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DAILY TRIBUNE THURSDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1941 – 46 PAGES – PRICE TWO CENTS Download the original scanned images -- 22.74 MB ZIP |
GOAL IS 10 MILLION ARMED MEN; HALF TO FIGHT IN AEF
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Proposes Land Drive by July 1, 1943, to Smash Nazis; President Told of Equipment Shortage.
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BY CHESLY MANLY.
Washington, D. C., Dec. 3.—A confidential report prepared by the joint army and navy high command by direction of President Roosevelt calls for American expeditionary forces aggregating 5,000,000 men for a final land offensive against Germany and her satellites. It contemplates total armed forces of 10,045,658 men.
One of the few existing copies of this astounding document, which represents decisions and commitments affecting the destinies of peoples thruout the civilized world, became available to The Tribune today.
It is a blueprint for total war on a scale unprecedented in at least two oceans and three continents, Europe, Africa, and Asia.
The report expresses the considered opinion of the army and navy strategists that “Germany and her European satellites cannot be defeated by the European powers now fighting against her.” Therefore, it concludes, “if our European enemies are to be defeated it will be necessary for the United States to enter the war, and to employ a part of its armed forces offensively in the eastern Atlantic Band in Europe and Africa.”
July 1, 1943, is fixed as the date for the beginning of the final supreme effort by American land forces to defeat the mighty German army in Europe.
In the meantime, however, increasingly active participation if prescribed for the United States, to consist of the gradual encirclement of Germany by the establishment of military bases, art American air offensive against Germany from bases in the British Isles and in the near east, and possible action by American expeditionary forces in Africa and the near east.
For the ultimate supreme effort the war prospectus calling for 10,045,658 in the armed forces would give the navy 1,100,000, including the naval air force, and would place 150,000 in the marine corps, 6,745,658 in the army ground force, and 2,050,000 in the army air force.
The report states that the forces deemed necessary to defeat the potential enemies of the United States total five field armies, consisting of approximately 215 divisions (infantry, armored, motorized, air borne, mountain, and cavalry) and approximate supporting service elements.
The estimate that 5,000,000 men will be sent overseas to European areas is contained in the section of the report that deals with shipping. It states that there will not be enough shipping to transport such a force to Europe over a period of one year, but that the “ building up of large military forces in the theater of operations will probably extend over a period of at least two years.”
The document emphasizes that the stupendous task which it assigns to the United States will require military forces "of unprecedented strength,” and qualifies the over-all estimates as follows:
“The forces that we now assume as necessary to realize our national objectives and for which production capacity must be provided may not be adequate or appropriate. No one can predict the situation that will confront the United States in 1943. We may require much larger forces ” than those indicated by the estimates mentioned above.
The report assumes that Germans’, Italy, all German occupied countries cooperating with Germany, Vichy France, Japan. Manchukuo, and possibly Spain and Portugal are potential enemies. It calls for continuation of the war against this assumed combination of enemies even the the British commonwealth and soviet Russia should be completely defeated, and predicts that Russia will be militarily impotent by July 1, 1942.
Against Japan the report recommends eventual “ strategic methods ’’ consisting of a strong defense of Siberia, with the assistance of whatever Russian resistance remains in the maritime provinces; a strong defense of Malaysia, an economic offensive thru blockade, a reduction of Japanese military power by air raids and a Chinese offensive against the Japanese forces of occupation.
The report does not attempt to estimate what the cost of waging war on such a tremendous scale will be, but The Tribune disclosed in a Washington dispatch last week that the administration's armament program contemplates additional appropriations by congress of 40 billion dollars in the next six months. This would raise the total cost of the war program to approximately 110 billion dollars by July 1, 1942, a full year before the proposed beginning of the " supreme effort.”
The war prospectus is dated Sept. 11. 1941, and was prepared by the army and navy joint hoard, which is the supreme command of the United States, in response to a letter addressed to Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson by President Roosevelt on July 29, 1941. Harry L. Hopkins, closest adviser to the President on war strategy and his confidential emissary to Winston Churchill, the British prime minister, and Josef Stalin, the Russian dictator, assisted
In the preparation of the high command estimates. Hopkins was asked to participate in the confidences by the President, who directed Secretary Stimson to initiate the confidences.
The President's letter follows in full:
“July 9, 1941.”
“My dear Mr. Secretary:”
“I wish that you, or appropriate representatives designated by you, would join with the secretary of the navy [Frank Knox] and his representatives in exploring at once the over-all production requirements required to defeat our potential enemies.”
“I realize that this report involves the making of appropriate assumptions as to our probable friends and enemies and the conceivable theaters of operation which will be required. I wish you would explore the munitions and mechanical equipment of all types which, in your opinion, would be required to exceed by an appropriate amount that which is available to our potential enemies.”
“From your report we should be able to establish a munitions objective indicating the industrial capacity which this nation will require. I am not suggesting a detailed report but one that, while general in scope, would cover the most critical items in our defense, and which could then be translated by the OPM into practical realities of production facilities.
“ It seems to me that we need to know our program in its entirety, even tho at a later date it may be amended. I believe that the confidential report which I am asking you to make to me would be of great assistance not only in the efficient utilization of our production facilities, but would afford an adequate opportunity for planning for the greatly increased speed of delivery which our defense program requires.
“I am asking Mr. Hopkins to join with you in these conferences. I would appreciate it if the secretary of war could take the initiative in these conferences.
“ Very sincerely yours.
“ Franklin D. Roosevelt.”
The joint board consists of Adm. Harold R. Stark, chief of naval operations; Gen. George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the army; Maj. Gen. William Bryden, deputy chief of staff; Rear Adm. R. E. Ingersoll, assistant Chief of naval operations; Maj. Gen. Henry H. Arnold, deputy chief of staff for air and chief of the army air forces; Rear Adm. John H. Towers, chief of the navy's bureau of aeronautics; Brig. Gen. L. T. Gerow, assistant chief of staff in charge of the war plans division, and Rear Adm. R. K. Turner, director of war plans in the office of the chief of naval operations. The report was signed by Gen. Marshall and Adm. Stark.
As the date of the President’s letter shows, the joint board already was at work on the preparation of the war estimates when President Roosevelt joined Prime Minister Churchill in the proclamation of their so-called Atlantic Charter of Aug. 14, which pledged the cooperation of the United States for "the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny."
At a White House conference on Aug. 18 Mr. Roosevelt told congressional leaders about his secret confabulations at sea with Churchill. The Tribune reported exclusively that the new war alliance called for an ultimate land invasion of the continent of Europe as the only possible method of defeating Germany and that such an Invasion would depend upon the assistance of a vast American expeditionary force.
The Tribune dispatch displeased President Roosevelt and the White House ordered Senate Majority Leader Alben W. Barkley of Kentucky to repudiate the article on the floor of the senate. Barkley denounced The Tribune story as a “deliberate falsehood.”
The Tribune nevertheless continued to reveal the hidden war plans of the administration, as it had as the announced objectives progressed from “short of war” to “shooting war.”.
On Oct. 1 The Tribune disclosed that appropriations and authorizations already voted by congress were large enough to equip 10 million men, including an air force of 2 million.
On Nov. 26 The Tribune informed its readers that the administration’s so-called victory program contemplated an army of 5 to 8 million men and would require appropriations of 40 billion dollars, including 20 billions for lend-lease aid to Britain, Russia, and other countries, within the next six months.
The secret report prepared by the high command under President Roosevelt’s direction officially confirms the Tribune revelations.
The high command report supports two of the major contentions of Charles A. Lindbergh, who has been maligned as a defeatist, an appeaser, and a Nazi sympathizer by administration war propagandists and the interventionist press.
Lindbergh has insisted that the powers now fighting Germany cannot defeat Germany. This is the opinion of the army and the navy. Lindbergh has insisted that England does not possess enough bases to accommodate airplanes for a successful aerial bombardment of Germany. On this question a section of the confidential report, which was prepared by the army’s air intelligence, states:
“The air force that can be employed against a hostile nation is that which can be placed within a radius of action of any enemy objective from available bases. Bombardment units required for operations against Germany have been estimated together with pursuit aircraft required for the defense of the bases.
“The radius of action of bombarding airplanes and the availability of bases are thus considered: 6,860 bombardment airplanes is the estimated requirement for operations against Germany. It develops that but 169 bases are available, which will accommodate 3,842 bombers and 1,690 pursuit planes for operations against Germany, and an additional 117 airdromes to accommodate 3,018 bombers are required.”
The official report also explodes some of the other popular myths that have been most sedulously fostered by administration spokesmen and war propagandists generally.
For instance it scorns the popular notion that this is a war to overthrow Hitler and the Nazi régime, rather than a war against the German people, in the following words:
“It is believed the overthrow of the Nazi régime by action of the German people is unlikely in the near future, and will not occur until Germany is upon the point of military defeat. Even tho a new régime were to be established it is not at all certain that such a regime would agree to peace terms acceptable to the United States.”
In the following words the report demolishes the administration argument that the United States would be shut off from world trade and strangled economically if the axis powers were permitted to dominate Europe, Africa, and Asia:
“Since the paramount trade interests of the United States are in the western hemisphere it is imperative that the United States must provide armed forces appropriately dispersed which, in any eventuality, operating in cooperation with the forces of other American powers, could successfully prevent expansion in the western hemisphere by European or Asiatic powers even tho the British commonwealth had collapsed.”
But the report adds that the attainment of “this objective alone,” that is, upholding the Monroe doctrine in the western hemisphere, will not accomplish the other specified national objectives. These objectives, it slates, can be attained “only thru military victories outside of the hemisphere.”
The other objectives, that is, the war aims of the United States outside the western hemisphere, are stated thus:
“Prevention of the destruction of the British empire; prevention of the further extension of Japanese territorial dominion; eventual establishment in Europe and Asia of balances of power which will most nearly In sure political stability in those regions and/or the security of the United States, and, so far as practicable, the establishment of régimes favorable to economic freedom and economic liberty.”
Thus it appears that the No. 1 military objective of sending American armed forces outside the western hemisphere is the preservation of the British empire. The last mentioned objective is the "freedoms” which President Roosevelt has vowed to establish everywhere in the world.
Three of the President’s four freedoms, however, have been eliminated —freedom of religion, freedom of expression, and freedom from fear. The fourth—freedom from want—becomes “economic freedom and economic liberty.”
The section of the report dealing with the navy calls for forces and facilities, including naval aviation, “capable of executing strong naval offensives in the eastern Atlantic and the central and western Pacific ocean.” Besides the so-called two ocean navy, with a personnel of 1,100,-000 men and 150,000 in the marine corps, the report calls for an increase in American merchant shipping to a total of 18 million gross tons.
The section on shipping estimates that the transportation of 5 million men with modern air and mechanized equipment to European areas over a period of one year would require 7 million tons of shipping, or 1,000 ships, and that to maintain such a force in the theater of operations would require about 10 million tons, or 1,500 ships.
Of the total of 18 million tons of shipping proposed to be constructed, 6 million tons are for the use of Great Britain.
A section of the report under the title, “Major Strategy of the United States and its Associates,” states in part:
“The Joint board is convinced that the first major objective of the United States and its associates should be the complete military defeat of Germany.
“ An inconclusive peace between Germany and her present active military enemies would be likely to give Germany an opportunity to reorganize continental Europe and replenish her strength. Even tho the British commonwealth and Russia were completely defeated, there would be important reasons for the United States to continue the war against Germany in spite of the greatly increased difficulty of obtaining final victory.
“From this it follows that the principal strategic method employed by the United States in the immediate future should be the material support of the present military operations against Germany and their reenforcement by active participation, in the war by the United States, while holding Japan in check pending future developments. Necessarily only small army contingents are now sufficiently equipped and trained for immediate participation in offensive operations.
“Except in the case of Russia the principal strength of the associated powers is in naval and air categories. Naval and air power may prevent wars from being lost and by weakening the enemy’s strength may greatly contribute to victory. By themselves. however, naval and air forces seldom, if ever, win Important wars. It should be recognized as an almost invariable rule that only land armies can likely win wars.
“It is out of the question to expect the United States and its associates to undertake in the near future a substantial and successful land offensive against the center of the German power. It being obvious that the associated powers cannot defeat Germany by defensive operations, effective strategic offensive methods other than an early land offensive in Europe must be employed. These methods may be found in a continuation of the economic blockade; the prosecution of land offensives in distant regions where German troops can excel only with a fraction of their total strength; air and sea offensives against Germany’s military, economic and industrial resources; and the support of subversive activity in the conquered territories.”
The report states that the "field forces of the United States, air and ground, will not be prepared for ultimate decisive modem combat before July 1, 1943, due to the shortage of essential equipment.” Accordingly the strategic concept of operations required to defeat Germany is projected beyond that date into the indefinite future.
The projected operations are divided into three phases, as follows:
“First phase [until M-day, or when hostilities begin]: Objective: Insure delivery of supplies to the British Isles and provide munitions for other nations fighting the axis in order to preclude diminution of other war efforts and concurrently to prepare United States for active participation in the war. [We are now in this phase.]”
“Second phase [M-day until prepared for final offensive action]: Objective: Prepare the way for the eventual defeat of Germany by active participation as an associate of Great Britain and other nations fighting the Axis powers.”
“Final phase: Total defeat of Germany.”
The Tribune has been informed by reliable sources that the second phase of American participation in the war probably will begin next April with the dispatch of air forces to the British Isles and the near east, where bases already are under construction. The report of the joint board does not fix a definite date for the beginning of active participation in the war but indicates that it will be soon.
The report states that “before ground operations are undertaken in continental Europe the following conditions must be created by our sea and air forces in collaboration with the British and associated powers:
“1. The surface and subsurface vessels of the axis must be swept from the seas, particularly in the Atlantic waters contingent to Europe.
“2. Overwhelming air supremacy must be accomplished.
“3. The economic and industrial life of Germany must be rendered ineffective.
“4. The combat effectiveness of the German air and ground units must be weakened by dispersion and the shortage of materials, including fuel.
“5. Popular support of the war effort by the peoples of the axis powers must be weakened, and their confidence shattered by subversive activities, propaganda, deprivation, and the destruction wrought.”
The report states that “ the elimination of effective military bases encircling the Nazi citadel must be undertaken as appropriate means become available and when favorable conditions are created for the operations involved.”
The report sets forth the exact number of troops that will be required in American military bases and outlying possessions. They include substantial forces in England, Ireland, and Scotland, as well as Iceland, Newfoundland, Greenland, Jamaica. Bermuda. Antigua, St. Lucia, Curacao, Aruba, British Guiana, Trinidad, Puerto Rico, Panama, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Alaska. Curacao and Aruba are Dutch possessions In the Caribbean. American troops already have occupied Dutch Guiana in South America.
The section of the report prepared by the army's air intelligence disagreed with the opinion of the joint board that a land invasion against Germany can be attempted by July 1, 1943.
“It is improbable,” air intelligence stated, “that a land invasion can be carried on against Germany within the next three years.”
Also contrary to the belief of the joint board, the air strategists expressed the opinion that “if an air offensive is successful, a land offensive may not be necessary.”
The air intelligence section contains an elaborate diagram showing American bombing planes converging over selected objectives in Germany from a network of bases in the British Isles and from two “AAF” [American air force] bases in the near east.
[Two army bases already are under construction in the near east, one at the foot of the Red sea and one at the head of the Persian gulf.]
According to the data set forth by the air intelligence the bombardment operations will be directed against 154 selected German targets and will require a total of 6,834 operating bombardment planes, with monthly replacements of 1,288 planes.
The air intelligence report also contains detailed plans for what it describes as a “strategic defense” in the orient. These plans call for 25 groups of bombers, with 1,700 planes, not including reserves, and 32 groups of pursuit planes, 4,160 in all, not including reserves.
The report estimates Germany’s airplane strength as follows:
Operation combat, 5,847; projected strength to Sept. 21, 1943, 9,250.
Total in air fleet, 11,835; projected Strength to Sept. 21, 1943, 18,900.
Sum total of all types, 36,320; projected strength to Sept. 21, 1943, 57,705.
Estimated pilot strength, 48,500.
Estimated total monthly losses, 1,800.
The report estimates that there are 6½ million men under arms in the German army, 100,000 in the navy and 1½ million in the air force. In addition to this armed force it is estimated that 8½ million men are engaged in armament works, making a total of almost 17 million men engaged directly in this war.
The war plans division of the general staff prepared the section of the report which expresses belief that “Germany will occupy Russian territory west of the general line White Sea-Moscow-Volga River, all inclusive, by July 1942, and that militarily Russia will be impotent subsequent to that date.” The report expresses the opinion, however, that Germany will require until July, 1943, to establish order out of chaos in western Russia sufficiently to profit economically from her drive to the east.
Under the heading “Strategic Employment of Ground Forces,” the report of the war plans division indicates that the “allies,” meaning American and British forces, must drive German forces out of Norway before beginning the final land offensive against the German army. This task alone may require several hundred thousand men, including specially trained mountain divisions, the report states. It continues:
“Careful studies concerning the Scandinavian peninsula, the Iberian peninsula, the near east and Africa have been made by the war plans division of the general staff and these studies made important contributions in the determination of the estimated ground forces. Task forces consisting principally of armored and motor divisions must be created for possible operations in North Africa, the middle east, France, and the Low Countries. The exact strength and the composition of the task forces necessary to seize and maintain military bases will be determined immediately prior to the operations.
“The United States is approaching its task in a logical manner but the production of material must be greatly accelerated to permit its accomplishment. At present the bulk of our production has to be devoted to the support of Great Britain and associates, rendering it impracticable for us to undertake offensive commitments. But time is of the essence, and the longer we delay effective offensive operations against the axis the more difficult will become the attainment of victory. It is mandatory that we reach an early appreciation of our stupendous task and gain the wholehearted support of the entire country in the production of trained men, ships, munitions, and ample reserves.”