COMPARATIVE VALUE OF TARGETS
|
REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR ASCENDANCY Tab B Japanese Theatre - Appendix J-VI Oil |
|
No. |
Name and Location |
Daily Capacity (bbls.) |
Percent Japan Total |
|
1. |
Pladjoe Refinery - Paleabang |
50,000 |
37.8 |
|
2. |
Mitsubishi Refinery - Kawasaki |
9,000 |
6.8 |
|
3. |
Nippon Refinery - Tsurumi |
7,000 |
5.3 |
|
4. |
Ogura Refinery - Yokohama |
7,000 |
5.8 |
|
5. |
Nippon Refinery - Kudumatsu |
5,500 |
4.2 |
|
6. |
Navy Refinery - Tokuyama |
5,000 |
3.8 |
|
7. |
Manshu Refinery - Dairen |
4,500 |
3.4 |
|
8. |
Nippon Refinery - Amagasaki |
4,000 |
3.0 |
|
9. |
Nippon Refinery - Akita |
4,000 |
3.0 |
|
10. |
Chosen Refinery - Gensan |
4,000 |
3.0 |
|
11. |
Nippon Refinery - Kashiwasaki |
3,500 |
2.6 |
|
12. |
Marusen Refinery - Shimotsu |
3,000 |
2.2 |
|
13. |
Nippon Refinery - Niigata |
3,000 |
2.2 |
|
14. |
Hayama Refinery – Kawasaki |
3,000 |
2.2 |
|
15. |
Ogura Refinery - Tokyo |
3,000 |
2.2 |
|
|
TOTAL |
115,000 |
87.0 |
|
SUMMARY: Japan can obtain ample crude oil from The Netherlands East Indies but has only a small excess of refining capacity, which can easily be made the serious bottleneck in her petroleum position. Storage reserves are sufficient for at least one year, possible some what longer; but without refineries a sustained war effort is impossible. Refineries are highly vulnerable to aerial attack, being easy to identify from the air, very susceptible to damage and requiring considerable time to repair. Since there are generally a large number of storage tanks clustered about each refinery, bombing of the latter automatically entails the destruction of a portion of Japan's reserve stocks. Note particularly that Japanese refining capacity is concentrated in three areas: 1. Palembang, Sumatra – 37.8 % of total capacity 2. Tokyo Bay Area (a) – 24.1 % of total capacity 3. Tokuyama, Kudumatsu, Hiroshima Area (b) – 11.1 % of total capacity TOTAL 73.0% (a) Including three secondary refineries not listed in Target Schedule. (b) Including two secondary refineries not listed in Target Schedule. |
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1. DESCRIPTION OF TARGETS
Oil refineries embody a considerable number of component parts some of which are of very heavy construction, such as the thick walled vertical steel cracking chambers, etc. The main aim would be to destroy completely one of the groups of plants which constitute the bottleneck in the complete continuous process, as for example, the compressor house.
2. NUMBER OF DIRECT HITS AND TYPE OF BOMBS REQUIRED
It is considered that at the least six (6) direct hits with 500 lb. bombs should be obtained on the selected aiming point, which would probably only have an area of about 200' by 100'. It follows that a heavy weight of attack is required upon an area of such small dimensions. As a result, many bombs aimed thereat would fall upon other portions of the plant.
3. NUMBER OF SORTIES AND BOMBER FORCE REQUIRED
Based upon detailed calculations taking into account all operational factors involved in making attacks against highly defended targets with appropriate allowances for probabilities, aiming errors, losses, etc., etc., it appears that in order to deal with the fifteen (15) plants suggested for this system, it will be necessary to have a total of:-
7,920 SORTIES
In order to carry out these sorties in sixty (60) operational days, a force of:-
16 - B 29's and
105 - B 17e’s
must be set up.