REQUIREMENTS FOR AIR ASCENDANCY Tab B |
AIR OPERATIONS IN THE JAPANESE THEATER
In accordance with the agreed general strategy of the United Nations, the air operations contemplated in the Japanese Theater in 1943 and early 1944 are in pursuit of the Strategic Defensive. However, it is appreciated that some limited offensive operations are necessary in order to gain base areas suitable for the ultimate offensive against Japan.
The reopening of the Burma road is also recognised as a proper necessary step in sustaining China. There is also a recognised need for land-based aviation for the defense of Alaska, the Island Chain to Australia, and Australia itself. Hence provision is made for all the land-based medium and heavy bombers considered necessary for the air support of the U.S. Navy and Army in the conduct of amphibious operations from Australia as a base, for the support of United Nations land forces operating from India and China as bases, and for the defense of Alaska. Hawaii, the Island Chain, and Australia.
Adequate fighter forces (land-based) are also provided. It is anticipated that considerable land-based dive bomber forces will be provided by the U.S. Marine Corps, and that adequate carrier forces will be provided by the U.S. Navy.
North Pacific
The air forces in Alaska and the Aleutian Islands are primarily for defensive operations. A strong reconnaissance unit for employment over the water has been provided and a striking force of heavy and medium bombardment is made available to attack any targets located. A single fighter group to furnish defense for the key bases is also provided. One transport group is required to insure that communications are maintained. The weather in this theater is definitely a limiting factor and seriously curtails operations.
Central Pacific
(Includes Midway, Hawaiian Islands, Johnston, Palmyra and Christmas)
Hawaii is the main base of the U.S. Fleet west of the continental United States and its security is of primary importance. For this reason a strong air force balanced between local defense forces and reconnaissance and striking units has been provided. The necessity for insuring the security of the advanced base at Midway and of the islands on the line of communication to Australia also demands a considerable force for these bases. Some aircraft for the direct support of the ground forces has been included in order that these ground units may operate at maximum efficiency. A part of the long range aircraft of this area are considered as available to support the North and South Pacific.
South Pacific
(Includes Canton, Bora Bora, Tutuila, Upolu, Savaii,
Wallis, Viti Levu, Tonga Tabu,
New Caledonia, Efate, Espiritu
Santu, Guadalcanal, New Zealand)
If the line of communication from Hawaii to Australia is to be maintained, the individual bases scattered from the equator near Christmas Island to New Caledonia must be retained. To accomplish this purpose, air forces of two types have been supplied, first, local forces to provide fighter protection, short range reconnaissance, and close support bombing; second, a long range, mobile force capable of moving rapidly along the island chain to search out and attack in some strength any enemy units which may threaten our lines of communication.
These long range forces obviously serve to supplement our naval surface forces in the area and form a reserve for employment in the Central or Southwest Pacific.
Southwest Pacific
In this area it is necessary to provide an air force for defensive as well as for offensive operations. Contact with the enemy is continuous and the enemy is especially active. Units have been provided for a local defense at several points, for direct support of the ground forces, for direct support of naval forces and for operations of strategic nature. In addition the extremely long distances involved and scarcity of surface transportation make communication and supply such a major problem that a large number of transport aircraft have been furnished. Shortage of air base facilities at the proper places will limit the number of aircraft that can be brought to bear on the enemy. However, since the action is continuous it is believed advisable to provide sufficient units to permit relief and rotation of organisations at frequent intervals. Logistic difficulties will develop due to distance from supply sources but these will have to be overcome by use of air transport and by construction of supply depots where required.
Pacific Attack Forces
For the seizure of air and naval bases and for support of surface forces, particularly of the naval forces, a mobile organisation is required. Such a requirement has been set up by the U.S. Navy in its plans for April 1944. The Heavy and Medium bombers needed for this force are provided by the Army Air Forces.
India - Burma - China - Ceylon
In this theater operation will be jointly conducted by the British and Chinese ground forces with the possible assistance of a small contingent of U.S. Army troops. Air support will come principally from the U.S. and British air units with a small amount of aid from the Chinese Air Force. A major ground effort is required to reopen the Burma Road and adequate air support is mandatory. In view of the difficult terrain and lack of communications, great dependence must be placed in air transport.
Eastern Siberia
The availability of Eastern Siberia as a base is highly questionable. However, the forces required there should be provided for, in case it does become possible to exploit such an advantage. Eastern Siberia is suitable as an air base for strategic bombing of Japan. The offensive portion of this force is covered elsewhere in the paper but it will be necessary to move in a ground and air defensive force capable of supporting the strategic bombardment units. For this reason air units should be prepared to exploit this advantage of position. Japanese retaliatory measures, both ground and air may be expected and the Joint U.S. and Russian forces must be strong enough to prevent loss of the air bases within range of Honshu. A maximum amount of air transport must be furnished to insure logistic support. Since Russian forces will probably fight alongside the U.S. troops and form the bulk of the ground forces, and since supply of aircraft from European sources will no doubt be severed, we must plan to provide all the aircraft to be used in this theater.
AIRCRAFT REQUIREMENTS
North Pacific |
||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
Heavy bombers |
48 |
|
Medium Bombers |
32 |
|
Fighters Day Single Seat |
100 |
|
Patrol Bomber Boat Medium |
|
72 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 1 Eng |
|
24 |
Transports |
52 |
|
Total |
232 |
96 |
Central Pacific |
||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
Heavy Bombers |
96 |
|
Medium Bombers |
64 |
|
Light Bombers |
|
48 |
Scout Dive Bombers |
72 |
42 |
Observation |
126 |
|
Fighters Day Single Seat |
350 |
72 |
Fighters Night Multiseat |
|
12 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Heavy |
|
72 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Medium |
|
24 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 2 Eng |
|
24 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 1 Eng |
|
30 |
Transport |
52 |
12 |
Total |
760 |
336 |
South Pacific |
|||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
RNZAF |
Heavy Bombers |
48 |
|
|
Medium Bombers |
16 |
|
|
Light Bombers |
|
24 |
|
Scout/Dive Bombers |
96 |
40 |
40 |
Observation Army and Fleet Coop |
42 |
|
72 |
Fighters Day Single Seat |
300 |
72 |
126 |
Fighters Night Multiseat |
|
12 |
|
Patrol Bomber Boat Heavy |
|
24 |
|
Patrol Bomber Land Light 2 Eng |
|
|
81 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 1 Eng |
|
48 |
12 |
Transports |
26 |
8 |
|
Total |
528 |
228 |
331 |
Southwest Pacific |
||||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
RAAF |
NEI |
Heavy Bombers |
240 |
|
|
|
Medium Bombers |
192 |
|
|
18 |
Scout/Dive Bombers |
192 |
|
216 |
|
Torpedo Bombers |
|
|
72 |
|
Observation Army and Fleet Coop |
168 |
|
115 |
|
Fighters Day and Single Seat |
600 |
|
288 |
24 |
Photo |
52 |
|
|
|
Fighters Day Multiseat |
|
|
168 |
|
Patrol Bombers Boat Medium |
|
36 |
45 |
|
Patrol Bombers Land Light 2 Eng |
|
|
126 |
|
Transports |
312 |
|
81 |
|
Total |
1,756 |
36 |
1,111 |
42 |
Pacific Attack Forces |
||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
Heavy Bombers |
144 |
|
Medium Bombers |
128 |
|
Light Bombers |
|
24 |
Scout/Dive Bombers |
|
352 |
Observation |
|
36 |
Fighters Day Single Seat |
300 |
447 |
Fighters Night Multiseat |
|
36 |
Photo |
52 |
24 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Heavy |
|
48 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Medium |
|
180 |
Transports |
52 |
108 |
Total |
676 |
1,255 |
India - Burma - China - Ceylon |
|||
|
U.S. Army |
British |
Chinese |
Heavy Bombers |
96 |
18 |
|
Medium Bombers |
128 |
36 |
64 |
Light Bombers |
64 |
198 |
|
Scout/Dive Bombers |
|
28 |
|
Torpedo Bombers |
|
80 |
|
Observation |
|
28 |
|
Photo |
52 |
|
|
Fighters Day Single Seat |
300 |
288 |
150 |
Fighters Day Multiseat |
|
72 |
|
Patrol Bomber Boat Medium |
|
108 |
|
Patrol Bomber Land Medium |
|
40 |
|
Patrol Bomber Land Light 2 Eng |
|
40 |
|
Transports |
312 |
100 |
|
Total |
952 |
1,036 |
214 |
Reserve Force for Eastern Siberia |
||
|
U.S. Army |
Russia |
Medium Bombers |
128 |
100 |
Light Bombers |
64 |
50 |
Scout/Dive Bombers |
96 |
100 |
Observation |
84 |
50 |
Photo |
52 |
|
Fighters Day Single Seat |
600 |
600 |
Transports |
26 |
100 |
Total |
1,050 |
1,000 |
RECAPITULATION |
|||||
|
U.S. Army |
U.S. Navy |
British |
China |
Total |
Heavy Bombers |
672 |
|
18 |
|
690 |
Medium Bombers |
688 |
|
36 |
182 |
906 |
Light Bombers |
128 |
96 |
198 |
50 |
472 |
Scout/Dive Bombers |
456 |
434 |
284 |
100 |
1,274 |
Torpedo Bombers |
|
|
152 |
|
152 |
Observation |
420 |
36 |
215 |
50 |
721 |
Fighters Day Single Seat |
2,550 |
591 |
702 |
774 |
4,617 |
Fighters Day Multiseat |
|
|
240 |
|
240 |
Fighters Night Multiseat |
|
60 |
|
|
60 |
Photo |
208 |
24 |
|
|
232 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Heavy |
|
144 |
|
|
144 |
Patrol Bomber Boat Medium |
|
312 |
153 |
|
465 |
Patrol Bomber Land Medium |
|
|
40 |
|
40 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 2 Eng |
|
24 |
247 |
|
271 |
Patrol Bomber Land Light 1 Eng |
|
102 |
12 |
|
114 |
Transports |
832 |
128 |
181 |
100 |
1,241 |
Total |
5,954 |
1,951 |
2,478 |
1,256 |
11,639 |