NOTES TO TABLE 44

This table illustrates the ordnance-carrying advantages and limitations of individual models of aircraft, and shows how each model was used as an ordnance carrier during the last 7.5 months of the war.

The principal fighter bomb loadings, accounting for 87 to 94 percent of their total bomb loads, were bombs of three types; the 500-lb. and 1000-lb. GP, and the fire bomb. The 500-pounder predominated among carrier VF, because of range and weight considerations, while the three types were nearly evenly matched among land-based VF. Only one other type of bomb, the 260-lb. fragmentation (usually with VT fuzing) enjoyed substantial use on fighters; this was largely in the fast carrier attacks on Japanese airfields in the last few months of the war.

VSB, in turn, were largely limited to bombs of 250 to 1000 pounds size, carrying no 2000-pounders and few small bombs or clusters. Land-based SB2Cs were used to carry fire bombs, however, and both types of VSB carried 260-pound frag bombs on wing racks at the end of the war.

The TBM carried most of the Navy’s 100-pounders, though that type constituted only 28% of its total load. Unable to carry effective loads of bombs of the 250 and 1000-lb. sizes, the TBM could carry any items of 100, 500 or 2000-lb. size, yet it was rarely used for such special items as 100-lb. or 500-lb. incendiary, fragmentation or butterfly clusters, and was insufficiently used to carry 100-pounders.

The versatility of the PB4Y and PBJ is well illustrated by the table. The PB4Y loadings of small bombs reflect the predominance of small vessels among its targets. The heavy firebomb loadings on PVs should be noted. These were largely used in strikes on isolated enemy positions in the Borneo area.

NOTES TO TABLE 45

This table analyzes bomb expenditures by type of target, for 1945 only. Inspection of this table permits the general statement that while bomb selection did vary somewhat with the varying requirements of different targets, the outstanding characteristic of the table is the sameness of the bulk of the loadings from column to column.

The latter characteristic results in large part from the relative inflexibility of loading arrangements on fighter and dive bomber aircraft. The former were limited to one or two bombs per plane, and clusters were generally excluded by safety considerations; the VSB were limited to 3 or 4 bombs per plane and here again clusters were excluded and other types of bombs limited. Only the TBM, PB4Y and PBJ were widely flexible as to variety of ordnance which could be carried with minimum sacrifice of their total load. Under these circumstances, the fact that bomb expenditures varied between types of targets as much as they did, is evidence that selection of attacking aircraft and type of bomb was to some extent consciously directed toward the requirements of the targets. That selection was not perfectly adapted to target requirements goes without saying; specific cases have been covered at length in analytical reports by Op-23-V and Com-AirPac. It is important to note, however, that even the closest attention paid to scientific selection of ordnance will be of little value if plane design seriously limits the variety of useful ordnance that can be carried.

Attacks on airfield targets show evidence of conscious planning in the high use of 100-lb. GP bombs and fragmentation bombs reported, and the comparatively small use of bombs larger than 500 pounds. The first two types are recommended for attacks on parked aircraft, and GP bombs of 100 or 500 pound size are recommended for runway cratering and destruction of buildings. The heavy reported use of 1000-lb., 2000-lb., and SAP bombs probably largely reflects deficiencies in operational planning and in bomb supply; the use of over 50% 500-pounders may reflect in addition the plane loading problem referred to above.

The category of other military land targets is so large and internally diverse that little comment can be made, other than to point out the extensive use of fire bombs, and the relatively light use of small bombs against targets which are frequently small and difficult to hit, yet vulnerable to fragmentation effect.

Likewise little comment can be made with respect to the miscellaneous categories of land targets, other than to point out the small variation between the three columns, and to suggest that industrial targets (included in "other land") frequently require a large proportion of heavy bombs.

The record with respect to armored warships shows a commendable restraint with respect to the use of ineffective small bombs, but a rather inadequate use of the 2000-lb. GP bombs, which have been adjudged superior to SAP and AP bombs for glide and dive attack on most types of armored vessels. The 500-pounders, which made up over one-third of the tonnage, were probably largely ineffective. The heavy use of fragmentation bombs to neutralize A/A may be noted. The light use of torpedoes results from the fact that most attacks in 1945 were made on ships in harbor.

Attacks on unarmored warships were distinguished by a commendable concentration on 500-lb. GP bombs. The use of heavier GPs was permissible, but SAP and AP bombs are wasteful against these targets, and torpedoes have a rather small chance of hitting fast maneuvering small vessels of these types.

The selection of bombs against merchant vessels appears to have been excellent. However, more 1000-lb. GP bombs and torpedoes could well have been used against large vessels, and SAP bombs eliminated. The excellent selection of small GP bombs, incendiary and fragmentation clusters (largely by VPB) against small vessels, should be especially noted.