September 11, 1941,                                  

JOINT BOARD ESTIMATE OF
UNITED STATES OVER-ALL PRODUCTION
REQUIREMENTS.

I. DIRECTIVE.

1. The directive requesting the Secretaries of War and of the Navy to undertake an exploration of over-all production requirements of the United States is contained in a letter from the President. This letter; which was referred to the Joint Board for recommendation, is quoted as follows:

                                       "July 9, 1941.

My dear Mr. Secretary:

I wish that you or appropriate representatives designated by you would join with the Secretary of War and his representatives in exploring at once the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.

I realize that this report involves the making of appropriate assumptions as to our probable friends and enemies and to the conceivable theatres of operation which will be required.

I wish you would explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which in your opinion would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that available to our potential enemies. From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require,

I am not suggesting a detailed report but one that, while general in scope, would cover the most critical items in our defense and which could then be related by the OPM into practical realities of production facilities. It seems to me we need to know our program in its entirety, even though at a later date it may be amended.

I believe that the confidential report which I am asking you to make to me would be of great assistance, not only in the efficient utilization of our productive facilities but would afford an adequate opportunity for planning for the greatly increased speed of delivery which our defense program requires.

I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences. I would appreciate it if the Secretary of War could take the initiative in those conferences.

Very sincerely yours,
/S/ Franklin D. Roosevelt."

2. In solving this problem, it is first necessary to conceive how our potential enemies may be defeated. Having arrived at this conception, it is possible to estimate the military forces required to carry out the operations planned. Once a statement of the major forces is completed, the critical items of equipment may readily be computed.

3. The production requirements mentioned in The President's letter refer to the materials which the United States will be called upon to provide for supporting successful military action against our potential enemies. Any military action by the United States ought to be undertaken only in accordance with sound military policy, necessarily based upon sound strategy. This paper, there-fore, will present views as to how the national policy of the United States can best be supported by a military policy which shall guide all military operations, undertaken either by the armed forces of the United States, or by the armed forces of other Powers which may be associated with the United States. Categories of forces and approximate strengths which the United States should raise, or which it should support in whole or in part, will then be listed. In the interest of brevity, lines of reasoning and supporting arguments are omitted.

II. MAJOR MILITARY POLICY.

4. Germany, and all German-occupied countries whose military forces cooperate with Germany; Japan and Manchuko; Italy; Vichy Franco; and possibly Spain and Portugal, are assumed potential enemies. Countries considered as friends or potential associates in war are the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, China, Russia, Free France, peoples in German-occupied territory who may oppose Germany, and the countries of the Western Hemisphere.

5. Those major national objectives of the United States which are related to military policy may broadly be stated as: preservation of the territorial, economic and ideological integrity of the United States and of the remainder of the Western Hemisphere; prevention of the disruption of the British Empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly ensure political stability in those regions and the future security of the United States; and, so far as practicable, the establishment of regimes favorable to economic freedom and individual liberty.

6. Since the paramount territorial interests of the United States are in the Western Hemisphere, it is fundamental that the United States must provide armed forces appropriately disposed, which in all eventualities, and operating in cooperation with the forces of other American Powers, can successfully prevent the extension in the Western Hemisphere of European or Asiatic political or military power, even though the British Commonwealth had collapsed.

7. Attainment of this objective alone will not lead to the success of all of the national policies mentioned in paragraph 6. Those national policies can be effectuated in their entirety only through military victories outside this hemisphere, either by the armed forces of the United States, by the armed forces of friendly Powers, or by both.

8. Should Germany be successful in conquering all of Europe, she might then wish to establish peace with the United States for several years, for the purpose of organizing her gains, restoring her economic situation, and increasing her military establishment, with a view to the eventual conquest of South America and the military defeat of the United States. During such a period of "peace", it seems likely that Germany would seek to undermine the economic and political stability of the countries of South America, and to set up puppet regimes favorable to the establishment on that continent of German military power. In such circumstances, Germany would have better chances to defeat the United States. This concept can not be accepted as certain, because it is conceivable that Germany might at once sock to gain footholds in the Western Hemisphere.

9. Were Japan to defeat China and Russia, and obtain control of Siam, Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, it is probable that she likewise would endeavor to establish peace for the purpose of organizing the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". Almost inevitably the Philippine Islands would ultimately pass under Japanese hegemony.

10. It is believed that the overthrow of the Nazi regime by action of the people of Germany is unlikely in the near future, and will not occur until Germany is upon the point of military defeat. Even were a new regime to be established, it is not at all certain that such a regime would agree to peace terms acceptable to the United States.

11.Assuming the truth of the views expressed in the preceding paragraph, it is the opinion of the Joint Board that Germany and her European satellites can not be defeated by the European Powers now fighting against her. Therefore, if our European enemies are to be defeated, it will be necessary for the United States to enter the war, and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in the Eastern Atlantic and in Europe or Africa.

12. The Joint Board also holds the view that, if, under present circumstances, Japan should advance against the British in Malaya and against the Dutch in the Netherlands East Indies, British and Dutch forces probably could not successfully withstand such an advance in the absence of active military assistance by the United States. The result of an attack by Japan on the Eastern Siberian Soviet Republic cannot now be predicted.

13. In view of the preceding considerations, the Joint Board recommends that the over-all production and material objective of the United States be designed to meet United States needs while engaged simultaneously in war against Germany and Japan, under either of the following sets of circumstances:

a. While associated as a belligerent with the British Commonwealth, the Netherlands East Indies, Russia, and China.

b. While associated as a belligerent with Canada and some of the Latin American countries, other belligerent Powers having been defeated by Germany and Japan.

14. Due to inadequate industrial capacity and material resources, friendly Powers must look to the United States for a large part of the munitions and other materials which they will require for success. The munitions and other materials which may be produced or controlled by the United States should be divided between itself and friendly Powers in such a manner as to effectuate the success of the military strategy adopted by the United States as best calculated to defeat our common enemies.

III. PROBABLE CHARACTER OF THE ENEMY'S MAJOR STRATEGY:

(A) GERMAN STRATEGY:

15. For Germany, the objective of the current phase of the war is the complete military and political domination of Europe, and probably of North and West Africa. If Germany is successful she may then seek a period of peaceful refreshment, during which she can reorganize Europe and prepare for further adventures. However, the possibility can not be dismissed that Germany might seek at once to continue into India, South Africa, or South America.

16. Germany's present major strategic objectives, and the means by which she seeks to attain them, seem to be some or all of the following:

a. The conquest of European Russia, the destruction of the Russian Armies, and the overthrow of the Soviet regime. This is a task for the German army and air forces, and will doubtless absorb most of the energy available to these contingents for some months to come. Final success in this aim is still in the balance.

b. The destruction of the power of resistance of the United Kingdom, through accelerated attrition of shipping, and continued bombing of British facilities. The forces employed will be surface raiders, submarines, and aircraft in the northwestern approaches and down through the Middle Atlantic, operating from bases in Norway, France, Portugal, and French West Africa; and merchant-type raiders distributed throughout all oceans. Invasion of England may possibly not be attempted unless those other measures fail.

c. The conquest of Egypt, Syria, Irak, and Iran. This may be the region in which the next major German offensive will be undertaken. Large land and air forces must be employed, both German and Italian, aided by Italian naval forces in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Black Sea. Success may depend upon whether or not a large concentration of British and Russian defensive forces are available, and upon the continued military capacity of Italy, now an uncertain quantity.

d. The occupation of Spain, Portugal, Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Atlantic Islands, for the purpose of strengthening the German offensive against British shipping, and for denying those positions to Germany's enemies. Considerable land, air, and naval forces will be required for this offensive, though not so great as would be required for conquest of the lands to the eastward of the Mediterranean.

17. In and near her own home territory, Germany can exert her full effort. As her forces move away from the home base, the effort that can be exerted at the point of military contact becomes reduced in proportion to the length and security of the lines of communication, and to the difficulties of transportation. Germany is experiencing those difficulties in Russia; she would experience them in an even greater degree in an offensive in the regions to the east of the Mediterranean; while the problem of the support of strong forces in Morocco, French West Africa, Senegal, and the Azores would be very groat indeed. In the eastern part of European Russia, in Egypt, Irak, Iran, and North and West Africa, the effort that German military forces can exert is only a fraction of what they have been able to put forth in France, the Balkans, and Poland. Severe German defeats in those regions might readily affect the stability of the Nazi regime. This significant possibility should be taken into account in the development of the strategy of the associated Powers.

(B) JAPANESE STRATEGY:

16. The Japanese objective is the establishment of the "East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere". It is Japan's ambition ultimately to include within this Sphere Eastern Siberia, Eastern China, Indo-China, Thai; Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, the Philippines, and possibly Burma. The accomplishment of this objective is a heavy task for Japan's strength, a fact well realized by the Japanese.

19. Dependent upon results in Europe, Japan's strategic moves might be as follows:

a. Building up and maintaining an effective screen in the Japanese Mandate Islands by the employment of minor naval forces and considerable air forces, supported by the COMBINED FLEET. This activity would include submarine and raider action against United States naval forces and United States and British lines of communication in the Central and Eastern Pacific Ocean.

b. The conquest of Eastern Siberia by means of land and air operations covered by the COMBINED FLEET operating to the eastward of Japan.

c. The conquest of Thai, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, and the Philippines. Success will require strong air forces, a considerable strength of light naval forces, and rather largo land forces. It is unlikely that Japan will simultaneously attempt a major effort to the Northward and to the Southward, because of her lack of equipment and raw materials.

d. An offensive from Northern Indo-China against Yunnan for the purpose of cutting the Burma Road and eliminating further resistance of the Chinese Nationalist army. This move might be supplemented by an attack on Burma. Considerable land and air forces would be required, as well as a largo amount of shipping to provide the necessary support.

20. All of those prospective Japanese moves would be made at great distances from Japan. If Japan encounters stubborn and protracted resistance, her ability to continue offensives at these distances is problematical, owing to a lack of adequate resources and industrial facilities. Marked weakness or lack of cohesion on the part of her opponents might permit Japan to accomplish any one of those objectives within the next few months.

IV. MAJOR STRATEGY OF THE UNITED STATES AND ITS ASSOCIATES.

21. The Joint Board is convinced that the first major objective of the United States and its Associates ought to be the complete military defeat of Germany. If Germany were defeated, her entire European system would collapse, and it is probable that Japan could be forced to give up much of her territorial gains, unless she had already firmly established herself in such strength that the United States and its Associates could not afford the energy to continue the war against her.

22. An inconclusive peace between Germany and her present active military enemies would be likely to give Germany an opportunity to reorganize continental Europe and to replenish her strength. Even though the British Commonwealth and Russia were completely defeated, there would be important reasons for the United States to continue the war against Germany, in spite of the greatly increased difficulty of attaining final victory. From this it follows that the principal strategic method employed by the United States in the immediate future should be the material support of present military operations against Germany, and their reenforcement by active participation in the war by the United States, while holding Japan in chock pending future developments. Necessarily, only small Army contingents are now sufficiently equipped and trained for immediate participation in offensive operations.

23. Except in the case of Russia, the principal strength of the Associated Powers is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost, and by weakening enemy strength may greatly contribute to victory. By themselves, however, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land armies can finally win wars.

24. It is out of the question to expect the United States and its Associates to undertake in the near future a sustained and successful land offensive against the center of the German power. It being obvious that the Associated Powers can not defeat Germany by defensive operations, effective strategic offensive methods other than an early land offensive in Europe must be employed. These methods may be found in a continuation of the economic blockade; the prosecution of land offensives in distant regions where German troops can exert only a fraction of their total strength; air and sea offensives against German military, economic and industrial resources; and the support of subversive activities in the conquered territories. Strategic methods to be employed against Japan (assuming her in the war) should be a strong defense of Siberia and Malaysia; an economic offensive through blockade; a reduction of Japanese military power by raids; and Chinese offensives against the Japanese forces of occupation.

25. The major strategic objectives which it is believed the United States and the Associated Powers should adopt are indicated below, as well as the means for attaining them. The material assistance to be supplied friendly Powers (where mentioned in the succeeding subparagraphs), should be consistent with the needs of the United States.

a. The security of the Western Hemisphere against the extension into it of of European or Asiatic political or military power is an essential of United States strategy. To provide this security under all eventualities, the United States must have naval, land, and air forces in such positions that they can be made promptly available in both the Atlantic and the Pacific Oceans in strengths adequate for preventing invasion should the British Isles and Russia collapse. In this connection, an important question is whether or not Northwestern Africa and the Atlantic Islands are in German or friendly hands. Similarly, Alaska, Hawaii, and the Islands of the South Pacific Ocean have an important relation to the security of the Eastern Pacific. United States naval strength, built up in accordance with the approved program, should be adequate for defensive needs until 1944. However, if Germany is successful in Europe, and Japan is successful in the Far East, naval strength for defensive purposes must be increased, even in excess of the present approved naval program. United States land and air forces may be required for the defense of the Western Hemisphere within the next few years, and it is necessary for Latin American countries to be provided with munitions and manufactured articles.

b. The security of the United Kingdom is essential to the prosecution in the Eastern Hemisphere of military operations against Germany and Japan. Its safety is also highly important to the defense of the Western Hemisphere. The security of the United Kingdom depends on an effective defense by sea, land, and air forces. In turn, this defense depends upon the safety of sea communications. The sea communications can continue to support the United Kingdom only if the damage now being inflicted upon then is greatly reduced through increases in the strength of the protective sea and air forces based in the British Islands, Iceland, and positions in the central and eastern Atlantic. Unless the losses of British merchant ships are greatly reduced, or unless there is an internal collapse of Germany, it in the opinion of the Joint Board that the resistance of the United Kingdom can not continue indefinitely, no natter what industrial effort is put forth by the United States. Therefore, the immediate and strong reenforcement of British forces in the Atlantic by United States naval and air contingents, supplemented by a large additional shipping tonnage, will be required if the United Kingdom is to remain in the war. These contingents must be manned by Americans, since the reserves of British manpower for employment in Europe are practically exhausted. To maintain present British strength, the United States must also continue to supplement the British blockade, and the naval building and repair potential; and to provide considerable numbers of aircraft.

c. Safety of the sea communications of the Associated Powers throughout the world is essential to the continuance of their war effort. Naval and air forces employed in and near Europe should, so far as practicable be strong enough to prevent the escape of surface raiders to the open sea, and to defeat submarine and air raiders. In addition, a widespread distribution of naval and air forces for direct protection of shipping foci and shipping routes will be required.

d. The enforcement of economic blockade is, for the time being, likely to be the most effective offensive method for use against Germany and Japan. Naval and air forces must be maintained to close all avenues of sea approach to Germany. The continued existence of hostile land fronts in Russia and in the Middle East is necessary if this blockade is to be maintained. In addition, diplomatic, economic, and financial measures should be employed for increasing the effectiveness of the military blockade.

e. The retention by the British of the control of the Red Sea, Irak, and Iran is necessary for preserving opportunities for decisive land action against Germany. Of great importance are effective land and air forces of all categories; largo numbers of merchant vessels for their support; and adequate naval forces for the protection of communications leading to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. These forces can not be fully supported by the material means available to Britain. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and raw materials required by these troops, and should supply much of the merchant shipping for their transport.

f. The maintenance of an active front in Russia offers by far the best opportunity for a successful land offensive against Germany, because only Russia possesses adequate manpower, situated in favorable proximity to the center of German military power. For Russia, ground and aviation forces are most important. Predictions as to the result of the present conflict in Russia are premature. However, were the Soviet forces to be driven even beyond the Ural Mountains, and were they there to continue an organized resistance, there would always remain the hope of a final and complete defeat of Germany by land operations. The effective arming of Russian forces, both by the supply of munitions from the outside and by providing industrial capacity in the Volga Basin, or to the east of the Ural Mountains, would be one of the most important moves that could be made by the Associated Powers.

g. Prevention of Axis penetration into Northwest Africa and the Atlantic Islands is very important, not only as a contribution to the defense of the Western Hemisphere, but also as security to British sea communications and as a potential base for a future land offensive. In French North and West Africa, French troops exist which are potential enemies of Germany, provided they are re-equipped and satisfactory political conditions are established by the United States. Because the British Commonwealth has but few troops available and because of the unfriendly relations between the British and the Weygand regime, it seems clear that a large proportion of the troops of the Associated Powers employed in this region necessarily must be United States troops.

h. Retention by the United States and its Associates of the Philippines, Malaya, the Netherlands East Indies, Australasia, Burma, and China would have far-reaching effects. The armed forces of the United States can not be greatly increased in the Far East if they are to discharge their heavy tasks in other regions, but the operations of the Pacific Fleet will have an important influence on events. The United States should undertake to provide a part of the munitions and aircraft to China and the Netherlands East Indies. A large part of this material must be transported in United States bottoms.

i. Retention of Eastern Siberia by Russia is necessary if Japan is to be checked. Only material assistance can be provided by the United States to Siberia. No materials can be sent to Siberia by water when Japan is at war with Russia, but deliveries of aircraft could continue by air.

26. The following principles have been taken into consideration in arriving at recommendations concerning the strengths of the armed forces which the United States should undertake to raise or support, in whole or in part.

a. The Navy considers that, since the principal strength of the Associated Powers is at present in naval and air categories, the strategy which they should adopt should be based on the effective employment of these forces, and the employment of land forces in regions where Germany can not exert the full power of her land armies. The Army believes that the foregoing strategy may not accomplish the defeat of Germany and that it may be necessary to come to grips with the German armies on the continent of Europe. Consequently, the Army feels that the equipment for the land armies necessary to meet this contingency should be provided as a part of the over-all production requirements.

b. Past experience of the United States and other Powers should condition estimates of the capability of the United States to support a war effort, with due regard to differences in over-all industrial capacity; differences in availability of materials; and an appropriate balance between the man-power to be employed in the armed forces, and the man-power to be employed in industry and essential civilian services. Because of the present high degree of mechanization, a greater proportion of man-power must be allocated to industry for the manufacture of equipment and munitions than was the case in former wars.

c. The sound use of diplomatic, economic, financial, and propaganda weapons, will serve to reduce the magnitude of the direct military effort.

d. The burdens of the war effort, even though continued by the United States over a long period of time, should be so adjusted as to maintain the morale and the will to fight of the civilian population.

27. In Appendix I the Chief of Naval Operations presents his estimates of the over-all production required from the United States, by the dates indicated. Those estimates pertain to the United States and foreign navies, and to the United States and foreign merchant marine fleets. The proposed size of the U.S. Navy is the so-called "Two-Ocean" Navy as approved by the President and Congress, plus a total tonnage increase of 21 per cent, plus the aircraft required for the indicated increase in aircraft-carrying naval vessels. The additional naval vessels recommended for the United States can be constructed without any increase in existing or approved ship-building and manufacturing facilities.

28. In Appendix II the Chief of Staff presents estimated requirements for the United States and foreign armies, including aviation for forces other than United States naval aviation. The Chief of Staff believes that the equipment set up in the Army program should be assembled, if practicable from the viewpoint of industry, against the possible necessity of an all-out effort against Germany and her allies. The position of the Chief of Staff is that the maximum requirements of the Navy and Army, as related to tonnage and the probable conflicts in material, priority and production facilities, should be surveyed by OPM and then if necessary readjusted by the Joint Board within the limits determined by OPM.

George C. Marshall, General, U.S. Army, Chief of Staff.

H.R. Stark, Admiral, U.S. Navy, Chief of Naval Operations.

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

J.B. No. 355 (Serial 707)

SECRET

JOINT BOARD ESTIMATE OF

UNITED STATES OVER-ALL PRODUCTION

REQUIREMENTS

September 11, 1941

I N D E X

Joint Board Estimate of United States Over-All Production Requirements — Report.

Appendix I. Navy Requirements — Decision on Production Requirements for Major Categories of Materials Recommended by the Navy.

Appendix II. Army Requirements:

Part I. Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat our Potential Enemies (Tabulated Chart).

Part II. Ultimate Requirements — Ground Forces;
        Section I. Chart — Distribution and Employment.
        Section II. Supporting Study.

Part III. Ultimate Requirements — Air Forces.
        Section I. Brief and Graphic Presentation:
                Chart No. 1. Tabulated Brief — Munitions Requirements of the Army Air Forces.
                Chart No. 2. Air Offensive Against Germany;
                Chart No. 3. Air Operations Other Than Those Directed Against Germany Proper.
        Section II. Supporting Study: Tabs 1 to 17 (Incl.)

Part IV. Production Requirements — Army estimate of U. S. Needs and those of Foreign Nations — Critical Items only (Ground and Air) - 20 Charts:

Engineer Equipment............................................................................2 charts
Ordnance Equipment..........................................................................8 charts
Quartermaster - Motor Transportation................................................1 charts
Quartermaster - Clothing & Equipment................................................2 charts
Signal Corps Equipment (Air Corps)...................................................1 charts
Signal Corps Equipment (Ground Forces)............................................2 charts
Air Corps Supplies (For Arms & Services Other than Air Corps).........1 charts
Medical Equipment..............................................................................1 charts
Chemical Warfare Service...................................................................1 charts
Requirements for planes.......................................................................1 charts

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

APPENDIX I.                                        SECRET

DECISION ON PRODUCTION REQUIREMENTS FOR MAJOR CATEGORIES OF
MATERIALS RECOMMENDED BY THE NAVY

(A) NAVY PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1946.

1. U.S. Navy, including aviation. Provide naval forces and facilities for the United States capable of executing strong naval offensives in the Eastern Atlantic and the Central and Western Pacific Oceans. Major items of this program are :

a.  Naval Personnel, including that required for manning merchant auxiliary tonnage      1,100,000

b.  Marine Corps Personnel                                         150,000

c.  Naval vessels -

d. Schedule of Naval Ship Deliveries.
Deliveries of large combatant naval vessels now under construction, authorized and proposed should be planned in accordance with this table:

e. Naval Aircraft.

f.  Naval Shore Establishment.

See Appendix I and Appendix II for the permanent naval shore establishment program. To these total requirements should be added temporary overseas naval base constructions equivalent to 25% of the authorized permanent overseas construction. Emergency shipbuilding and manufacturing equivalents are to be computed under subparagraphs d, e, and g.

g.  Naval Munitions Requirements for naval ships, aircraft and bases.

h. Marine Corps Munitions Requirements.

2. Foreign Navies. Provide Naval forces and facilities for Associated Powers as follows:

a.  300,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for the British Commonwealth.

b.  200,000 tons of naval combatant vessels for Latin-American countries.

c.  Temporary facilities in the United States for the repair of 25% of British naval combatant vessels.

(B)  ARMY PROGRAM, excluding aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

(C)  AVIATION PROGRAM, excluding U.S. Naval Aviation.

No estimates under this heading are submitted by the Navy.

(D) MERCHANT SHIPPING PROGRAM, for completion by December 31, 1944.

1.  Increase United States merchant shipping to a continuing total of 18,000,000 gross tons, including 600,000 gross tons for the U.S. Navy, additional to the present program. This merchant fleet is to be manned by the United States.

2.  Supply the British Commonwealth with merchant shipping of a total of 6,000,000 gross tons.

Note: An analysis of shipping requirements is as follows:

a.  For United States Industry and Latin-America, including sea-going and coastwise ships of over 1,000 gross tons --	6,000,000 gross tons
b.  For support of U.S. Army forces in Europe, Africa, and South America, estimated at 1,500,000 troops --	2,400,000 gross tons
c.  For transporting annually 12,000,000 tons of munitions for the support of Associated armed forces in Middle East, Russia and Asia, (estimated as the munitions requirements of 2,000,000 troops) --	5,000,000 gross tons
d.  For support of population, industry and armed forces in United Kingdom,(annual delivery of 15,000,000 tons) --	4,000,000 gross tons
e.  For transports for U.S. Navy for support of overseas naval forces and U.S. Army overseas garrisons --	600,000 gross tons
Total required by 1944 --	18,000,000 gross tons
Loss of U.S. Flag vessels expected by 1944 --	3,000,000 gross tons
f.  Ships to be supplied to the British Commonwealth by 1944 --	6,000,000 gross tons
Thus the total tonnage that must be made available from United States sources by the end of 1944 is --	27,000,000 gross tons
Of this there is now available --
g.  U.S. Shipping --	6,700,000 gross tons
h. Present merchant ship program due for completion in 1943 --	10,700,000 gross tons
i. Total estimated as available by 1945 --	17,400,000 gross tons
j. The additional program to meet requirements, and which should be built by the end of 1944 is --	9,600,000 gross tons
Note: The Chairman of the Maritime Commission estimates this figure is the maximum that should be fixed for the United States shipbuilding industry.

(E)  PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF THE UNITED STATES.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required by the population of the United States for civil purposes. (Requirements for this need should be established by other than military agencies.)

(F)  PROGRAM FOR CIVIL NEEDS OF FRIENDLY POWERS.

Fabricated, processed, and raw materials, required from the United States for the industrial and civil establishments of friendly Powers. Attention should be given to the importance of establishing raw material and industrial production facilities outside of the United States, in regions where the following conditions exist:

1.  Raw materials are available, or their production is readily possible.

2.  Man-power is available for industrial employment.

3.  Proximity to a hostile front, with ample man-power available for military employment, (Requirements for this need should be established by civil agencies, in consultation with military authorities).

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

ESTIMATE

ARMY REQUIREMENTS
SUPPORTING STUDY

prepared by:

WAR PLANS DIVISION
GENERAL STAFF

(SECTION II, PART II, APPENDIX II)

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS STUDY
ESTIMATE OF ARMY GROUND FORCES

1. The specific operations necessary to accomplish the defeat of the Axis Powers cannot be predicted at this time. Irrespective of the nature and scope of these operations, we must prepare to fight Germany by actually coming to grips with and defeating her ground forces and definitely breaking her will to combat. Such requirement establishes the necessity for powerful ground elements, flexibly organized into task forces which are equipped and trained to do their respective jobs. The Germans and their associates with between 11 and 12 million men under arms, now have approximately 300 divisions fully equipped and splendidly trained. It is estimated that they can have by 1943, a total of 400 divisions available in the European Theater.

2. The important influence of the air arm in modern combat has been irrefutably established. The degree of success attained by sea and ground forces will be determined by the effective and timely employment of air supporting units and the successful conduct of strategical missions. No major military operation in any theater will succeed without air superiority, or at least air superiority disputed. The necessity for a strong sea force, consisting principally of fast cruisers, destroyers, aircraft carriers, torpedo boats and submarines, continues in spite of the increased fighting potential of the air arm. Employment of enemy air units has not yet deprived naval vessels of their vital role on the high seas, but has greatly accelerated methods and changed the technique in their employment. It appears that the success of naval operations, assuming air support, will still be determined by sound strategic concepts and adroit leadership. A sea blockade will not accomplish an economic strangulation or or military defeat of Germany. Nor will air operations alone bring victory. Air and sea forces will make important contributions but effective and adequate ground forces must be available to close with and destroy the enemy within his citadel.

3. It is therefore imperative that we create the productive capacity to provide equipment for the following:

a. Appropriate forces distributed for the defense of the United States, outlying possessions and bases selected to facilitate the defense of the country and the Western Hemisphere.

b. Task Forces which can effectively conduct military operations, primarily in the European Theater, as well as in the Western Hemisphere and in other strategically important areas.

c. The military forces of associates and friendly Powers committed to the policy of opposing Nazi aggression. Quantities to be limited only by our own strategic requirements and the ability of the friendly Powers to use the equipment effectively.

4. A sound approach to the problem of determining appropriate military means requires careful consideration of WHERE, HOW and WHEN, they will be employed to defeat our potential enemies and to assist our associates.

a. WHERE. Accepting the premise, that we must come to grips with the enemy ground forces, our principal theater of war is Central Europe. Possible subsidiary theaters include Africa, the Near East, the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and the Far East; however, the operations in those theaters must be so conducted as to facilitate the decisive employment of Allied forces in Central Europe.

b. HOW. The combined and carefully coordinated operations of our military forces, in collaboration with associated Powers, must accomplish the following:

(1) The surface and subsurface vessels of the Axis and associated Powers must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic and water areas contiguous to Europe

(2) Overwhelming air superiority must be accomplished.

(3) The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective through the continuous disruption and destruction of lines of communication, ports and industrial facilities, and by the interception of raw materials.

(4) The combat effectiveness of the German military forces must be greatly reduced by over-extension, dispersion, shortage of matériel, including fuel, and a deterioration of the Home Front. Popular support of the war effort, by the peoples of the Axis Powers must be weakened and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, the destruction wrought and chaos created.

(5) Existing military bases (the British Isles and the Near East) must be maintained. Additional bases, which encircle and close in on the Nazi citadel, must be established in order to facilitate air operations designed to shatter the German industrial and economic life. Such bases may also provide feasible points of departure for the combined operations of ground and air forces. In disposing of our forces, we must guard against dispersion of means in operations that do not make timely and effective contributions to the accomplishment of our main task, the defeat of Germany.

(6) The commitment of our forces must conform to our accepted broad strategic concept of active (offensive) operations in one theater (European), and concurrently, passive (defensive) operations in the other (Pacific).

d. WHEN. The following factors with regard to the time element are important in determining, the production capacity necessary to realize our national objectives:

(1) The lag between plan and execution is considerable. Past experience indicates that from eighteen months to two years are required.

(2) How many months will Germany require to defeat Russia, to reconstitute her forces subsequent to Russia's defeat and to exploit to any perceptible degree the vast resources of Russia?

It is believed that Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line; White Sea, Moscow, Volga River, (all inclusive) by July 1, 1942, and that militarily, Russia will be substantially impotent subsequent to that date. Thereafter, Germany will “Coventry” all industrial areas, lines of communications and sources of raw materials east of the line indicated, unless a drastic Nazi treaty is accepted by Russia. Germany will probably require a full year to bring order out of chaos in the conquered areas, so that it will be July 1, 1943, before she will largely profit economically by her “drive to the east.” The maintenance of huge armies of occupation has become unnecessary. By totally disarming the conquered people, maintaining splendidly organized intelligence and communications nets, and employing strategically located, highly mobile forces (parachute, air-borne, mechanized and motorized), Germany may control the occupied areas with relatively small forces, thus releasing the bulk of the military for other tasks. Obviously, our war effort time-table covering the production of munitions, the creation of trained military forces and the increase of transportation facilities (air, ground and sea), is strongly influenced by events transpiring in the Russian theater.

(3) We are confronted by two possibilities; first, a rapidly accelerated all-out effort with a view to conducting decisive, offensive operations against the enemy before he can liquidate or recoup from his struggle with Russia; second, a long drawn-out war of attrition. Under our present production schedule, we will soon have adequate military means to defend our outlying possessions and bases and to provide for the security of the Western Hemisphere, but we will not be able to provide sufficient appropriate forces for timely offensive action in the principal theater of operations. The urgency for positive action exists, particularly while the enemy is contained militarily in Russia, It would strongly contribute to the early and decisive defeat of the Axis Powers, if the Allied forces could seize and firmly establish military bases from which immediate air and subsequent ground and air operations might be undertaken.

(4) The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner, but the production of matériel must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present, the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the Axis, the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task, and gain the whole-hearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves. Otherwise, we will be confronted in the not distant future by a Germany strongly entrenched economically, supported by newly acquired sources of vital supplies and industries, with her military forces operating on interior lines, and in a position of hegemony in Europe which will be comparatively easy to defend and maintain.

(5) The time by which production can reach the levels defined by our national objectives is highly speculative, July 1, 1943, has been established as the earliest date on which the equipment necessary to initiate and sustain our projected operations can be provided. The ability of industry to meet this requirement is contingent upon many intangibles; however, the program can be definitely accomplished, in fact, greatly exceeded, if the industrial potential of the country is fully exploited. The urgency of speed and the desirability of employing our present great economic and industrial advantage over our potential enemies cannot be overemphasized.

4. Strategic Employment of Ground Forces.

a. The future alignment of Powers and their respective combat capacities cannot be accurately predicted. In order to arrive at a plausible basis from which to determine our future requirements, the following assumptions pertaining to the world situation as of July 1, 1943, are made:

(1) Russia is substantially impotent militarily in Europe. Resistance in Siberia, to include the Maritime Provinces, probably continuing.

(2) The Axis military strength is materially weakened through economic blockade; by losses in the Russian campaign, by British air and sea operations; by the inability to exploit quickly the extensively sabotaged Russian industries and raw materials; by lowered morale of the people.

(3) The military forces of Japan are fully involved with or contained by campaigns against a somewhat strengthened China, by the Russian forces in the Far East Maritime Provinces, or by the threat of United States - British military and economic reprisals,

(4) Great Britain and associates have increased their fighting forces by creating and equipping additional combat units.

(5) The French will probably continue their passive collaboration with Germany.

(6) Control of the Mediterranean Theater, including North Africa and the Near 2ast, remains disputed.

(7) The United States is an active belligerent and is collaborating in an all-out effort to defeat Germany.

b. If these assumptions are correct, or even reasonably sound, on July 1, 1943, there will be no military bases remaining in Allied hands, other than the United Kingdom, possibly the northern coast of Africa and the Near East. The establishment of additional bases, for example, in the Iberian Peninsula, the Scandinavian Peninsula and Northwest Africa will be bitterly contested by the Axis. However, to bring about the ultimate defeat of Germany, those bases and others even more difficult to establish, must be available to the Allies. Obviously, carefully planned action, involving appropriate sea, air and ground units must be undertaken. Allied success is directly contingent upon the coordinated employment of overwhelming forces, surprise and mobility, supported by sufficient reserves in materiel and manpower to insure a succession of effective impulses throughout the operations.

c. Latest information pertaining to the potential industrial capacities and military strengths of the opposing Powers, (excluding the U. S.) as of July 1, 1943, indicates that the Axis Powers will have about 400 divisions available in the European-Near East Theater and the Allied Powers approximately 100 divisions. To accomplish the numerical superiority, about 2 to 1, usually considered necessary before undertaking offensive operations, the Allies would have to raise about 700 divisions. A force of 700 divisions with appropriate supporting and service troops would approximate 22 million men. If Great Britain and the United States should induct so many men for military service, added to the tremendous numbers already under arms, the economic and industrial effort, necessary to conduct the war, would be definitely imperiled.

d. It is believed that the enemy can be defeated without creating the numerical superiority indicated. Effective employment of modern air and ground fighting machines and a tight economic blockade may create conditions that will make the realization of the Allied War Aims perfectly feasible with numerically less fighting men. Another million men in Flanders would not have turned the tide of battle for France. If the French army had had sufficient tanks and planes, and quantities of antitank and antiaircraft matériel, France might have remained a dominant power in Europe. In June, 1941, when the Germans launched their invasion of Russia, they know that their adversary was numerically superior and could maintain that superiority in spite of tremendous losses. They probably also knew that Stalin was creating a military force of great power, consisting primarily of effective modern fighting machines, and that if they delayed their "drive to the east" another year, Russia would possess armadas of air and ground machines which would not only render an offensive campaign impossible, but would make large demands upon the German military to secure her eastern frontier. The Crete campaign also presents illuminating evidence in favor of modern fighting means when opposed by superior numbers that are equipped with inappropriate means and are operating under World War I static tactical concepts. Approximately 17,000 Germans attacked and conquered the island which was defended by about 30,000 British.

e. Our broad concept, of encircling and advancing stop-by-stop, with a view to closing-in on Germany, will remain sound regardless of future developments in the European situation, for it envisages the only practical way in which military and economic pressure may be brought to bear effectively against Germany. The loss of potential bases of operation, presently available, would render the accomplishment of our strategic plans extremely difficult and costly. It is important, therefore, that the Allies take effective measures to hold the United Kingdom, the Middle East, and North African areas. Also the islands off the northwestern coast of Africa should be denied to the enemy. Before undertaking operations in connection with the establishment of additional military bases, for example, in the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, Africa and the Low Countries, a careful survey of the areas of projected operations and a thorough examination of the enemy capabilities are mandatory. The unfortunate Norway campaign of 1940 is a glaring example of a total lack of appreciation of such realities on the part of those responsible for the British expedition. The Germans employed approximately 175,000 men, strongly supported by the Air Force, to conquer and secure their lodgement in Norway. Special Task Forces, including two Mountain divisions and numerous parachute units made effective contributions to the success of the operation. Having gained a foothold, the Germans quickly established themselves in order to hold their bases and to facilitate exploitation. The British Forces despatched against Norway totalled about 24,000 men, with no mountain troops and with inadequate air supporting units. The failure of the British expedition is directly attributable to insufficient and inappropriate means. If and when the situation indicates the feasibility of an Allied expedition, against Norway for example, powerful and appropriate means, especially trained and equipped for the task, must be provided. Large and effective reserves must be readily available to preclude dislogement of the initial forces and to facilitate subsequent exploitation. A careful study of Norway, including the terrain and communications net, and a survey of possible enemy capabilities, indicate the necessity for mountain, infantry foot and motorized divisions, numerous parachute, tank, antitank, antiaircraft and air-borne units. The force required for the entire operation may total several hundred thousand men. The execution of the plan would be predicated on sea and local air superiority. The size of this force may appear large. However, even though our enemy may not be strong initially in the area of projected operations, the mobility of modern fighting means will enable him to concentrate destructive forces against us with unprecedented speed and surprise effect. The foregoing considerations apply with equal emphasis to proposed forces for other theaters of operations. Careful studies, concerning the Scandinavian Peninsula, the Iberian Peninsula, the Near East and Africa, have been made by the War Plans Division of the General Staff, and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated Ground Forces (See Tab A). The enemy capabilities in those theaters in 1943 would obviously be conjecture. Task Forces consisting principally of armored and motorized divisions, must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the Middle East, France and the Low Countries. The exact strength and the composition of the Task Forces, necessary to seize and maintain military bases, will be determined immediately prior to the operation. We can avoid the unfortunate disasters experienced by our potential allies in Norway, France, the Balkans and in Crete by planning now and creating quickly the production capacity necessary to equip the ground forces recommended (Tab A). We must not suffer ignominious defeat and be expelled from the bases that we elect to establish. If the premises and assumptions made earlier in this study are appropriate and sound, additional strategically located bases are vital to the splendidly conceived plans of the Air Force and finally may serve as areas of departure Tor the combined operations of air and ground forces. The seizure, retention, and effective utilization of these bases is predicated on the successful operations of adequate sea, air and ground forces.

5. Shipping was a bottleneck in the last war and again increased demands will be placed on all transportation facilities, particularly water, by constant troop movements and the expanded war industrial and economic effort. In order to transport and maintain effective forces in European areas, several million tons of shipping and adequate port facilities must be made available essentially for military service. To transport five million men with their modern air and mechanized equipment to European ports over a period of approximately one year would require about seven million tons of shipping or 1,000 ships. To maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about ten million tons of shipping or 1,500 ships. But it is highly improbable that the situation in Europe will develop in such manner as to permit or to require operations involving the movement of so large a force across the Atlantic within the limited time of one year, even if the ship tonnage were available. The progressive building-up of large military forces in the theater will probably extend over a period of at least two years. This progressive movement would greatly reduce the demands upon maritime shipping for essentially military purposes and further would extend the period of time for the augmentation of maritime shipping now available. The realization of our present national policies may require operations in distant theaters by military forces of unprecedented strength.

It would be folly to create strong fighting forces without providing the transportation to move and maintain them in the contemplated theaters of operations. The maximum possible shipbuilding capacity of our country, coordinated of course with other essential demands upon industry and raw materials, must be exploited and continued in operation for the next several years.

6. The foregoing considerations clearly indicate the importance of creating a productive capacity in this country, that will provide the most modern equipment designed to give mobility and destructive power to our striking forces. The forces that we now estimate as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided, may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in July, 1943. We may require much larger forces than those indicated below, and correspondingly greatly increased quantities of equipment. Emphasis has been placed on destructive power and mobility, with a view to offensive maneuvers in our principal theater of operations (Europe). The forces deemed necessary to accomplish the role of ground units in the supreme effort to defeat our potential enemies, total 5 Field Armies consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, air-borne, mountain and cavalry) with appropriate supporting and service elements. The strategic concept outlined in this paper contemplates distribution of U. S. ground forces approximately as follows: (More specific data will be found in Tab A).

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

TAB A

The Ground Forces estimated as necessary to provide for the security of the U.S. outlying possessions, the Western Hemisphere and to make available appropriate forces for projected military operations follow:

1. Units organized, fully equipped and trained as soon as practicable:

c. The troops considered necessary in the ground forces, i.e. organized, fully equipped and trained, for current and future employment as security forces in military bases and outlying possessions, and as striking forces in any theater, follows:

2. Production capacity should be created to equip approximately 3 million for the reserve units indicated below. Activation, location and training of these units will depend upon the international situation.

3. Ground troops required for the Zone of Interior and Fixed Defense Units 1,200,000

4. Recapitulation of Ground Forces

5. Air Force requirements (details submitted in a separated study)

- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

SECRET

Brief of Strategic Concept of Operations Required to Defeat our Potential Enemies

(September 1941)

Strategic Objective: To defeat GERMANY and her Allies.

Purpose of the formation of a Strategic Concept of Operations: To evolve a basis for the determination of the United States over-all production requirements.

- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -- - - - - - - -

SECRET

ULTIMATE REQUIREMENTS - GROUND FORCES

(September 1941)