SECTION II. PART III, APPENDIX II

ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS AIR FORCES - SUPPORTING STUDY

INDEX OF TABS

TABS

   1. Tabulation of Total Aircraft Requirements.

(a) Map - Disposition of Combat Air Units.

   2. Air Intelligence — Estimate of the Situation.

(a) Map - Principal Targets Air Offensive against Germany.

   3. Army Air Force Bombardment Operations against Germany.

(a) Tabulation of Bombardment Force Required.

(b) Basis for Calculation of Force Required to Destroy Targets.

   4. Escort Fighters.

   5. Bombardment Bases for Operations against Germany.

(a) Airdromes in United Kingdom and Middle East.

(b) Map Sphere of Action, 4,000 Miles Radius Airplane.

   6. Army Aircraft Required for Control of the Seas (Operations in Support of and in Lieu of the Fleet).

   7. Bombardment Aviation Required for Hemisphere Defense.

(a) Map — Hemisphere Defense, Bases and Operating Radii (B-17 and B-24).

   8. Bombardment Aviation Required for Strategic Defense in Asia.

   9. Pursuit Requirements — Total,

(a) Pursuit Requirements to Support Air Offensive against Germany.

(b) Pursuit Requirements for Hemisphere Defense,

(c) Pursuit Requirements for Strategic Defensive in Asia

(d) Pursuit Requirements for Support of Ground Forces.

   10. Air Support Aviation Required for Support of Ground Forces.

   11. Transport Aviation Required to Maintain Aerial Lines of Communication.

   12. Pilot Training Requirements (Flying Schools and Training Airplanes.)

   13. Personnel Requirements.

   14. Aircraft Production Program,

   15. Flying Weather — All Theaters.

   16. Chart — Comparison of Hostile Air Forces,

   17.  Production Requirements for Heavy Bombers — Discussion.

a) Chart - Monthly Production Rates - Heavy Bombers.

b) Chart — Rate of Activation of Heavy Bombardment Gps.

TAB 1

TABULATION OF TOTAL AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS

(Consolidated)

Aircraft Types	Total Airplanes (including 25% Reserve)	Monthly Replacement Rate	Anticipated on Hand July 1, 1943 Present Schedule (Tab 14)
Bombardment
(4000 mi. rad.)	(3,740)*	(501)*	0
(H & I)	7,097	1,379	7,550
(Dive & L)	2,201	98
Pursuit	3,775	576	7,700
Obsn. & Photo.	2,043	121	350
Transport	2,560	102	1,140
TOTAL COMBAT	22,676 (26,416)*	2,276 ( )**	16,740
Training	37,051 59,727 (63,467)*	(See page 4 this Tab)	15,100 31,840***
* The eventual strength and composition of the Army Air Force required to accomplish the mission includes 4000 mile radius of action bombardment airplanes. Pending the manufacture of these airplanes in tactical quantities, double combat crews are to be employed in operations against Germany in the shorter range airplanes (heavy and medium bombardment) as an undesired expedient. The strength and composition of this interim expedient Air Force are indicated by the figures not in parentheses, ** When sufficient numbers of 4000 mile radius of action bombardment airplanes are on hand, the replacement rate of heavy and medium bombardment types will be reduced almost 50%, the expedient necessity for double combat crew operation having been eliminated. *** This total has been reduced from the figure 43,320 airplanes (given as the total of Army production shown in the exhibit "Aircraft Production Program"-Tab 14) by the losses estimated during the period until July 1, 1943.

(TAB 1, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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DETAILS OF REQUIREMENTS BY TYPE

BOMBARDMENT

Aircraft Type	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Offensive against Germany
H/B B-25 26 types	10	60	40	10	10	850	212	286	Tab 3
H/B B-17 24 types	20	120	80	20	20	1360	340	456	Tab 3
H/B B-29 32 types	24	144	96	24	24	1632	408	546	Tab 5(a)
H/B 4000 mile rad*	(44)	(264)	(176)	(44)	(44)	(2992)	(748)	(501)	Tab 5(a) (Par 6)
TOTALS	54	324	216	54	54	3842	960	1288
Hemisphere Defense
H/B B-17 24 types	23	130	92	23	23	1564	391	46	Tab 7
Strategic Defense in Asia
H/B B-17 24 types	4	24	16	4	4	272	68	45	Tab 8
Recapitulation-Total Bombardment by Types
H/B (or M/B)	10	60	40	10	10	850	212	286	---
H/B B-17 24 types	47	282	188	47	47	3196	799	547	---
H/B B-29 32 types	24	144	96	24	24	1632	408	546	---
H/B 4000 mile rad*	(44)	(264)	(176)	(44)	(44)	(2992)	(748)	(501)	---
GRAND TOTAL L&H BOMBERS
ALL TYPES	81	486	324	81	81	5678	1419	1379
* H/B 4000 mile radius of action not included in totals.
DIVE AND LIGHT BOMBERS
Bombers for Air Support Commands
L/B A-20	13	65	39	13	13	757	189	42	Tab 10
Dive Bomb.	13	65	39	13	13	1004	251	56	Tab 10
TOTAL	26	130	78	26	26	1761	440	98

(TAB 1, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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PURSUIT

Aircraft Type	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Offensive vs Germany
Inter. Day	21*	84	63	21	21	2,205	551	334	Tab 9
Inter. Night		21	21		--	525	131	80	Tab 9
TOTAL	21	105	84	21	21	2,730	682	414
* Only 16 of these groups can be accommodated initially in England and Suez. Five (5) groups initially will be located in the Western Hemisphere.
Hemisphere Defense
	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Inter• Day	31	124	93	31	31	3,255	814	98	Tab 9
Inter. Night		31	31		-	775	194	23	Tab 9
Fighter Long Rnge	--	--	-	--	--	--	--	--
TOTALS	31	155	124	31	31	4,030	1,008	121
Reserve for Ground Forces Tab 10
Inter. Day Inter. Night.  Fighter Long Rng	Six Pursuit Groups, in Strategic Reserve in the U.S., are included in Hemisphere Defense totals. Five of these groups are allocated initially to air support commands.
Strategic Defense in Asia
	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Inter. Day	2	8	6	2	2	210	53	33
Inter. Night		2	2			50	12	8	Tab 9(c)
Fighter Long Rnge	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	2	10	8	2	2	260	65	41

(TAB I, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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Aircraft Type	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Recapitulation - Total Pursuit by Types
Inter, Day	54	216	162	54	54	5,670	1,418	465	---
Inter. Night		54	54			1,350	337	111	---
Fighter Long Rng	--	--	--	--	--	--	--	--
TOTAL	54	270	216	54	54	7,020	1,755	576
GRAND TOTAL PURSUIT
ALL TYPES	54	270	216	54	54	8,775		576

TRAINING
Bombardment (Combat type - allocated to schools)	2,594 Airplanes
Transport	74 Airplanes
Primary Training	11,115 Airplanes
Basic Training	11,486 Airplanes
Advanced Training - 1 Engine	3,853 Airplanes
Advanced Training - 2 Engine	7,484 Airplanes
Observation	445 Airplanes
TOTAL	37,051 Airplanes

Observation For Air Support Command.

PHOTO & OBSERVATION

Aircraft Type	Total Gps	Total Sqs	Combat Sqs	Opn Tn Sqs	Hq Sq	Op. Aps	25% Res. in Aps	Repl. in Aps.	Pert Tabs
Observation		108	108			1,521	380	98	Tab 10
Photo	2	10	8		2	114	28	23	Tab 10
TOTAL	2	118	116		2	1,635	408	121
TRANSPORT
Maintenance Command	13	65	52	0	13	832	208	25	Tab 11
Ground Troop Training	19	95	76	0	19	1,216	304	77	Tab 10
TOTAL	32	160	128	0	32	2,048	512	102
TOWED GLIDERS
15 Man Gliders						2,400	600	153

(TAB 1, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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TAB 2

AIR INTELLIGENCE - ESTIMATE OF THE SITUATION

1. National Mission;— a. To defeat our potential enemies. (Letter from The President to the Secretary of War, 9 July 1941).

b. The broad strategic objective (object) is, in conjunction with Great Britain and her allies, to defeat Germany and her allies (United States-British Staff Conversations Report, ABC-1).

c. This plan is based upon the conception that Germany should be decisively defeated first, and that her allies, including Japan should be decisively dealt with after that aim has been reached.

2. Air Mission:— a. To wage a sustained air offensive against German military power, supplemented by air offensives against other regions under enemy control which contribute toward that power (ABC-1).

b. To support a final offensive, if it becomes necessary to invade the continent.

c. In addition, to conduct offensive air operation in connection with Hemisphere Defense and a strategic defensive in the Far East.

3. Situation:— a. The center of Axis system is in Germany. Hence, that is where pressure must be applied ultimately. Italy has been relegated to a position of secondary importance.

b. The German offensive against Russia and the other German war operations have placed a considerable strain upon the economic structure of the Reich, and the Russian Campaign engaged a major portion of the Germany army and most of the German Air Force in Eastern Europe,

c. The declaration of war by Germany against Russia improved the conditions for enforcing the sea blockade and the means of applying pressure through economic warfare. Even in the event of Russian collapse, the German economic structure will continue to operate under heavy strain, and there will be a period of at least a year before Russian economy could be resuscitated and incorporated into the German system.

d. The extent of the economic strain on Germany is indicated by the following: at present there are 6.5 million men under arms in the German army, 100,000 in the German Navy, and 1.5 million in the German Air Force, Behind this armed front, there are 8.5 million men engaged in armaments works alone, about half of whom are working in steel industries. Nearly 17 million men are directly engaged in this war, to the exclusion of all normal civil pursuits and production. Hence, there is a very heavy drain on the social and economic structure of the state. Destruction of that structure will virtually break down the capacity of the German nation to wage

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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war. The basic conception on which this plan is based lies in the application of air power for the breakdown of the industrial and economic structure of Germany. This conception involves the selection of a system of objectives vital to continued German war effort, and to the means of livelihood of the German people, and tenaciously concentrating all bombing toward destruction of those objectives. The most effective manner of conducting such a decisive offensive is by destruction of precise objectives, at least initially, as German morale begins to crack, area bombing of civil concentrations may be effective.

e. It is improbable that a land invasion can be carried out against Germany proper within the next three years. If the air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary. Our air bases in England and elsewhere must be made secure, primarily by ground forces, and the lines of communication by sea must also be made secure.

4. a. Possible Lines of Action, Based on an analysis of military and economic factors, the following lines of action for an air offensive can be set up for consideration.

(1) Lines of action whose accomplishment will accomplish the air mission in Europe.

(a) Disruption of a major portion of the Electric Power System of Germany.

(b) Disruption of the German transportation system.

(c) Destruction of the German oil and Petroleum system.

(d) Undermining of German morale by air attack of civil concentrations.

(2) Lines of action representing intermediate objectives, whose accomplishment may be essential to the accomplishment of the principal objectives listed above.

(a) Neutralization of the German Air Force,

(1) By attack of its bases.

(2) By attack of aircraft factories (engine and airframe).

(3) By attack of aluminum and magnesium factories.

(3) Lines of action representing diversion objectives, which may be forced upon us by the necessity for assisting in maintaining the security of bases.

(a) Attack of submarine bases.

(b) Attack of surface sea craft.

(c) Attack of "invasion" bases.

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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5. Discussion of Possible Lines of Action,

a. Electric Power, Nearly all industry, civil as well as military, finds its roots in electric power. The German electric power system, the second largest in the world, was greatly expanded for this war. Even so, it is operating at 50% greater rate than the British electric power system today. It is vital to the German war effort, and is highly important to civil life. Following are some of the industries dependent upon electric power:

Aircraft manufacture
Aluminum production (which absorbs 10% of all public power)
Synthetic rubber production (a critical item. Two plants provide nearly 1/2 production).
The textile industries (an important item in view of the shortage of wool and warm clothing in Germany).
All the armament industries, involving the production of guns, great quantities of shells, and tanks.
Shipbuilding industry.
The automotive industry.
Cold storage of food.
Urban transportation.

The electric power industry is closely integrated into a "power grid". However, the careful selection of major power stations and switching stations and their destruction would make it possible to isolate the principal manufacturing and population centers from their sources of electric energy. The targets involved are small, but readily distinguishable in daylight. They are susceptible to destruction by bombs, but many hits are required. They vary in distance from 400 to 1,000 miles from England. They are precision targets. A typical plant covers an area about 500 ft. x 300 ft. The British estimate that about 17 hits in that area will guarantee destruction of the plant. It is estimated that the destruction of about 50 power plants will reduce the total capacity to about 60% of the present total. However, by destroying selected switching stations this number might be reduced to about twenty, and the industrial power to key manufacturing centers be almost completely shut off. Eighty percent of electric power consumed in Germany is utilized by industry. 50 targets are set up for this task. See Map - Principal Targets Air offensive against Germany. Tab 2(a).

b. Transportation. In anticipation of this war, Germany has deliberately dispersed critical industries as much as possible. However, this has made transportation even more vital than would normally be the case. The German Transportation system is carrying an extremely heavy load, divided about as follows:

Railroads 72%
Waterways 25%
Long haul truckage 3%

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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(1). Railways.— The German railways are working at capacity. They are dependent upon a highly complex system of marshalling yards. The great majority of railroad traffic enters or leaves the Ruhr, which is virtually the manufacturing center of the heavy industries, 10% of the steel industry is concentrated there.

(a). Marshalling Yards.— It is estimated that about eight marshalling yards handle almost all of this traffic to the Ruhr. These marshalling yards are only about three hundred and fifty miles from England, They are area targets. The yards themselves are not particularly vulnerable to air attack. Traffic may be seriously delayed, but the damage to tracks is fairly easily repaired. Hence, they must be subjected to repeated attacks. It is estimated that disruption of the marshalling yards of the Ruhr for 24 hours sets back the production of the Ruhr about two weeks. Considering the rail net as a whole, it is believed that repeated attacks upon fifteen marshalling yards would cause such traffic confusion as to break down the operating system. In addition, there are important railroad bridges across such major waterways as the Rhine, the Elbe, and the Oder. These bridges are difficult to replace, even with temporary structures. They represent rather small precision targets. Repeated attacks arc necessary to prevent replacement with temporary structures.

(b). A total of 30 targets is set up for the railroad transportation system.

c.Inland Waterways.— (1). The German transportation system is vulnerable through the inland waterways because of 2 factors

(a). The waterways carry 25% of the total freight transported in Germany.

(b). The railroads are already taxed to capacity, and could not stand up under a 25% increase.

(2), The vulnerability of the inland waterway system to air attack arises from the fact that the destruction of an estimated 14 targets would neutralize the effectiveness of the east-west canal system of Germany, These 14 targets consist of 3 ship elevators, locks at 9 points, and the inland harbors at Manheim and Duisburg. (See Map: Principal Targets Air Offensive against Germany - Tab 2(a)), The purposes of the German Inland Waterways are twofold:-

(a). To relieve the railroads in time of emergency of the slow, bulky freight such as coal, ore, agricultural products, etc, etc.

(b). To bring the Ruhr coal and Sigerland iron products to central and southeastern Germany. (areas of the strategically relocated German industry -Hermann Goering Works, Volkswagan Plant, gasworks at Magdeburg-Rothensee) by a cheap water route.

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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(3) The main continuous stretch known as the Central German Canal, starting with Duisburg on the Rhine and ending at Plauer near Berlin, is about 330 miles long. The canal has 54 locks and double locks, 3 ship elevators, 23 pumpworks, 29 water overflow facilities, 21 high water entires, 27 safety locks, 11 canal bridges, 454 tunnels underneath canals, 110 railway bridges, 6 highway bridges, 636 street bridges, 9 railway and street tunnels, and 8 pipe bridges,

(4). In 1943 the Rhine-Main-Danube canal system will be completed. Broadly speaking; the purpose of this system is to connect the North and Black Seas by a continuous inland waterway. The completion of this system will increase the number of targets beyond those which have been selected on the existing system. Three targets have been set up for this increase.

(5). The seasonal factor should be given careful consideration in any final plan of operations against the German inland waterways system, inasmuch as the canals are frozen over for a considerable period in the winter and traffic fluctuates widely at other seasons of the year; reaching a peak in the late fall. The greatest effect would be secured by an attack on the canal system at the time of greatest traffic, i.e. in the last summer and fall seasons,

(6). In addition to the effect upon war industry, crippling of the German transportation system would bring severe suffering to the German people by denying them the necessary coal for heating. The winters in Germany are cold and clothing is becoming scarce. Breakdown of the transportation system would interfere with the orderly distribution of food-stuffs and common utilities.

(7). Canal locks and ship elevators are precision targets. They are easy to locate and vulnerable to destruction by bombing. Their destruction would have an immediate effect, and a relatively permanent one.

(8). The importance of transportation is emphasized by the fact that 70% of steel production is in the Ruhr, and 2/3 of the iron ore for steel production must be transported into Germany from outside sources.

d. Summary of Transportation targets:

Railway
Marshalling yards	15
Bridges over the Rhine, Oder and other sensitive points	11
Total	30
Inland Waterways
Ship elevators	3
Locks and harbor works	11 (existing)
Targets	3 (new canal)
Total	17

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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e. Petroleum and Synthetic Oil. — (1). German transportation, the German Air Force, the German Navy, and German industry all are dependent upon oil. The amount of oil in storage in Germany before the war is not known. The present German production and importation of oil and the production of synthetic oil and gasoline is believed to be capable of meeting current expenditures.

(2). About 60% of aviation gasoline comes from synthetic production in Germany proper. Eighty per cent of this production come from 27 plants. These plants vary from 400 to 1,000 miles from England. They are easily distinguishable in daylight, and they are susceptible to destruction by bombing. They are precision targets.

(3). About 22% of the oil for aviation gasoline comes from Rumania. It is refined in Rumania and is moved primarily by water transportation up the Danube to Germany. Success in the oil venture might necessitate operating against the Danube to stop this flow. Hence, the importance of retaining bases in Asia Minor or Syria,

(4). Russian oil, if procurable by Germany, must also move across the Black Sea by water transportation, which might be disrupted by air attack in this theater.

(5). Synthetic oil plants resemble ordinary petroleum refineries, and both are vulnerable to destruction by bombing. They are large targets, easily distinguishable, and they are hard to replace. However, they should not be considered area targets. The most vital element of each plant should be determined and bombing should be concentrated against that point. Near misses and normal bombing distribution will contribute to destructive effect required.

(6). Number of targets set up for this task: 27.

f. Morale. Timeliness of attack is most important in the conduct of air operations directly against civil morale. If the morale of the people is already low because of sustained suffering and deprivation and because the people are losing faith in the ability of the armed forces to win a favorable decision, then heavy and sustained bombing of cities may crash that morale entirely. However, if these conditions do not exist, then area bombing of cities may actually stiffen the resistance of the population, especially if the attacks are weak and sporadic. Hence, no specific number of targets is set up for this task. Rather it is believed that the entire bombing effort might be applied toward this purpose when it becomes apparent that the proper psychological conditions exist.

6. Intermediate Objectives.

a. German Air Bases. One way to insure the feasibility of precision bombing attacks upon the Principal Objectives would be through the destruction of the German Fighter Forces, However, the Germans have been at great pains to provide adequate air bases for their forces. It is estimated that there

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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are approximately 500 bases in Western Germany and the occupied territories. They are provided with exceptionally strong light "flak" defenses. Aircraft are dispersed, generally about a mile from the landing areas for the bombers, less for the fighters. Each airplane is provided with individual protection in the form of a revetment and concrete taxiways are provided. Quarters for personnel are scattered through neighboring villages. The whole system is carefully camouflaged. Incidentally, the German air bases are far superior to the bases of the R.A.F., from the standpoint of security. It seems improbable that the German Fighter Command can be neutralized by air attack of its bases. However, further analysis will be made.

Present and Projected Strength in Aircraft:

(1). The above figures for 7/1/43 were arrived at by a continuation of curves representing past growth of productive capacity and losses. It is not believed that the figures estimated by this method are possible of attainment by Germany, due to various difficulties of production, notably a lack of skilled labor, various essential materials, transportation difficulties and other factors. Hence; the gain in German air force strength in planes between today and 7/1/43 as estimated by extension of curves has been arbitrarily reduced by 50 percent, giving the estimate shown below:

Estimated Strength German Air Force, 7/1/43.

It is estimated that of the bombers shown above, 500 of the Total Operational Combat and 800 of the Total in Air Fleet, will consist of long range types. (Over 1000 miles radius of action.)

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II)

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(2). It is estimated that the total number of air-planes in the German Air Force, including transport, training types, army cooperation, and a depot reserve equal to 100% of Air Fleet airplanes will on 7/1/43 amount to approximately 45,000 planes. The achievement by Germany of this estimate is, of course contingent upon the availability of all essential materials, skilled labor, and other elements of production necessary to complete the job.

c. German Aircraft Factories. The Germans have concealed most of their new factories, and have dispersed them.

Also the manufacture of parts and assemblies has been widely decentralized. However, the older plants are still being used as assembly plants, and their location is well known. They are from 500 to 700 miles from England. They really represent area targets, or areas of precision targets. They are not so susceptible to bombing as had been anticipated, as factory bombing is apt to result in less damage than had been estimated. However, adequate forces of bombers should be capable of seriously reducing production, if used in quantity and for considerable periods of time. The number of targets presented can be readily determined, but is not immediately available. The effect of bombing aircraft factories would not be felt immediately, as it is estimated that the Germans had about 100% reserves in storage at the beginning of the Russian campaign. The eighteen principal assembly plants have been selected as targets.

d. Aluminum and Magnesium Plants. Aluminum plants are highly essential to aircraft production, and are concentrated into a small number of objectives. Aluminum production in Germany has been increased from 175,000 tons yearly in 1938 to about 300,000 tons at this time (September, 1941). This increase has taken the form of plant expansion of existing facilities, and six plants produce about 90% of the aluminum. These plants are located from 400 to 800 miles from England.

They are precision targets requiring large destruction effort, The time factor would provide some delay in producing effective-results, but sooner or later the effect would be catastrophic to the aircraft industry. Aluminum is now being used to replace fittings normally made of copper. This is the result of a critical shortage of copper. Magnesium is equally concentrated, but the quantity of magnesium is appreciably less than that of aluminum required. Six aluminum and six magnesium plants have been selected as targets.

7. Diversion Objectives.— Threats to the security of the British Isles may make it mandatory to employ bomber forces against submarine bases, invasion ports, and surface raiders. However, these targets represent a diversion from the true objective. It is believed best to avoid such commitments altogether, if possible, leaving this employment to the British bomber force, except in actual emergency,

8. Nature of Opposition to be Encountered.— The question "Is it feasible to make deep penetrations into German territory and conduct precision bombing without prohibitive losses?" is vital to any consideration of a decisive air offensive in this

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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war. Following is a very general discussion of German air defenses:

a. Fighters:— (1), Up until the appearance of the British Sterling bomber and the American Flying Fortress, the German fighters have made daylight bomber operations excessively expensive. Interceptions are the rule, not the exception. The Germans are now known to be using a radio means of detecting and tracking aircraft. They also have a well organized system of ground observers. The German fighters are armed with 20 mm cannon and .30 calibre machine guns. The Germans are producing a 15 mm machine gun with a high rate of fire.

(2). It is difficult to analyze the disposition of the German fighter defenses. There appear to be wide gaps in the defenses. Practically all the defenses have been pushed far forward, leaving the interior of Germany practically undefended. However, it is probable that these defenses would be promptly reorganized if penetrations in daylight become more prevalent.

(3). The German night fighter defenses are rapidly improving. One method of operation is in connection with a band of searchlights which is continuous from the Danish border for about 150 miles to the South. It is about 20 miles deep. Engagements with the night fighters is rapidly becoming the general rule. However, there appears to be a limit to the number of fighters which can operate by radio control in any sector. The Germans are using ME 110 and converted JU 88 fighters for this work, armed with cannon. There appear to be few night fighters in the interior of Germany.

(4). The British Sterling and American B-17 bombers provide a means, at least for the moment of copying with day fighters. The B-17's rely upon speed, altitude, and deception. However, they have been intercepted, and each time the ME 109's were capable of flying above them and of overtaking them. It is apparent that the B-17 will need defensive fire power. At least one Sterling squadron seems to be solving the problem by fire power. It has lost two airplanes, and has shot down 22 German fighters. The Sterling has a 4-gun power turret in the tail and a 2-gun turret above and another in the nose.

(5). In the penetration of good defenses, it is apparent that all means of protection must be used. Speed is highly important because it limits the number of attacks that may be encountered in a deep penetration and also limits the maneuver of the fighter for attack and the avenues of attack; altitude is highly important for the purpose of evading fighters, and also limiting their maneuver in combat; defensive fire power and armor are essential to stand off attacking fighters (the British are considering reducing their bomb loads by as much as 3,000 lbs. to get better armor and fire power); an escort defensive fighter to accompany bomber formations to close off the rear avenue may be necessary; and simultaneous penetration of defenses at many places in great numbers may offer tactical success. Reliance is still put on defensive formations, although the best size of such formations for large aircraft may be as little as three airplanes. Training of

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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gunners is recognized as absolutely essential to deep penetration of defenses.

9. Artillery Defenses

a. The German antiaircraft defenses are extremely good, and are still improving. They are widely scattered throughout Western Germany and the occupied countries, and are highly mobile. It is necessary for bombers to keep maneuvering to avoid being shot down, even at 18,000 feet. The Germans use radio predictions, and fire with amazing accuracy, even though an overcast. It is believed that the effectiveness of antiaircraft fire would be reduced by increasing the number of aircraft making simultaneous approaches to the objective, so as to present simultaneously a maximum number of separate targets.

b. Consideration of all these factors leads to the conclusion, that by employing large numbers of aircraft with high speed, good defensive fire power, and high altitude, it is feasible to make deep penetrations into Germany in daylight. It is believed that the degree of reliability of conducting sustained offensive air operations would be greatly enhanced by development of an escort fighter.

10. Support of a Final Offensive With Invasion of the Continent.

a. Success in the air offensive against the objectives outlined above night cause a collapse of the German government. However, in the event that such an air offensive is not conclusive, it will be necessary to invade the continent. In any event, the threat of such an invasion must be emphasized.

b. The targets listed for the air offensive continue to be appropriate as bomber objectives in this final phase. In addition targets of opportunity in the combat zone and on the battlefield will be revealed as the situation progresses. At that time, all or a part of the bomber forces available can be thrown against such targets. It is not feasible to select such targets now.

11. SUMMARY. -- It is believed that the destruction of the following objectives will result in the maximum contribution of the air offensive toward defeat of our enemies in Europe.

a. Isolate principal industrial and population centers from their sources of electric power:
          50 Targets - Precision

b. Disrupt German system of transportation:
          30 Rail Targets
          17 Waterway Targets

c. Destroy the major sources of petroleum and synthetic oil:
          27 Precision Targets

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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d. Conduct direct attacks against morale, after it begins to crack from other strain.

e. Neutralize the German Air Force by air attacks on
          Assembly Plants - - - 13 targets, precision
          Aluminum Plants - - - 6 targets, precision
          Magnesium Plants- - - 6 targets, precision

(TAB 2, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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TAB 3

ARMY AIR FORCE BOMBARDMENT OPERATIONS AGAINST GERMANY

1. THE ARMY AIR FORCE MISSION: — (Condensed extracts from ABC-1 and Rainbow 5)

Beginning on M-Day and with increasing power until the final phase -
              TO WEAKEN GERMANY,
              TO RESTRICT AXIS AIR OPERATIONS,
              TO SUPPORT FINAL OFFENSIVE (assault or occupation).

2. THE OBJECTIVES:

a. The available information on the German military and civil establishments leads to the conclusion that several systems of objectives are vital to the effectiveness of the German Air Force and the civil and military strength of the German nation (Air Intelligence - Estimate of the Situation (Tab 2)).

A study of the size of the Air Force necessary to destroy each of these systems of objectives leads to the conclusion that only certain of these objectives which are vital are also within the capabilities of an Army Air Force of the size that could be produced in the reasonably near future.

b. The systems of objectives, the destruction of which first will accomplish the mission and second are within the capabilities of an Air Force which we can develop, are:

Electric Power Inland Transportation The Petroleum Industry Bombing of Civil Population of Berlin	To Weaken Germany
German Airplane Assembly Plants Aluminum Plants Magnesium Plants	To Restrict Axis Air Operations.
The Objectives listed above Military Targets in the Interior Battlefield Targets	To Support Final Offensive

3. SIZE OF BOMBARDMENT COMPONENT OF AAF REQUIRED TO ACCOMPLISH THE MISSION: --

a.. More data and further study are necessary to afford a better analysis than is now available of the vital systems of objectives. More data are required on the specific location and detailed description of the vital points within these systems of objectives which would provide most profitable targets for air attack.

b. Summary: -- The total bombardment force set up to accomplish the mission comprises 98 Bombardment Groups. Consideration of the availability of bases (Tab 5 - Bombardment Bases for Operations against Germany) and the resultant requirements for radii of action breaks this number of 98 Groups into types as indicated below:

10 Groups, M.B (Similar to B-25 or B-26, or improved models)
20 Groups, H.B. (Similar to B-17 or B-24, or improved models)
24 Groups, H.B. (Similar to B-29 or B-32, or improved models)
44 Groups, H.B (4000 mile operational tactical radius of action)
98 Groups — Total

(Tab 3, Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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4. INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORTATION; —

a. The transportation system of Germany is indispensable to the functioning of her military organization and national structure. The disintegration and failure of this system can be brought about by the neutralization of the inland waterway system and by simultaneous attack upon certain selected points in the railway system. The inland waterways carry 25% of the total freight transported in Germany and the railways could not stand up under this additional load if the inland waterways were destroyed. It is estimated that the existing inland waterway establishment can be paralyzed by the destruction of 9 locks, 3 ship elevators and inland harbor facilities at Mannheim and Diusburg.

b. In 1943, a projected Rhine - Hain - Danube Canal system may be completed. Additional data and further study may develop the necessity to destroy this Canal establishment also. If such proves to be the case, it may be necessary to double-approximately, the bombardment force set up herein to destroy the known existing inland waterway establishment Where are set up in this force, sufficient bombardment airplanes to take out three ship elevators or three locks in this canal system now under construction and about which little detailed information is available.

c. Force Required for Destruction of Inland Waterways: — 11 Groups of Bombardment (heavy or medium), (For detailed description of the targets, see Tab 2).

5. RAIL TRANSPORTATION: --

a. The rail net of Germany would be unable to absorb the full freight load if the inland waterway establishment were destroyed. It is estimated that the destruction of about 15 marshalling yards and about 15 other sensitive points within the rail net, in conjunction with the attacks on the inland waterways, will cause the disintegration and failure of the transportation system of Germany.

b, Force Required for Destruction of Rail Net: —

19 Groups Bombardment (heavy or medium). (For detailed description of these targets, see Tab No. 2).

NOTE: Attention is invited to the feet that the destruction of these targets calls for a large bombardment force. It is not to be inferred that this force or any other force cannot be used for other purposes. During major air operations, some of the vital elements of the German Air Force and airplane manufacturing installations about which information is now very obscure will surely be uncovered. At that time, all or portions of this force can be diverted to attacks on the German Air Force.

6. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: — a. Twenty-seven (27) synthetic oil plants concentrated in 3 areas in western and central Germany account for nearly 50% of Germany's supply of crude petroleum. The destruction of these establishments will not only very greatly reduce the gasoline available for the operation of the German military land and air machine, but will interfere with the production and supply of: carbon gas black (tires, ink and paints), alcohols (antiseptics, lacquers, essential oils), chemical solvents, naphthas, kerosene, furnace oil, diesel oil, waxes, heavy oils (lubricating, emulsifying, transformer

(Tab 3, Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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and flotation oils), asphalt, pitch, tar, sulphuric acid, synthetic plastics and synthetic rubber.

b. Force Required for Destruction of Petroleum Objectives ; — 17 Groups of Bombardment (heavy or medium). (For detailed description of these targets, see Tab No. 2).

7. ELECTRIC POWER: — a. Although Germany's rail net is not electrified, some 80% of Germany's total production of electric power is consumed in industry. The destruction of approximately 50 electric generating stations in Germany would eliminate some 40% of Germany's total generating capacity. The denial to Germany of 40% of her electric generating capacity at the same time that the German petroleum industry and inland transportation establishment is seriously interfered with, will in all probability cause the collapse of the German military and civil establishment.

b. Force Required for Destruction of Electric Power Objectives : — 32 Groups of Bombardment (heavy or medium). (For details as to these targets, see Tab 2).

8. BOMBING OF CIVIL POPULATION OF BERLIN -- Immediately after some very apparent results of air attack on the material objectives listed above or immediately after some major set-back of the German ground forces, it may become highly profitable to deliver a large scale, all-out attack on the civil population of Berlin. In this event, any or all the bombardment forces may be diverted for this mission. Ho special bombardment force is set up for this purpose.

9. GERMAN AIR FORCE AND AIRPLANE MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENTS:

a. The German air establishment, military and civil, may include 3000 widely dispersed and carefully camouflaged manufacturing establishments. Similarly, the German Air Force is widely dispersed, well concealed and heavily defended. It is known, however, that there are 18 large airplane assembly plants, 6 large aluminum plants and 6 magnesium plants which are of great importance to the German airplane manufacturing establishment. Air units are set up to destroy these plants. As additional key establishments are located, it may be decided to divert other forces from their systems of objectives to the attack of aviation facilities or factories.

b. Force Required for Destruction of Known Airplane Manufacturing Establishments; — 19 Groups of Bombardment (heavy or medium). (For details as to these targets, see Tab 2).

10. MILITARY TARGETS IN THE ZONE OF THE INTERIOR AND BATTLEFIELD TARGETS IN SUPPORT OF THE FINAL OBJECTIVE: — When control of the sea has been obtained and an overwhelming air superiority has been achieved, the presence of large friendly ground forces and their offensive operations against Germany are expected. At that time, it is believed that a large portion of the bombardment force set up for operations against Germany will no longer be required for the specific missions indicated and will be properly diverted by the theater commander to operations directly related to the success of the ground forces. For this reason, no bombardment force is set up in this Tab for the specific purpose of supporting the final objective (except units in the Support Commands, see Tab 10).

(Tab 3, Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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TAB 3(a)

TABULATION OF BOMBARDMENT FORCE REQUIRED

1. Total Bombardment Airplanes and Units Required.

Type (1)	Group	Combat Sqs.	OTU* Sqs.	Hq. Sqs.	Total Planes	Initial 25% Reserved)	Month Attrition Rate (2)
							(a)	(b)
M/B B-26 Type	10	40	10	10	850	212	(143)	286
H/B B-24 Type	20	80	20	20	1,360	340	(228)	456
H/B B-32 Type	24	96	24	24	1,632	408	(273)	546
H/B 4000 Mile Rad.	(44)	(176)	(44)	(44)	(2,992)	(748)	(501)	--
Totals (Incl. 4000 mi. Aps.)	(98)	(392)	(98)	(98)	(6,834)	(1,708)	(1,145)
Totals Initial Op'ns (See Note 2b)	54	216	54	54	3,342	960		1,288
*Operational Training Units.

Notes:

(1) Requirements in first three lines include those bombardment airplanes that can be based in British Isles and Suez area. Requirement on the fourth line is the difference between those required and those that can be based in British Isles and the Suez area. (See Tab 5 -Bombardment Bases for Operations against Germany for discussion).

(2) Current (inintelligible).D. attrition rates (20% per month loss in airplanes by all units except operational training units where 3% prevails) are applied throughout.

a. Replacements required if the indicated numbers of 4000 mile radius of action airplanes are available (probably 1944 or later).

b. Replacements actually required until the indicated numbers of 4000 mile radius of action airplanes are available. All shorter radius of action airplanes in operation against Germany must be operated by double combat crews until that date. (See Tab 4 for discussion). Single combat crew operation may be resumed when the 4000 mile airplanes are available.

(3) Initial 25% Reserve on basis of total planes.

(TAB 3(a), SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II)

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2. Airplanes Required by Types of Missions. (Note 1)

Type of Objective (1)	No. of Targets	Groups	Planes in Hq & Combat Sqs.	Planes in OTU* Sqs.	Total Planes
Inland Waterways	17	11	627	143	770
Rail Transportation	30	19	1,083	247	1,330
Petroleum Industry	27	17	969	221	1,190
Electric Power	50	32	1,824	416	2,240
German Air Force & Airplane Mfg. Estabs.	30	19	1,083	247	1,330
	154	98	5,506 (2)	1,274 (3)	6,860 (4)
*Operational Training Units.

Notes:

1. The numbers of airplanes computed herein are based on the total requirement to accomplish the mission. The lack of adequate air bases and the difficulty of manufacturing airplanes of sufficient radius of action (4000 miles) forces the expediency of employing double combat crews on shorter radius of action airplanes. (See Note 2b, Par 1 of this Tab).

2. The number of planes considered for combat missions.

3. These planes not considered as performing combat missions.

4. Difference between this total and that appearing in paragraph 1 due to factors pertaining to airdromes and difference between number of planes in medium and heavy bombardment squadrons.

(TAB 3(a), SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II)

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TAB 3 (b)

BASIS FOR CALCULATION OF FORCE REQUIRED TO DESTROY TARGETS

1. BASIS;

The only sound method of forecasting the capabilities of a force in accomplishing a particular mission is to take past records and apply such additional factors as may be available. The application of the theory of probabilities and the Law of Errors in the determination of the bombardment force required to accomplish a given result is the best basis that can be applied.

Only a smattering of facts are available as the basis on which to answer the question, "How many bombardment airplanes should we employ in two or three years hence to penetrate the resistance which may be interposed against us at that time to reach and to find those objectives and to be practically sure that the necessary number of the proper sized bombs hit their targets and that the mission will be accomplished?" Among these facts are the following: The British bombing range standard of bombardiers' accuracy is known. As a result of 15 attacks on one target, it can be deduced that the probable British bombing range error is 2.5 (or 2.25; unintelligible) times greater in actual operations when confronted by antiaircraft artillery, hostile pursuit, day and night conditions, favorable and unfavorable weather, some camouflage and some concealment. Precise data as to the American bombardiers' current bombing range errors are known. The computations which follow are, therefore, based on increasing the American bombing range probable error by 2.25 times (as was the case with the British in the only instance on which data are available) when the American bombardier moves from the bombing range into actual combat operations .

2. THE CURRENT AMERICAN BOMBARDIERS' BOMBING RANGE PROBABLE ERRORS:

The probable errors considered as a basis for calculations are those obtained from June through December 1940. throughout the bombardment units. These probable errors are slightly larger than those of which must be met by student bombardiers before they are graduated as 3d Class Bombardiers. These probable errors are considerably greater than those obtained by the Air Forces in previous years. More emphasis on training will reduce them considerably. However, these errors are sound data on the current American bombardier's accuracy and they must be accepted as a basis for calculation.

3. PROCEDURE IN CALCULATING THE FORCE:

a. Assumptions: Bombing altitude - 20,000 feet.
Current American Errors
(Range - Probable Error —220 feet. )
(Direction — Probable Error — 275 feet.)
Assumed Average Size of Target: 100 ft. x 100 ft.

b. Determination of Single Shot Probability:

50 ft / 220 ft. Rep = 0.1230 Probability of hitting in Range
50 ft / 275 ft. Dep = 0.0966 Probability of hitting in Direction
Single Shot Probability = 0.012

(Tab 3 (b), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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c. 90% Probability of Hitting with One Bomb:

Note: Assumption - one hit of proper size bomb on target should effect its destruction. The majority of targets will be susceptible of destruction by bombs of the smaller sizes (1000#-500#), One hit of such size bomb indicates a high probability of other hits from remaining bombs released from plan simultaneously. Hence, for purpose of calculation, one bomb equals one airplane as a conservative basis for calculating force.

Single Shot Probability of 0.012 results in a requirement of 220 bombs (planes) to secure one hit.
Result: To secure one hit against target of selected size — 220 airplanes (bombers) are required.

d. Organization: — One bombardment group consists of 5 squadrons, one for operational training and one headquarters squadron. Each squadron consists of 13 airplanes of which 9 are employed on a combat mission.

Airplanes in Group:
Group Headquarters	3
Four Combat Sqs	52	36 used on combat missions
One Operational Sq	13
TOTAL IN OP.	68

36 planes considered used on one group mission.

e. 220 plane missions equals 6 group missions for one target per current (3d class) bombardier accuracy in peace time.

f. War time errors assumed to be 2.25 times those of peace time. The force required in war time is thus 2.25 squared or 5 times that for peace time bombing.

g. War Time Group Missions:

6 Group Missions in peace x 5 - 30 Group Missions required to secure destruction of one target in war. (Note: To get one hit, 30 Group Missions are required. With normal bomb loadings. 30 Group missions release 1,080 2000 lb bombs, 2,160 1100 lb bombs or 4,320 600 lb. bombs.)

h. Period of time devoted to destruction of each of the several classes of targets selected:

As a general statement, weather which favors continuous bombardment operations (See Tab 15) will be found over Germany only during the six summer months. As a result all computations are based on surely smashing each target one time during a six month operating period and prohibiting repair by an occasional attack in much smaller force.

(Tab 3 (b), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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4. INLAND WATERWAY TRANSPORTATION:

a.	14	vital points in existing canal system.
	3	vital points in proposed Rhein-Main-Danube System.
	17	vital points in inland waterway transportation system.

b. 17 targets to be hit during 6 month operating period.
    17 targets x 30 group missions per target equals 510 group missions.

c. 510 group missions divided by 8 missions per group per month equals 64 Group Months.

d. 64 Group Months divided by 6 months (operating period) equals 11 Groups required for 6 months of operation.

e.. 11 Groups x 70 planes per Group = 770 tactical operating airplanes.

11	Headquarters and HQ Squadrons	55 planes
11	Operational Training Squadrons	143 planes
44	Combat Squadrons	572 planes
		770 planes

5. RAIL TRANSPORTATION:

a.	15	marshalling yards.
	15	other sensitive points within the rail net.
	30	vital points in the rail transportation system.

b. 30 targets to be hit during 6 months of operation.
    30 targets x 30 Group missions per target = 900 Group missions.

c. 900 Group missions divided by 8 missions per Group per month = 113 Group months.

d. 113 Group months divided by 6 months (operating period) = 19 Groups required for 6 months.

e. 19 Groups x 70 airplanes per Group = 1,330 operating airplanes

19	Headquarters and HQ Squadrons	95 airplanes
19	Operational Training Squadrons	247 airplanes
76	Combat Squadrons	988 airplanes
		1,330 planes

6. THE PETROLEUM INDUSTRY:

a. 27 synthetic oil refineries comprise the vital points in the petroleum industry.

b, 27 targets x 30 Group missions per target = 810 Group missions.

(Tab 3 (b), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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c. 810 Group missions divided by 8 missions per Group per month = 101 Group months.

d. 101 Group months divided by 6 months (operating period) = 17 Groups required for 6 months.

e. 17 Groups x 70 airplanes per Group = 1,190 airplanes.

17	Headquarters and HQ Squadrons	85 Aps.
17	Operational Training Squadrons	221 Aps
69	Combat Squadrons	884 Aps
		1,190 Aps

7. ELECTRIC POWER:

a. 50 electric generating stations represent the vital points in the electric power establishment.

b. 50 targets x 30 Group missions per target = 1500 Group Missions.

c. 1500 Group Missions divided by 8 missions per Group per month = 188 Group months.

d. 188 Group months divided by 6 months (operating period) = 32 Groups required for 6 months.

e. 32 Groups x 70 airplanes = 2,240 Airplanes.

32	Headquarters and HQ Squadrons	160 Aps.
32	Operational Training Squadrons	416 Aps
128	Combat Squadrons	1,664 Aps
		2,240 Aps

8. GERMAN AIR FORCE AND AIRPLANE MANUFACTURING ESTABLISHMENT:

a.	18	assembly plants.
	6	aluminum factories
	6	magnesium factories
	30	vital points in German airplane manufacturing establishment.

b. 30 targets x 30 Group missions per target = 900 Group Missions.

c. 900 Group missions divided by 8 missions per Group per month = 113 Group months.

d. 113 Group months divided by 6 months (operating period) = 19 Groups required for 6 months.

e. 19 Groups x 70 airplanes per Group = 1,330 operating airplanes.

19	Headquarters and HQ Squadrons	95 Aps.
19	Operational Training Squadrons	247 Aps
76	Combat Squadrons	988 Aps
		1,330 Aps

(Tab 3 (b), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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TAB 4

ESCORT FIGHTERS

1. Principal Function of Escort Fighters.-- As the name implies, the function of this class of aviation is the escort in close support of other classes of aviation. The escort fighter hence affords protection against the efforts of hostile pursuit and fighter aircraft to destroy the escorted formation or to prevent the accomplishment of its mission.

2. Necessity For This Class of Aviation. Consideration of Bombardment Aviation.--a. The effectiveness of an Air Force in contributing to the defeat of an enemy is measured by the efficiency of the bombardment component in destroying vital enemy objectives, Day bombing, in which the target may be most readily seen, will result in the highest bombing accuracy.

b. The German Air Force began daylight attacks against England. The efficiency of the British Air Defense system and the technical superiority of the British pursuit airplanes, well armored and mounting eight machine guns, overwhelmed the German bombardment airplanes which carried few guns of weak calibre and which were indifferently armed. Thus the German bombers met the British pursuit on unequal terms, Support by German single seater fighters failed to protect the bombers. The former had to abandon the German bombardment formation when combat took place.

c. It is clear that the technical superiority of the British fighter airplane over the German bomber was the principle reason for the heavy losses of German airplanes which accounted for practical abandonment of Nazi daylight attacks. The United States is endeavoring to overcome in its bombardment airplanes that technical deficiency present in the German bombers, by increased gun power in larger calibre machine guns and in cannon; in power operated turrets; in adequate armor protection for the combat crew and vital parts of the airplane,

d. It has not yet been demonstrated that the technical improvements to the bombardment airplane are or can be sufficient to overcome: the pursuit airplane, permitting day operations in the face of strong pursuit opposition. It is hoped that the defensive measures in technical improvements will insure this. It is anticipated that the interceptor airplane and the effectiveness of its fire will be further improved and it is not impossible that the present relative superiority of the interceptor over the bomber may be maintained.

e. The importance of day attacks is recognized in seeing hits against vital targets. It is unwise to neglect development of escort fighters desired to enable bombardment formations to fight through to the objective.

(TAB 4, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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3. Characteristics of the Escort Fighter.-- This air-plane must have the radius of action of the bombardment planes it supports. Slightly higher speed is essential to permit it to move from one position to another with respect to the bombardment formation. It must carry the maximum number possible of machine guns and cannon. Of the greatest importance, each member of the crew must be adequately protected by armor. The Escort Fighter must be designed to fulfill one role; defense against hostile pursuit.

4. Tactics of the Escort Fighter.--The escort fighter would initially take positions on the flanks and rear of the bombardment formation. When combat was formed, these planes would be maneuvered to positions where the maximum hostile pursuit attack was developing. In substance, the escort fighters would be so disposed that hostile pursuit could not attack the bombardment formation with impunity, without first passing through the fire of the aerial fighters, or without first disposing of them.

5. Strength of the Escort Fighter Component.--The number of escort fighters would depend primarily upon the technical efficiency of the airplane in armament and armor. It is believed that the maximum number of these airplanes would be on the proportion of an escort squadron per bombardment group. These fighters will be required only when the enemy had developed an efficient air warning system. And the required number of fighters would, in the final calculations, be much less than on the ratio of an escort squadron to a bombardment group. The decision would depend upon the technical development and test.

6. Recommendation

a. That the possible need for the escort fighter, designed solely for defense purposes, be recognized.

b. That the Army Air Forces establish military characteristics and specifications for this type of airplane immediately.

c. That upon approval of b. above, thirteen (13) escort fighters be built by which tests of the efficiency of this weapon may be determined through the organization of an Escort Fighter Squadron.

d. That if the need for this weapon is determined our industry must be further expanded to construct these airplanes or reduction in the production of other types be made so that adequate escort fighters can be constructed.

(TAB 4, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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TAB 5

BOMBARDMENT BASES

For Operations against Germany

1. Discussion.

a. The air force that can be employed against a hostile nation is that which can be placed within the radius of action of enemy objective from available bases.

b. The bombardment units required for operating; against Germany have been estimated, together with the pursuit aircraft required for defense of the bases.

c. The radius of action of the bombardment airplanes and available bases are then considered. 6860 bombardment airplanes is the estimated requirement for operations against Germany. It develops that but 169 bases are available, which will accommodate 3842 bombers and 1690 pursuit for operations against Germany. An additional 117 airdromes to accommodate 3018 bombers are required.

2. See Tab 5(a) for detailed discussion of the problem. See Tab 5(b) depicting the advantage of the 4000 miles radius of action bomber from the standpoint of bases in exercise of American air power through the world.

(Tab 5, Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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TAB 5 (a)

AIRDROMES AVAILABLE IN UNITED KINGDOM AND MIDDLE EAST

1. Data on British Expansion Program In England:

Basis - Cablegram August 1, 1941. AG 381 (8-1-40) MC No. 74 from London to The Adjutant General

a. Ultimate RAF Expansion Program.

No. of Sqs.	Type	Planes Per Sq.	Estimated Tot. Initial Equip.
40	Fighters (long-range)	16	640
104	Fighters (short-range)	16	1,664
279	Bombers	16	4,464
6	Torpedo Bombers	20	120
13	General Reconnaissance Boats	9	117
16	General Reconnaissance Land	20	320
458			7,325

b. Total Airdromes - 465 plus 23 in Eire.

Fighter Command	144
Coastal Command	44
Army Cooperative Command	19
Bomber Command	170
Total First Line Airdromes	377
Operational Training Airdromes	88
Eire (suitable for fighters and bombers)	5
(suitable for light bombers and Army cooperative aviation)	4
(potential sites)	14
Total available and potential (Notes 1 and 2)	488

NOTES: (1) Projected airdromes can be increased very little.
              (2) Airdromes considered to be large enough to accommodate two squadrons.

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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2. Airdromes required for British Expansion Program and Remainder Estimated Available for American Units.

NOTES: (1) Based on British transferring 10 operational units to Canada.
              (2) Army Cooperative and Coastal Command airdromes not considered for American use due to lack of more definite information.
              (3) 19 out of 23 potential airdromes considered suitable for American units.
              (4) Suitable only for light bombers or army cooperative aviation.

3. U. S. air units that can be based in British Isles predicated upon above data.

a. Ratio of 1 fighter airplane to 2 bombardment airplanes (Basis - British ratio of 2,304 fighter airplanes to 4,664 bomber airplanes).

b. 132 airdromes can accommodate 264 squadrons.

Type (2)	Gps	Combat Sss	Combat Aps.(1)	OTU* Sqs	OTU* Aps.	Total Aps.	Airdromes	Total Aps. Per Gp.
M/B B-25 26 Types)	10	40	690	10	160	850	25	85
H/B B-17 24 Types)	20	80	1,100	20	260	1,360	50	68
H/B B-29 32 Types)	1	48	660	12	156	816	30	68
TOTALS	42	168	2,450	42	576	3,026	105
Pursuit	10	40	1,050	10	250	1,300	25	130
GRAND TOT.	52	208	3,500	52	826	4,326	130
* Operational Training Units

NOTES: (1) Gp Hq planes based with a combat squadron and included in combat airplane totals.
              (2) Models selected on division of the British Isles in three general base areas:
                            Southern Area for B-25 and 26 planes
                            Central Area for B-17 and 24 planes
                            Northern Area for B-29 and 32 planes.

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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4. U. S. Air Units that can be based in the Suez Area.

(Basis: Report of Intelligence Division, OCAC, 8/7/41, subject: "British Controlled Airfields in Africa and the Near East within 2000 miles of Berlin and believed suitable for bomber operations." Copy filed with AAF files.)

a. The number of existing airdromes is extremely small, when the size of the area is considered. Unquestionably, a large number can be constructed from the standpoint of available area. However, other considerations will introduce limiting factors, among which are:

(1) Availability of construction materials and difficulty in shipping them to this area from the United States or elsewhere.

(2) Difficulties in the supply and maintenance of large numbers of squadrons so far removed from base of supply.

Action has been taken to secure additional data upon which a refinement of the estimate as to airdromes in the Near East may be made.

b.	Location of Bases	Airdromes
	Anglo-Egyptian Sudan	1
	Cyprus	2
	Egypt	7
	Iran	3
	Iraq	12
	Palestine	3
	Syria	4
	Transjordan	7
	Total Airdromes	39

It is assumed:

(1) That British will make these airdromes available.

(2) The ratio of pursuit to bombardment airplanes of 1 to 2 maintained in this area.

(3) Improvements where essential to be made.

c (39. airdromes will accommodate 78 squadrons.)

Type	Ops	Combat Sqs	Combat Aps.	OTU Sqs	OTU Aps	Total Aps	Airdromes	Tot. Aps. Per Group
H/B B-29 & B-32 type	12	48	660	12	156	816	30	68
Pursuit	6	24	630	6	150	780	9*	130
	18	72	1,290	18	306	1,596	39
* It will be assumed that these 9 airdromes can be expanded to accommodate 24 rather than 18 squadrons or that an additional 3 airdromes to accommodate 6 squadrons can be constructed.

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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d. Summary of U. S. planes that can be based in British Isles from standpoint of operating bases:

	Total Bombers	Combat Bombers	OTU Bombers	Tot. Pur..	Comb. Pur.	OTU Pur.	Airdromes
British Isles	3,026	2,450	576	1,300	1,050	250	130
Suez Area	816	660	156	780	630	150	45
	3,842	3,110	732	2,080	1,680	400	175

5. Informative Summary of British and American Aircraft.

		Bombers	Pursuit
British Isles	British	4,464	2,304
	American	3,026	1,300
Suez Area	British	?	?
	American	816	780
		8,306	4,384

6. American Requirements in Bombers predicated upon operation areas.

Estimated Requirement	6,860 (not including 25% reserve or monthly attrition)
Bombers for which airdromes are available:
Medium Bombers based in G.B.	850
B-17 type bombers based in G.B.	1,360
B-29 type bombers based in G.B.	816
B-29 type bombers based in Suez Area	816
Total U.S. Bombers	3,842
Bombers estimated as required for which airdromes are apparently not available—	3,018

7. Problem in securing bases for 3,018 Bombardment Airplanes for which no bases appear to be available.

a. Requirements in airdromes. — The above paragraph indicates that bases for 3,018 bombers are not available. With 13 planes per squadron, 2 squadrons per airdrome, an additional 117 two-squadron airdrome, within a radius of 2,000 miles of the vital German industrial areas, are required.

8. The Problem. — Either these airdromes must be constructed or airplanes of a greater radius of action than the B-29 or B-32 must be constructed in order to increase the availability of airdromes.

a. First Solution. — Construct 117 airdromes in the British Isles, the Suez Area, Iceland, or Russia. The number of air bases projected for the British Isles cannot be increased by any appreciable amount. From the standpoint of area, it is possible to construct a large number of bases in the Suez Area. Practical difficulties, such as the supply of bases, available water, availability of material for their construction will probably limit the number of bases that can be built in that area. Further investigation is being made. Use of Russian bases will depend upon future situations that cannot be predicted.

b. Second Solution. — Use double combat crews for

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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airplanes that can be based in British Isles and Near East, to perform 16 instead of 8 missions per month. Estimate in airplane requirements based on a bombardment force of 6,860 airplanes of which the 5544 operating airplanes perform 8 missions per month for six months (less approximately 25% of the latter which are held out for maintenance). Of the force of 3842 airplanes that can be provided airdromes. 3,110 are operating airplanes. On the assumption that the 3,110 operating airplanes (less approximately 25% of the latter which will be undergoing maintenance on the ground) employ the double operating rate, the result in theory will provide for approximately 9% more missions than would be possible with the 8 mission rate per month with the 5,544 bombers.

(1) The advantages are:

(a) Maximum use would be made of the equipment.

(b) The initial production problem in aircraft would be lessened. However, the attrition rate would be increased from 20% to 40% and a higher production program would be required to maintain 3,842, than to maintain 6,820 aircraft.

(2) The disadvantages are:

(a) The weather may not permit 16 operations per month.

(b) War time maintenance would be doubled in using 3,110 airplanes to do the missions of 5,544. Hostile bombings of airdromes, the necessity of night maintenance under field conditions, supply difficulties with aircraft so fer from the source of supply will tend to cut down the 16 missions per month. Increased maintenance personnel would be needed. The units would be operating on a narrow margin of safety in endeavoring to maintain the airplanes for double missions.

(c) With a force of 5,544 bombers performing eight missions per month, a reserve of force is present. At a critical period, where the breakdown of a particular enemy industry was indicated, the whole force performing for short period missions at a heavier rate than on the basis of eight missions per month, could double the bombing effect that would be possible with 3,110 airplanes. Thus 6,860 airplanes with a total of 5,544 operating airplanes provide, in part, a reserve for a major effect at a critical time. This reserve is lost by depending on a force of 3,482 airplanes of which 3,110 are operating airplanes which must perform sixteen missions per month — a maximum effect from that number of aircraft.

c. Third Solution. — To have a war plan study made in cooperation with the British Royal Air Force to determine if the 4,464 British Bombers and the 3,842 American Bombers — a total of 8,306, may be sufficient to accomplish the defeat of Germany from the standpoint of combined air force operation. (Estimates in Tab 2 - Air Intelligence — Estimate of the Situation, are that Germany will have 7,245 bombers in air fleets with 100% in depot reserve as of July 1, 1943.)

d. Fourth Solution. — Reduce the number of operational training squadrons to 1/3 of those set up, converting them to combat squadrons. This would increase operating squadrons

(Tab 5 (e), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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to 38 and increase the operating aircraft to 494, and reduce airdrome requirements by 19. Obviously the gain would not compensate for the reduction in training personnel for combat which would result from this policy.

e. Fifth Solution. — (1) Eliminate the Medium Bomber (B-26 type) and the Heavy Bomber (B-17 type) substituting therefor the Heavy Bomber (B-29 type). Estimated performance data on usable ranges for purpose of comparison only are:

Model	Range	Bomb Load
B-26	1,150 miles	2,000 lbs
B-17	1,195 miles	4,800 lbs
B-29	2,410 miles	16,000 lbs

From the standpoint of maximum bomb load alone, the B-29 airplane is equivalent to:

8	B-26 planes
3 1/3	B-17 planes

Replacing the B-26 and B-17 types with the B-29 type on the basis of the former two airplanes set up for the operations against Germany, the following academic result would obtain:

                                  850 B-26 type x 8 = 6,800 on a gain of 6,050 planes
                                  1,360 B-17 type x 3 1/3 = 3,533 on a gain of 2,173 planes
                                  Academic increase by substituting B-29 plane 8,223 planes

(2) From the standpoint of hits, however, the academic increase would be reduced considerably. In war it is best to calculate on a single release of all bombs, rather than release of each bomb singly on separate approaches. Hence the probability of hitting is not increased in proportion to the increased number of bombs carried.

(3) It is clear that substitution of the B-29 type, for the B-17 and B-26 types, would reduce considerably the shortage due to unavailability of airdromes. Time limitations in preparing this tab have not permitted the thorough study that will be continued on this solution.

f. Sixth Solution. — (1) To build aircraft with a 4,000 mile operating radius of action to the total of 3,740, which could operate against Germany from:
                      Newfoundland
                      Northeastern U. S. and Canada
                      Africa - Ivory Coast
                      Greenland
                      India

(2) The development of the bombardment airplane with a 4,000 mile radius of action is of great importance. With such a bomber, the United States could, from bases under its control, exercise air power over all important areas. (See map Tab 5 (b)). The development of such an airplane has been initiated. A project to manufacture such an airplane

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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in tactical quantities (3,740 required on the basis of this study) should be initiated immediately.

g. Seventh Solution. — The seizure of areas suitable for construction of air base, from Dakar north on the West Coast of Africa or in Norway by combined air, naval and ground operations.

9. Conclusion:

a. The final solution of the problem will necessarily involve a combination of the several contemplated above.

b. That solution most acceptable is the procurement of the bombardment airplanes having an operating radius of action of 4,000 miles and a maximum range of 10,000 miles. With a force of airplanes of this type, the United States would be in a position to operate against Germany from airdromes far removed from the threat of German attack. A wide selection of operating bases throughout the world would be possible. Furthermore, no matter what the final outcome of the war in Europe, the Army Air Forces, in cooperation with the Navy would be able to cover with aerial operations the principal oceans of the world and could operate against bases and installations on the lands adjacent thereto -a situation highly favorable to our National interests. The procurement problem will delay the adoption of this solution.

c. The immediate expediency which must be adopted, is the use of double combat crews as discussed under the second solution, recognizing its many disadvantages.

(Tab 5 (a), Section II, Part III, Appendix II)

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TAB 6

ARMY AIRCRAFT REQUIRED FOR CONTROL OF THE SEAS

(Operations in Support of and in Lieu of The Fleet).

1. Assumptions.

A force for this purpose has been set up as such. An assumption is made that the aircraft included under Hemisphere Defense and for the Strategic Defensive of Asia will be adequate to the support of sea forces or for operations in lieu thereof, from the air bases at which such forces are located.

2. Use of Air Forces on this mission prior to offensive in Europe.

The building up of the air force units required for an offensive in Europe will progress gradually until completion of the program and the entire force is operating against German objectives. During this program, units will be organized and trained, gradually being moved to European or Near-Eastern bases. Prior to the offensive, such of the first units, when formed and ready for action, will be available initially for the mission of operating against hostile seacraft, in conjunction with naval forces or in lieu thereof. It is not an unreasonable assumption that such operations will succeed in this initial mission, and that special forces will not be required.

3. Use of the Air Forces created for Hemisphere Defense.

The fulfillment of the mission of Hemisphere Defense includes the destruction of hostile seacraft within the operating radius of the air bases, together with reconnaissance essential thereto. The forces established for Hemisphere Defense have been held to a minimum consistent with an offensive in Europe requiring the major effort. This force, however, is estimated to be adequate.

(TAB 6, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II).

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TAB 7

BOMBARDMENT AVIATION REQUIRED FOR HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

I. PROBLEM.

To provide for Hemisphere Defense by locating, at strategic points, the minimum number of Bombardment Groups capable of performing that mission during the conduct of our strategic offensive in the European theatre,

MISSION:

a. To protect our vital economic and military objectives against carrier, or flying deck based air attacks.

b. To defend the Pacific Triangle, Alaska and approaches to the Panama Canal.

c. To acquire data and information concerning requirements, technical and tactical, to enable the United States to institute an all-out Hemisphere Defense in the event of a forced retirement from the European theatre.

FORCE REQUIRED:

23 Groups, with a total of 1,955 heavy bombardment airplanes, which figure includes a 25% reserve, with a monthly replacement requirement at 3% per month of 46 airplanes.

II. TABULATION OF BOMBARDMENT FORCE REQUIRED.

	GROUPS	COMBAT SQS	OTU SQ	HQ SQ	TOTAL PLANES	25% RES.	MO. REPL 3%
Continental U.S.	5	20	5	5	340	85	10
N.E. Area	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Norfolk Area	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
So. Calif.	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
San Fran. Bay	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Seattle, Wash. Area	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Greenland	1	4	1	1	6b	17	2
Newfoundland	1	4	1	1	68	17	2
Puerto Rico	1	4	1	1	66	17	2
British Guiana: Georgetown	1	4	1	1	63	17	2
Brazil	3	12	3	3	204	51	6
Belem	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Natal	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Rio de Janeiro	(1)	(4)	(1)	(1)	(68)	(17)	(2)
Chile, Antofagasta	1	4	1	1	68	17	2
Peru, Lima	1	4	1	1	68	17	2
Mexico, Acapulco	1	4	1	1	68	17	2
Panama	2	8	2	2	136	34	4
Hawaii	3	12	3	3	204	51	6
Alaska	2	8	2	2	136	34	4
Iceland	1	4	1	1	68	17	2
TOTAL	23	92	23	23	1564	391	46

(TAB 7, SECTION II, PART III, APPENDIX II)

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RECAPITULATION

Total Groups.	23
Airplanes in Groups	1,564
Airplanes in reserve (25%)	391
Total airplane requirement	1,955
Monthly Replacement: 3%	46 Airplanes.