NOTES TO TABLES 19, 20, 21

One of the principal achievements of Naval aviation in the war was the devastating supremacy Naval planes attained over Japanese aircraft in air combat. These tables, and others in this section, provide the evidence.

At the beginning of the war Naval superiority in the air was rather slim. Our forces were small and scattered. When they met the enemy in air combat they were often outnumbered. Even if the opposing forces were of equal strength a clear-cut victory could not be assured, though for 1942 as a whole we claimed a 3-to-1 ratio over the enemy in air combat.

In 1943, with newer planes, more planes, better training, and some deterioration of the enemy, our air combat superiority rose to approximately 5-to-1, and the F6F, employed in strong, concentrated surprise attacks from the new, more mobile carrier forces, showed-promise in the last months of the year. In early 1944 the premise was proved. In the first four months of that year Naval carrier aircraft, roaming the Central Pacific from the Marshalls to Truk, Saipan, Palau and New Guinea, shot down 419 Jap planes and lost but 19 in air combat, a ratio of 22 to 1. This ratio fell during the campaigns against the Marianas and Iwo, and in the bitter battles of Formosa and Leyte, but it was exceeded in the Visayas and Luzon operations of September, October, and December, and the roving raids of January 1945. After falling to 11-to-1 in the Tokyo and Kyushu strikes of February and March, the supremacy became almost absolute in the Okinawas during April and May; the enemy might get planes through to attack our ships, but he could not compete successfully against our aircraft. During these two months the Japanese lost 1,744 planes in aerial combat, to the Navy’s 34 losses, a ratio of over 51-to-1.

For these later operations, of course, the Japanese had few effective combat pilots or planes remaining, and generally attempted to avoid direct combat with our planes. Nevertheless, over half of the Jap planes shot down in these two months were of single-engine fighter types, . including 461 Zekes and 197 newer VF types.

Table 19 presents the record for individual types of aircraft for the entire war. It will be clear from the foregoing data that direct comparisons cannot always be made between various types of aircraft, because of the varying times and conditions under which they engaged in combat. Thus comparisons are valid between the carrier F6F and F4U totals because they generally operated from the same ships during the same periods. The FM, however, operating from CVEs, did not usually encounter the same heavy resistance as did the fast carriers operating in advance of the Fleet. Marine F4Us were used on CVs largely in the more difficult February and March actions, and were present only in small quantities to reap the rich April and May harvest which fell to Navy F4Us. Land-based F4Us were handicapped by the difficult conditions of the Solomons in 1943-44. Land-based Navy F6Fs operated in the Solomons; land-based Marine F6Fs operated under the comparatively lush conditions of Okinawa in 1945. The effect of these differences on the totals for the entire war may be partly judged by comparing the yearly data by plane model in Table 20.

Certain tentative conclusions may be reached from these two tables:

(a) The F6F was slightly superior to the F4U in combat, apparently chiefly because of its greater ability to survive damage.

(b) CVL F6Fs enjoyed an advantage over CV F6Fs.

(c) FMs and CVE F6Fs both turned in remarkable records. The F6F appeared to be clearly superior to the FM under CVE combat conditions, but the high combat ratio in favor of the FM, its ability to destroy over 55% of the planes it engaged, and its low ratio of loss to damage indicate that it was an exceptionally good fighter within its speed limitations.

(d) The PB4Y, normally flying unescorted single-plane long range searches, was one of the Navy's best fighter planes.

(e) Navy single-engine bombers, far from being the highly vulnerable aircraft claimed by their detractors, gave out far more punishment than they took.

Table 21 gives evidence of:

(a) The formidable enemy air opposition to Naval air operations throughout the war. Far more enemy planes were engaged (and destroyed) in combat in 1944 and 1945 than during the adverse years of 1942-43.

(b) The relative decline in enemy air opposition in proportion to the vast increase in ou own offensive and defensive air effort. In 1942 a quarter of our action sorties engaged enemy aircraft; in 1945 only 4 percent engaged.

(c) The increasing effectiveness of Naval aircraft against the enemy, measured in the ratio of enemy planes destroyed to own losses, in the percentage lost of own planes engaging in combat, and in percentage of own action sorties lost in air combat. In 1942 5% of all Navy action sorties were lost in aerial combat, in 1945 less than one-eighth of one percent.

(d) The increasing effectiveness of Naval fighter escort of single-engine bombers. In 1942 fifteen percent of carrier VSB-VTB action sorties had to engage enemy aircraft and four percent were lost to enemy air action; in 1944 only 1.7 percent met enemy aircraft, and only one-thirteenth of one percent were lost; in 1945 less than 1/2 of one percent were forced to engage enemy planes, and only 7 bombers, or 1/36 of one percent were lost in air combat.