

First, what our intelligence shows us with regard to the magnitude of the threat, whether from the Soviet Union or from the Chinese.

And, second, in terms of what our evaluation is of any talks that we are having by that time or may be having with regard to arms control.

And, finally, because we believe that since this is a new system, we should constantly examine what progress has been made in the development of the technique to see if changes in the system should be made.

I should admit at this point that this decision has not been an easy one. None of the grave decisions made by a President are easy. But it is one that I have made after considering all of the options and I would indicate before going to your questions two major options that I have overruled.

One is moving to a massive city defense. I've already indicated why I do not believe that is, first, feasible, and there is another reason. Moving to a massive city defense system, even starting with a thin system and then going to a heavy system, tends to be more provocative in terms of making credible a first strike capability against the Soviet Union. I want no provocation which might deter arms talks.

#### 'Doing Nothing' Option

The other alternative to the other extreme was to do nothing or to delay for six months or 12 months, which would be the equivalent, really, of doing nothing, or for example, going the road only of research and development.

I have examined those options. I have ruled them out because I have concluded that the first deployment of this system which will not occur until 1973, that that first deployment is essential by that date if we are to meet the threat that our present intelligence indicates will exist by 1973.

In other words, we must begin now. If we delay a year, for example, it means that that first deployment will be delayed until 1975. That might be too late.

It is the responsibility of the President of the United States above all other responsibilities to think first of the security of the United States. I believe that this system is the best step that we can take to provide for that security.

There are, of course, other possibilities that have been strongly urged by some of the leaders this morning. For example, that we could increase our offensive capabilities, our submarine force, or even our Minuteman force, or our bomber force.

That I would consider to be, however, the wrong road because it would be provocative to the Soviet Union and might escalate an arms race. This system is truly a safeguard system, a defensive system only. Its safeguards are deterrent and under those circumstances, can in no way, in my opinion, delay the progress which I hope will continue to be made toward arms talks which will limit arms not only this kind of system, but particularly offensive systems.

We'll now go to your questions.

### QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

#### 1. Enemy Attacks in Vietnam

Q. Mr. President, the war in Vietnam has been intensifying recently and if there has been any notable progress in Paris it has not been detectable publicly. Is your patience growing a little thin with these continued attacks, par-

Q. Will you make your own State of the Union address and what will your legislative program encompass?

A. I do not plan a State of the Union Address in the traditional manner. I will within approximately a month, however, state a general domestic program. By that time the program will be at the point that I think it should be completely summarized and set forth not only for the nation as to what we have done but particularly to the Congress as to what we expect for the balance. I would not like to anticipate now what will be in that program.

#### 3. Reaction to ABM Plan

Q. There's been a great deal of criticism in Congress against the deployment of any type of antiballistic missile defense system. What kind of reception do you think that your proposal this morning will receive there?

A. It will be a very spirited debate and it will be a very close vote. Debates in the field of national defense are often spirited and the votes are often close. Many of my friends in Congress who were there before I was there remarked that the vote on extending the draft in 1941 won by only one vote. This might be that close.

I think, however, that after the members of the House and the Senate consider this program, which is a minimum program, but which—and which—particularly provides options for change in other directions, if we find the threat has changed or that the art has changed—our evaluation of the technique has changed—I think that we have a good chance of getting approval. We will, of course, express our views and we hope that we will get support in the country.

#### 4. Effectiveness of ABM Plan

Q. Mr. President, I understand that your first construction or deployment of antimissile systems would be around two Minuteman retaliatory operations. Do you think that deploying around these two provides enough deterrent that would be effective?

A. Let me explain the difference between deploying around two Minuteman bases and deploying around, say, 10 cities. Where you are looking toward a city defense, it needs to be a perfect or near-perfect system to be credible, because, if, as I examine the possibility of even a thick defense of cities, I found that even the most optimistic projections considering the highest development of the art, would mean that we would still lose 30 to 40 million lives.

That would be less than half of what we would otherwise lose, but we would still lose 30 to 40. Now, when you are talking about protecting your deterrent, it need not be perfect.

It is necessary only to protect enough of the deterrent that the retaliatory second strike will be of such magnitude that the enemy would think twice before launching a first strike, and I, it has been my conclusion that by protecting two Minuteman sites we will preserve that deterrent as a credible deterrent and that that will be decisive and could be decisive in so far as the enemy considering the possibility of a first strike.

#### 5. The Face of the War

Q. Mr. President, there have been charges from Capitol Hill that you have stepped up the war in Vietnam. Have you?

A. I have not stepped up the war in

we are trying to do everything that we can in the conduct of our war in Vietnam, to see that we can go forward toward peace in Paris.

That is why my response has been measured, deliberate and—some think—too cautious. But it will continue to be that way because I am thinking of those peace talks every time I think of our military option in Vietnam.

#### 6. Prospects on Taxes

Q. Mr. President, your safeguard ABM system, I understand, would cost about \$1-billion less in the coming fiscal year than the plan which President Johnson sent up. Will this give you the opportunity to reduce the surcharge, or will the continued high level of taxation be needed for the economy.

A. That question will be answered when we see the entire budget. Secretary Laird will testify on the defense budget on Wednesday, and incidentally, my understanding at this time and I've seen the preliminary figures is that the defense budget for, that Secretary Laird will present, will be approximately \$2.5-billion less than that submitted by the previous Administration.

Now whether, after considering the defense budget and all the other budgets that have been submitted, we then can move in the direction of either reducing the surcharge or move in the direction of some of our very difficult problems, with regard to our cities, the problem of hunger and others, these are the options that I will have to consider at a later time.

#### 7. Response to Foe's Attacks

Q. Last week you said that, on the matter of Vietnam, you would not tolerate heavier casualties in the continuation of the violation of the understanding without making an appropriate response

## Sentinel Decision Likely to Hurt Nixon in Senate

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was said to have been careful not to present the matter in terms of a vote of confidence in his Administration.

Senator J. W. Fulbright of Arkansas, chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, said that the President "went out of his way to be conciliatory."

Just before the two-hour meeting ended, according to Senator Everett McKinley Dirksen of Illinois, the Republican leader, the President said:

"I want to assure you that I know there are differences of opinion. But these in no way will interrupt our friendly relations. We are all working for the same boss—the national security of the United States. Feel free always to come and talk with me, to consult with me."

To some Congressional leaders, Mr. Nixon gave the impression that he was not overly enthusiastic about his decision and had accepted a compromise rather than undercut Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird.

To the Sentinel opponents, the President offered the assurance that he was "going down the road" toward stra-

### President's 'Safeguard' Is Not an Official Name

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, March 14—President Nixon at his news conference today referred to the Sentinel missile system as the "Safeguard system," but Pentagon officials said the name had not officially been changed.

After Mr. Nixon used the term, officials changed the name from Sentinel to Safeguard on a chart used after the news conference by the Deputy Defense Secretary, Davvid M. Packard.

The name Safeguard, according to Daniel Z. Henkin, acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, was coined by Mr. Nixon himself.

tegic arms limitation talks with the Soviet Union.

#### Conciliatory Approach

This conciliatory approach, combined with the suggestion that the Senate "had a responsibility to exercise its own judgment in this matter,"

the Russians will interpret your ABM decision today as not being an escalating move in the arms race?

A. As a matter of fact, Mr. Kaplow, I have reason to believe, based on the past record, that they would interpret it just the other way around.

First, when they deployed their own ABM system, and as you know, they have 67 missiles—ABM sites—deployed around Moscow, they rejected the idea that it escalated the arms race on the ground that it was defensive solely in character.

And second, when the United States last year went forward on the Sentinel system four days later the Soviet Union initiated the opportunity to have arms limitation talks.

I think the Soviet Union recognizes very clearly the difference between a defensive posture and an offensive posture. I would also point this out—an interesting thing about Soviet military and diplomatic history: They have always thought in defensive terms and if you read their—not only their political leaders but their military leaders—the emphasis is on defense.

I think that since this system now—as a result of moving the city defense out of it and the possibility of that city defense growing into a thick defense—I think this makes it so clearly defensive in character that the Soviet Union cannot interpret this as escalating the arms race.

#### 9. Summit Meeting Plans

Q. Mr. President, last week at your press conference you mentioned negotiations with the Russians at the highest level being in the wings. Could you tell us if since then we've moved any closer to such a summit meeting?

A. I should distinguish between negotiations at what you'd call the highest level, and what I said was the highest

on offensive weapons?

A. Well, Mr. Scali, I am prepared in the event that we go into arms talks to consider both offensive and defensive weapons. As you know, the arms talks that have at least preliminarily been discussed do not involve limitation or reduction; they involve only freezing where we are.

Now your subject, your question goes to abandoning. And on that particular point I think it would take two, naturally, to make the agreement. Let's look at the Soviet Union's position with its defensive deployment of ABM's.

Previously, that deployment was aimed only toward the United States. Today their radars, from our intelligence, are also directed toward Communist China. I would imagine that the Soviet Union would be just as reluctant as we would be to leave their country naked against a potential Chinese Communist threat.

So the abandoning of the entire system, particularly as long as the Chinese threat is there, I think neither country would look upon with much favor.

#### 13. Nonproliferation Treaty

Q. Mr. President, would you think that the deployment of the ABM by both the Soviet Union and the United States are compatible with the N.P.T., the nonproliferation treaty?

A. I considered that problem and I believe that they are compatible with the N.P.T. We discussed that in the leaders' meeting this morning and I pointed out that as we consider this—this kind of defensive system which enables the United States of America to make its deterrent capability credible, that that will have an enormous effect in reducing the pressure on other countries who might want to acquire nuclear weapons.

That's the key point. If a country

enemy attacks in South Vietnam has produced or yielded any results in Paris or in the attitudes of the North Vietnamese leaders in Hanoi?

A. Our measured response has not had the effect of discouraging the progress—and it is very limited progress—toward talks in Paris. That is the negative side in answering your question.

As to whether or not a different response would either discourage those talks or might have the effect of even encouraging them is the decision that we now have to make.

#### 16. U.S. Troop Reduction

Q. Again on Vietnam—in connection with Secretary Laird's visit, we've heard for some time predictions that American troop levels could be cut as the South Vietnamese capabilities improved. And, again last week while he was in Vietnam, we were given similar reports from Saigon, despite the high level of the fighting that's going on now. Do you see any prospect for withdrawing American troops in any numbers soon?

A. Mr. Bailey, in view of the current offensive on the part of the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong, there is no prospect for a reduction of American forces in the foreseeable future.

When we are able to reduce forces as the result of a combination of circumstances—the ability of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves in areas where we now are defending them, the progress of the talks in Paris, or the level of enemy activity—when that occurs I will make an announcement. But at this time there is no foreseeable prospect in that field.

#### 17. Shelter Program

Q. Mr. President, what effect, if any, will your safeguard program have on the shelter program. Can you tell us anything about your long-range plans in this direction?

A. Congressman Holifield, in the meeting this morning, strongly urged that the Administration look over the shelter program and he made the point that he thought it had fallen somewhat into disarray, due to lack of attention over the past few years.

I have directed that General Lincoln, the head of the Office of Emergency Preparedness, I directed him previously to conduct such a survey—we're going to look at the shelter program to see what we can do there in order to minimize American casualties.

#### 18. Middle East Stand

Q. Mr. President, if I recall correctly at the last press conference when you were discussing the meeting with General de Gaulle and the Middle East situation, you said you were encouraged by what he told you because he was moving closer to our position. I wonder if you can tell us what our position is in the Middle East and if it has changed significantly in the last year.

A. We have had bilateral talks, not only with the French but also with the Soviet Union, and with the British, preparatory to the possibility of four-power talks. I would not like to leave the impression that we are completely together at this point.

We are closer together than we were but we still have a lot of yardage to cover. And until we make further progress in developing a common position, I would prefer not to lay out what our position is. I don't think that would be helpful in bringing them to the position that we think is the right position.

Thank you Mr. President.

helped explain the reluctance of Senator Mike Mansfield of Montana, the Democratic leader, to take on the new Administration.

In a Senate speech a week ago, Senator Mansfield said that a decision favoring the Sentinel would set the pattern of national policy for the next decade and determine whether the nation was going to place old militaristic policies over the problems of "internal security."

But today in an interview in his office, he said that it would not be clear whether the pattern had been set until the Senate voted.

The Administration will probably have no difficulty in winning House approval of the modified Sentinel system. Speaker John W. McCormack of Massachusetts called the President's proposal "a necessary, precautionary measure for the defense of our country in case of a future attack."

The fight, however, was far from over in the Senate.

One Democrat said: "We sought to give our advice and he rejected it. Now he has to get our consent."

President Nixon acknowledged at his news conference that he might have trouble get-

ting Senate consent and said he expected "a very close vote." [Question 3, Page 16.]

"I think that we have a good chance of getting approval," he said.

The Sentinel opposition, which appeared to have mustered a majority in the Senate, was thrown on the defensive. By moving Sentinel sites away from cities and giving the system an anti-Soviet justification, the Administration probably picked up wavering votes, such as that of Senator Hugh Scott of Pennsylvania, the assistant Republican leader. Senator Mansfield told reporters that "as of right now there is not a majority" against a modified Sentinel system. But he emphasized "right now."

#### Draft Resister Gets 4 Years

BALTIMORE, March 14 (AP)—Harry L. Lack 30, a leader in draft-resistance movements, was sentenced to four years in Federal prison yesterday for failing to report for Army induction in September, 1967. Chief Judge Reszel C. Thomsen refused to grant bail pending appeal after learning of the 26-year-old Lack's activities in counseling draft resisters about leaving the country for Canada.