HEADQUARTERS
EIGHTH AIR FORCE
ETOUSA

18 April, 1943.

SUBJECT: Plan for the Build-up and Employment of the Bomber Offensive, Eighth Air Force.

TO: Commanding General, ETOUSA.

1. Immediately upon receipt of your directive a board of officers was given the two-fold task assigned:

a. To make a careful study of the Report of Operations Analysts on industrial targets in Germany.

b. To determine the Air Forces required progressively and effectively to attack this industry with sufficient force and effect to accomplish the destruction and neutralization of the most vital industrial targets.

2. The Board was headed by Commanders with combat operational experience in this theatre, who approached the problem in the knowledge that they might have to carry out the plan which they recommended. Other members of the Board comprised target analysts who have been working on this problem ever since the Eighth Air Force arrived in this theatre. They worked in continuous collaboration with experienced bombardment personnel of the R.A.F. The report of that Board is enclosed herewith. I look upon it as a sound, thorough and intelligent analysis of these vital problems. This report may be briefly summarized as follows:

The Report of the Committee of Operations Analysts is eminently sound. It is a magnificent piece of work. A careful review of it indicates that its conclusions coincide with the facts available to us, and with all information available to the R.A.F. and Air Ministry, which was freely placed at our disposal.

A decisive proportion of German industry, most vital to her effective continuation in this war, can be destroyed by the joint operation of U.S. and British bombers from U.K. bases, if sufficient forces are provided. The U.S. bomber forces required are not now available here. They must be built up in progressive phases. The first phase requires the presence of 944 heavy bombers in U.K. by July 1, 1943; the second phase requires 1192 heavy bombers here by October 11; the third phase needs 1746 bombers by January 1, 1944; and the fourth phase 2700 bombers by April 1, 1944.

3. The following are pertinent considerations which should be appreciated in reviewing the enclosed plan:

a. The capacity for German industrial destruction by heavy bombers is based on the actual results accomplished by the small force of U.S. bombers which have been active in this theatre during the past six months. It is, therefore, conservative, and can be absolutely relied upon. There is no guess work about it. It is based on actual experience.

b. The airdrome and base facilities can be made available in U.K. for the effective operation of the bomber forces called for.

c. The task requires the force called for. The provision of a lesser force will not accomplish a proportionate result. For example, if only 75% of the force called for is made available, 75% of the result cannot be expected. If only 75% of the forces called for is made available less than 50% of the result outlined can be accomplished.

d. It cannot be emphasised too strongly that this proposal does not visualise the conquest of the enemy by air effort alone. It outlines the preliminary air phase which must precede any successful invasion of the Continent.

d. The operational method and technique to be employed has already been worked out along sound lines. The organization for the control of this force is established and experienced. The initial logistic studies to implement the tactical plan involved in this study indicated that the task is well within our accomplishment in this theatre if the necessary service troops and equipment to balance the combat forces are made available. It but requires the necessary shipping to furnish the materiel and personnel indicated. Our study of the logistic and materiel phases, including the maintenance and supply establishments required and the storage capacity for arms and munitions, indicates that the task is logistically feasible.

4. I urge that all higher echelons in reviewing this study bear in mind that no land operation against Germany can hope to succeed without this preliminary air phase, emphasising as it does the destruction of the enemy's air industry and the depletion of his defensive air forces.

5. I recommend that the enclosed plan be approved and that a directive be issued at the earliest possible date to all affected agencies to implement and initiate it.

(SGD.) IRA C. EAKER
Major General, U.S.A.,
Commanding.

1 Incl:
Study of Committee of report of of Operations Analysts: “The Combined Bomber Offensive from the U.K.”

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CONTENTS
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EIGHTH AIR FORCE
APO 633      ETOUSA

12 April 1943.

THE COMBINED BOMBER OFFENSIVE FROM THE U.K.

1. THE MISSION

The mission of the U.S. and British bomber forces, as prescribed by the combined chiefs of staff at Casablanca, is as follows:

To conduct a joint US-British air offensive to accomplish the “progressive destruction and dislocation of the German Military, industrial, and economic system and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened.” This is constructed as meaning “so weakened as to permit initiation of final combined operations on the Continent.”

2. THE PRINCIPAL OBJECTIVES

A thorough study of those elements of the German military, industrial, and economic system which appeared to be profitable as bombing objectives was made by a group of Operations Analysts consisting of eminent U.S. experts. The Report of the Operations Analysts concludes that:

“The destruction and continued neutralization of some sixty (60) targets would gravely impair and might paralyze the Western Axis war effort. There are several combinations of targets from among the industries studied which might achieve this result.”

Examination of this report shows complete agreement by U. S. and British experts. (See Tab “A”). From the systems proposed by the Operations Analysts, six systems, comprising seventy-six (76) precision targets have been selected. (See Tab “B”). These targets are located within the tactical radius of action of the two air forces, and their destruction is directed against the three major elements of the German Military Machine: its submarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces, and certain industries vital to their support.

Concentration of effort against these systems will have the following effect, the percentage of destruction is as indicated by the Operations Analysts.

Submarine Construction Yards and Bases

Destruction of the submarine building yards selected will reduce present submarine construction by eighty-nine percent (89%). Attack of submarine bases will affect the submarine effort at sea. If it is found that successful results can be achieved, these attacks should continue whenever conditions are favorable for as long and as often as is necessary.

German Aircraft Industry

Depletion of the German Air Force will fatally weaken German capacity to resist our air and surface operations. Complete domination of the air is essential for our ultimate decisive effort. Destruction of forty-three percent (43%) of the German fighter capacity and sixty-five percent (65%) of the German bomber capacity is provided for in this plan, and will produce the effect required.

Ball Bearings

The critical condition of the ball bearing industry in Germany is startling. The concentration of that industry renders it outstandingly vulnerable to air attack. Seventy-six percent (76%) of the ball bearing production can be eliminated by destruction of the targets selected. This will have immediate and critical repercussions on the production of tanks, airplanes, artillery, diesel engines - in fact, upon nearly all the special weapons of modern war.

Oil

The quantities of petroleum and synthetic oil products now available to the German is barely adequate to supply the life blood which is vital to the German war machine. The oil situation is made more critical by failure of the Germans to secure and retain the Russian supplies. If the Ploesti refineries, which process thirty-five percent (35%) of current refined oil products available to the Axis are destroyed, and the synthetic oil plants in Germany which process an additional thirteen percent (13%) are also destroyed, the resulting disruption will have a disastrous effect upon the supply of finished oil products available to the Axis.

Synthetic Rubber and Tires

These products are vital to all phases of German Military strength on land and in the air. Provision is made for destruction of fifty percent (50%) of the synthetic rubber capacity and nearly all of the tire production. This destruction will have a crippling effect.

Military Transport Vehicles

Seven (7) plants produce a large proportion of the military transport and armored vehicles. The precise proportion in unknown. Loss of these plants will strike directly at the German Military strength.

The cumulative effect of the destruction of the targets comprising the systems just listed will “fatally weaken” the capacity of the German people for armed resistance.

The selection of these objectives is confirmed by the fact that the systems about which the Germans are most sensitive and about which they have concentrated their defenses such as balloons, camouflage, anti-aircraft, searchlights, decoys, and smoke are:

Aircraft factories.
Submarine construction yards.
Ball bearings.
Oil.

3. INTERMEDIATE OBJECTIVE

The Germans, recognizing the vulnerability of their vital industries, are rapidly increasing the strength of their fighter defenses. The German fighter strength in Western Europe is being augmented. (See Tab “C”).

If the growth of the German fighter strength is not arrested quickly, it may become literally impossible to carry out the destruction planned and thus to create the conditions necessary for ultimate decisive action by our combined forces on the Continent.

Hence the successful prosecution of the air offensive against the principal objectives is dependent upon a prior (or simultaneous) offensive against the German fighter strength.

4. Integrated Royal Air Force – U.S. Army Air Forces Offensive

The combined efforts of the entire U.S. and British bomber forces can produce the results required to achieve the mission prescribed for this Theater. Fortunately the capabilities of the two forces are entirely complementary.

The tremendous and ever increasing striking power of the R.A.F. bombing is designed to so destroy German material facilities as to undermine the willingness and ability of the German worker to continue the war. Because of this, there is great flexibility in the ability of the R.A.F. to direct its material destruction against those objectives which are closely related to the U.S. bombing effort which is directed toward the destruction of specific essential industrial targets. It is considered that the most effective results from strategic bombing will be obtained by directing the combined day and night effort of the U.S. and British bomber forces to all-out attacks against targets which are mutually complementary in undermining a limited number of selected objective systems. All-out attacks imply precision bombing of. related targets by day and night where tactical conditions permit, and area bombing by night against the cities associated with these targets. (See Tab “E”). The timing of the related day and night attacks will be determined by tactical considerations.

5. General plan and forces required (See Tabs “E” and “G”)

a. It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minimum operating force necessary to make deep penetrations.

b. In order to establish a yardstick to be used in the determination of the number of bombers required to destroy the objectives desired, the following procedure was employed:

12 successful missions were conducted in January, February, and March. Approximately 100 bombers were dispatched on each. It was found that sufficient bombs fell within a circle of 1000 foot radius centered about the aiming point, to cause the desired destruction. For each prospective target the number of 1000 foot radius circles necessary to cover it has been calculated. The yardstick as determined by experience is therefore; the number of 1000 foot radius circles of destruction, each requiring 100 bombers.

c. The plan of operations is divided into four phases. The depth of penetration, the number of targets available, and the capacity of the bombing forces increases successively with each phase.

d. Medium Bombers: It will be noted that no U.S. medium bombardment aircraft have been specifically included in the computation of force required above. That does not mean that medium bombardment is not necessary to implement this plan. Supplementary attacks against all strategic targets within range of medium bombers are anticipated as necessary adjuncts to the heavy bomber attacks. In addition, medium bombardment is required in order to conduct repeated attacks against German fighter airdromes, to aid the passage of the heavy bombers until the attacks against the German aircraft industry make themselves felt. Medium bombardment will be necessary to support combined operations in early 1944. The crews must be operationally trained in this Theater by that date.

RECAPITULATION OF U. S. BOMBER FORCES REQUIRED

e. At all times there is a need for an extensive U. S. fighter force both to protect the bombers and to assist in the reduction of the German fighter strength. (See Tab “G”). Prior to the initiation of operations on the Continent, this fighter strength must be at a maximum, and must be fully trained for operations in this Theater.

f. This plan deals entirely with the requirements for the strategic bombing force, except for its use in the 4th phase on missions which will render most effective support to surface operations on the Continent, which may begin in early 1944. In order to supplement this force in providing the close support required for the surface operations, steps must be taken early to create and train a tactical force in this Theater. This force must include light bomber, reconnaissance, fighter, and troop carrier elements.

CONCLUSIONS

6 a. If the forces required as set forth above are made available on the dates indicated, it will be possible to carry out the mission prescribed in the Casablanca Conference. If those forces are not made available, then that mission is not attainable by mid 1944.

b. Depletion of the German fighter strength must be accomplished first. Failure to neutralize that force will jeopardize the prosecution of the war toward a favorable decision in this Theater.

c. The following bombing objectives should be destroyed under the provisions of the general directive issued at the Casablanca Conference :

Intermediate Objective:

German fighter strength.

Primary Objectives:

German submarine yards and bases.
The remainder of the German aircraft industry.
Ball bearings. #
Oil. # (Contingent upon attacks against Ploesti from the Mediterranean).

# – A successful initial attack on the key element of either of those systems would demand the immediate concentration of effort on the remaining elements of that system to exploit the initial success.

Secondary Objectives:

Synthetic Rubber and Tires.
Military Motor Transport Vehicles.

d. The following statement of principle is concurred in: As expressed by Operations Analysts:

“In view of the ability of adequate and properly utilized air power to impair the industrial source of the enemy’s military strength, only the most vital considerations should be permitted to delay or divert the application of an adequate air striking force to this task.”

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TAB A
REPORT OF OPERATIONS ANALYSTS.

1. The group of “Operations Analysts” referred to, includes eminent U.S. economic experts such as:

Mr. Thomas W. Lamont,
Mr. Elihu Root, Jr.,
Dr. Edward M. Earle (Princeton),
Mr. Fowler Hamilton (B.E.W.),
Mr. Edward S. Mason (O.S.S.).

The group made a detailed study of the vulnerability to air attack of the German economic, industrial and military structure. Assistance in the conduct of these studies was obtained from many prominent experts in the field of each industry under examination and from both U.S. and London representatives of the Board of Economic Warfare, Office of Strategic Services, Ministry of Economic Warfare, Air Ministry, War Department G-2, and War Production Board.

2. Their studies, submitted in a Report dated March 8th 1943, have been carefully examined by the Eighth Air Force, the Economic Warfare Section of the American Embassy, the Royal Air Force, and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

3. It can at once be said that there is complete agreement in those high priority objectives which are suitable, from the tactical point of view, for air attack.

4. These studies are now being examined in detail by the Economic Warfare Section of the American Embassy and the Ministry of Economic Warfare.

5. It is agreed that study on these industries, and any others considered desirable, should be continued, and that any developments of interest should be immediately communicated to this Theater.

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TAB B
TARGET SELECTION

1. Target selection has been made after thorough study of.

a. The operational capabilities as established by experience in this theatre.

b. The effect of the destruction of these targets on the German Military Machine.

2. The German military machine consists of three major elements, its submarine fleet, its air force, and its ground forces. It has been considered vital in target selection, in view of the probable size of our striking force, to inflict the maximum damage to each of these elements by the destruction of the fewest targets which will accomplish our purpose.

3. Based on the above, the selected systems, for inclusion in the operational plan, are as follows:

a. Intermediate objectives:

German Fighter Strength.

b. Primary Objectives of equal priority:

Submarine Yards And Bases.
The remainder of the German Aircraft Industry.
Ball Bearings
Oil (contingent upon attacks against Ploesti).

c. Secondary objectives in order of priority:

Synthetic Rubber and Tires.
Military Motor Transport Vehicles.

4. There is complete agreement on all sides with the following conclusion of the Operations Analysts:

“It is better to cause a high degree of destruction in a few really essential industries than to cause a small degree of destruction in many industries. Results are cumulative and the plan once adopted should be adhered to with relentless determination.”

In the application of this principle, the following considerations obtain:

a. The situation is not static. The destruction of the Roumanian oil refineries would immediately make a maximum effort against the synthetic oil plants in Germany mandatory. Similarly the importance of synthetic rubber and tires fluctuates with the success of the blockade.

b. A geographical spread of targets is necessary both on account of weather, and also to allow of diversionary and training operations. These considerations led to the inclusion of Motor Transport, especially in view of its benefits to future ground operations.

5. Thus while six systems of targets are discussed and portrayed, only the first three are mandatory – the last three depending on the future course of events and tactical expediency.

6. The most immediate effect on the German fighter strength can be obtained by the destruction of air frame factories. Hence concentration upon those is in order. Later, however, it is reasonable to suppose that the rebuilding of the facilities as has been done by the British will be accomplished in such a way as to make them unprofitable bombing objectives. In such a case, if continued destruction of the fighter industry is called for, it may be found that fighter engine factories provide the most profitable objectives. Fighter repair and storage depots have been included to give tactical latitude while contributing to the reduction of the German fighter strength.

7. Intensive search must be continued to isolate other concentrated critical systems of objectives which cut across nearly all war production as does the Ball Bearing System. If and when such a system is found, priority of objectives should be modified accordingly. The grinding wheel and abrasive industries show promise of being such a system although in the light of present knowledge, there is insufficient justification for its selection as a priority objective.

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TAB “C”
The German Fighter Plane Position

The following figures from Graph of German Fighter plane Dispositions indicate the growth of German fighters.

Germany has increased its fighter strength by 43.7% since America entered the war. It is impressive to reflect that this increase was accumulated in the face of heavy fighter wastage in the campaigns in Russia, in Africa and on the Western Front.

Even more significant to us is the disposition of the increase. While total fighters rose by almost half, fighters on the Western Front very nearly doubled. They form an aerial westwall between our bombers and the vitals of the German war effort. Fighters protect the building of submarines, the equipping of Panzer divisions, the feeding and housing of the home front. Fighters have restricted the bulk of the British bombing to operating in the dark with casualties comparable to American day bombing losses. Night fighters account for 78% of British night losses. Fighters destroy American bombers and disrupt and limit their missions.

The German knows this. The Comparison Graph shows how the German fighters have outstripped the German bombers in both strength and production. German aircraft production indicates that he has consciously assumed the aerial defensive and rests his position on the foundation of a steadily increasing number of fighters.

It is a position that already seriously limits our bombardment offensive. There is, moreover, a possibility of a sharp acceleration in the increase of German fighters in this Theater. German withdrawal from Tunisia may free many of the fighters in use there. It will cut fighter wastage and permit some increase of allocation of new fighters to the Western and Russian fronts. Should the Russian front be stabilized, some fighters could be made available from there. The additional accretion of fighters available to the Western Front may well make German Europe as impregnable to effective allied bombing as British fighters have made this island impregnable to effective German bombing.

But even if present wastage rates against it continues, we cannot hope to reduce German fighter strength by mere attrition. We have seen how it grew in the face of a three-front wastage. The reason for this steady growth lies in German fighter plane production as the Production-Wastage Graph shows.

During the last seven months the estimated average wastage of German fighter planes was 655 per month. At this rate the present German fighter strength would be entirely consumed by attrition in less than three months if it were not for production. As it is, the production rate of 808 fighters attained in February will completely replace the German fighter strength of 1704 planes in slightly more than two months. Even the average production of 763 for the months plotted gives the German a continuing increase of over 100 fighters per month.

CONCLUSION

German fighter planes are increasing. Even their present strength already impedes our bombardment offensive against all German war effort. The roots of German fighter strength are in fighter production. Before we can bomb German targets with full effectiveness we must clear the path by bombing the source of the fighter production which protects all German targets.

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TAB “D”
EFFECTIVENESS OF EIGHTH AIR FORCE

The operations of the U.S. Army Air Force in daylight bombing of defended objectives in German occupied Europe have been sufficient to establish a criterion of precision daylight bombing effectiveness; the operations of the R.A.F. Bomber Command leave no room for doubt of the ability of that force to devastate industrial areas. The daylight operations of the Eighth Air Force from 3 January 1943 to 6 April 1943 definitely establish the fact that it is possible to conduct precision pattern bombing operations against selected precision targets from altitudes of 20,000 feet to 30,000 feet in the face of anti-aircraft artillery and fighter defenses.

Of 20 missions dispatched by the U.S. Eighth Air Force in that period, 12 have been highly effective. These 12 daylight missions have been directed against a variety of targets, including:

Submarine Bases.
Locomotive Shops.
Power Houses.
Marshalling Yards.
Shipbuilding Yards.
Motor Vehicle And Armament Works
Airplane Engine Factories.

The average number of aircraft dispatched against these targets has been eighty-six.

The destructive effect has, in every case, been highly satisfactory. From this experience it may be definitely accepted that 100 bombers dispatched on each successful mission will provide entirely satisfactory destructive effect of that part of the target area within 1000 feet of the aiming point; and that two-thirds of the missions dispatched each month will be successful to this extent.

In computing the force required, a yardstick of 100 bombers dispatched per target area of 1000 feet about each aiming point has been accepted as a reasonable product of actual experience to date. Each target has been evaluated in terms of these “Target Units”, or the number of 1000 foot radius circles in which this destructive effect must be produced.

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TAB E
GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS AND FORCES REQUIRED

It would be highly desirable to initiate precision bombing attacks against German fighter assembly and engine factories immediately. However, our present force of day bombers is too small to make the deeper penetrations necessary to reach the majority of these factories. Considering the number of German fighters which can be concentrated laterally to meet our bombers on penetration, and again on withdrawal, it is felt that 300 heavy bombers is the minimum operating force necessary to make deep penetrations.

Experience in the Theater to date indicates that at least 800 airplanes must be in the theater to dispatch 300 bombers on operations. (See Tab G). Hence, until the level of U.S. bomber strength in this Theater reaches approximately 800, it will not be feasible to sustain a precision bombing offensive against the German fighter factories. To accomplish the task set forth in Phase I, 944 bombers are required by the end of the period. It is estimated that we will be able to accommodate and train a force of this capacity by July of this year. In the interim every effort should be made to reduce the German fighter force by attack of those fighter factories which can be reached, and by combat under favorable conditions. The repair depots and airdromes are included for the purpose of giving commanders the necessary tactical latitude. Concurrently operations can be conducted against submarine installations within reach and against other targets contributing directly to the principal objectives which are within covering range of our own fighters, or which do not require deep penetration. Some operations will have to be conducted to provide the necessary training for the incoming forces; such operations must be conducted against objectives within the listed categories.

During the next phase, from July to October, in which it is estimated that we will be able to penetrate to a limit of 400 miles, a determined effort must be made to break down the German fighter strength by every means at our disposal, concentrating primarily upon fighter aircraft factories. During this time interim an additional increment of 248 bombers is required so that the strength in the Theater by October should be approximately 1192. This would provide a striking force of 450 bombers at the end of this period. The average striking force during this period would be 400.

During the third phase, the German fighter force must be kept depleted, and the other sources of German strength must also be undermined. During this phase our bombing offensive forces must be adequate to perform all their major tasks.

From October to January an additional increment of 554 bombers is required, bringing the total to 1746. This should provide an operational striking force of 655 bombers at the end of that time. The average striking force during this period will be 550 bombers.

During the last phase - early 1944 - the entire force should be used to sustain the effect already produced and to pave the way for the Combined Operation on the Continent. This will require a force of 2702 heavy bombers.

Estimated effect of precision bombing effort.

Each of the targets to be destroyed has been analysed and translated into terms of the precision bombing effect achieved to date. On this basis the force required and effect expected during each phase is tabulated below.

No computation of size force required has been made in the case of the RAF bomber effort. It is intended that the entire weight of the RAF Bomber Command be employed if necessary to undermine the industrial areas surrounding the selected precision targets.

CHARTS I, II, III AND IV show the joint bombing effort by phase.

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APPLICATION AND EFFECT OF DAYLIGHT STRIKING FORCE BY PHASES

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TAB F
PROJECTED GERMAN FIGHTER STRENGTH

The two graph lines projected on the attached paper are an attempt to convey pictorially the possible future strength of the German fighter force under two separate sets of conditions.

I

Graph Line No. 1 is a projection of the present operational strength of 1704 German fighters increased by 108 planes per month until April 1944. The 108 is the average monthly difference between German new production plus repair and German wastage during the last recorded seven months. It should be noted that this average accretion was accumulated in the face of exceptionally heavy wastage on the Russian, Mediterranean and Western Fronts. It should further be noted that the actual monthly production of new planes increased in this time from 525 in August to 650 in February. It is felt that this projection represents the enemy's capability unless wastage is materially increased or fighter production is decreased by bombing or internal difficulty.

II

Graph Line No. 2 is a a projection based upon two assumptions. The first is a continuance throughout its course of the average German fighter wastage of the last recorded seven months.

The second assumption is the addition to this wastage of two new factors. Factor one is the progressive destruction of German fighter production as envisaged in the four phases of the plan. Factor two is the accelerated rate of combat wastage based upon increase in our sorties and hence our claims.

It is realized that past claims seem high although there is no previous comparable combat experiences against which to measure them. It is also realized at any time the Germans may refuse or alter a continuance of the combat conditions that have produced these claims. For the sake of conservatism therefor in this projection, the additional combat wastage expected of the intensified operations has been arbitrarily computed at the figure of 0.04% or less than ¼ of the figure of 0.17% which is the recorded ratio of claims and sorties to date.

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TAB G
BASIS OF COMPUTATIONS

Rate of Operations

During the Eight months of experience in daylight bombing by the USAAF in this Theater, the following missions have been flown:

Proportion of total bombers in the theater to bombers dispatched per raid during the last three months' experiences:

Average number of effective raids.

A careful analysis of the effect of raids dispatched during the last three months indicates that twelve out of twenty have been highly successful. The remaining eight have produced lesser degrees of success down to and including one which failed entirely to reach the assigned target. Hence, as a conservative conclusion based on actual experience it may be assumed that two thirds of the raids dispatched will be successful against their assigned targets.

COMPUTATION OF BOMBERS REQUIRED