June 1947 and, 1951 to look far into the future and to examine and change tactics in the light of atomic developments. All the services seemed occupied with adapting atomic weapons to their established roles and missions, and usually by employing well-established tactical procedures and systems of weapon employment.¹

Nevertheless, by 1953, the basic problems in the control of atomic operations were confronted and a functioning system was created. Command and control of strategic operations was recognized as being composed of several functional areas. Selection of targets, allocation of bombs, and control of operational delivery were all complex issues and were to involve the highest levels of strategic planning. The basic factors were the role to be given atomic weapons in strategic plans and the limited number of bombs, which made careful targeting essential and, indeed, governing. It was the Joint Chiefs who established the quantitative and qualitative requirements for atomic weapons and who controlled SAC, and it was logical that they determine the precise manner of employment. The three services, however, had different views on the relative importance of targets. Since the Air Force for the first five or six years was the only service that could deliver atomic bombs and also had responsibility for air intelligence, the Army and Navy could only try to achieve some share of control over atomic weapons by sharing in target selection at the highest level. Later, as the Navy also acquired the capability to deliver atomic weapons, the problem of bomb allocation to various missions and commands further complicated the command and control process. The JCS were thus compelled to control operational delivery as well as targeting.²

A. ORGANIZATIONAL DEVELOPMENTS

During the final days of the Second World War, the forces for the delivery of atomic bombs consisted of one bomber group. This unit was controlled through a chain of command that led finally to the President via General Arnold, the commanding general of the Army Air Forces, and General Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, bypassing the JCS as such. The operational atomic bomb force was placed under the long-range Twentieth Air Force, but the control channels for it were specialized in nature.³ Ü

Unified theater commands were officially formed on 14 December 1946, when the President approved the Unified Command Plan (UCP), by which one member of the JCS was designated executive agent for each theater command to act for the JCS. The Strategic Air Command, which had been established within the AAF structure in March 1946, was considered one of those commands. However, in the implementation of the UCP in January 1947, JCS directives were sent to the Far East, Pacific, and Alaskan commands but not to SAC. Although SAC was regarded as a JCS command thereafter, the JCS took no further formal steps in regard to SAC until 22 July 1948, when JCS 1944/13 included a directive that the commanding general of SAC prepare and coordinate detailed plans based on the new Joint Emergency War Plan, FLEETWOOD (previously HARROW).⁴

The precedent for a special-purpose force went back to the establishment of the Twentieth Air Force on 4 April 1944 as the command to carry out long-range strategic attacks on the Japanese home islands. From the beginning, there was a general understanding that SAC, as the prime strategic bombing force of the nation, would be centrally controlled and directed by the orders of the JCS. However, Air Force mission statements provided that SAC should operate in accordance with directives and policies received from the AAF commanding general and later the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. Until the 1958 Reorganization Act, the CSAF was able to exert operational control over SAC units not only as a member of the JCS but also as executive agent for the Secretary of Defense and, after 1953, for the Secretary of the Air Force, too. The need for this control had been stressed by General Vandenberg during the congressional hearings on the Air Force Organization Act of 1951. He stated that this authority was essential because he had to be able to stop or change the attack of his SAC commanders immediately upon receipt of emergency political guidance from the President or the Secretary of Defense.⁵

The Strategic Air Command could not be handled as a normal unified command, however, since it did not include Army or Navy forces. The JCS sought a solution in the Key West Agreements (1948), whereby they agreed to appoint executive agents not only for unified commands but also for "certain operations and specified commands." A specified command thus came to be a single service command under the JCS. While ultimately the JCS would assert that SAC had been responsible to them since 14 December 1946, they did not officially assign the mission of conducting strategic warfare operations to SAC until 11 April 1949 (JCS 1259/129). They then provided that SAC, under the JCS and with the Air Force as executive agent, was authorized to direct the strategic air offensive, to assign targets, weight of effort, and timing of air strikes, and to coordinate strategic strikes with theater air activities in order to prevent Interference between forces and thus gain maximum benefits.⁶ By spelling out their exact relationship to SAC, the JCS were defusing a Navy concern. The Navy had opposed the idea of SAC as a unified command, fearing that such an arrangement could lead to SAC's taking full operational control over any naval air units placed under SAC by the JCS for coordination. The compromise limited SAC to units specifically assigned by the JCS and provided also a measure of independence for any non-USAF units that might be assigned.

On 19 January 1949, the JCS accepted an Air Force recommendation that operational units assigned to SAC be exempted from control by any unified commander (JCS 1259/11.5). The possibility that SAC might not have complete control of its forces at all times was of great concern to the Air Force. While a unified commander could not take control of SAC units in his area under most circumstances, he could assume temporary control in an emergency. The SAC forces specifically exempted by this directive from temporary operational control or "seizure" by a unified commander were 1 heavy bomber wing, 11 medium bomber wings, 2 fighter wings, 1 strategic reconnaissance wing, and 1 strategic support wing. The directive recognized that aircraft not specifically equipped for atomic operations would be required to support the atomic bombers, such as strategic reconnaissance, diversionary bombing, electronic countermeasures (ECM), escort fighters, and strategic support and that the list of designated exempt units would grow as SAC expanded.

A new list of exempt units was approved by the JCS on 9 May 1950 after long debate over Army objections. To avoid the necessity of repeated revisions, the USAF in February 1952 suggested that the JCS approve force levels for SAC in terms of numbers and types of units and that they authorize the Air Force as executive agent to determine specific units to be exempted. The Navy and Army opposed this unless the principle of exemption from theater seizure was extended to all JCS commands considered to have units engaged in vital tasks. The Air Force agreed, and in March 1952 the problem of reviewing the unified commands and recommending exemptions in quantitative terms for each was assigned to the Joint Strategic Planning Committee. The Committee's report, approved by the JCS on 17 February 1953* stated that all units should be exempted from seizure that were at the time scheduled for, or engaged in, the execution of specific operational missions under war plans approved by the JCS. This in effect changed the method of determining exempted units from one of preselection to one of employment, and eliminated a list of exempt units.⁷

B. THE TARGETING ISSUE 0

Like other atomic warfare issues, the question of target selection became highly controversial and could only be settled at high levels. The controversy lasted for over three years, from June 1947 to June 1950. It began with the JCS evaluation of Operation CROSSROADS. A key point made in the report was that "the selection of targets for attack by atomic weapons must take account of the number of such weapons available in the predictable future. Thus selection and priority of targets become of prime importance in the employment of the weapon."⁸

The report recommended that the JCS set up a continuing responsibility for the selection of atomic targets. The Air Force wanted this function assigned to it because of its role as the JCS executive agent for SAC, but both the Army and Navy objected. The Joint Strategic Survey Committee recommended that the responsibility go to the Air Force Intelligence Division, which was already responsible for strategic target selection. This recommendation was rejected by the Army and Navy, which insisted that the JCS retain responsibility.

The final solution was complicated. The Air Intelligence Division was to submit its target studies and recommendations to the Joint Intelligence Committee and the Joint Strategic Plans Committee successively, each to append recommendations, after which the material would go to the JCS. The Chiefs would then instruct the Chief of Staff of the Air Force as to the effects desired from the strategic air offensive in each of the war plans. With this guidance, the CSAF would submit target annexes, including priorities. Once the JCS approved these target lists, SAC would have the responsibility of preparing detailed operational plans.⁹ This action, taken by the JCS on 18 April 1950, was another step toward full control of atomic operations and was considered to have met the recommendation of the CROSSROADS report.¹⁰

C. COORDINATION OF ATOMIC OPERATIONS

Between 1945 and 1950, SAC had a virtual monopoly of the means of delivery of atomic bombs. As has been described, the JCS had drawn SAC forces under direct operational control in 1946 and had strengthened their control later by prohibiting the usurpation of SAC forces by unified commanders. Therefore, no coordination problems in planning and executing the atomic offensive existed in these years. By the early 1950s, however, this situation was being transformed by the proliferation both of weapons and delivery means.

The Navy announced in 1952 that all its new attack planes were capable of carrying tactical atomic bombs and that it had on hand aircraft capable of handling large bombs. Newly activated Air Force tactical air units in Europe and the Far East were able to deliver the new smaller weapons. The Secretary of the Air Force announced that nearly all Air Force combat aircraft were being modified to carry small weapons, and in September 1951 the Air Force decided that all combat aircraft would be capable of carrying atomic weapons by 1954. With the incorporation of carriers and tactical air units into the atomic-capable forces, the establishment of centralized control became a matter of urgency.¹¹

The Joint Strategic Plans Committee had been directed in August 1950 to prepare the directives required to implement a report by it on procedures for control and coordination of atomic forces, but the directives were never prepared because of service differences. The assignment of a new mission to SAC, also in August 1950—that of retarding the advance of Soviet ground forces into Western Europe—made clear the necessity for a review and revision of the existing command and control structure. Subsequently, in early 1951 JCS 2056/7 established the new requirement that the unified commanders concerned coordinate their operational plans pertaining to retardation operations and have those plans approved by the JCS.

In February 1951, a concept of operations for the Far East Command (CINCFE) and SAC was drawn up and signed. Each command was to support the other; SAC would employ the atomic bombs allotted to CINCFE for that purpose, with delivery to be on targets and at times prescribed by CINCFE as long as that did not conflict with the primary mission of SAC. The SAC command elements (phonetic commands) for coordination purposes were to be designated X-RAY for CINCFE, ZEBRA for CINCEUR.

One of the issues that arose constantly was that of the use and control of SAC units. It was finally agreed by SAC and CINCFE that on D-day SAC would take control of all SAC units in the Far East Command. Although these units might not have nuclear capabilities themselves, they could be used for diversionary attacks in connection with atomic missions, and such missions would take precedence over retardation missions. Another issue was whether SAC units would stay in the theater for conventional attacks. SAC agreed, so long as no other missions were required of them elsewhere.

It was also agreed that elements of SAC headquarters would be established near or in the command posts of other unified commanders in order to keep them informed of the support requirements of SAC in retardation missions and to establish close coordination on all phases of such operations. The main forward command elements, X-RAY and ZEBRA, were considered deputy headquarters of SAC and were designated Hq SAC, ZEBRA and X-RAY.¹²

The system was tried out in the Far East Command in September-October 1951. Exercise HUDSON HARBOR was conducted to demonstrate the capability of combined forces to employ the atomic bomb tactically in support of ground forces. The conclusions of the exercise were that (a) the minimum time needed to deliver a weapon was too long; (b) while the relationship between Hq SAC X-RAY and CINCFE was good, it was certain that SAC's primary mission would detract from its retardation capabilities (in this regard, CINCFE suggested the need for an available "on call" capability to deliver atomic bombs in the theater); and (c) CINCFE should be allocated its own weapon supply.¹³

The embryonic system and the test of it apparently were accepted as a basis for a permanent system. In January 1952, the JCS directed the establishment of an ad hoc committee to submit recommendations on the same subject. The resulting report the next month led to JCS 2056/24, approved in March, which was to be a major step in the achievement of atomic coordination. It was in essence the refinement and final draft of the earlier document by means of which X-RAY and ZEBRA were established.

The conclusions and recommendations of JCS 2056/24 were as follows. First, at least until 1957, there would be fewer atomic weapons available than were required in the event of a general war.

Second, during this period of relative scarcity the JCS must preserve for themselves a positive, centralized corftrol over weapon allocation. Within the scope of their responsibilities and without usurping the prerogatives of their commanders, they must retain sufficient control of weapon expenditure to insure achievement of several objectives:

(a) That appropriate forces having atomic delivery capabilities and atomic weapons are promptly available to and in support of commanders specified by the JCS.

(b) That a ready accounting is available to the JCS of all atomic weapons in the hands of the military. This should include the ability to count those remaining as well as those expended.

(c) That there be no interference between atomic air forces.

(d) That maximum military effect is obtained in delivery of atomic weapons. This requires coordination of plans to obtain mutual support between striking forces.

(e) That targets not be over-bombed or ignored, and that useless action not be taken by one force in ignorance of other actions.

Third, the report went on to say that JCS supervision of planning and execution would require the following:

(a) Channels for lateral coordination of planning and implementation and a rapid exchange of operational data.

(b) A jointly staffed war room annex at the Pentagon with key data on the stockpile, presidentially released atomic weapons, storage sites and the distribution of weapons, the deployment of atomic forces, targets, planned operations, and expenditures. These data were to be provided to the war room annex by the services, the Military Liaison Committee, the APSWP, and the unified and specified commands.

(c) Charging the Chief of Staff of the Air Force with responsibility for undertaking the above steps. Once the necessary machinery was in place and functioning properly, this responsibility could be ended, at the discretion of the JCS.

(d) Directing the unified commands to coordinate with SAC and to prepare atomic annexes for plans.¹⁴

The last point (d) required that the Commander in Chief, Europe (CINCEUR), the Commander in Chief, Northern and Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean (CINCNELM), and the Commander in Chief, USAF Europe (CINCUSAFE) prepare appropriate annexes for the employment of atomic weapons in accordance with the plans and directives of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe and that they effect mutual coordination with each other and with SAC and the Commander in Chief, Atlantic (CINCLANT). The latter was to prepare appropriate annexes for the conduct of operations as foreseen by SACLANT and was to effect coordination with SAC and the JCS representatives in Europe. The Commander in Chief, Far East (CINCFE), the Commander in Chief, Pacific (CINCPAC), and the Commander In Chief, Alaska (CINCAL) were to prepare appropriate atomic annexes and to coordinate those with each other and with SAC. Each of the above commanders was also to submit his atomic annex to the JCS for approval.

The Chief of Staff of the Air Force thus became the authority for the control and coordination of all forces with an atomic delivery capability and was responsible for implementing the specified relationship. The commanding general of SAC was, in turn, designated as his agent for the establishment of channels for the lateral coordination of atomic plans and operations and for the gathering of information to be displayed in the war room annex. The director of operations of the Air Force was directed to establish the war room annex.

The Commanding General of SAC, General LeMay, began to negotiate an agreement with General Gruenther, the representative of SACEUR, that acknowledged the coordinating authority assigned to the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and provided for the establishment of a full coordination center in the United Kingdom. Under the agreement, a field representative would be appointed by the CSAF, and staff and data would be supplied by SAC and SACEUR. Similar agreements were made by General LeMay with SACLANT, CINCFE, CINCPAC, and CINCAL.⁶ Each recognized that the CSAF would appoint a field representative who would establish the necessary facilities and operating procedures and that SAC and other parties would provide staff and planning procedures.¹⁵

The field facilities for lateral coordination of planning, called Joint Coordination Centers (JCCs), were located in Buckinghamshire, England, and Pershing Heights, Tokyo. The European field representative was appointed in October 1952 and the Far Eastern one in December. The European JCC coordinated atomic operations for CINCNELM, CINCEUR, CINCSAC, SACEUR, SACLANT; the one in Japan for CINCPAC, CINCFE, CINCAL, and CINCSAC. The joint war room annex in the Pentagon, which was to receive the reports of the JCCs, had been established by the end of that year.

The JCCs were war room facilities for the receipt, compilation, display, review, coordination, and relay of information concerning the plans and operations of atomic forces for the benefit of the unified and specified commanders and the JCS. Information on targets scheduled for attack was forwarded to the Pentagon war room annex, where duplication might be noted and, theoretically, eliminated. Under existing ground rules, it was found that as many as four commanders were scheduling atomic attacks against the same target. The JCCs were also to serve as advance command posts to control an emergency war plan employment of SAC in support of the theater.

It should be noted that the coordination established was to be operational coordination, in that it was to take place after hostilities began. However, early exercises of the JCCs in 1954 revealed the need for pre-hostilities coordination of atomic plans as well. Accordingly, that same year the JCS asked each appropriate commander to submit an atomic annex, a target list, to his war plan and to coordinate it with other theater commanders and CINCSAC.¹⁶

A SACEUR exercise in May 1953 provided a test of all of the machinery to use atomic bombs in support of NATO forces. The results were discouraging. From H-hour to the simulated dropping of bombs, 39 1/2 hours elapsed, most of it spent waiting for nuclear material. The Navy, too, was involved in the atomic operation exercise. Since SAC had been charged with responsibility for the atomic air offensive and with control of forces operating for that purpose, the Air Force sought information from the JCS in regard to the Navy's planned targets and also targets the Navy would be willing to attack in performance of collateral functions of strategic operations. The Navy asserted that no naval air units would be available for collateral operations (by implication under SAC direction) and that all atomic units were already assigned to unified commanders who would use them.¹⁷

As for the broad problem of allocation of weapons, the JCS were reluctant to allocate atomic weapons until the coordination annexes were received from unified and specified commanders. They did make an interim allocation in August 1953 after the chief of the AFSWP had reported that total demands for nuclear components coming to him exceeded the stockpile. The interim allocation at least permitted the development of pickup schedules. The allocation of weapons turned out to be a controversial issue, since it required a decision by the JCS on duplicated targets, a decision the JCS kept postponing.

A compromise agreement reached in April 1954 still avoided the hard decision. The agreement did, however, set some general principles for unified and specified commanders in regard to target selection and the timing of attacks, and it permitted the refinement of pickup schedules and the development of atomic annexes to plans. The guidelines laid down by the JCS were that (1) targets within reasonable proximity of one another were to be attacked by only one commander; (2) targets of interest to more than one commander were to become a commitment on the target annex of the commander having delivery capability who considered the target of highest relative priority as to timing; (3) targets to be attacked by CINCSAC in support of other commanders were to be those that such commanders lacked normal delivery forces to attack themselves; and (4) in regard to (3), the desires of the requesting commander would govern as to timing (if practicable) and weapons expended would be charged to him.¹⁸

In summary, during the period 1949-53 most atomic planning revolved around the preparation of atomic operation annexes to be implemented by SAC in support of the Joint Emergency War Plan. As various unified commanders acquired an atomic capability or were promised, atomic support by SAC, however, SAC became responsible for coordinating the atomic annexes to avoid duplication and to permit best use of the weapons. Under JCS review, SAC thus became in this period the principal locus for atomic planning.

As long as all prospective nuclear targets were within the Soviet Union, the simple procedure for coordination established in 1952 appeared to be workable. However, the situation rapidly began to get out of hand as the "New Look" doctrine of reliance on nuclear weapons greatly loosened planning for the employment of the rapidly growing atomic stockpile in limited, as well as in general, wars. The situation became more unmanageable throughout the 1950s and was not to be settled until the establishment in 1960 of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff at SAC headquarters.

D. THE IMPACT OF WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT ON THE CONTROL ISSUE

This account has so far illustrated how command and control of atomic operations was intimately intertwined with the issue of Air Force domination of atomic war matters and with the interservice controversies that derived from it. Command and control of atomic strategy and operations was also influenced by the revolutionary developments in atomic weaponry after 1950. These included the development of lightweight weapons, and, finally, the coming of the thermonuclear bomb, all made possible by the rapid ending of the scarcity of fissionable material.

The development of a sizable national stockpile was extremely slow, and for the first three years US nuclear strategy was based upon a small number of bombs. There had been a marked slowdown immediately after the Second World War in atomic bomb development because of the prevalent belief that fissionable material would remain scarce. In fact, Chairman Lilienthal of the AEC told President Truman in November 1949, while advocating US development of the hydrogen bomb, that only one-fortieth of total military spending since 1945 had been on atomic weapons. In FY50, less than 1 percent of the national budget was directed toward atomic weapon development.¹⁹ The Chairman of the Joint Congressional Committee on Atomic Energy repeated the point in August 1951 that, while six years ago it was generally recognized that atomic weapons had changed the anatomy of air power and that the United States had proceeded to place overwhelming reliance on the deterrent stockpile, still only one-fortieth of total military spending had gone to the development of atomic weapons. He found deeds strangely out of line with words.²⁰ His comments, however, made in respect to the need to push tactical bomb development more vigorously, reflected the then common belief about the immediate recognition and acceptance of the role of atomic weapons after the war, a development which we have seen did not happen quickly at all.

The scarcity problem began to ease by February 1950, when the AEC announced that it could turn out atomic bombs on a virtual production-line basis. The critical problem of atomic supply, which had from the start conditioned all atomic planning, seemed on the way to solution.²¹ As a result, funds for procurement of atomic weapons increased and the rate of production rose rapidly after 1950, as evidenced by stockpile data listed in Chapter III.

The recognition that the availability of fissionable material would no longer be a problem came at a time when technological improvements were permitting the fabrication of ever lighter bombs that could be carried on smaller aircraft. New weapons, weighing as little as 1,700 pounds, appeared. The great significance of such weapon developments was that they permitted the Navy and the Army to achieve finally the basis for some claim to part of the atomic mission. By the end of 1950, the Navy and Army were developing atomic weapons and the Air Force monopoly was ended, although rivalry still continued over the size of the respective shares of the nuclear stockpile.²² The Navy began to build aircraft capable of flying atomic bombs off carriers, and the Army began to develop a nuclear artillery piece. Between May 1951 and July 1953, both services achieved their objectives.

The Air Force was originally hesitant about accepting tactical atomic bombs. The fundamental basis of this reluctance lay in the Air Force view that atomic bombs should be used mainly as part of a strategic atomic offensive launched over great distances. Air Force concentration on strategic atomic operations led to the natural preference for design and fabrication of large bombs for large targets. It was probable, too, that the Air Force recognized that the tactical weapon would mean the end of Its atomic monopoly and the special status that went with it. The reluctance faded only gradually, although the Air Force did begin the development of a tactical atomic air force in these same years. Air Force preferences were probably shaped also by the JCS decision in the summer of 1950 that gave retardation targets second priority out of three, ahead of attacks on Soviet industry. It was clear that tactical aircraft and tactical atomic bombs would have great value in this role, thereby preserving the strategic air force for the strategic offensive.

The thermonuclear revolution came next. The rapid development of small tactical weapons was accompanied by the dramatic development of the immensely powerful super bomb. Right after the first Soviet atomic explosion of August 1949, the AEC had advocated a quantum jump over the Soviets with the crash development of the H-bomb, instead of pursuing a simple arithmetic race with atomic bombs.²³ The first US thermonuclear explosion came In November 1952, the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion in August 1953, and the first US weapon shot in March 1954.

The thermonuclear revolution of 1954-56 was to change the picture again, making it clear that high-yield weapons could be employed by tactical aircraft. By 1955, the distinction between tactical and strategic weapons would begin to blur and even the distinction between tactical and strategic air forces would be questioned. It was also apparent that the H-bomb was not simply a super bomb, and that it would compel a complete reorganization of the national stockpile and a re-evaluation of target systems.

V. INTERSERVICE CONTROVERSY OVER ATOMIC MATTERS

It was noted in earlier chapters that the years between 1945 and 1953, when the US military were grappling with the overall problem of how to use, control, and coordinate atomic weapons and operations, were also the years of the bitterest inter-service disputes. To be sure, competition for funds fueled much service controversy, especially between 1948 and 1950, but in large part, atomic energy was also a root cause. There were two main facets to the atomic aspect of interservice controversy. The first was essentially operational in character and had deep significance for the development of roles and missions. The second was a broad doctrinal issue. Both invariably influenced the effort to create an atomic force and a doctrine by which to use it.

The first problem was the claim of the newly created Air Force to control all strategic bombing operations and, specifically, all atomic operations. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force raised with the JCS the subject of control of atomic operations on 23 March 1948, by which he attempted to establish Air Force command authority over the Armed Forces Special Weapons Project. He reminded the Chiefs that the Air Force had been charged with primary responsibility for strategic air operations, including atomic operations, but that, as yet, the Air Force had not been delegated proper authority to exercise that responsibility. In order to organize, train, and properly equip USAF units for atomic operations, the Air Force needed more positive control over the AFSWP, which was responsible for protecting the stockpile of atomic weapons. The CSAF suggested that there should be a single authority to which the AFSWP should report, rather than to the Chiefs individually.¹

Objection was made to the Air Force bid by the Navy and by Admiral Leahy, the then "Chief of Staff to the President," on three main grounds. They asserted that (1) the JCS did not yet have presidential authority to use atomic weapons; (2) the Navy's development of an atomic delivery capability would be relegated to the category of an unnecessary luxury that was unlikely to survive the stringencies of peacetime budgets; and (3) the JCS, as such, would be weakened by loss of direct control over atomic weapons. The Secretary of the Navy picked up the second point and charged that giving the requested authority to the Air Force would effectively prevent the Navy from developing an atomic capability, thereby depriving the United States of a second atomic-capable force. Naval carriers would soon be able to use atomic weapons, and it was always possible that the Air Force might be cut off from its operational bases, especially the overseas ones. This would leave the United States desperately dependent on a naval atomic capability.

The CSAF acknowledged that the JCS could not use any atomic weapons without presidential authority, but pointed out that the HALF MOON Joint Emergency War Plan (approved by the JCS in May 1948; see Chapter II) had been adopted on the basis of an early atomic offensive, that the Secretary of Defense had asked the JCS to direct one of their number to ready the weapons for use, and that the Air Force had already been assigned the responsibility for strategic plans involving atomic operations.²

Neither the Key West nor the Newport meetings among the services in 1948 resolved fundamental problems or stilled controversy to any degree. The key issues were simply postponed. At the Newport Conference in August, for example, it was frankly agreed to postpone any decision concerning the permanent future organization for the control and direction of atomic operations until further study was possible. At the same time, in regard to planning for the atomic aspects of the Joint Emergency War Plan, HALF MOON, it was agreed as an interim measure to direct the chief of the AFSWP to report to the CSAF for instructions. The interim nature of this agreement was heavily stressed.³ The Navy agreed, so long as the AFSWP continued to report to it on any atomic missions assigned to the Navy.

In mid-1948, however, the Air Force, with good grounds, had denied that either the Navy or the Army had any atomic role, since only Air Force aircraft could carry the large bombs, which made most efficient use of the scarce fissionable material. However, also by 1948 both the Navy and the Army had become interested in the atomic stockpile and its allocation, and the Air Force apparently suspected the Navy of trying to delay the resolution of issues on responsibilities for atomic affairs and operations until it had developed a working delivery capability of its own, thereby increasing its weight in the controversial arenas. Air Force policy, therefore, seemed to be aimed at limiting tactical atomic weapons, since it could not exclude their development altogether, so that the national stockpile would remain overwhelmingly strategic in nature.⁴

The other major strand in the interservice controversy was the broad doctrinal one concerning the overall role of strategic airpower in national strategy. As described in Chapter II, the concept of the strategic atomic blitz was from its very beginning opposed for a variety of reasons. One has just been discussed—the connection between the concept and the Air Force's attempted domination of nuclear weapons. Another basis for dissent lay in a skepticism as to the war-winning capability of nuclear weapons. A third lay in the moral implications of atomic war.

It was the proposal in 1949 to build the hydrogen bomb that launched the intensive debate on the extent to which the United States should rely upon atomic strategic attack and upon its derivative, the concept of deterrence. The justification for the new weapon lay In its contribution to deterrence rather than to victory in a war. The consequences of its use, however, were stressed not by its supporters but by its opponents. The debate on the hydrogen bomb was conducted mostly within the government, but the issues relating to the viability of deterrence and the morality of atomic war became very public matters. These issues came together publicly in the B-36 controversy, primarily between the Air Force and the Navy, during 1949 and reached a climax in the congressional hearings on the matter.

The B-36 became the symbol of the clash over overall strategy and doctrine and the consequent allocation of defense funds. The issue that the Navy, in its attack on the B-36, put foremost was the one of the degree of priority to be accorded long-range strategic bombing with atom bombs within the larger framework of US national strategy. The Navy attacked the atomic blitz concept as immoral, claiming that the B-36 was good only for bombing cities. Involved in the feud, of course, were also issues of money and service pride. The Navy resented what it felt to be the Air Force role in the cancellation of a projected "super" carrier, the Air Force position having been that such a large, expensive vessel would only duplicate the existing capability of SAC and the B-36. Service pride was present in the underlying resentment of the Navy that the role of the long-range striking arm of the nation, traditionally the function of the Navy, had now apparently passed to the Air Force.

In the congressional hearings of October 1949, the Navy stressed that the issue was how much effort and money should be devoted to Intercontinental strategic bombers as a deterrent to war. These, the Navy asserted, should not be accepted blandly as a substitute for other armed forces, which experience had shown were always required.⁵ Admiral Radford, as a senior Navy spokesman, denied the validity of the concept of an easy, cheap atomic war:

I do not believe that the threat of atomic blitz will be an effective deterrent to a war or that it will win a war. I do not believe that the atomic blitz theory is generally accepted by military men.... Strategic bombing should be the primary role of the Air Force. However, the United States is not sound in relying upon the so-called strategic bombing concept to its present extent.⁶

Radford's main thesis was that the United States must win a war but an atomic blitz was no guarantee of winning that war. He also raised the morality issue by asserting that the United States would also have to live with the peace thereafter.

The Chairman of the JCS, General Bradley, also, while willing to concede that the atomic bomb was the strongest single deterrent to war and that the strategic air force should have first priority in the defense program, still did not believe that the United States should rely solely on the atomic bomb, even in the first phase of a war. ⁷

The hearings were inconclusive and damaging to both the Navy and the Air Force in terms of their public image. Both were revealed as not having fully thought through their cases. The failing was more serious in the case of the Air Force, since the hearings had demonstrated that the prime user of atomic weapons had apparently not given enough realistic analysis to the problems of waging atomic war.⁸

The B-36 episode exposed the inadequacy of defense strategy, the absence of an integrated perspective within the National Military Establishment on national security policy, and the shortcomings of an exclusive reliance on strategic air power. In a sense, however, the hearings represented something of a climax in the interservice disputes. They came at a time when Secretary of Defense Johnson was making major reductions in the defense budget, yet within a little over six months the outbreak of the Korean war would sweep away most of the fiscal constraints underlying the disputes. In addition, the nuclear-sharing aspect of the disputes was also transformed by the apparent ending of the scarcity of fissionable material and by the rapid development of tactical nuclear weapons. Thus, by 1953, the end of the period under consideration here, the Navy had achieved a solid role in the strategic atomic offensive, and Navy criticism of Air Force strategic atomic concepts and strategy had become much more muted.

Nevertheless, the long dispute and the final public hearings had a major impact on the processes and organization for control of atomic operations. Once the other services, especially the Navy, had achieved a share of the atomic offensive, they guarded it carefully and coordination of atomic operations suffered accordingly.

VI. DEVELOPING THE INSTRUMENT FOR ATOMIC WAR

The second major element in the national effort to develop a military atomic capability, along with conceptual and organizational developments, was the creation of the force that would use it, the Strategic Air Command. The development of the bomb had been only the first step. It alone did not give the country a viable strategy of deterrence. That required many other actions on many other programs. The development of concepts, of weapons, and aircraft, and the establishment of forward bases became meaningful only as they were integrated into an organization specifically devoted to the atomic mission. The growth of SAC occurred concurrently with the steps already discussed in previous chapters, steps that were intended to provide the means of control and the procedures under which atomic weapons would be used. Like the development of those means and procedures, the creation of the instrument was surprisingly slow, and it was not until the end of the period under consideration that the SAC that finally emerged began to take definite shape.

The emergence of SAC as the primary embodiment of strategic deterrence took place between 1949 and 1953- Its importance is described by Samuel Huntington:

It was one of the most significant developments in the American military establishment after World War II. It marked a fundamental change in the composition of American military forces, comparable to the development of the battlefleet by the Navy at the turn of the century. Moreover, because it was carried out within an existing organizational structure, it was accomplished with no legislation and little or no public debate and discussion. The rejuvenation of SAC required, of course, demands upon scarce resources and conflicts with other groups. Its most significant aspect, however, was an internal matter: not the acquisition of resources, but the creation and acceptance of the purpose and concept which would shape the use of the resources. Unlike the military services, SAC was a single purpose organization. That purpose was the most important one in American military policy. It could be clearly grasped and understood both by the members of SAC and by the general public. It could furnish clear cut criteria for judging the priorities of programs and standards of performance.¹

Because the mechanisms for command and control of strategic nuclear operations grew with SAC and for SAC, some account must be presented of the growth of this unique organization.

A. ORIGINS OF SAC

As mentioned earlier, the direct predecessor to SAC was the Twentieth Air Force, which from 1944 on attacked the Japanese home islands. In the rush of demobilization, General Spaatz had given first priority to the preservation of the backbone of the AAF, the long-range bomber groups, and their associated long-range protective fighter groups. It was these that he combined into the new SAC. On 21 March 1946, SAC was activated at Bolling Field, Md.; It was moved to Andrews AFB, Md., in October of that year, and then to Offutt AFB, Neb., two years later. The interim mission given SAC by General Spaatz on 12 March 1946, even before SAC was formally established, was as follows:

The SAC will be prepared to conduct long-range offensive operations in any part of the world either independently or in cooperation with land and Naval forces; to conduct maximum range reconnaissance over land or sea either independently or in cooperation with Naval forces; to provide combat units capable of intense and sustained combat operations employing the latest and most advanced weapons; to train units and personnel for the maintenance of the Strategic Forces in all parts of the world; to perform such special missions as the Commanding General, Army Air Forces, may direct.²

That fall a new, revised mission was assigned by AAF Regulation 20-20, which required SAC to have a global striking force in constant readiness rather than the capability to furnish such a force at a future time.

In October 1946, SAC was also assigned ASW and search-and-rescue missions. It retained this role, along with a responsibility for aerial mine-laying, until 1950, when it was finally recognized that these roles would interfere with SAC s emergency war plan mission, which would require all available aircraft. However, SAC was not completely free of these responsibilities until 1952.³

In January 1946, the AAF had designated all long-range bomber units as the atomic strike force, even though only a few aircraft were capable of carrying atomic bombs. This step was taken to avoid the impression among the public and the Congress that only a small element of the bomber force was so capable, an impression that could have led to a reduction of funds to non-atomic forces. Actually, one group of the 58th Bombardment Wing, the 509th Bombardment Group, was designated in February 1946 as the test and training unit, to be kept in instant readiness to deliver atomic bombs. (The group was also to assume this role for the Bikini tests in mid-1946.) The unit was to be completely air-mobile and to be capable of immediate deployment to anyplace where ordinary base facilities existed. A transport squadron attached to the Wing would move the atomic bombs and associated technical personnel. Operational orders were to go to the Wing, then based at March Field, Calif., directly from AAF headquarters in Washington. The Wing was incorporated in the new Strategic Air Command when SAC was established within the Army Air Forces structure in March 1946.

The Wing was not confined to just delivering atomic bombs; it was also to be prepared to drop the very largest high-explosive bombs, like the Tall Boy.⁴ At this time, plans for SAC were predicated on scientific reports that fissionable materials were very scarce and that a state of nuclear plenty was improbable. General Arnold had warned the AAF that atomic bombs would be scarce and expensive. Consequently, SAC was to be capable of delivering conventional weapons, as well.⁵ It might be added here that SAC continued to retain the capability for conventional operations, and all SAC aircraft were designed to include such a capability. However, the mission became secondary by the early 1950s and SAC began to think of itself as a nuclear force only. The conventional mission, however, was never abolished.

The function of the 58th Wing was described in a SAC directive of May 1946 to the Fifteenth Air Force, which then controlled the 58th Wing:

man, train, and equip the 58th Wing, including allied units and associated services, as the single AAF agency to coordinate and direct AAF activities concerned with the atomic bomb, maintain these elements as part of the strategic striking force, assist the Manhattan District in aerial experimentation and development and act as the AAF liaison agency with the Manhattan District.⁶

Due to the preoccupation of the 58th Wing with the Bikini atomic tests, SAC's long-range planning for an atomic strike force did not get under way until after mid-1946. In July, AAF headquarters Instructed SAC to prepare a training directive for the Very Heavy Bombardment Wing, which was to be the atomic strike force, and indicated that this unit was to be the forerunner of the conversion of all VHB units to atomic-capable status, which would be accomplished as soon as national capabilities permitted.⁷

In directives from SAC and in discussions between the AAF and the Manhattan District, there was no mention of command and control arrangements, beyond the initial arrangement mentioned above. While it seemed to be recognized that this nuclear unit would be very different from nonnuclear ones, there did not seem to be enough concern over command arrangements to spell them out in any detail. This comparative lack of concern over command and control was probably a reflection of the lack of any imminent threat to SAC, which allowed it the luxury of time to respond. In these years, it will be recalled, SAC was planning in terms of 40-45 days to go to war. By 1957 the time would be reduced to two hours. The difference is a measure of the attention paid to command and control In two different eras. While General LeMay brought to SAC the idea of a full force ready for war, it took him a long time to achieve that capability.

B. EQUIPPING THE ATOMIC STRIKE FORCE

Initially, SAC was very weak. The B-29 was not an intercontinental bomber. There were not enough bases in the United States to accommodate heavy bombers, and overseas bases in appropriate areas were also inadequate. Yet the United States had a few bombs, and it had the 509th Group.

The equipment of the 509th Group, based at Roswell, N.M., was to include the 27 specially modified (SILVERPLATED) B-29s then available. At the end of the war, 46 B-29s had been modified to carry the atomic bomb, but for a year thereafter no further modifications were undertaken. By November 1946, less than half of the 46 remained operational. Eighteen were in storage and 4 had been destroyed.⁸ Not all the aircraft available to the 509th were continually in readiness, however. In November 1946, for example, the aircraft were in commission only 51 percent of the time.⁹

While overall SAC bomber strength grew steadily, the size of the atomic-capable force grew very slowly, much more slowly than anticipated. Exact strength estimates vary for the period, even within individual sources. R. D. Little, for example, states that in the summer of 1947 there were only 34 SILVERPLATED B-29s. He mentions elsewhere in the same volume that in October 1947 the atomic capability of SAC consisted of 18 modified B-29s. At the end of 1947, 30 flight crews were available in the 509th to man these planes, but only 20 crews were cleared for atomic activities.¹⁰ Similarly, the bomb-assembly rate was very slow. As of July 1946, the Manhattan District had trained only 10 AAF weaponeers to handle and assemble the bomb.¹¹ It was estimated in October 1947 that it would take a minimum of 9 days and 20 hours to assemble 11 bombs. A more pessimistic estimate in January 1948 was 1 bomb in 5 days, initially, and as long as 30 days for 20 bombs.¹²

Military exercises had shown the weaknesses of SAC. On 16 May 1947, SAC participated in a mock attack on New York. Of the total of l80 B-29s then in SAC, only 101 were able to take part in the test, which was marked by both poor planning and performance.¹³ Tests in July and August that year in conjunction with the AFSWP also pointed up numerous deficiencies, primarily in bomb handling.

Despite plans to increase requirements for modified aircraft, bomb commanders, and weaponeers, the status of SAC remained almost unchanged until the latter part of 1948, this despite the Communist coup in Czechoslovakia and the Berlin blockade.

The Eighth Air Force, which had been assigned to SAC in November 1946 and which included the three Very Heavy Bombardment Groups of the 58th Wing, reported its strength for the 509th as follows:

In September 1948, the Military Liaison Committee reported to the Secretary of Defense that the atomic striking capability still consisted essentially of the 509th Group with its 30 modified aircraft and 39 specially trained crews; in all the Air Force had only 106 trained bomb commanders and 69 weaponeers. By January 1949, SAC had 90 special crews' and 124 modified aircraft available, as against a JCS-stated requirement for 175 and 225, respectively.¹⁴

Overall, including the non-atomic units, SAC was showing greater improvement. Whereas in 1947 only six Bombardment Groups had reached a state of operational efficiency that would permit even partial deployment abroad, in 1948 six more Groups were capable of overseas deployment.¹⁵

The assumption of command of SAC by General LeMay in October 1948 was to rejuvenate SAC, although low budgets prevented full modernization and expansion until after 1950. In 1948, SAC received its first postwar bombers, the B-50 and the B-36. The latter had close to true intercontinental range. Under the influence of evolving atomic warfare concepts, the extensive use of refueling techniques promised to extend aircraft ranges even more and led to changes In the organizational concept for atomic units.

The following tabulation shows the growth of SAC in the period under review:

Numbers of aircraft, however, do not give a true picture of strength. For example, in 1950, three heavy bomber wings were out of operation because of lack of equipment, and the medium bomber wings were also short of equipment.¹⁷ Also, there were 312 SAC crews but only 263 were considered combat ready.

C. EARLY OVERSEAS DEPLOYMENTS

The emergence of the Soviet Union as the only threat to the continental United States dictated the geographical areas in which the most important SAC operations would be concentrated. The Arctic was one of those areas, because of the belief that the great circle route across the polar basin from Europe would be the likely avenue of approach by any attacker. It seemed wise therefore to acquaint SAC personnel with the problems inherent in cold weather operations.¹⁸ Considerable attention was given In 1947 to flights in and around Alaska and Greenland; emphasis was placed on polar rescue and survival, cold weather maintenance, and the peculiarities of cold weather operations. These experiences graphically showed the need for much improved communications if SAC were to operate in this area.¹⁹

The following year a program was begun of long overseas flights to and around the Arctic, Europe, and the Far East. However, the focus did not last long; in what the official SAC history termed "probably the most significant change in operational policy during 1948," operational emphasis was shifted from the polar regions to Europe. The rotation of SAC units to Alaska continued, but that region rapidly lost some of its early presumed importance as a key area in worldwide plans for strategic bombing when, after a partial alert in June 1948, SAC units were assigned to Europe.²⁰ This development was to have major significance for command and control, especially in regard to communications, which had remained a major weakness in Arctic operations and indeed had been a major factor in SAC s disenchantment with the Arctic as an operating area.

As noted earlier, the European crises in the first half of 1948 found the striking power of SAC still relatively low. The key unit, the 509th Group, was described at this time as having only 11 fully qualified crews and possibly 12-15 more that could be scraped together and that would have some proficiency in atomic operations. Officers of the Group felt they would be lucky to "get off 30 bombs by D+30 with any assurance that the crews were equal to their tasks." The 509th also did not at this time have any target folders.²¹

On 27 June 1948, it was decided to dispatch three full heavy bombardment groups to Europe as both a political and military gesture. At the time, SAC s strength in Europe comprised one squadron of the 301st Bombardment Group at Furstenfeldbruck The other two squadrons of the group were ordered to Goose Bay, the normal summer staging area for Europe. The 307th Bombardment Group was placed on 3-hour alert and the 28th Bombardment Group on 12-hour alert, both to go to the United Kingdom. The rest of SAC went on 24-hour alert.

By 2 July, all the 301st Group was in Germany, where it was ordered to fly nothing but test flights until 7 July. For a time, some consideration was apparently given to using the B-29s to transport coal to West Berlin, but to SAC s relief the idea was abandoned. It took longer to move the 307th and 28th Groups to Britain because of the need to prepare temporary bases. SAC's strength in Europe had been increased ninefold, but it took three weeks to do it, and by the time the units were fully operational there, the alert had been relaxed. Nevertheless, the units were kept in Europe for the rest of 1948.²² It should be noted that none of the aircraft in these units carried atomic bombs or was capable of carrying atomic bombs.²³

It was not until 1951 that SAC permanently stationed units overseas—B-36s arrived in Britain in January 1951 and at Moroccan bases in December of that year.²⁴ The Moroccan bases were decided upon because of the vulnerability of the UK bases to Soviet attack. Along with the establishment of these bases came the development of the KC-97 tanker, which gave the B-47 an intercontinental bombing capability and thus vastly increased SAC's operational capabilities. In addition, by this time the B-36, which had many performance deficiencies when it first arrived in SAC in 1948, had been greatly improved and was the backbone of the heavy bombardment force.

In these early years, the lack of a true, long-range intercontinental bombing force made SAC almost completely dependent on overseas bases in order to conduct its atomic offensive. It was not only a matter of aircraft range. The logistical support required for an atomic campaign was such that, for rapid response, that support had to be located at a forward base. No matter how self-contained and air-transportable SAC units tried to be, moving such materiel and personnel forward in an emergency would have taken too long.

It was felt in SAC in those years that the absence or loss of forward bases would cut SAC's striking power fully as much as if the greater part of SAC were destroyed on the ground. At the same time, overseas bases became more and more politically and militarily vulnerable as the 1950s progressed. Nevertheless, for its first decade, SAC remained heavily dependent on them. It was not until after the mid-1950s that a recognition of the vulnerability of those bases led to a complete reorientation of SAC operational concepts and a withdrawal of SAC to well-dispersed bases within the United States.

D. THE DEVELOPMENT OF SAC COMMUNICATIONS

The role of SAC as the atomic core of the American military establishment and the special command and control requirements deriving from that role would seem to have demanded special communications capabilities. Atomic warfare doctrine and its special sensitivities would seem to have imposed a need for finely tuned atomic responsiveness. In the actual course of events, the development of communications to fill these special needs came about very slowly and was not fulfilled in the period under review.

At the close of World War II, no special AAF communications system, as such, existed. The AAF was a subordinate service of the Army and thus could not claim a separate system. From 1946 to 1949, SAC depended on the Army Command and Administrative Net, supplemented by a radio telephone circuit from the Pentagon to SAC headquarters at Andrews AFB in Maryland.²⁵ No special telephone facilities were available to SAC, and normal commercial long-distance service was depended upon..²⁶ Not until 1949, when the USAF command teletype network (AIRCOMNET) became operational, did the Air Force have its own communications system. The AIRCOMNET was supposed to carry both operational and administrative traffic.

The AIRCOMNET fell short of meeting the operational requirements of SAC, which wanted a fully independent system. It was found that the system could not efficiently carry both operational and administrative traffic. The success of SAC's mission would clearly depend a great deal on the communications that directed it. Even the limited deployment to the United Kingdom in 1948 had revealed severe communications deficiencies. Common-user facilities were simply unequal to the task when SAC might have to be employed on a worldwide basis.

Improvements made to the AIRCOMNET proved inadequate. General LeMay complained that the system did not function adequately even for current, limited operations. He directed the establishment of a control system that would be more exclusively SAC's but that would still be coordinated with other systems. In late 1949 and early 1950, plans were formulated for the construction and activation of the Strategic Operational Control System (SOCS). This net made use of a teletype and telephone system independent of the existing AIRCOMNET. The latter continued to handle administrative traffic, while the SOCS carried operational traffic only. Initially, the SOCS, which was fully Installed by 1 May 1950, was to function entirely within the continental United States, providing the telephone and teletype facilities necessary for operational control of SAC units in the event of war. Circuitry was also established later in 1950 with Tokyo, Goose Bay AFB, Ernest Harmon AFB, Kindley AFB, North Africa, Guam, and Britain.²⁷ These circuits employed Army, Navy, Airways and Air Communication Service, and commercial circuits by special agreements. Early in 1951 an important circuit to the Azores was activated and a cable circuit to the United Kingdom replaced the radio teletype as a primary circuit.

The SOCS net paralleled the SAC chain of command. Its nerve center was the RAMROAD network of long-distance telephone lines fanning outward from SAC headquarters to all subordinate Air Force headquarters and air bases in the United States. Supplementing the telephone net was the teletype net. These were not full-time circuits, however. Through agreement with the American Telephone and Telegraph Company, the SOCS net was an "on call" net, which meant that upon the request of SAC headquarters all circuits could be. established or made operable within approximately 30 minutes.²⁸ In addition, there were the communications systems of subordinate air forces; each air force operated control rooms full time, which enabled them to pinpoint the location of all aircraft at any time.²⁹

A SAC communications command post exercise (CPX) in September 1950 revealed that serious communications deficiencies persisted. Involving 14 locations and generating some 250 messages to and from SAC headquarters, the exercise revealed an average transmission-time requirement of 4 hours and 44 minutes. The bulk of the delays were man-made.³⁰ (By June 1952, a marked improvement was noted in another CPX involving 50 locations and some 4,500 messages, whose average transmission time had dropped to 48 minutes.³¹) Nevertheless, the 1950 exercise had indicated that, while communications inside the United States were fairly satisfactory or improving, the real problem lay in the overseas links.

The skeletal structure of the overseas communications system was formed around four types of communications equipment: radio teletype, submarine cable, landline teletype, and land-line telephone. This mixed system was entirely independent of SAC control and funds to maintain it were allocated from independent sources. General LeMay stressed repeatedly that SAC needed direct communications between SAC headquarters and any bases from which SAC units might operate.³² Ironically, it would appear that by the end of 1951 the capabilities of SAC, with its new overseas base structure, had improved faster and further than the command and control structure by which it would be operated.

Until 1951, SAC was still dependent upon the USAF AIRCOMNET for all traffic, operational, logistical, and administrative, of higher classification than "restricted," since the teletype portion of SOCS (which had been installed in late 1949) connecting SAC headquarters to the subordinate air forces was not equipped with an encrypting or deciphering capability. Its operational use was thus severely limited and greater use had to be made of AIRCOMNET, which had an encoding capability, during operations. Consequently, the next step, using part of AIRCOMNET, was the development early in 1951 of a teletype system, the SAC Communications Network (SACCOMNET), which gave SAC an improved capability but was still not fully satisfactory.³³

All the major communications plans of the USAF originated before the outbreak of the Korean war, so the war had no direct effect upon the initial planning of a communications network to support SAC. The effect of Korea was to stimulate construction, procurement of equipment, and the extension of communications into areas of the world not served up till then.

The improvement of communications to forward bases occurred at this time. The overseas portion of SACCOMNET terminated in a major relay station in England, which in turn connected major strategic bombardment bases. Circuits were provided from England to North Africa, and, in addition, the Navy allocated to SAC two point-to-point circuits to bases being established In Morocco, one at Rabat and one at Sidi Slimane.

However, the North African bases presented serious problems. All the landline circuits were leased from the Post Telephone and Telegraph (PTT) of French Morocco and were unreliable. While construction of the bases was moving along by the end of 1951 and personnel were in place, communications equipment was still in very short supply. There were no facilities (radio or other) available to back up the PTT-leased line. Progress in this direction was very slow.

There were also communications problems in the Northeast Air Command area, which covered the northeast United States Iceland, Greenland, Newfoundland, and Labrador. The problems there stemmed from a shortage of equipment and from a natural phenomenon called the auroral absorption zone. These problems had been recognized fully after the SAC exercise in September 1950, and, while the solution appeared to be in the use of very high frequency (VHF) communications, the problems were still unresolved in mid-1952. ³⁴

As early as 1946, the idea had been initiated of an Air Force global communications system that would enable all commands to monitor their aircraft anywhere in the world. The Korean war inspired the Congress to appropriate funds for the USAF strategic communications system—GLOBECOM, which was to be composed of point-to-point landline teletype and radio facili-ties as well as air-ground-air radio links. The system would not belong to any one Air Force command and would give to SAC, upon request, allocated circuits that were owned and operated entirely by the Air Force.³⁵ Once completed, GLOBECOM would relieve SAC of its primary reliance on channels allocated by the Army, Navy, and Coast Guard.

The initiation of the project was accompanied by a long dispute in regard to the proper organization and management of the system after it was completed. As a result, by mid-1952 only painfully slow progress had been made because of production, procurement, delivery, and funding problems. Much of the available equipment was diverted to the Northeast Air Command area in an effort to surmount the especially serious communications problems there. GLOBECOM still did not satisfy SAC's stated requirements, and all through the decade SAC was to complain of the inadequacy of a common-user net like GLOBECOM for SAC's special role. The story of GLOBECOM was to be typical of much of the overall communications picture in the early 1950s, a picture of very slow progress despite an obvious need.

VII. US PERCEPTIONS OF THE SOVIET THREAT

The effort described in this study to cope with the new force of atomic energy and to create a military force prepared to use it as a weapon was carried out initially without any countervailing Soviet nuclear threat. There was, of course, the other and first threat, that of the Soviet army in Europe. That Soviet ground forces had the capability to attack and conquer Western Europe against existing ground opposition was accepted all through these years. The major asset in NATO was the threat of a US atomic attack. The American monopoly of atomic weapons endured for four years; while there was concern at the time over the possibility of Soviet long-range air attacks with conventional weapons, the danger involved was miniscule in comparison. In the first SAC plan (25 July 1946) for training and employment, for example, SAC pointed out that "no major strategic threat or requirement now exists nor, in the opinion of our country's best strategists, will such a requirement exist for the next three to five years."¹ The first real concern lay in just when the Soviets might develop their atomic bomb.

It is curious that the legend has been created that the United States was surprised by the Soviet achievement of an atomic explosion in August 1949- Both the military and the scientific community had accepted the US monopoly as temporary and, indeed, probably fleeting. In September 1945, Secretary of War Stimson had warned the President that the Soviets might have the bomb in four years. Ambassadors Harriman in Moscow and Steinhardt in Prague reported that the Soviets were working hard on an atom bomb. In August 1946, the Army's Intelligence Division thought the Soviets would be producing bombs by 19I49 or 1950, and in December 1947 the USAF Director of Intelligence expected a Soviet bomb by the summer or fall of 1949. In mid-1948, the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) of the JCS thought it would be mid-1950.²

Estimates continued to disagree. In December 1947, the Director of the CIA released an estimate jointly prepared by the CIA, the Office of Naval Intelligence, and the Army G-2. The estimate conceded that Soviet results In 1947 were apparently equivalent to those achieved by the Manhattan Project in 1943, but, allowing a progress rate only one-third that of the US rate, the estimate thought it unlikely that a Soviet bomb would appear before 1953. It was "almost certain" that it would not appear before 1951. Air Intelligence, which had not been consulted in the preparation of the joint estimate, dissented, asserting the USAF belief that the Soviets would certainly have the bomb in the 1949-52 period.³ In early 1949, the Air Force intermediate range war plan stated that mid-1950 was the "earliest possible" date and that mid-1953 was most probable for a complete weapon. Consequently, the Air Force felt, by 1955 the Soviets could have a stockpile of 50 bombs in the event of the mid-1950 completion date or 20 in the event of the mid-1953 date.⁴

While the Soviet bomb was obviously the watershed event most watched for, intelligence estimates were also concerned with expected overall Soviet delivery capabilities. In December 1948, the Joint Intelligence Committee sent to the Joint Chiefs a US-UK estimate of Soviet Intentions and capabilities for 1949 and 1956-57. It stated that by 1957 improved versions of the German V-1 and V-2 missiles, with ranges up to 600 miles, were likely to be in quantity production by the Soviets. It was unlikely, however, that these missiles would employ nuclear warheads.⁵

By early 1949, there began to appear suggestions from US intelligence sources as to coming periods of danger. In May 1949, the Technical Evaluation Group of the Committee on Guided Missiles of the Research and Development Board reported that (1) the probability of active warfare was expected to rise "sharply" in 1951-52 and to be critical after 1955-56 (the dates corresponded roughly to the expected development of the first Soviet bomb and the Soviet creation of a medium-size stockpile); (2) the Soviets would have a strategic attack force using planes similar to the B-29 by 1951-52; and (3) smaller numbers of higher performance bombers might be expected by 1955-56. The JCS, it should be noted, commented on this estimate in October 1949, agreeing except in the use of the word "sharply" in regard to the possibility of war.

Interestingly enough, the JCS comment included a priority list regarding Soviet missile developments, which they passed to the Research and Development Board. In a list of 13 items, the top three were different categories of air defense missiles. Long-range surface-to-surface missiles with atomic warheads ranked eighth on the list.⁶

In early 1950, NSC 68 concluded that by 1954 the Soviets could have the capability to launch a "devastating" attack on the United States. In the same vein, an Air Force air defense briefing to the JCS in March 1950 spelled out some specific estimates for expected Soviet capabilities:

Assumptions concerning a Soviet attack were that there would be little or no warning; the enemy would attempt to deliver a major portion of his stockpile in a minimum time to achieve maximum shock; and effective attacks might be conducted under conditions of darkness. By mid-1950, the study stated, the Soviets would have the capability to damage the United States seriously by a simultaneous attack with 50 atom bombs. ⁷

In April 1950, the JIC reported on the Soviet capability to attack the United States with guided missiles from submarines. By mid-1951, it was estimated, the Soviets would be able to deploy 49 guided-missile-launching submarines against the United States on D-day, each with two V-l-type missiles with a 150-mile range and an accuracy adequate for area targets. However, the use of atomic warheads or V-2-type missiles would not be within the Soviet submarine-launched capability during this period. The report also stated that biological agents could be used in V-l warheads or otherwise dispersed from submarines.⁸

The outbreak of the Korean war and the apparent Soviet inspiration of it led to a rising fear of the Soviets and of the potential for general war. As the Secretary of Defense expressed it in mid-1951, "the Communist aggression in Korea marked the beginning of a new military policy for the United States. It left no doubt that the Soviet Government and its satellites were willing to risk a general war by multiple aggressions all over the world, unless confronted by substantial military strength."⁹ By late 1951, the JCS officially accepted 1954 as the year of maximum danger, the threshold year when the Soviets could obtain a capability to inflict "critical or even fatal" damage on the military capacity of the United States. It was also expected, conversely, that by 1954 the capabilities of the NATO alliance would have increased to such a degree as to reduce greatly the chances of a quick and easy Soviet seizure of Western Europe.¹⁰

In early 1951, the USAP Directorate of Intelligence estimated that by mid-1952 the Soviets would have bombers with a 2,000-mile range, and that by mid-1956 the range would have increased to 3,500-4,000 miles. By 1956, too, they would also possess a subsonic guided missile that would carry a 1-ton warhead 5,000 miles, and shortly after that a supersonic missile able to carry a 2.5-ton warhead the same distance.

By mid-1953, more modest appraisals began to appear concerning the expected Soviet threat. In August, a JIC estimate expressed doubt that the Soviets would possess an operational missile capability by 1957, although it was considered probable that they would be able to launch a limited number from submarines. The estimate did express the belief that by 1957 the Soviets could deliver some 550 atomic weapons with an average yield of 80 kilotons, but that they would do so only in desperation or on some assurance of overwhelming success. ¹¹

In October 1953, the JCS accepted a JIC report on "The Magnitude and Imminence of the Soviet Air Threat to the US—1957" Essentially a revision of the estimate described in the preceding paragraph, the report indicated that there was no evidence of a Soviet guided missile capability beyond the level of the V-1 and V-2, although the Soviets were carrying out intensive research and development. The JIC did not believe the Soviets would have a guided missile that could threaten the United States if launched from Soviet-controlled territory. While there was no positive evidence of Soviet R&D in submarine-launched guided missiles, it was estimated that by 1957 the Soviets could equip a limited number of boats to launch V-l-type missiles with a probable range of 200 nautical miles and a maximum of 500 miles.¹²

The US perception of the Soviet threat went through several stages in the eight years covered in this chapter. Initially, no threat to the continental United States was seen, but a grave threat to Europe. By 1950, the threat to Europe was seen as so serious that, it will be recalled, SAC was directed to prepare to expend precious atomic bombs on retardation targets in Europe. In these years, too, the Soviet long-range air force grew but with only conventional weapons at its disposal. After 1950 and Korea, the United States saw the Soviet capability as growing rapidly while, at the same time, there was general agreement that the US ability to prevent a Soviet surprise attack remained extremely low and would be low for several years ahead. Thus it was that while the period saw a great Increase in the growth of US offensive power, the end of the period found the United States with only a marginal air defense capability. It is to a consideration of the growth of a US warning capability to meet the Soviet threat that we now turn.

VIII. THE DEVELOPMENT OF WARNING SYSTEMS, 1945-53

Warning is an integral part of air defense, but for the purposes of this study it has been separated from its air defense matrix. Our concern with warning in this study of command and control is in terms of its passive detection role. We do not deal with any of the combat aspects of air defense systems.

A. THE BEGINNING OF A WARNING SYSTEM

While the Army Air Forces established the Air Defense Command (ADC) at Mitchell Field, N.Y., on 27 March 1946, the prevailing attitude toward air defense in this early postwar era was one of extreme ambivalence. Air defense was regarded within the air forces as necessary in theory but not in terms of resource allocation. Not surprisingly, therefore, planning for air defense in any practical and coordinated sense got under way late. This resulted also from the unsettled nature of roles and missions before mid-1948, the indeterminate status of Air Force programs and organization, and the cost of attempting to build both air defense and offensive forces.¹

By the end of 1946 and early 1947, however, world developments had led to some public concern, primarily over the deliberate reliance by the ADC on Air National Guard (ANG) and Reserve personnel to man the few resources it possessed. The first major air defense debate thus began over the issue of whether the United States required an "in-being" air defense system or whether one based on the Air National Guard and Reserve would be adequate.²

When the ADC was activated, there was not a single search radar in operation within the United States. General Spaatz, the commanding general, Army Air Forces, revealed before a congressional committee in May 1946 that he had no intention of allocating a substantial proportion of regular AAF strength to air defense, and he declared his intention to rely principally for air defense manning on the ANG and Reserve. He did, however, ask at this time for funds to operate certain radar sites on a 24-hour basis.³

The issue that lay behind Spaatz' attitude was the one that underlay the whole air defense problem and was probably the crucial one in determining the course of events. This was the issue of resource allocation. Most of the AAF/USAF leadership was deeply committed to a concentration of resources on the development and expansion of US strategic striking power. Their view was that this course was dictated not only by the scarcity of funds, but by the absence for some time to come of any real airborne threat from the Soviet Union. Experimenting with air defense seemed a costly and unnecessary enterprise. With the sharply reduced budgets of the late 1940s, the new Air Force would choose to apply its resources to the development of nuclear attack forces, which would be a concrete asset, rather than to the air defense field, which was so dominated by uncertainties.

An issue derivative from the above was whether to postpone the development of an air defense system for several years, both until the threat became more real and by which time newer equipment would be available, or to start now on a system using rapidly obsolescing World War II equipment.⁴

All through 1946 and into 1947, discussion of the real mission of the ADC continued, numerous views being expressed within the Army Air Forces, the other services, and the Congress. One overriding consideration did control the debate. In May 1947, Spaatz directed the ADC not to rock the boat over the matter until the unification of the air forces and budget issues were settled. It must be stressed that a dominant concern of Army Air Force leaders in 1946-47 was the establishment and organization of an independent US Air Force.⁵ The ramifications of this concern were such that, while the issue of resource allocation between strategic offensive forces and air defense continued to be fundamental, in actual fact the United States would have little of either for several years, in good part because of the preoccupation of the Air Force leadership with the creation of the USAF.

Accordingly, steps toward the creation of even a token warning system were halting. In May 1947, operational search radars were set up in Arlington, Wash., and Half Moon Bay, Calif., but they were operated on a part-time basis and were mostly for training purposes.⁶ No real action was taken on any of the ADC's plans until after the establishment of the USAF in July 1947. On 12 November 1947, the Secretary of Defense announced that planning for a nationwide radar early warning system was under way. This was an Air Force plan named SUPREMACY, which was designed to remedy the most fundamental lack in US air defense—an air control and warning (AC&W) system that would cover a very large part of the approaches to the United States. SUPREMACY was to provide a framework for such a system; it called for 223 basic radar stations and 14 control centers within the United States, and 37 basic radars and 4 control centers in Alaska. The plan, however, was too ambitious for the political and budgetary climate and it died when Congress failed to appropriate funds for it.⁷

SUPREMACY did serve the function of raising key issues about air defense and warning. An exchange of memorandums between Secretary Forrestal and the JCS pointed up major issues that were to continue for years. The Bureau of the Budget, in May 1948, had sent the Secretary a memorandum that raised questions concerning SUPREMACY. The Bureau wanted to know the relative priority of the program, the extent to which USN picket ships would be used, and how the strength of the services and the National Guard would be integrated.⁸

A month later Forrestal turned to the JCS for advice. He pointed out the admitted Inadequacies of the proposed radar fence against even World War II aircraft and reported that the Research and Development Board thought that the United States could not expect to obtain more adequate equipment from current development programs for about five years. The Air Force, he said, planned an orderly replacement of older type equipment, at as reasonable a cost as possible, when new types became available. Forrestal continued:

Therefore, a fine question of judgment is involved. On the one hand there are considerations of economy involved in spending a substantial amount of money on radar which is now not completely effective and which will probably be obsolete in a few years, and on the other hand there is the obvious fact that the use of the present types of radar would give us at least some protection against a surprise attack during the years in which superior types are being developed.⁹

The JCS reply came almost four months later, which perhaps indicates something of the priority they placed on air defense. They explained that the Soviets possessed aircraft capable of one-way strikes to any vital target in the United States and that Alaska and the Pacific Northwest were within radius of those aircraft from their present bases. As of September 1948, the Soviets had 210 long-range bombers with this capability, and it was estimated that their force of improved bombers would reach 1,600 by 1952. Furthermore, Soviet development of an aerial-refueling capability was possible. It could be assumed that until 1952 the Soviets would not have the atomic bomb in sufficient quantity to wage atomic war against the United States of such magnitude as to be decisive.

However, by 1953 it was possible that the Soviets might have 20-50 bombs. Until 1953, the JCS felt, the Soviets would have to rely upon high explosives, chemical, or bacteriological attacks, which would imply a series of sporadic, harassing attacks.

The JCS pointed out that the present 12 radar control and warning stations had almost negligible value. They recognized that present equipment was only reasonably effective now and would have only limited effectiveness against anticipated Soviet air capabilities in 1953. They therefore recommended the implementation of a modified air defense system that would (a) provide a basic capability; (b) be an operational proving ground for integration and improvement of methods, equipment, and training, both for defensive and offensive purposes; (c) be a deterrent to enemy attack; (d) provide means for the formulation of doctrine and ultimate requirements for joint and civilian participation; and (e) serve as a deterrent to the pressure of public opinion to divert military forces from offensive missions in case of attack. In regard to the Secretary's query as to priority, the JCS said it was low compared with programs for the offensive, but that the priority would rise progressively with Soviet strategic capabilities.¹⁰

Nevertheless, the pressures of growing tension in Europe had provoked some action. In March 1958, the Air Force had ordered the Arlington, Wash., radar station onto a 24-hour basis and activated four other radars in the area to cover the Hanford, Wash., nuclear facility. This was probably the initial step in a serious warning system.¹¹

A much reduced version of SUPREMACY, called the Interim Plan, was approved by the JCS and the Secretary of Defense in late 1948. This plan was to be completed in 26 months and would include the 5 basic radar stations and 2 control centers currently in operation. With equipment that was in storage or on order added to the existing facilities, a total of 61 basic radar stations and 10 control centers in the United States and 10 basic radar stations and 1 control center in Alaska would be operational. In addition, 15 more basic radars were scheduled for eventual activation.¹² The Interim Plan system was recognized as being far from Ideal, but it did represent what could be accomplished by 1952 with restricted funds. What is significant about it is that by the end of 1948 a token "in-being" air defense system had finally begun to take shape.

The Interim Plan system was approved by Congress in March 1949. However, by this time the need for more immediate protection was recognized, and to fill the gap until the completion of the Interim Plan system, the ADC was directed to establish a temporary AC&W system, to be named LASHUP. This system would consist of 44 stations using World War II radars. Work got under way in late 1948.¹³ By the spring of 1949, 18 radars had been deployed to the northeast United States, but LASHUP was not completed until mid-1950.¹⁴

Although the first plan (SUPREMACY) was submitted to it in late 1947, Congress did not act on a permanent radar system until the fall of 1949, after the first Soviet atomic explosion. During the first half of 1950, however, the Air Force continued to stress the construction of the Interim Plan system, and it was hoped by summer that the system, originally scheduled for completion in 1952, might be operational by mid-1951.¹⁵ By this time the Interim Plan system had merged into the so-called permanent system, so future reference shall be made the later term.

B. THE IMPACT OF KOREA

The outbreak of the Korean war, coupled with the Soviet nuclear explosion, provided tremendous stimulus to the development of a comprehensive warning system. The issuance of NSC 68 added further impetus. Appearing in early 1950, NSC 68 had concluded that by 1954 the Soviets would have the capability to launch a devastating attack on the United States. One recommendation of the report was to build an active air defense that would provide warning of an attack and a means of defeating a bomber attack without resorting to nuclear retaliation initially, The suggested system would include a successive line of trans-Canada radar early warning stations, dispersed interceptor groups, deployment of antiaircraft missiles, an airborne-alert portion of the bomber force, and a hardened and sheltered command and control system to ensure communications. While no immediate action followed, the points made were all prophetic of future developments.

After June 1950, money ceased to be a problem, at least temporarily. The problems now lay not in budgetary constraints but in the slowness of project completion. Deadlines began slipping steadily. Completion date for the permanent system slipped from a firm November 1951 to May 1952.

There was also an increasing realization in the Air Force in 1951 that, despite the sense of accomplishment in that both the administration and the Congress had accepted the requirement of an in-being air defense system and were pouring massive funding into it, the system under development was based upon obsolescent World War II equipment and techniques. In order for the system to be effective for a respectable lifespan, considerable improvement would be needed.¹⁶

There was also some concern that the public had been oversold or had oversold itself on the capabilities of the air defense of the near future. Official DoD views had been cautious. The Secretary of the Air Force, in his January-June 1950 report, had stated:

Completion of this aircraft early warning system will be an important step forward in the air defense of the US. However, it is only a start and will fall far short of the ultimate goal of a complete radar coverage. Additional stations must be built both in the US and in the North and great technical developments must be made in our scientific centers and labs In perfecting equipment and methods used for detection of aircraft.¹⁷

These cautions were too often forgotten. Estimates by authorities in early 1951 that the permanent system would stop only 5-10 percent of an attacking force led DoD to request the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to undertake Project Charles.

The Project Charles report on 1 August 1951 offered no unusual solutions to the dilemmas of air defense. It strongly recommended that the current system be updated by Increasing the extent of the radar coverage and also by increasing the speed by which data acquired by radar could be analyzed and acted upon. The report further recommended use of picket ships and airborne radar to provide a measure of offshore coverage. The Ground Observer Corps (see below) could be used to cover low altitudes.

The report said that no new spectacular improvements In radar could be expected, but that great possibilities existed In the use of data automation to improve air defense systems. The scientific personnel who authored the report were convinced that automation was the only means by which speed in radar-data handling could be measurably Increased. They called for new computers specially designed for an air defense function.¹⁸ (At this time, automation was just beginning to come Into use in industry and its potential was not well understood.)

The Air Force accepted the recommendations in September 1951 and established the Lincoln Laboratory at MIT to continue research in the field.

C. THE GROUND OBSERVER CORPS

A civilian support force for warning made its first appearance in September 1949, when personnel from the Office of Civil Defense were used in air defense tests. By December of that year, the USAF was considering a permanent Ground Observer Corps (GOC).¹⁹ Progress in developing a GOC was slow, however, through 1951, and the system itself proved faulty. The reporting and analyzing of data were generally too slow for the sightings. A much more rapid system, along the line of the Project Charles recommendation, was clearly needed. Yet, until a low-altitude radar could be developed, the GOC was the only capability for low-altitude coverage.

Another weakness of the GOC lay in its volunteer nature, which meant that it was not immediately available. It would require three-hours notice before it was ready to begin to function. An effort in 1951 to get a 24-hour manning for the northeast portion of the United States during the summer months (estimated by intelligence to be the period of greatest danger) failed. The GOC was finally placed on a 24-hour operational basis in 27 states in July 1952. This was achieved, it should be added, only after a shaky, politics-riven start as a result of the clashing of state and local jurisdictions with the DoD.²⁰ The system was now given the code name of Operation Skywatch.²¹

D. MAJOR CHANGE : THE DEW LINE

Despite progress, there was a certain confusion and lack of decision apparent in warning and air defense planning by 1952 over the issues of the scope and nature of a proper air defense of the United States. It will be apparent that the issues were the same ones that had appeared in 1946-47—how much should be devoted to air defense and what should be expected from it. A 75-station permanent radar system and new radar and aircraft were being produced to replace the older equipment. All had been authorized in 1951, or earlier. The question that came to the fore in 1952 was whether the basic air defense system under construction should be further expanded and improved—at very considerable cost. Discussion was brought into focus by the Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group, which recommended construction of a distant early warning (DEW) line across Canada and integrated and fully automated communications for control of the air defense systems, all this at a cost of several billions of dollars.

The DEW line had early antecedents. In 1946, a similar scheme had been proposed by AAF planners but died for economy reasons. In 1947-48, when the USAF was proposing SUPREMACY, the ADC had objected that the plan omitted a line of land-based radars along the farthest reaches of North America, a system the ADC called essential since the Soviets were then capable of a B-29-type aircraft assault across the North Pole. A distant early warning line could provide three-six hours of extra warning. The ADC's efforts in 1948-49 failed, because no real threat was yet perceived in view of the US nuclear monopoly.

Some intermediate efforts were made to piece together AC&W programs in Canada and Alaska. One control center and 10 radar stations were planned for completion in 1952, but these ultimately became operational under the Alaskan Air Command only in early 1954. While US-Canada discussions dated to 1940, serious joint consideration of air defense did not begin until April 1949. A US-Canada agreement was signed In 1951, under which a total of 33 AC&W stations would be built in Canada, 22 by the United States and 11 by Canada. Eighteen would be manned by USAF personnel and 15 by Canadians. Of the US sites, 8 were assigned to the ADC and were operational by mid-1954. The other 10 US sites, deployed along northwest Canada from Baffin Island across Labrador to Newfoundland, were assigned to the Northeast Air Command. In addition, 10 permanent radars were to be erected in Greenland and Iceland to extend coverage eastward.²²

By the end of 1951, however, only five air defense radar stations were operational in Canada with Canadian manning. The Canadians were using World War II equipment and operating only eight hours a day; the Canadians said they could not begin full-time manning until sometime in 1952.²³

The patched-together system thus created provided some measure of protection against B-29-type bombers, but it was obviously going to be inadequate against the threat expected in the 1956-60 period. Production of Soviet jet aircraft similar to the B-47 was predicted for the late 1950s, with even faster models to come. The increased speed of Soviet aircraft dictated the need to push a detection line farther out in order to make up for the increment of lost time. Consequently, a joint US-Canadian military study in 1953 agreed to a 1950 Canadian plan to set a line of radars across Canada at 54° or 55° N, to be called the Mid-Canada Line, with an operational date of 1957.

A very distant early warning line concept had been resurrected by Project Charles in August 1951, which concluded that a few hours extra warning would be invaluable. The Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group in August 1952 had suggested a line of radars along 70° N, connecting Alaskan radars with those of the Northeast Air Command. Locked onto the ends of this line would be a series of over-water stations flown by AEW&C patrols.²⁴ Neither DoD nor the Air Force was enthusiastic and the report was not immediately approved. Both were concerned primarily over costs. The USAF opposed the Summer Study Group recommendation, essentially on the basis that the strategy of deterrence did not require such an enormous allocation of resources to air defense systems. The Air Force argued that available equipment did not possess the very high standards of technological excellence that were demanded by such a harsh environment as in the Far North. Furthermore, a DEW line concept was disparaged as potentially creating a Maginot Line mentality that could create a false sense of security. With these views, the Secretary of Defense tended to agree.

Opposition to the distant early warning line came from varied sources. The Commander of the ADC, General Chidlaw, favored, prophetically, concentration of resources on a ballistic missile defense system. A RAND study of the DEW Line concept in November 1952 also opposed it. Such a huge undertaking would necessarily be contingent upon a great increase in air defense funds sufficient to activate other air defense steps first, such as development of a low-altitude radar screen for the United States, establishment of AEW&C and picket-ship coverage off either coast, and major improvement in the permanent warning system. Also, a very crucial point was that no such great commitment of resources to the Arctic should be made until communications between the United States and the Arctic could be thoroughly tested and proved.²⁵ The Air Force declined to recommend the Summer Study report to the National Security Council, but in September 1952 the chairman of the National Security Resources Board took it to the NSC. The Air Force concern was the old one, that NSC consideration could end by compelling the Air Force to spend heavily on defense systems at the expense of the deterrent forces.

The NSC took no concrete action, except to request further study of the report. However, the findings of the Summer Study Group were leaked to the press and became the subject of a public debate in which advocates of concentration of resources on the deterrent forces were depicted as being too cavalier with the safety of the United States. This was an unfortunate interpretation of the issue, which was really one of competition for funds and a matter of proper timing for such major undertakings, u

Late in 1952, the President decided to issue a policy statement on a warning system. The services and the JCS unanimously opposed what was first expected to be a public statement. The flurry that was created led to some very specific statements of the fundamental inhibition felt by most Defense official's, military and civilian, over air defense programs. The Secretary of the Air Force, for example, cautioned the Secretary of Defense that "we must give full weight to the deterrent as well as to the air defense function in any considerations. There must be no withdrawal from or diminution of established national policy which holds that a strong offensive capability is the greatest single deterrent to war."

The Secretary of the Air Force also suggested that a presidential statement on warning might result in accentuating early warning to the detriment of other known defense measures, as well as offensive striking power. If so, the buildup of "known quantities would be impaired in favor of what thus far is still a pig in a poke." He also cautioned about announcing completion dates or estimates of cost. He stated that "we must have as effective an early warning system as American ingenuity can provide, but, in the national interests, this project must be viewed in proper perspective."²⁶

The President and NSC took account of the solid front against any public statement and revised the policy statement accordingly. It appeared as NSC 139 on 31 December 1952, a top secret document. It stated that the estimated time scale on which the Soviet Union would possess sufficient atomic weapons to deliver a heavy attack on the United States indicated that the United States should plan to have an effective system of air, sea, and land measures ready no later than 31 December 1955. An early warning system that would provide three-six hours warning was desired, and as much of the system as possible should be completed by 31 December 1954 and the full system completed by 31 December 1955.²⁷

The episode illustrated well the perpetual issue that overhung all warning and air defense developments, that of offense versus defense. Up until this point, the proponents of heavy emphasis on offensive measures and capabilities had been dominant,

In the meantime, despite the lack of any decision on an improved air defense and warning system in 1952, the existing permanent system was extended. Forty-four mobile radar stations were approved and in July the ADC requested 35 more. At the end of the year, the ADC was operating 8l radar stations within the United States. Of these, 75 were part of the permanent network and 6 were LASHUP radars of the earlier system. Nine stations were operational in Canada, 2 from the approved 33-station Canadian extension of the permanent system, and 7 of the LASHUP type.

Thus a basic "in-being" air defense was operational, although mostly of World War II type. The radar stations of the permanent system and the GOC in 27 states were sending data to 11 control centers. Thirty-nine interceptor squadrons backed up the system. One-third of these were early model all-weather jets (F-89B/C and F-94A/B), while 15 squadrons had fighters capable of daylight operations only (F-80, F-84, and F-86). Eleven squadrons still had World War II piston-engine fighters (F-47 and F-51).²⁸

The DEW Line controversy carried over into the new Eisenhower administration. The hearings on the last Truman budget began In early March 1953 and immediately bogged down over the air defense issue. General Vandenberg, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force, stressed that the goal suggested by the Summer Study Group of a 25 percent attrition of an attacking force was gilding the lily and did not represent a reasonable objective. The issue posed a dilemma for the new Eisenhower administration, which had been elected on an economy-in-government campaign and now faced major outlays for air defense, outlays over which there was no general agreement. The administration and the NSC tended to divide over the issue.

The Kelly Committee, appointed in late 1952 to examine overall US defenses, reported in May 1953 that, while the principal element of American defense was the strategic striking force, a better air defense system, especially an early warning system, was needed. The report could thus be used by both opponents and proponents of the Summer Study Group recommendations. However, the Committee did play down the need for haste in continental defense and rejected the idea of a rush program.

With the administration still undecided, Secretary of Defense Wilson appointed another committee, under Maj. General Bull's chairmanship, to study the air defense issue. Bull's group reported to the NSC in July 1953 that existing air defense plans were entirely inadequate and estimated that needed improvements might cost $18-$25 billion. The report was not acted on by the NSC.²⁹

The JCS position on expenditures of this magnitude reflected the position of those who stressed offensive deterrent power. In a memorandum to the Secretary of Defense on the matter of continental defense, the JCS summed up their philosophy. Decrying the "inadequacy of intelligence" and calling for better intelligence on Soviet capabilities as a basis for threat projections, the JCS stated:

In weighing the effectiveness of defensive measures against the costs involved, the JCS feel that substantial improvement is possible at a modest cost. Yet there comes a point where a comparatively small increase in effectiveness becomes increasingly expensive until it reaches a point where even great expenditures fail to raise significantly the effectiveness of defenses. An aggressor nation will be far more deterred by evidence that we have the offensive potential and the mobility capable of dealing it decisive blows than by the excellence of our defenses.³⁰

The Summer Study Group, however, seemed vindicated in its criticism of the inadequacy of the warning and air defense system by Exercise TAILWIND in July 1953. The Strategic Air Command sent 94 bombers against the air defense system, employing all the techniques available to it—night attack, surprise, diversionary attacks, electronic countermeasures, saturation attack, and so on. Only 7 attackers were successfully intercepted. The following day, against daylight attacks, the air defense intercepted 29 out of 38 SAC task forces. Yet obviously, a real attack would come by night. The exercise pointed up the need for better early warning, solid radar coverage from 0 to 50,000 feet, and some automatic means of tying together data and displaying them to the battle commanders.

What finally broke the back of opposition to a DEW Line was the first Soviet thermonuclear explosion in August 1953. The JCS soon after identified continental air defense and massive retaliation as the two principal military problems facing the country, while on 26 August, Admiral Radford, the new Chairman of the JCS, in his first press conference declared that the Soviet thermonuclear development would compel the United States to review and to strengthen its air defenses.³¹ The questions of US thermonuclear development had been debated earlier In the year, with leading members of the scientific community linking their opposition to development with the air defense issue. Their position was that with a sufficiently tight air defense there would be no need for massive offensive operations that would require thermonuclear weapons. In the debate, supporters of thermonuclear weapon development and of the primacy of the deterrent mission were again portrayed as the villains.

On 6 October 1953, the NSC approved NSC Paper 162, which included most of the Summer Study Group's findings, of which a DEW Line and automation were the most significant. The NSC was apparently convinced that the large expenditures necessary to make automation in air defense a reality should be spent, notwithstanding the fact that automation was a new thing and nobody was certain what obstacles lay in the way of such large-scale applications of automation.³²

In late 1953, the Air Force, reflecting the NSC action, approved FY55 funding for 29 more mobile radars (Phase III of the Mobile Radar Program), 5 Texas towers for offshore radars, a Canadian radar line along the 55th parallel, and 323 small gap-filler radars for low-altitude coverage.³³ Inclusion of the 55° line indicated the continued reluctance of the Air Force to build a DEW Line farther north.

The small gap-filler radars were meant to remedy deficiencies in existing radars, and would be unattended stations. Eventually they would replace the GOC, until then the only means of low-level coverage, which was proving to be a weak reed. Only about 11 percent of the personnel the ADC felt were needed were active, public apathy having taken its toll.

E. THE SEAWARD EXTENSION OF A WARNING SYSTEM

It was early recognized that any radar line, either close in or far to the north, would require extensions out to sea and down the coasts of the United States in order to prevent the possibilities of an end-run attack on the United States. Three elements came to be involved—airborne radars, naval picket ships, and fixed offshore installations anchored to the sea floor.

1. AEW Systems

The idea of an airborne early warning and control aircraft was first raised in the mid-1940s, before the war ended. The Army Air Forces had no experience in the field, but the Navy had at least an introduction to it through its efforts to intercept Japanese kamikaze attacks on the fleet off Okinawa. Yet, overall experience with the technique was lacking.

The advantages were obvious. Such an extension of the radar system would give at least 30 additional minutes of warning; low-altitude coverage that was overlooked by coastal-based radars would also be possible—AEW aircraft at altitude could look down and thus reduce the prospect of low-altitude sneak attacks.³⁴

Shortly before the end of the war, the AAF had directed the Air Materiel Command to examine the concept of an airborne control center for offensive operations. In 1946, the Air Staff suggested that the effort be switched to serve air defense purposes. However, because of budgetary constraints, duplication of Navy efforts, and the Navy's head start in the field, the AAF project was dropped. The final closing out in 1948 of any USAF effort on an airborne facility left the Air Force dependent on the Navy for an offshore radar screen.

In the meantime, in April 1947, a newly formed US-Canadian planning group, which was under the respective Chiefs of Staff, issued a plan for early warning. They proposed an early warning line across Alaska, Canada, Greenland, Newfoundland, and off both coasts. Offshore coverage would be by radar planes and ships. The plan never went anywhere, but it did reflect an early expression of what was to become the ultimate air defense system a decade later.³⁵ Strangely, the 1947 Air Force plan, SUPREMACY, had not included provision for offshore coverage and had been criticized by both the JCS and the ADC for the inadequacy.

The Navy pursued its AEW development program, adopting radars to Navy Grumman bombers and then to B-17s (PB-1Ws). Lockheed Constellations (C-121s) were also configured for radar. In late 1949, the Air Force directed the ADC to observe Navy experiments.

The basis for interservice cooperation in air defense was established by the Key West Agreements in the spring of 1948. The Navy agreed to provide "sea-based air defense and sea-based means of coordinating control for defense against air attack," and also to coordinate with other services in the establishment of such systems. However, not until the creation of the Continental Air Defense Command in late 1954 were any jointly approved doctrines or procedures issued by the JCS. In view of this lack of JCS-approved doctrine, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) in 1949 drew up general principles for Navy cooperation, which were to serve for years. He decreed that the basic principle for naval participation in air defense was that naval forces possessing important air defense capabilities would be trained and prepared for emergency deployment to reinforce those forces that were regularly assigned the air defense mission. He did not intend that there be a routine and permanent commitment of naval forces to the mission. Specific arrangements were to be made between individual commanders of sea frontier and air defense forces.³⁶

While it was not until 1951 that an ADC-owned AEW&C force was authorized, the ground work for such a mission had been laid earlier. Late in 1949, the Navy had suggested the possibility of using AEW aircraft for both ASW and air defense in joint tests, to which the Air Force agreed. The Navy tested its AEW aircraft in both an ASW and a surveillance role with ADC cooperation in July 1950 off the West Coast. Tests of intercepts vectored by Navy PB-lWs were successful in picking up targets 500 miles out, and of intercepting them 300 miles out.³⁷

Finally convinced of the utility of and necessity for AEW, the Air Force established the requirement for 48 RC-121s in July 1951 and then raised the total to 56 by year's end. The first 10 were slated for 1953 delivery, all by 1955. In actual fact, final deliveries were not made until 1956, and, while the first squadron was activated in October 1953, it was not equipped until a year later.³⁸ The first plane was delivered in May 1954. An effort was made to offset the time lag by converting some B-29s to an AEW role, but this proved abortive.

The first comprehensive plan for employment of the AEW aircraft was prepared by February 1952. It proposed establishment of barriers off each coast, 800 miles long and 200 miles offshore. Each barrier would be manned by four AEW&C aircraft orbiting on station, with about 200 miles between planes. The ADC estimated that with this spacing the probability of detection at low altitudes would be 80-90 percent. The eastern barrier started about 125 miles southeast of Nova Scotia and ran to about 250 miles northeast of Norfolk. The western barrier ran from 250 miles west of Seattle to 200 miles off San Francisco.³⁹ The final total of some 60 aircraft would operate 30 from one base on each coast.⁴⁰

2. Picket Ships

The Air Force early recognized the need for shipborne radars to fill the offshore gap until the AEW system was functioning. It also recognized that ships could complement the AEW aircraft by adding a high-level coverage to the aircraft low-level coverage.

The matter had been discussed by the Air Force and the Navy since 1949, but the Navy was slow to move, despite agreement on the utility of picket ships. In December 1950, the Navy finally volunteered two picket ships to work with the ADC in the event of emergency, but the next month the Air Force told the CNO that vessels for 10 stations were needed as soon as possible. The Navy replied that 10 ships of the type probably would not be available until 1954.

A test of the two proffered picket ships was jointly held by the Eastern Air Defense Force and the Eastern Sea Frontier Force in February and March 1951. The main problem uncovered was that of poor communication from ship to shore. Neither radio-telegraph nor voice contact could be maintained for more than 28 hours without a complete breakdown. Intervals of over three hours occurred during which no contact could be made.

The Air Force tried in vain to have the Navy Increase the number of picket ships. Not even the two tested were actually formally approved for that emergency role until September 1952. As a result, no more than one or two stations were manned until 1955.⁴¹

3. Offshore Stationary Radars

While the concepts of AEW aircraft and picket ships were raised quite early, the offshore stationary radar was a latecomer. The Lincoln Laboratory Summer Study Group in 1952 concluded that an additional means of reinforcing radar coverage was offered by the shoals lying off the northeast coast of the United States. It suggested use of radar platforms, like oil drilling rigs, to be emplanted on five shoals in water 50-100 feet deep, 75-100 miles offshore. The name of Texas tower was soon applied to what seemed a way of bypassing the problem of getting picket ships from the Navy.⁴² The ADC endorsed the concept, but as noted earlier, no action was taken until late 1953, when the Air Force included 5 Texas towers in its FY55 funding.

G. ORGANIZATION FOR AIR DEFENSE AND WARNING

Progress in the development of the substance of a warning system during these years was not matched by improved organization. Throughout the entire period, organization was fragmented.

It will be recalled that the Army Air Forces established the ADC in March 1946, as a first organizational step. The National Security Act of 1947 did not clarify air defense responsibilities, but in the Key West Agreement of 1948 the Air Force was assigned the responsibility for air defense, and the Army and Navy agreed to provide forces as required. Each service was to perform its assigned mission "in accordance with the policies and procedures approved by the JCS."

In the meantime, the ADC had been dissolved and merged, along with the Tactical Air Command, into the Continental Air Command in December 1948. However, because of the added impetus given air defense at the beginning of the 1950s, the ADC was reestablished in January 1951, with headquarters at Colorado Springs.⁴³ In April 1951, the Army established an Antiaircraft Command, to be collocated with the ADC. The structure of the organizations was parallel and closely integrated for field operations.

From time to time, the Chief of Naval Operations issued policy statements regarding Navy participation in continental air defense, but no separate command organization was established. The two Sea Frontier commanders were still, in 1953, the principal operating link between the Navy and the Air Force on air defense matters.

The ADC was responsible to the Air Force, the Antiaircraft Command to the Army, and the Sea Frontier commanders to the Navy. Any plan prepared by the ADC, whether it Involved solely an Air Force function or required participation by the Army and Navy, had first to be approved by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force. As far as the Air Force portion of the plan was concerned, it had first to compete with the plans of other Air Force commands for its share of the Air Force budget. If the ADC plan did include the other services, the Air Force then had to bargain with them, and quite likely the JCS as well, to get the plan requirement fulfilled. This bargaining ran smoothly so long as no service interests were contradicted.

The Air Force had responsibility for the basic ground radar system for surveillance and control of all weapons, the fighter forces, and the initiation of warning to alert both military and civilian agencies. Within limits, the Air Force established requirements for all the services. In theory, the ADC, through the CSAF, could levy requirements on the other services for participation in a program. In practice, while tactical control of air defense forces of all three services was broadly executed by the ADC, there was no assurance that the ADC could obtain Army and Navy forces as required.

The same situation prevailed in the US-Canadian air defense relationship. There were two coordinated systems, rather than one integrated one.⁴⁴

H. WARNING 1945-53: A SUMMATION

By the end of 1953, 87 radar stations were operational in the US warning net. Of these, 75 represented the US permanent system, 8 were Canadian sites of the Radar Extension Program, and 4 were old LASHUP sites still in operation. Seventy-nine mobile and semimobile stations had been authorized, but would not be in operation until late 1954-early 1955.

The Secretary of the Air Force was able to report in July 1954:

The development of an air defense in depth has been greatly aided by increased radar operations by the Canadians and the resultant extension of our basic radar net. Improvements in the radar net have permitted greater emphasis to be placed on increasing the radar coverage and improving the overall system capability. A major step will be the ultimate transition from a manual system to a high capacity radar net capable of providing the essential elements of detection and control. Additional aircraft control and warning squadrons have been deployed to advanced overseas bases.

The activation of the first airborne early warning and control division of the Air Force on 1 May 1954 marked a major advance in air defense early warning and control systems. This division is being equipped with specially modified versions of the Super Constellation (RC-121). Eventually the Division will operate squadrons off both Atlantic and Pacific coasts on a round-the-clock basis.⁴⁵

At the end of 1953, therefore, the type of air defense system outlined by the commanding general of the ADC in 1946-47 was in place and operating. Plans for improving range, responsiveness, and kill potential had been approved, but the necessary hardware delivery had not yet begun.

After seven years of consideration, the JCS authorized the creation of a joint command to control air defense, directing in August 1954 the establishment at Colorado Springs of the jointly manned Continental Air Defense Command, under the USAF as executive agent.⁴⁶ The step was apparently not taken enthusiastically. In response to a request by the CJCS, Admiral Radford, on 16 October 1953, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force had submitted on 16 December a report on command arrangements for defense of the United States (included in JCS 1899/89) in which he concluded that no change was needed or advisable. The CJCS replied that a joint command was both necessary and advisable and recommended that the JCS approve in principle the establishment of a joint air defense command.⁴⁷

The years from 1947 to 1953 had seen the establishment of a system comparable to that used in World War II. The extended public debate and the final NSC decision In October 1953 directed the creation of a wholly new system. This was the crucial decision. The steps taken in the previous eight years had been both discrete and incomplete. They did not represent a major coordinated effort to develop a continental defense system. The years 1954 and 1955 were to see the construction and integration of new elements of the system. However, the public debate continued over the efficacy of the air defense system, with Congress repeatedly expressing concern over the disproportionate resources being allocated to the strategic striking forces. The irony was that the delays in reaching the decision to create a wholly new system meant that the system was to be rendered obsolescent before it became operational

IX .THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMAND POSTS FOR STRATEGIC OPERATIONS CONTROL

Within a year of the nuclear explosions over Japan, awareness had grown in some circles in the government that in a future major war the US national command structure would come under attack for the first time (if one excludes the visit of the British Army to Washington in l8l4). This concern began a cycle of planning for the development of command centers, which has continued to this day. The problems that underlay the initial concern and that were revealed quite early have never been resolved.

Since command and control depended upon the survival of the political and military decisionmakers, much more attention was paid to the issue of disaster planning after the Soviet atomic explosion in August 1949. As the Soviets steadily improved their nuclear capabilities, the problems of command and control survivability became more difficult. During the next 10 years, planning for continuity of operations was based either on "emergency evacuation" or on staying in place and hoping to ride out an attack.

There were two aspects to the matter of command posts for atomic operations. One aspect involved the safety of the command authorities; the other concerned the machinery for controlling atomic (or non-atomic) operations. It was in September 1946 that General Eisenhower, as Chief of Staff of the Army, was requested by the chairman of the Senate Finance and Banking Committee to lay before the JCS a request that "the Army and Navy undertake a study to determine the advisability, cost, and best methods of making the United States as invulnerable to attack as possible."¹ Eisenhower recommended to the JCS that such a study be undertaken and encompass not only the relocation of industry, population, transportation, and similar facilities, but also the War and Navy Department command posts and major signal communications centers.

A. JOINT COMMAND POST

The JCS directed that such a study be undertaken on 11 September 1946. The first report was submitted in August 1947, then revised, but not completed. That October the portion of the study dealing with the relocation of major command posts and signal centers was made a separate study, and the remainder was withdrawn shortly thereafter, on the grounds that the matters it concerned were within the jurisdiction of the newly formed National Security Resources Board. The JCS did recognize that planning for a joint command post should be initiated and that this planning should be related to planning by other agencies on the composition and location of an alternate seat of government.²

By May 1948, the JCS study had indicated the need for a joint CP in a protected location "to effect operational control of US and Allied Armed Forces in event of war." The mission of the joint CP was to be as follows:

(1) Direct and coordinate operational elements of the Armed Forces in the strategic offensive and in the defense of vital areas by:

(a) Transmitting the policy decisions of the JCS and the necessary implementing directives to the unified commands and services.

(b) Furnishing military intelligence to the unified commanders and the services.

(2) Insure direction of the operational effort in consonance with logistics capabilities and the mobilization effort.³

The Army-was assigned the responsibility for the planning.

The JCS study, which had been reported on in the Secretary's memorandum cited above, had stressed the interrelationship between the joint CP and the relocation of other elements of the government. The JCS requested that steps be taken to establish a joint command post (JCP).⁴

Progress toward creation of a JCP was painfully slow, with more studies and more planning not followed by any implementing measures. Part of the problem lay in service disagreements over the scope and role of a JCP and over service responsibilities. The question arose, too, of the relationship of alternate service CPs to the JCP and of the choice of relocating the seat of government or attempting to protect Washington.

A JCS study on the organization of the JCP, requested by Secretary Forrestal in May 1948, finally appeared in October 1949. It stressed that planning for the JCP had followed the NSRB decision that the seat of government would remain in Washington until the city was completely untenable. The relationship between the JCP and the seat of government would thus remain the same regardless of any alternative seat-of-govern-ment locations chosen by the NSRB. The study also stated that it was believed that the Secretary of Defense, the service secretaries, and the JCS would remain at the seat of government, as would the Joint Staff. It thus became necessary to determine what functional portions of the present staffs would be moved to the JCP in time of danger.⁵

In late 1949, NSC 68 called for a hardened and sheltered command and control system to ensure communications under attack, but just what the command and control system should consist of was not spelled out. Presumably, it would include an alternate command post, such as the one projected for Fort Ritchie.

There was evidently a growing gap between the NSRB and JCS views" of what the functions of the JCP should be. The JCS took a much more restricted view than the NSRB. While they admitted that initial planning had been in terms of a joint command post as an agency of the JCS, they felt, by late 1949, that these were no longer appropriate conditions for the facility that was to be created. By May 1950, the name of the facility had been changed from JCP to alternate joint communication center (AJCC), a name the JCS felt was more appropriate to its real purpose.

The change in emphasis is difficult to trace and its causes are concealed. It would appear that the services did not want a single CP. The Air Force no doubt felt the need for a CP specially prepared to launch and monitor strategic air strikes, a capability that they may not have felt could be achieved in the Army-operated JCP. The Air Force apparently did attempt unsuccessfully to gear the development of the AJCC and its facilities to ADC and SAC operations, these being the key elements in a nuclear war. It is perhaps for this reason that the other services seemed to hold back.⁶

As late as December 1949 the Secretary of Defense, in reporting on the JCP status to the President, still referred to it as "the principal implementing agency of the JCS," using Secretary Forrestal's language of May 1948.⁷

The alternate site was approved by the President in January 1950, and in May, Fort Ritchie, Md., was selected as the location.⁸ The center would handle planning, operations, intelligence, communications, and logistics; the alternate CPs of the services would conduct matters of interest to the service only. The site was not, however, to be manned until danger was imminent. The plan was that the Battle Staffs of the service headquarters would evacuate the Pentagon as soon as an attack was confirmed, go to Ritchie, and there assume control. The crucial questions of how they would get there under the prevailing conditions and what means they would employ to maintain contact with and control of the forces (particularly SAC and the air defense forces) during the conflict remained unanswered.

The issue of pre-locating a staff at the AJCC arose as early as 1952, when the Air Force argued unsuccessfully that the center should be manned full time by a small cadre. With the completion of the facility in 1953_s the operating principle called for a state of alert to be declared by the President, upon which the JCS would activate the AJCC. In December 1952, the JCS had decided that in the event that Washington became untenable, certain JCS elements and small operating groups from each service would move to Ritchie. The JCS also suggested that, under those conditions, the President and others he chose might also move to the AJCC.⁹

The outbreak of the Korean war had prompted an effort to disperse agencies from Washington to reduce vulnerability, but the intention proved difficult to implement. An enormous amount of planning went on in the next several years, but it was not until the late 1950s that emergency evacuation was recognized as impossible. Since the military could not plan on directing the war effort from Washington, the direction would have to be exercised by personnel relocated before the attack or by a predesignated headquarters that had escaped the attack. With sufficient tactical or strategic warning, Washington personnel could evacuate to predesignated emergency relocation sites to carry out operations. With insufficient warning, however, the predesignated alternate headquarters would have to direct the war effort.¹⁰

B. THE ROLE OF THE AIR FORCE COMMAND POST

The establishment of a command center for the control of strategic operations began very modestly in the fall of 1947 when, at the request of General Spaatz, the AAF established a "war room" In the Pentagon, which became operational early in 1948. Initially, it was used primarily for intelligence displays and briefings.¹¹

The history of the Air Force command and control system as it exists today, however, really dates to the outbreak of the Korean war. The Air Force command post (AFCP) was created on the opening day of the war, 25 June 1950, when an emergency facility was hastily set up within the Pentagon to serve as a central processing point for messages from the Far East. This was the lineal predecessor of the present National Military Command Center. Since air defense was primarily an Air Force mission, the command post also set up communications lines to alert the National Command Authorities in the event of Soviet attacks on the United States; direct phone lines were established between the Pentagon CP and the ADC headquarters at Mitchell AFB and the small radar complex then operating on the East Coast. Procedures were prepared for the dissemination of information pertaining to a hostile act against the United States; a roster was drawn up of key personnel to be notified in case of an imminent attack. By August, the AFCP had become a rudimentary national system when, at the request of the White House, the CP ran a direct phone line to the President, by which the President could be notified immediately of an air alert. Appropriate procedures were established for notifying the White House of such alerts.¹² The facility was moved to more permanent quarters in the Pentagon and began functioning there in early 1951.

The Air Force facility included the command post proper, which was in essence a communications center, and a war room, which prepared status displays of plans, operations, and intelligence. In 1951, the Air Force also established an Emergency Air Staff Actions Office, which held in readiness prepared messages for transmission at a moment of crisis. This office and function were incorporated into the command post early in 1952. The national role of the AFCP was reinforced by its use by DoD for high-level briefings of both US and allied leaders. In 1952, the Emergency Air Staff Actions section of the CP was also given responsibility for maintaining the "Check List of JCS Actions Upon the Imminence or Outbreak of War."¹³

The AFCP continued its key role in the joint arena by virtue of its link to the warning and air defense system. Initial warnings were received at the ADC headquarters at Colorado Springs and suspicion or confirmation of attack would then be relayed to the Pentagon CP and to SAC headquarters. While SAC and ADC forces moved to war-readiness status, the Pentagon CP would pass the warning to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the JCS, and would in turn relay their orders to the combat forces. However, it was not until 1955 that the NSC designated the APCP as the national air defense warning center. This step confirmed what the APCP had been doing on the national level and permitted it to establish communications to other agencies with an important war-emergency role.¹⁴

The Joint War Room Annex, which had been established by the JCS in March 1952 as a means to coordinate the operations of all atomic-capable forces, was operated by the Air Force as an adjunct to the APCP. It was not until after the crises of 1958 that the JCS would assume control of the Joint War Room Annex and, finally, in August 1959, would establish their own Joint War Room. In December 1960, the AFCP finally gave up its joint and national responsibilities.¹⁵

Another development that arose out of the Korean war years was the establishment of a requirement for alternate service CPs. Mitchell AFB, N.Y., as headquarters of the Continental Air Command, had fulfilled this role before 1950. Langley AFB, Va., was designated as primary alternate in 1951. Presumably, if the Pentagon were destroyed, command of the Air Force would be switched to Langley. Maxwell AFB, Ala., was designated as secondary alternate. However, personnel and funding shortages prevented the Air Force from manning or equipping these posts to any realistic extent. Also, the development of the JCP/AJCC discouraged long-range Air Force planning in this regard, since the facility at Fort Ritchie would presumably attempt to do what the Air Force alternate CP would have done.¹⁶

X. THE FIRST EIGHT YEARS: AN OVERVIEW

If the early process of development of an American atomic capability and of the procedures and mechanisms to control it could be characterized by one word, it would be "incongruous." The preceding chapters have illustrated the numerous contradic tions that existed in these years, the differences between aspiration and actuality, words and deeds, policy and implemen tation.

In summary, these were the major incongruities:

• Despite the spectacular explosion of two bombs over Japan and the success of the Bikini tests, there was only a gradual acceptance by the military, and especially by the Air Force as the service most immediately concerned, of the military implications of atomic energy.

• Despite the tendency to brandish the atomic weapon politically, there was astonishingly little planning undertaken to use that weapon. Similarly, there was only a very slow improvement of the physical capability—in terms of aircraft and crews—to deliver atomic bombs.

• Despite the recognition that the atomic bomb formed the balance in Europe, production of bombs moved slowly, too. The scarcity of fissionable material conditioned all thinking in the first four postwar years, but that situation was totally transformed in the next four years.

• While deterrence was early adopted as the national strategy against the Soviet Union, the strategy had few teeth in it until after 1950.

• An atomic blitz concept was developed as the preferred method of atomic attack, but the scarcity of bombs rendered it infeasible for years.

• While the scarcity of bombs initially made targeting of crucial importance, intelligence on Soviet target systems remained abysmally poor.

• Despite the at least verbal emphasis on atomic bombs, for some time there remained considerable skepticism as to their war-winning capacity.

• Despite the emphasis on deterrence, there remained uncertainty as to whether the President would indeed authorize the employment of atomic bombs.

• The Air Force jealously guarded its monopoly over atomic weapon use and attempted to exert control over the bomb Itself, yet it did little at first to develop the capability to use the bomb.

• This was the period of fierce interservice rivalry over shares of the atomic pie, yet there was unusual military unanimity over the primacy of atomic offensive forces over defensive measures.

• The system of civilian custody of atomic bombs, so carefully set up and so rigidly defended during the early years, was relaxed with surprising speed In the face of operational realities and needs.

• While it was expected that the Soviets would sooner or later achieve an atomic capability, the effort to develop an extensive warning and air defense system was an uphill fight all the way.

• Despite the sensitivity of atomic operations, comparatively little attention was paid to command and control arrangements before 1950. In fact, the concept as we understand it today did not appear until the mid-1950s. This strange duality was obviously the product of many factors, most of which have been discussed in the preceding pages. Perhaps above all was the newness of so much—atomic energy, the cold war, and the growth of an unprecedented threat to the American homeland. There seems little doubt that these factors contributed to many of the popular myths that now surround the history of that era.

The idea of action-reaction in terms of command and control is problematical. Command and control is designed for one's own forces, to fit one's own requirements. There is only an indirect relationship to the enemy, because command and control is a means, not an end in itself. However, if, as in this paper, command and control in these years comprehends the many steps taken and the problems encountered in the process of creating an atomic capability, then it seems obvious that the whole process can be viewed as a US reaction to Soviet actions, actual and anticipated. The very slow growth of command and control in the first three postwar years reflected the slow development of the cold war and US concern over it. Only after the crises of 1948 did the process begin to accelerate, with the acceleration moving into higher gear after the Soviet explosion of an atomic bomb and the outbreak of the Korean war. It would seem that it was the appearance of a Soviet nuclear threat to the United States that galvanized US efforts more than the Soviet threat to Europe. The rapid increase in atomic offensive forces to reinforce deterrence and the reluctant but eventual major effort to create a vast warning system were the results.

FOOTNOTES

Chapter I

¹(U) Walter Millis, Arms and the State (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1958), p. 156.

Chapter II

1(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, June 1963), pp. 3 and 20, SECRET.

²(U) David E. Lilienthal, Journals of David E. Lilienthal : The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper Row, 1964), p. 377.

³ (U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for an Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, 1959), p. 124, TOP SECRET.

4(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 11.

⁵(U) Ibid., p. 12.

⁶(U) Joint Chiefs of Staff, Final Report of the JCS Evaluation Board for Operation CROSSROADS : The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon (U), 30 June 1947, TOP SECRET.

⁷(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 17.

⁸(U) Office of the OSD Historian, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972 (U), 3 vols., Vol. I, Chronology-US, 1945-1960 (U), October 1974, p. 70, TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA.

⁹(U) Ibid., p. 81.

¹⁰(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air -Force Atomic Energy Program, II:152. Much of the material in Section II.B is drawn from this source, which is one of the most extraordinarily rich archives on the subject.

¹¹(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Operation CROSSROADS: The Role of the AAF From the Project 's Inception Until 7 May 1946 (U), 2 vols., I:158, TOP SECRET.

¹²(U) Interview with Hq SAC Historical Division.

¹³ Ibid., pp. 49-51. It is interesting that SAC historians have been told by General LeMay that one-way missions were never planned and, by the first commander of the 509th Bombardment Group, the first atomic unit, that such missions definitely were planned. The great amount of attention paid in early years to search and recovery of downed SAC crews would seem to imply that one-way missions were indeed options.

¹⁴(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1947 (U), p. 139, TOP SECRET.

¹⁵(U) Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (U), 2 vols. (Aerospace Studies Institute, June 1971, I:218, UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, II:255-61.

¹⁷ (U) Directorate of Plans, US Air Force, USAF Intermediate Range War Plan (COWLICK) (U), 7 March 1949, TOP SECRET.

¹⁸(U) Harry S. Truman, Memoirs, Vol. II, Years of Trial and Hope (New York: Doubleday, 1956).

^l9(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 27 April 1949, TOP SECRET.

²⁰(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the President, 27 April 1949, SECRET.

²¹(U) Weapons Systems Evaluation Group, Evaluation of Effectiveness of Strategic Air Operations (U), "Summary," WSEG Report No. 1 (10 February 1950), TOP SECRET.

²²(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 38.

²³ (U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, January-June 1952 (U), Vol. IX, Supporting Documents : A Staff Report on a Visit by CG SAC to the European Area, 4-14 December 1951 (U), TOP SECRET.

²⁴(U) Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1:278.

²⁵(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 34.

Chapter III

1(U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for an Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, 1959), p. 48, TOP SECRET.

²(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, -June 1963), p. 37, SECRET.

³ (U) David E. Lilienthal, Journals of David E. Lilienthal: The Atomic Energy Years, 1945-1950 (New York: Harper Row, 1964), p. 377.

4 (U) Walter Millis, ed., The Forrestal Diaries (New York: Viking Press, 1951), p. 458.

⁵(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the President, 21 July 1948, SECRET.

⁶(U) Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 460.

⁷(U) Memorandum from the President to the Secretary of Defense, 6 August 1948.

⁸(U) Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 460.

9(U) Ibid., p. 490.

¹⁰(U) Lilienthal, Journals, p. 502.

¹¹(U) Ibid., p. 351.

¹²(U) Office of the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons, 1945-1969" (U), 2 vols. (1970), an unpublished draft on deposit at the Defense Nuclear Agency, I:l6, TOP SECRET.

¹³ (U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 18.

^l4(U) OASD (AE), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons," 1:16.

¹⁵(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol. III, Building an Atomic Air Force, 1949-1953 (U), p. 107, TOP SECRET.

¹⁶(U) OASD (AE), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons," II:3, TOP SECRET.

¹⁷(U) Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the Assistant to the Secretary (Atomic Energy), "Summary of JCS Activities in the Field of Atomic Energy from 1 July 1951 through 30 June 1952" (U), 2 January 1953, TOP SECRET.

¹⁸(U) OASD (AE), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons," I:16.

¹⁹(U) Ibid., I:225.

²⁰(U) Ibid., I:25.

²¹(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, III:406.

²²(U) OASD (AE), "History of the Custody and Deployment of Nuclear Weapons," I:40.

²³ (U) Ibid., I:79.

²⁴(U) Memorandum from the Secretary of the NSC to Secretary of Defense, 28 March 1953, TOP SECRET.

²⁵(U) Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, 20 April 1953, TOP SECRET.

²⁶(U) Memorandum from the Deputy Secretary of Defense to the Executive Secretary of the NSC, 28 April 1953, TOP SECRET.

²⁷(U) W. R. Schilling, P. Y. Hammond, and G. H. Snyder, Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 173-

²⁸(U) A parallel has been suggested in regard to the uncertainty surrounding the possible use of gas in World War II, but gas was never considered a major weapon nor was it ever given a fixed role in strategic planning.

²⁹(U) US Congress, Public Law 585, Atomic Energy Act of 1946, (79th Cong.).

³⁰(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol. IV, The Development of Weapons, 1946-1953 (U), p. 345, TOP SECRET.

³¹ (U) Memorandum from Lt. General Vandenberg to Lt. General Eaker, 2 January 1946, quoted in Operation CROSSROADS : The Role of the AAF From the Project's Inception Until 7 May 1946 (U), 2 vols., SAC, Hq. (1947), p. 61, TOP SECRET.

³²(U) Memorandum from Secretary of the Army to the NSC, "US Policy on Atomic Warfare" (U), 19 May 1948, TOP SECRET, cited in Office of the OSD Historian, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972 (U), 3 vols., Vol. I, Chronology-US, 1945-1960 (U), October 1974, p. 72, TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA.

³³ (U) Schilling, et al., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, p. 173.

³⁴(U) Lilienthal, Journals, p. 302.

³⁵(U) Millis, Forrestal Diaries, p. 174.

³⁶(U) Memorandum from the Secretary of Defense to the JCS, enclosing NSC Staff Study, Procedures with Respect to a Presidential Decision to Use Atomic Weapons (U), 30 April 1951, TOP SECRET.

³⁷(U) Robert D. Little, Organizing for Strategic Planning, 1945-1950: The National System and the Air Force (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, 1964), p. 37, CONFIDENTIAL,

³⁸(U) Memorandum, Procedures with Respect to a Presidential Decision to Use Atomic Weapons.

³⁹ (U) Memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, 23 May 1951, TOP SECRET.

40(U) Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 18 February 1953, TOP SECRET.

41 (U) Schilling, et al., Strategy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, pp. 427-36.

Chapter IV

¹ (U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for an Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, 1959), p. 366, TOP SECRET.

²(U) Robert D. Little, Organizing for Strategic Planning, 1945-1950: The National System and the Air Force (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, April 1964), p. 49, CONFIDENTIAL.

³ (U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol. III, Building an Atomic Air Force, 1949-1953 (U), p. 332, TOP SECRET.

4(U) Ibid., 11:234.

⁵(U) Arthur K. Marmor, USAF Command and Control Problems, 1958-1961 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, January 1963), p. 62, SECRET.

⁶(U) Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (U), 2 vols. (Aerospace Studies Institute, June 1971), 1:178, UNCLASSIFIED.

⁷(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 111:334.

⁸(U) Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Final Report of the JCS Evaluation Board for Operation CROSSROADS : The Evaluation of the Atomic Bomb as a Military Weapon (U) (30 June 1947), TOP SECRET.

⁹(U) Little, Organizing for Strategic Planning, p. 45«

¹⁰(U) Office of the OSD Historian, History of the Strategic Arms Competition, 1945-1972 (U), 3 vols., Vol. I, Chronology-US, 1945-1960 (U), October 1974, p. 106, TOP SECRET/RESTRICTED DATA.

¹¹(U) History and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff, 1963 (U), p. 1, TOP SECRET.

^l2(U) Headquarters, Stratetic Air Command, Establishment and Test of the Command Elements X-RAY and ZEBRA (U), 4 May 1953, TOP SECRET.

¹³ (U) Headquarters, Far East Command, Report to the JCS upon HUDSON HARBOR, An Exercise Conducted in the Far East Command 24 September to 15 October 1951 to Demonstrate the Capability of Combined Armed Forces to Employ the Atomic Bomb Tactically in Support of Ground Forces (U), 3 January 1952, TOP SECRET/ RESTRICTED DATA.

^l4(U) JCS 2056/24, "Procedures for Control and Coordination of All the Forces Possessing an Atomic Delivery Capability" (U), 3 March 1952, TOP SECRET.

¹⁵(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 111:335-36.

¹⁶(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (U), 1963, TOP SECRET.

¹⁷(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, III:339.

¹⁸(U) Ibid., p. 341

¹⁹(U) Memorandum from the Chairman of the AEC to the President, 21 November 1949, TOP SECRET.

²⁰(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, Vol. IV, Development of Weapons, 1946-1952 (U), p. 377, TOP SECRET.

²¹(U) Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1:254.

²²(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, June 1963), p. 44.

23 (U) Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 11:254.

Chapter V

1(U) JCS Memorandum 1854 from C/S USAF to JCS, "Control and Direction of Strategic Atomic Operations" (U), 23 March 1948, TOP SECRET.

²(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, June 1963), p. 37.

³ (U) Memorandum from the Special Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, "Newport Conference—Summary of Conclusion" (U), 23 August 1948, TOP SECRET.

4(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 38.

⁵(U) US Congress, House of Representatives, Hearings before the Committee on the Armed Services, 8lst cong., 1st sess. , October-1949, p. 204.

⁶(U) Ibid., p. 41.

⁷(U) Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. Hammond, and Glenn H. Snyder, Strategyj Politics, and Defense Budgets (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), p. 167.

⁸(U) Robert P. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (U), 2 vols. (Aerospace Studies Institute, June 1971), I:24l, UNCLASSIFIED.

Chapter VI

1(U) Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 196l), p. 309-

²(U) Historical and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, The Strategic Air Command: A Chronological History, 1946-1956 (U), SAC Historical Study No. 61", undated, p. 3, CONFIDENTIAL.

³(U) Ibid., p. 65.

4(U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1943-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for An Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, 1959), P. 211, TOP SECRET.

⁵(U) Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (U), 2 vols. (Aerospace Studies Institute, June 1971), 1:194, UNCLASSIFIED.

⁶(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1946 (U), p. 69, SECRET.

⁷(U) Ibid., p. 124.

⁸(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:391.

⁹(U) Headquarters, Eighth Air Force, History of the Eighth Air Force, 1 November-31 December 1946,(U), undated, p. 9, SECRET.

¹⁰(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:221.

¹¹(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1946, p. 127.

¹²(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:222.

¹³(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1947 (U), p. 134, SECRET.

^l4(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:223.

¹⁵(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1948 (U), p. 140, SECRET.

¹⁶(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, The Development of The Strategic Air Command, 1946-1971 (U), 25 July 1972, UNCLASSIFIED.

^l7(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, June 1963), p. 34, SECRET.

¹⁸(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:232.

¹⁹(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic ,Air Command, 1947, p. 136.

²⁰(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1948, p. IA5.

²¹(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:233-

²²(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, 1948, p. 146.

²³(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, May-August 1949 (U), p. 149, SECRET.

²⁴(U) Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, Outstanding Events, Strategic Air Command, 1946-1971 (U), updated, 1971, P- 1, SECRET.

²⁵(U) Historical and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, January-June 19 52 (U), II :l', CONFIDENTIAL.

²⁶(U) Historical and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, History of the Strategic Air Command, July-December 1950 (U), 1:33, SECRET.

²⁷(U) Historical and Research Division, Headquarters, Strategic Air Command, SAC Communications in an Age of Transition: A Consideration of Problems Past and Present (U), SAC Historical Study No. 78 (30 December 1959), p. 4, SECRET.

²⁸(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, January-June 1952, 11:3.

²⁹(U) Ibid., p. 7-

³⁰(U) It has been suggested that in these years, and especially before 1951, SAC considered time its enemy as much as the Russians. The whole focus of SAC's effort was to reduce the time it took to launch the atomic offensive. Not until the establishment of overseas bases and the rapid increase in aircraft and atomic bombs was the response time reduced. The command and control structure was also designed to shorten that interval.

³¹(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, July-December 1950, 11:22.

³²(U) Ibid., p. 44.

³³(U) Hq SAC, History of the Strategic Air Command, July-December 1950, 11:34.

³⁴(U) Ibid., p. 20.

³⁵(U) Hq SAC, SAC Communications in an Age of Transition, p. 6.

Chapter VII

1 (U) Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907-1964 (U), 2 vols. (Aerospace Studies Institute, June 1971), 1:194, UNCLASSIFIED.

²(U) George F. Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, 1945-1950 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, June 1963), p. 51, UNCLASSIFIED.

³(U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1946-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for an Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force), P. 327, TOP SECRET.

4(U) Directorate of Plans, US Air Force, USAF Intermediate Range War Plan (COWLICK) (U), 7 March 1949, TOP SECRET.

⁵(U) JCS 1924/2, Report by the JIC, "Soviet Intentions and Capabilities—1949, 1956/57" (U), 20 December 1948, TOP SECRET.

⁶(U) Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions Relating to the US Missile and Earth Satellite Development Programs, May 1942-October 1957 (U), p. 12, TOP SECRET.

⁷(U) Headquarters, US Air Force, "Attainment and Maintenance of an Operational Air Defense System in the Continental US and Alaska" (U), Presentation to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2 March 1950, TOP SECRET.

⁸(U) OJCS, Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions, p. 21.

⁹(U) Department of Defense, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of Defense, January 1-June 30, 1951 (U) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1951), UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁰(U) Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, 1:297.

^l1(U) Lemmer, The Air Force and the Concept of Deterrence, p. 5.

¹²(U) OJCS, Chronology of Significant Events and Decisions, p. 32.

Chapter VIII

¹(U) R. D. Little, Organizing for Strategic Planning, 1945-1950: The National System and the Air Force (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, April 1964), CONFIDENTIAL.

²(U) Richard F. McMullen, Radar Programs for Air Defense, 1946-1966 (U), Historical Study No. 34 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, undated), p. 1, SECRET.

³(U) Richard F. McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950 (U), Historical Study No. 22 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, undated), p. 22, SECRET.

4(U) Ibid., p. 23.

⁵(U) McMullen, Radar Programs for Air Defense, p. 2.

⁶(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950, p. 24.

⁷(U) R. D. Little and L. Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 1946-1953 (U), 4 vols., Vol. II, Foundations for an Atomic Air Force, 1946-1948 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force), p. 334, TOP SECRET.

⁸(U) Memorandum from Bureau of the Budget to the Secretary of Defense, 24 May 1948, TOP SECRET.

⁹(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to JCS, 1 July 1948, SECRET.

¹⁰(U) Memorandum from JCS to Secretary of Defense, 20 October 1958, TOP SECRET.

¹¹(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950, p. 28.

¹²(U) Little and Bowen, A History of the Air Force Atomic Energy Program, 11:335.

^l3(U) Ibid., p. 336.

¹⁴(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950, p. 49.

¹⁵(U) Department of the Air Force, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, January 1-June 30, 1950 (U) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1950), p. 144, UNCLASSIFIED.

¹⁶(U) Richard McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957 (U), Historical Study No. 24 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, undated), p. 7, SECRET.

¹⁷(U) Department of the Air Force, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, January 1-June 30, 1950, p. 144.

¹⁸(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 10.

¹⁹(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950, p. 51.

²⁰(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 32.

^2l(U) Department of the Air Force, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, January 2-June 30, 1952 (U) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1952), p. 205, UNCLASSIFIED,

²²(U) Thomas W. Ray, A History of the DEW Line, 1946-1964 (U), Historical Study No. 31 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, June 1965), pp. 2-4, SECRET.

²³(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 18.

24(U) Ray, A History of the DEW Line, p. 18.

²⁵(U) Ibid., pp. 9-11.

²⁶(U) Memorandum from Secretary of the Air Force to the Secretary of Defense, 22 December 1952, TOP SECRET.

²⁷(U) National Security Council, "A Report to the NSC by the Acting Secretary on an Early Warning System" (U), NSC 139, 31 December 1952, TOP SECRET.

²⁸(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, pp. 51-53.

29. Ibid., pp. 41-43-

³⁰(U) Memorandum from JCS to Secretary of Defense, 28 August 1953, TOP SECRET.

³¹(U) Samuel P. Huntington, The Common Defense (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961), p. 333-

³²(U) Richard F. McMullen, The Birth of SAGE, 1951-1958 (U), Historical Study No. 33 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, undated), p. 17, SECRET.

³³(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 51-

³⁴(U) Thomas W. Ray, The ADC Airborne Early Warning and Control Program, 1946-1964 (U), Historical Study No. 28 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, January 1965), p. 2, SECRET.

³⁵(U) Canadian-US Military Cooperation Committee, "Air Interception and Air Warning Appendix to the Joint Canadian-US Basic Security Plan" (U), 2 April 1957, SECRET.

³⁶(U) Lydus H. Buss, Seaward Extension of Radar, 1946-1956 (U), Historical Study No. 10 (Headquarters, Air Defense Command, 1955), UNCLASSIFIED.

³⁷(U) Ray, The ADC Airborne Early Warning and Control Program, p. 5-

³⁸(U) Ibid., p. 8.

³⁹(U) Buss, Seaward Extension of Radar, p. 21.

40(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 33.

41(U) Buss, Seaward Extension of Radar, p. 15.

⁴² (U) Ibid., p. 71.

⁴³(U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1946-1950, p. 58.

44(U) Memorandum from ae Chairman, Research and Development Board, to the Secretary of Defense, "Continental Air Defense Systems" (U), 10 April 1953, TOP SECRET.

⁴⁵(U) Department of the Air Force, Semi-Annual Report of the Secretary of the Air Force, January 1-June 30, 1954 (U) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, July 1954), UNCLASSIFIED. •

⁴⁶ (U) McMullen, Air Defense and National Policy, 1951-1957, p. 56.

⁴⁷(U) Memorandum from CJCS to JCS (CM 47-54), 15 January 1954, TOP SECRET.

Chapter IX

1(U) Memorandum from Chief of Staff, US Army, to Secretary of Defense, "Comments on NSRB Draft: Development of Plans for the Alternate Seat of Government (16 February 1953)" (U), 29 May 1953, TOP SECRET.

2(U) Ibid.

³(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to Service Secretaries, 19 May 1948, TOP SECRET.

4(U) Memorandum from the JCS to the Secretary of Defense, 15 May 1948, TOP SECRET.

⁵(U) Memorandum from JCS to Service Secretaries and Secretary of Defense, 31 October 1949, TOP SECRET.

⁶(U) Thomas A. Sturm, "Emergence of the Air Force Command and Control System," Aerospace Commentary, 1:3 (Summer 1969), p. 42.

⁷(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the President, 8 December 1949, TOP SECRET.

8(U) Memorandum from Secretary of Defense to the President, 23 May 1950, TOP SECRET.

⁹(U) Arthur K. Marmor, USAF Command and Control Problems, 1958-1961 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, August 1967), p. 5, SECRET.

¹⁰(U) Thomas A. Sturm, The Air Force Command and Control System, 1950-1966 (U) (Historical Division Liaison Office, US Air Force, August 1967), p. 5, SECRET.

¹¹(U) From notes taken by Air Force Office of History from the Spaatz Papers in the Library of Congress.

12 (U) Headquarters, US Air Force, History of DCS/Plans (U) (July-December 1950), pp. 6-8, SECRET.

¹³(U) Headquarters, US Air Force, History of DCS/Operations (U) (1 July 1952-31 December 1952), p. 7, SECRET.

¹⁴(U) Sturm, "Emergence of the Air Force Command and Control System," p. 42.

¹⁵(U) Ibid.

¹⁶(U) Sturm, The Air Force Command and Control System, p. 3.