BOMBARDMENT AND FIGHTER AVIATION
REQUIRED FOR HEMISPHERE DEFENSE

I. PROBLEM:

To provide for Hemisphere Defense, exclusive of Hawaii and Alaska, by locating at strategic points, the minimum number of Bombardment and Fighter units capable of performing that mission during the conduct of our offensive against the Germans and Japanese.

II. MISSION:

To protect our vital economic and military objectives against carrier, or flying deck, based air attacks, by defending the Continental United States, the Northern Ferry Route to the United Kingdom, the approaches to the Panama Canal, and the bulge of Brazil.

III. FORCE REQUIRED:

a. 12¼ Groups of Bombardment, with a total of 800 airplanes, which includes a 25% reserve, and requires a monthly replacement at 5% per month of 34 airplanes.

b. 15¼ Groups of Fighters, with a total of 1,904 airplanes, which includes a 25% reserve, and requires a monthly replacement at 5% per month of 74 airplanes.

c. Totals comprise 27½ Groups, with 2,704 airplanes, which includes a 25% reserve. Monthly replacements at 5% per month are 108 airplanes.

IV. DISCUSSION:

a. To the Northern Ferry Route to United Kingdom is assigned in Iceland, Greenland, and Newfoundland 2 Bombardment and 1¾ Fighter Groups. These will normally be disposed by squadrons, capable of reinforcement by units in the Foreign Concentration Area.

b. The Continental United States is assigned 4 Bombardment and 4 Fighter Groups, equally divided between the East and West Coasts. These can be augmented by units undergoing operational training, and units in the Foreign Concentration Area.

c. The Puerto Rico-Trinidad Area is allotted 2 Bombardment and 3 Fighter Groups. This should be essentially a mobile defense for Bombardment, with Fighter Squadrons stationed on the smaller islands.

d. Panama contains the heaviest concentration; 2 Bombardment and 4 Fighter Groups, because of the necessity of guarding both coasts, and the necessity for continual fighter alert against carrier raids against the Canal.

e. South America is assigned 2 Bombardment and 1½ Fighter Groups, with the heaviest weight naturally located in the strategic bulge of Brazil.

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AIR OPERATIONS - ANTI-SUBMARINE.

1. Defensive Anti-submarine air operations are divided, into two categories: Offensive patrol and. air convoy escort.

a. Offensive patrols are carried out from Cape Sable, Nova Scotia, to Trinidad in the Caribbean,

b. Air convoy escorts are carried out on the North Atlantic shipping route to England and along the coast of South America from Trinidad to Natal.

2. The experience of the Army Air Forces in the conduct of antisubmarine operations has brought out certain important features in connection with these operations. First, it is possible to predict with a high order of accuracy the areas in which submarine activities will be concentrated. This prediction is carried out by radio intercept of messages sent by individual submarines well out in the Atlantic, It has proved a remarkably reliable means of plotting the course of the majority of the submarines operating in the Atlantic. Second, a high degree of mobility of the offensive air patrol forces is essential in order that they may be shifted to cover these concentration areas. The problem of anti-submarine operations on the East coast of the United States and in the Caribbean is really a single operating problem and should not be complicated by artificial jurisdictional command borders. On at least one occasion a concentration of submarines in the Caribbean was predicted several days in advance, but the necessary air forces could not be concentrated in time because of the necessity for passing through several chains of command, including different zones of responsibility of the Army and of the Navy.

3. It is estimated that 20 squadrons of Heavy Bombers plus 4 squadrons of Medium Bombers, all airplanes equipped with ASV and magnetic detectors (medium squadrons operating in the Gulf) are adequate to make submarine operations unprofitable in the area west of a line from Cape Sable to 300 miles east of Trinidad. The operating force, however, must be free to move anywhere in the area and have suitable base facilities from which to operate, (See – Plan of Operation). It is essential that the force have absolute freedom of operation in order to fully exploit its mobility in combatting submarine concentrations, which can be predicted by following submarine movements with radio intercepts.

4. If the Army participation in anti-submarine operations is increased to encompass a responsibility from Natal to Iceland, it is estimated that another 10 squadrons of Heavy Bombers will be required for convoy escort outside of the area of offensive patrol. Due to adverse weather conditions obtaining over the North Atlantic, it is not believed that air operations there will have more than a fraction of the effectiveness that they now have in the Western Atlantic.

5. It is not visualized that submarines will become a serious problem on the West Coast or in the Southwest Pacific due to the distances involved to the nearest Japanese bases. Except in the Western Atlantic and around England, it is believed that submarines will be combatted by surface means.

6. August sinkings within the area of operation of the First Bomber Command were 3, a decrease of 10 from the monthly average of 13 from December 1941 to May 1942. During August, there ware just as many submarines operating but they were in other waters as is evident from the total of 47 sinkings in American waters within range of aircraft. The inference is that air anti-submarine operations are effective in combatting the submarine menace, although this cannot be proven until an adequate force with absolute freedom of movement is provided for offensive patrols to force the submarines to enter the area of our patrols in order to attack our shipping.

7. While the number of probable submarine sinkings by airplane attacks are relatively few, the airplane does drive the submarine under the surface and by continuous patrol can make submarine operations within a given area unprofitable even though the submarines are not actually destroyed. Due to the fact that the submarines surface at night, night operations against submarines with ASV equipped airplanes is more profitable than daylight missions, and it is believed that results in night operations will improve rapidly as the percentage of ASV equipped airplanes increases. (Night attacks are made by the use of ASV equipment alone.)

8. Whereas heavy bombers are far more effective in this operation than a like number of medium bombers would be, nevertheless in this plan medium bombers are provided in order to release the heavy bombers for the important task of conducting the air offensive directly against the enemy, including the attack of submarine building-yards and operating bases. The heavy bombers set up for normal hemisphere defense duties might be employed to supplement the mediums in the conduct of air convoy escorts in the Atlantic.

RESULTS OF FIRST BOMBER COMMAND ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS DURING JUNE, JULY AND AUGUST.
	Airplane Missions	Sightings	Attacks	Night Attacks	Probable Sinkings	Night Sinkings
June	2,160	19	29		6
July	2,688	24	15	2	8	1
August	2,551	14	8	1	5
NOTE: ASV equipment is just getting into operation now. While a limited number of planes have had the equipment installed, operational difficulties have made it of little value to date.

REQUIREMENTS IN AIRPLANES DURING 1943 FOR ANTI-SUBMARINE OPERATIONS
Offensive Patrols	DESIRED		Provided in this Plan Medium Bombers
	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers
Trinidad to Cape Sable 20 sq HB @ 12 planes per sq.	240		22 sq = 352
Trinidad to Cape Sable 4 sq MB @ 16 planes per sq.		64
Convoy Escort	DESIRED		Provided in this Plan Medium Bombers
	Heavy Bombers	Medium Bombers
Cape Sable to Iceland 6 sq HB @ 12 planes per sq.	72		10 sq = 160
Trinidad to Natal 4 sq HB @ 12 planes per sq.	48
TOTAL	360	64	512
NOTE: Heavy Bombers are more desirable for anti-submarine operations in all areas except the Gulf due to the inefficiency of the shorter range Medium and the necessity of following the submarine to sea when they move out beyond the range of the Medium. (Mediums can be used in the Gulf) Both Heavy and Medium Bombers must be equipped with ASV and Magnetic detectors. See Discussion Note A