SPECIAL MARINE CORPS UNITS
OF WORLD WAR II
HISTORY AND
MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U.S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON,
D.C.
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U. S. MARINE CORPS SPECIAL UNITS OF WORLD WAR II
By
Charles
L. Updegraph, Jr.
HISTORY
AND MUSEUMS DIVISION
HEADQUARTERS, U. S. MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON,
D. C.
Printed
1972
Reprinted 1977
PCN 19000413200
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DEPARTMENT
OF THE NAVY
HEADQUARTERS UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS
WASHINGTON.
D. C. 20380
FOREWORD
"Special
Marine Units of World War II" is a brief narrative of
experimental special purpose units organized by the Marine Corps
for World War II. It is published for the information of those
interested in the special units and the events in which they
participated.
Charles L.
Updegraph, Jr., has been on the staff of the Historical Division
since June 1971. Previously he had occupied a variety of staff
positions with Headquarters, United States Air Force. He received
his B. A. with Honors in United States History from Hobart College
in 1964. In 1969 he was awarded a M. A. in International Affairs
from the School of Public and International Affairs of the George
Washington University.
In the
interest of accuracy and objectivity the Historical Division
welcomes comments from key participants, Marine Corps activities,
and interested individuals on this pamphlet.
/S/
E.
H. SIMMONS
Brigadier General, U. S. Marine Corps
Director of
Marine Corps History and Museums
Reviewed and
approved:
|
PREFACE
During World War
II, a variety of new and experimental units were organized by Marine
Corps to enhance the capabilities of the Corps. For the first time
under one cover, this historical reference pamphlet tells of the
development, deployment, and eventual demise of the five types of
special units: raiders, parachutists, glider forces, barrage balloon
squadrons, and base defense battalions. Official records of the
Marine Corps and appropriate historical works were utilized in
compiling this chronicle.
Final editing of
the manuscript was accomplished by Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Chief
Historian and Head, Histories Section, Historical Branch. Miss Kay P.
Sue typed the final draft. Maps were prepared by Sergeant Jerry L.
Jakes. All illustrations are official Department of Defense
photographs from the files of the Combat Pictorial Branch, G-3
Division of this Headquarters.
/S/
CHARLES
L. UPDEGRAPH, JR.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Foreword
Preface
Table
of Contents
Introduction
The
Raider Battalions
Marine Parachute Battalions
The Glider
Group
Barrage Balloon Squadrons
Defense
Battalions
Conclusion
Footnotes
Appendix A - Unit
Commanding Officers
Appendix B - Unit Battle Honors
Appendix C
- Unit Tables of Organization (T/O)
Appendix D - Unit Tables of
Equipment (T/E)
Appendix E - U. S. Naval Ships Named for Men of
the 1st Raider Battalion
Introduction
Among the
proudest traditions of the United States Marine Corps is the legend
"First to Fight." This recognized ability to deploy
effective forces in a minimum of time to meet any contingency is not
easily maintained. It requires a careful evaluation of international
trends and a constant reappraisal of the tactics and forces necessary
to meet any crisis. The types of forces which must be maintained, and
the structure of these forces, must be reviewed and updated.
During the middle
and late 1930s, concurrently with the Japanese expansion into
northern China, the Marine Corps studied and refined its amphibious
doctrine. Subsequently, the Corps stepped up its experimentation with
new theories and methods to meet world-wide contingencies. Especially
in the aftermath of the outbreak of war in Europe, the United States
military establishment undertook a reexamination of its resources and
capabilities. The Marines were among the most aggressive when it came
to adapting current forces to future requirements.
A number of the
units which emerged from this period, and from the early war years,
were either overtaken by events during the course of the war, or
never lived up to their original promise. In these cases, the Marine
Corps reorganized or disbanded the units as dictated by the tactical
requirements. This monograph traces the origin, formation,
deployment, and eventual demise of five such units.
The Raider Battalions (1)
Throughout the
decade of the Thirties, the Marine Corps experimented with the
concept of raider-type forces, generally as elements of larger
operations. The annual Fleet Landing Exercises (FLEXs) included
deployment of raiding and patrolling parties, generally operating
from high speed transports and destroyers, going ashore in rubber
boats. The continuing interests in these units was demonstrated by
the formation of "Provisional Rubber Boat Companies" from
Companies A, E, and I of the 7th Marines during FLEX-7 in February
1941. Reconnaissance patrols and landing raids had been discussed
extensively in the first "Tentative Landing Manual"
compiled in 1935.
The idea matured
during the two years prior to U.S. entry into the war. The British
commandos executed raids against German installations on the European
continent and in Africa. The raids suggested a certain audacity which
had an immediate appeal in the United States, especially after Pearl
Harbor, during the six months when American fortunes were very low.
Among those intrigued by the idea of forming a U.S. version of the
commandos was President Roosevelt. Only a month after Pearl Harbor,
Captain James Roosevelt, USMCR, the President's son, wrote to the
Commandant of the Marine Corps proposing the formation of a unit "for
purposes similar to the British Commandos and the Chinese
Guerrillas."(2) Roosevelt noted the successes of the British in
Europe and of the guerrillas operating with the Chinese (Communist)
Eighth Route Army in northern China. Especially in China it was
observed that these tactics were devasting when the Japanese lines
became extended. The line of Japanese-occupied islands in the Pacific
which threatened U.S. contract with Australia-New Zealand presented
an obvious parallel as an inviting target for raider operations.
Roosevelt continued:
It is submitted that the position of our forces in the
Pacific would be greatly aided by similar action on Japanese
positions in the Mandated Islands, and perhaps later the Philippines
by units based to the South; even more devastating action frontly by
landing on Japan proper from Mito north to Aomori would certainly
demoralize the enemy. (3)
The Marine Corps
already had taken steps to initiate a program. On 6 January 1942, the
1st Battalion, 5th Marines was redesignated the 1st Separate
Battalion and was transferred from the 1st Marine Division to
Amphibious Force, Atlantic Fleet, there to be available for the
execution of individual raids or to operate as part of a larger
force. Concurrently, Major General Thomas Holcomb, Commandant of the
Marine Corps, noted the similarity to the British commandos but
directed that the term "Marine" was alone sufficient "to
indicate a man ready for duty at any time and that the injection of a
special name, such as Commando, would be undesirable and
superfluous." General Holcomb went on to state:
The organization, equipment, and training of infantry
units of the Marine Divisions should, in practically all respects, be
identical to that of the 'Commandos'.... In general, it may be stated
that the training of all units in the two Marine Divisions prepares
them to carry out either offensive operations on a large-scale, or
small-scale amphibious raids of the type carried out by 'the
Commandos.'
On 14 January
1942, the Commandant of the Marine Corps advised the Commanding
General, Amphibious Force, Atlantic (Major General Holland M. Smith)
and the Commanding General, Department of the Pacific (Major General
Charles F. B. Price) of a proposal to appoint Colonel William J.
Donovan, USA, to brigadier general USMCR with duty as commanding
officer of the raider project. Both generals were requested to
comment on the proposal, and both used the opportunity to comment
generally on the entire raider concept.
General Smith
recommended against the appointment of Donovan on grounds that the
Marine Corps should not have to go outside of its ranks to secure
leaders. He also opposed the raider concept on philosophical grounds,
noting that all Amphibious Force, Atlantic Marines could be trained
in raiding techniques by their own officers if it were deemed
important. (4) General Smith noted that there were enough
"by-products" in the Corps and that "all Amphibious
Force Marines are considered as commandos," thereby expressing a
view that would become increasingly common among senior Marine
officers, namely, that there was no task that the "elite"
raider units could perform any more effectively than regular line
units.
General Price's
reply noted that the rapid expansion of the Marine Corps was
resulting in an extreme shortage of qualified officers and senior
NCOs with the requisite command experience. He therefore concurred
with the raider concept only if the personnel were recruited directly
rather than by drawing on already thin Corps resources.(5)
On 4 February
1942, the Commanding General, Amphibious Force Pacific Fleet, in
response to a Commander in Chief Pacific Fleet directive, ordered the
formation of four companystrength raider units. Concurrently, the
Commandant of the Marine Corps ordered organization of the 2d
Separate Battalion on the west coast. The 2d Separate Battalion
designation was thus assigned to the then-organizing raider
companies. In order to comply with CinCPacFlt's directive that four
companies be formed, a reinforced company was detached from the 1st
Separate Battalion at Quantico and reassigned to the 2d Separate
Battalion.
In early
February, General Holcomb wrote to General Smith, acknowledging the
latter's letter, and offering some details on the matter of
appointing Donovan.(*)
[* – Donovan was subsequently selected to be Chief
of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), the wartime forerunner of
the CIA.]
Apparently the
impetus for this appointment originated with a "very high
authority" and only the Commandant's "utter disapproval"
stayed the matter. It was apparent that the Marine Corps' expanded
interest in raider units was at least partly the result of intense
high-level political pressure. General Holcomb stated:
...we must act and act quickly. We must prepare
ourselves particularly for one of our most important missions, viz.;
the execution of amphibious raids.... in view of the situation now
facing us, it is imperative that we intensify this type of
training....(6)
In a similar
letter to Major General Clayton B. Vogel, Commanding General, 2d
Joint Training Force (subsequently redesignated Amphibious Force,
Pacific), the Commandant stated :
From this long letter I am sure you and all others
concerned will appreciate the importance of getting this project
underway immediately. It is really a matter of grave concern to me,
as it may have a very important influence on our future. (7)
In a move at
least partly precipitated by a desire to avoid a political appointee
as leader of the raider units, Lieutenant Colonels Merritt A. Edson
and Evans F. Carlson were designated to command the two battalions.
Edson had served in France in World War I, had been a Marine pilot,
captain of the Marine Rifle and Pistol Team, and an observer of the
Sino-Japanese hostilities around Chapei, China. Carlson had travelled
extensively with the Chinese (Communist) Eighth Route Army guerrillas
and had observed their tactics and organization. The executive
officer of Edson's 1st Raider Battalion was Major Samuel B. Griffith
who had observed the British commando training program.
The basic mission
of the two new raider units was threefold: to be the spearhead of
amphibious landings by larger forces on beaches generally thought to
be inaccessible; to conduct raiding expeditions requiring great
elements of surprise and high speed; and to conduct guerrilla type
operations for protracted periods behind enemy lines.
The 1st Separate
Battalion was redesignated the 1st Raider Battalion, Amphibious
Force, Atlantic Fleet on 16 February 1942. It was organized initially
with a headquarters company and four rifle companies; in a
reshuffling two days later a fifth rifle company was formed, but the
total reverted to four in a later reorganization. Lieutenant Colonel
Edson was commanding officer.
The 2d Separate
Battalion, then forming at Camp Elliott in San Diego, was
redesignated the 2d Raider Battalion, Amphibious Force, Pacific Fleet
on 19 February 1942. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson was commanding
officer and Major James Roosevelt was his executive officer. The 2d
Raider Battalion remained in California in training throughout the
spring. During the spring, high-level interests in the raider project
was maintained. In a personal note of 27 March, the Chief of Naval
Operations, Admiral Ernest J. King, asked General Holcomb for
information on the status of the raider units.(8) The Commandant was
able to report on noticable progress.
The
1st Raider Battalion had split into forward and rear echelons. The
former, with 29 officers and 638 men and full equipment left Quantico
on 1 April en route to Samoa via San Diego. Embarking on the USS
Zeilin
(AP-9)
on 12 April, it arrived in Samoa on 28 April. The rear echelon, under
Major Griffith, remained at Quantico until June when, after
conducting extensive landing exercises, it moved to San Diego and
embarked on the USS Heywood
(AP-12)
for Samoa. By early July, 1942, all elements of the 1st Raider
Battalion were in Samoa and ready for assignment.
The 2d Raider
Battalion had completed its basic training in mid-April. On 23 April,
Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, Commander in Chief, Pacific notified
Admiral King that the battalion was trained and ready to move to
Hawaii for advanced instruction in rubber boat operations and
landings from submarines. The battalion, minus Companies C and D,
arrived and disembarked at Pearl Harbor on 17 May 1942. Companies C
and D were detached and sent to reinforce the Marine units on Midway
where they participated in the battle of Midway, 4-6 June 1942, while
attached to the 6th Defense Battalion.
Following the
departure of the raiders after Stateside training, a number of views
emerged on whether these units were necessary and, if so, how they
should be organized and utilized. Writing some time after the event,
General Alexander A. Vandegrift, at the time Commanding General of
the 1st Marine Division, recalled the formation of the raider units:
...we progressed well in further filling, equipping,
and training the units [of the 1st Marine Division], But now the
first blow fell. Merritt Edson, armed with appropriate orders,
arrived to comb our units for officers and men deemed suitable for
his 1st Raider Battalion---a new organization. I had known about the
raiders in Washington. Neither General Holcomb nor I favored forming
elite units from units already elite. But Secretary of the Navy
Colonel Frank Knox and President Roosevelt, both of whom fancied the
British commandos, directed us to come up with a similar
organization....
Before forming the raiders we sent two young captains,
Sam Griffith and Wally Greene, to England to observe the
Commandos--largely on the basis of their recommendations General
Holcomb authorized two raider battalions, one under Merritt Edson on
the east coast and one under Evans Carlson on the west coast. Edson's
levy against our division, coming at such a critical time, annoyed
the devil out of me, but there wasn't one earthly thing I could do
about it. (9)
In addition to
disrupting personnel and training in regular units, the formation of
raider battalions generated a variety of requests for new and exotic
equipment. Typical requests were for riot type shotguns, Lewis
machine guns, collapsible bicycles, chain saws, scaling ropes, rubber
boats, bangalore torpedoes, and sufficient automatic pistols to issue
one per raider.(10)
Edson discussed
the armament of raider battalions in a letter to the Commandant in
April.(11) He compared the 81mm mortar with the 60mm, generally
favoring the latter. He noted that the inclusion of an 81mm mortar
platoon would exceed the capacity of an APD--high speed transport--(a
recurring parameter in raider organization was the carrying capacity
of an APD which was envisioned as the standard raider transport. To
exceed this capacity would require splitting companies among several
ships with the resulting disadvantages). Furthermore, because of its
greater weight, the 81mm would be less suited to contemplated
operations. The supply of ammunition would be an especially severe
problem in fast-moving actions. Edson suggested that, if it was felt
that the 81mm was indispensable, it be carried in the Weapons Company
minus personnel. It could then be operated by the 60mm personnel when
required in stable situations. Edson also suggested that the Browning
Automatic Rifle (BAR) used by squad leaders in the 60mm mortar
platoon be replaced with pistols or M-1 carbines because the weight
of the BAR plus ammunition would be too great if the squad leaders
were also carrying the mortar base plate, cleaning brush, and field
glasses.
Major Griffith,
while with the rear echelon of the 1st Raider Battalion at Quantico,
also discussed battalion organization. (12) Griffith compared the
organization of the 1st Raider Battalion (four line companies, a weapons company and a headquarters
company) with that of the 2d Raider Battalion (six line companies and
a headquarters company). The arrangement of the 2d Raider Battalion
was thought to be more conducive to raider operations, especially
with a weapons platoon in each company. Ideally, Griffith felt that a
raider battalion should be organized around six line companies and a
headquarters and service company which could be split, one element to
each company. Each company would include two rifle platoons, a
weapons platoon, and a company headquarters. The platoons would be
composed of three squads, each of which would include a squad leader
and three-man fire teams. The fire teams would be armed with BAR, an
M-1 rifle, and a Thompson submachine gun. This would permit engaging
an enemy at up to 500 yards with the M-1 and the BAR, while having
the support of the Thompson at close range or in street fighting.
These views
reflect one of the greatest assets of the raider battalions, namely a
constant reappraisal of troop organization, and an ability to realign
forces either permanently or for specific short-term objectives. The
raider units were characterized by intense review of weapons and
tactics and a willingness to adapt to rapidly changing circumstances.
Raider operations were envisioned as requiring forces in increments
of company strength, hence the alignment around a company base of
fire by organizing weapons platoons in each company.
By the summer of
1942, both raider battalions were in the field, preparing for the
types of missions they had been trained to undertake. Within weeks,
the 1st Raider Battalion would go ashore at Tulagi during the
Guadalcanal landings while the 2d Raider Battalion would carry out
the diversionary raid on Makin Island.
General
Vandegrift, Commanding General, 1st Marine Division split the
Guadalcanal force into two groups. One, under Vandegrift, would
execute the main landings at Lunga Point on Guadalcanal. The other,
under Brigadier General William H. Rupertus, Assistant Division
Commander, would land across the Sealark Channel in the Florida
Island group. General Rupertus' force consisted of the 1st Raider
Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Edson), the 1st Provisional Battalion
(Major Robert H. Williams), and the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines
(Lieutenant Colonel Harold E. Rosecrans).
Tulagi is an
island in Gavutu Harbor which is formed by the irregular southern
coast of Florida Island. Surrounded on three sides by large coral
beds, Tulagi is a long, narrow, hilly, heavily wooded mass. It is
approximately 4,000 yards long by 1,000 yards wide. The axis is
roughly northwest to southeast and the northern two-thirds is
dominated by a wooded 350-foot-high spine. A lesser ridge, separated
from the larger by a saddle depression, sits astride the southeastern
end. The island had been the seat of the British Solomon Islands
Government and most development was centered around the southeastern
tip and in the saddle.
The initial
landing, spearhead by Companies B and D of the 1st Raider Battalion,
was made at 0800 on 7 August 1942 near the western tip. The Japanese
apparently were not expecting a landing to occur at this point
because of heavy coral outcroppings, and the assault was unopposed.
This was fortunate as the landing craft hung up on the reef, some 30
to 100 yards from the beach. All assault troops had to wade ashore in
water up to armpit depth. Companies B and D landed without incident
and were followed by Companies A, C, and E. Following the occupation
of the native village of Sasapi, the battalion deployed in a line
across the ridge. Company B extended from the waterline on the north
coast to a point halfway up the ridge where it intersected the left
flank of Company D, which in turn extended to the crest. On the
southern slopes of the ridge, Company A took up position, its right
flank intersected Company C which filled the line down and rearward
to the waterline on the south coast. Company E, with the 60mm
mortars, took up positions near the landing area and provided beach
security. The line advanced against sporadic resistance until it
reached the area separating the wooded ridge from the cultivated
saddle. Here resistance mounted, especially in front of the Company C
sector, but was overcome with small arms fire and grenades.
The most serious
opposition developed in a ravine located in the smaller, southeastern
ridge. The ravine was parallel to the line of advance and was
defended so as to enfilade approaching forces. Edson decided to go
into positions for the night outside the ravine as darkness was
approaching.
The first night
on Tulagi set the pattern for many others to follow during the
Pacific War. The enemy launched four separate attacks against the
raider lines, occasionally making minor penetrations. In each case
the Japanese failed to consolidate their position and did not exploit
the gain.
On the morning of
8 August, the ravine was flanked on both sides by raider units and in
the rear by Companies E and F of the 2d Battalion, 5th Marines which
had moved up during the night. From these positions a heavy
concentration of 60mm mortar rounds from the raiders' weapons and
heavier 81mm fire from the mortars of 2/5 was directed against the
enemy defenses. At 1500 the raiders rushed the ravine and cleanedup
all remaining resistance. Tulagi was secure by nightfall, 8 August
1942.
The next raider
operation, the Makin Island action of 1718 August 1942, was intended
primarily as a diversion, upsetting Japanese plans to reinforce
Guadalcanal and hopefully forcing the enemy to divert some of those
reinforcements to the relief of the Makin garrison. The raiders would
also gather valuable intelligence and destroy enemy personnel and
installations on Makin.
Makin Island is
an atoll in the Gilberts, roughly triangular in shape, running
northeast to southwest. Butaritari, the principal island, is located
at the southwest point, just below the main lagoon entrance, and is
approximately eight miles long by less than one-half mile wide. The
entire island was covered by a thick growth of coconut palms which
extended to the waterline. The landing was scheduled for the ocean
(south) side of the island.
The raiding force
was under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, commanding
officer of the 2d Raider Battalion. The force was composed of Company
A (less one rifle section) under Lieutenant Merwyn C. Plumley and
Company B (less one rifle section) under Captain Ralph H. Coyte.
Denoted Task Unit 7.15.3, the raiding party totaled 13 officers and
208 enlisted men.
The
raiders embarked on the transport submarines
USS Nautilus
(SS-168)
and USS Argonaut
(APS-1)
and departed Pearl Harbor at 0900, 8 August 1942. The two subs
separated at nightfall and proceeded independently because the
Nautilus
was required to arrive off Makin early enough to make a periscope
reconnaissance. There was no contact with enemy shipping en route,
and almost the entire voyage was made on the surface. The Nautilus
made
landfall at 0300 on 16 August and conducted a submerged
reconnaissance of both the primary and secondary landing sites
although strong tides and a lack of distinguishing features
complicated the task. A successful rendezvous was effected with the
Argonaut
at
2116 (16 August) in a heavy
rain squall.
The
two subs moved to the debarkation point, arriving at 0300 under
scattered clouds. The unloading was complicated by a one and one-half
knot westward current which pulled the subs in toward the reef and
required a constant reverse to maintain a 500-yard distance. All
rubber boats were cleared on schedule despite confusion resulting
from heavy swells and a last minute requirement that several boats
launched from Argonaut
pick
up landing force personnel from Nautilus.
Voice communications were very difficult due to the roar of the surf
and the noise of the sea washing through the limber holes of the
subs. Although the original plan had specified two landing beaches,
confusion during the launch, together with several outboard motor
failures, dictated a last minute change. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson
ordered all boats to follow him to landing beach Z opposite
Government Wharf. Fifteen of the boats managed to land together; two
others landed about a mile north and their occupants joined up with
the main body during the initial fire fight. The last boat came
ashore over a mile to the south, well behind Japanese lines.
Tulagi
under attack. (USN Photo 80-G-11649)
Raiders
return to Pearl Harbor from Makin Island. (USN Photo 80-G-13859)
The landings were
unopposed, but while the two companies were forming up on the beach,
one trooper accidently discharged his rifle, giving the alarm to the
enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Carlson ordered Company A to cross the
island, seize the lagoon road, and report back on its position
relative to the wharves. Shortly before 0600, Company A reported its
point at Government Wharf and stated that Government House had been
captured without opposition. Proceeding south, the 1st Platoon of
Company A made contact with the enemy along the lagoon road. The
enemy defense included four machine guns, a flamethrower, two grenade
launchers, and infantry, armed with automatic weapons and supported
by well concealed snipers. A platoon from Company B reinforced the
right flank and finally broke through by 1130. (*)
[*
– The Medal of Honor was awarded posthumously to Sergeant Clyde
Thomason of Atlanta, Georgia for conspicuous gallantry during this
engagement.]
Meanwhile, two
enemy ships had been spotted entering the lagoon, one a 3,500-ton
transport, the other a 1,500-ton patrol craft. Both were sunk by well
placed shots from the submarines' deck guns.
Shortly after
1130, two Type-95 reconnaissance planes flew over and, after scouting
the area for 15 minutes, dropped two bombs and departed. At 1320 a
group of 12 aircraft appeared -- 2 Kawanishi flying boats, 4 Zeroes,
4 Type-94 reconnaissance bombers, and 2 Type-95s (possibly the same 2
from the morning). For over an hour they made passes over the island,
occasionally dropping bombs and strafing.
On the ground, in
an attempt to draw out the snipers around the main point of
resistance, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson ordered the center and right
flank of his line to withdraw 200 yards to an area offering a clear
field of fire, while leaving his left flank in position to enfilade
the enemy advance. Unfortunately, this ploy was not successful.
Nevertheless, during the final air attack at 1630, the positions from
which Carlson had withdrawn were heavily bombed by Japanese planes,
inflicting some casualties on advance enemy elements.
At this point,
time became a serious factor in the raid. Withdrawal was scheduled
for 1930 and the raiders had been unsuccessful in taking any
prisoners or destroying any facilities. The decision was made that an
orderly withdrawal was a necessity and that to continue pressing the
attack might jeopardize the tight time schedule. The flanks were
pivoted to the rear and by 1930 the boats were ready to enter the
surf.
The raiders had
had extensive practices in launches through the surf, and the surf
around Making had not appeared particularly difficult during the
predawn landings. Unfortunately, the rapid succession of the breakers
and their great force had not been taken into account. The ensuing
struggle was "so intense and so futile that it will forever
remain a ghastly nightmare to those who participated." (13)
Individual crews
fought the surf for up to an hour, almost invariably being washed
back onto the beach. Most equipment was lost during the struggle and
several men probably drowned at this time. Not over one-third of the
raider force managed to return to the subs on schedule. Heavy rains,
the loss of weapons, the probable arrival of Japanese reinforcements,
and renewed air attacks all added to the general dis-pair. At dawn
(18 August) further attempts to master the surf failed.
The submarines
were forced to submerge after repeated air alerts but set a new
rendezvous for 1930. Faced with the prospect of another day ashore,
Lieutenant Colonel Carlson sent out patrols to search for enemy food
and weapons. Slowly it became apparent that very few Japanese
remained alive on the island. Patrols shot two enemy, but were
otherwise unopposed. Upon returning to the scene of the previous
day's engagement, the bodies of 83 enemy dead were counted (*) while
the remains of 11 raiders were recovered.
[* – The true casualty figures are in dispute. In a
letter (19 Nov 62), the Chief, War History Office, Defense Agency,
Japan, stated to Head, Histories Branch, G-3 Division, HQMC (RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC) that total Japanese forces on the island on 17 August
numbered approximately 70, of whom 43 were killed, 3 were declared
missing, and 27 survived.]
Three
other raiders killed on the 17th were attached to the boat which had
landed behind enemy lines. This crew had harassed the enemy rear
throughout the day before re-embarking and successfully reaching the
Nautilus.
During the late
afternoon, one patrol uncovered almost 1,000 barrels of avgas which
it fired with TNT. It also inspected the office of the Japanese
commander who had been killed in the fighting and removed a number of
documents and charts.
In
the evening, the four remaining rubber boats were carried to the
lagoon side of the island where they were lashed to a native
outrigger. At 2030 the force put out across the lagoon and arrived at
2308 arrived alongside the Nautilus
off
Flink Point at the entrance to the lagoon.
Total raider dead
numbered 30, of whom 14 were killed in action, 7 were drowned and,
unbeknown to the United States until after the war, 9 were tragically
left behind. It is unclear how they were left ashore. Perhaps they
were actually left on the island or it may be that they were in a
boat which unsuccessfully fought the surf on the 17th and drifted
downshore. In any case, they were captured by the Japanese forces
reoccupying the island following the raid and were executed after a
brief captivity.
The evaluation of
the raid was mixed. Casualties were higher than expected and
equipment losses were very extensive. General Holland M. Smith,
commenting on the raid some years later, opined that it served no
useful military purpose and had in fact alerted the Japanese to our
intentions in the Gilberts, resulting in the heavy fortification of
Tarawa.(14) Nevertheless, two ships, two aircraft, petroleum stores,
and radio facilities were destroyed and a number of enemy were
killed. Also, the Japanese found it necessary to divert elements of a
relief force which had been forming at Truk to reinforce enemy
positions on Guadalcanal. Finally, a number of lessons emerged which
would be taken into account in later operations. In retrospect, the
Makin Island raid might best be viewed as a testing ground for the
raider concept, inconclusive in itself, but of marked value in later
operations.
The raiding force
returned to Pearl Harbor and disembarked on 25 August 1942. After a
short rest it embarked for its new permanent camp at Espiritu Santo,
stopping at Canton Island and Noumea, New Caledonia en route, finally
arriving on 20 September 1942. The arrival in Espiritu Santo occurred
concurrently with a heated debate involving three senior admirals and
General Holcomb, and concerned the formation of additional raider
battalions. The genesis of the problem was a message from Rear
Admiral Richmond K. Turner, Commander, Amphibious Force, South
Pacific to the Commanding Officer, Marine Detachment, 2d Marines,
Espiritu Santo. Admiral Turner directed that a "2d Provisional
Raider Battalion" be formed consisting of six rifle companies
and a small headquarters. Subsequently, the admiral indicated his
intention to order the formation of similar raider battalions in the
7th and 8th Marines, stating in part:
...In many circumstances in the future amphibious
warfare in the South Pacific it is believed that a Marine Regiment,
or a part of a Marine Regiment, or two Marine Regiments, will be the
size of force appropriate for offensive and defensive amphibious
operations. The employment of a division as a landing unit seems less
likely. In some cases, night landings by small units will be useful
for preparing bridgeheads for the main landings the next day. The
problem of mopping up outlying detachments will exist throughout the
campaign. For this reason, the Commander, Amphibious Force, South
Pacific, has reached the conclusion that Marine regiment will not be
an entirely suitable combat unit for operations in the South Pacific
unless it has, as an integral part of its organization, either a
Raider or a Parachute Battalion. The previous concept that Raider and
Parachute Battalions are always division or corps troops is no longer
agreed to.
In view of the foregoing, and in order to prosecute
promptly the operations required by prospective tactical situations,
the Commander, Amphibious Force, South Pacific, will, unless directed
to the contrary, proceed with the organization of Provisional Raider
Battalions in the 2d, 7th, and 8th Marines, and give these already
trained troops such additional specialized training as seems
appropriate. Furthermore, he recommends that Marine Corps
Headquarters issue directions for the permanent organization of
Raider Battalions as integral units of all Marine regiments now
attached to, or ultimately destined for, the Amphibious Force, South
Pacific. (15)
Vice Admiral
Robert L. Ghormley, Commander, South Pacific Force, forwarded the
letter to the Commandant of the Marine Corps via Commander in Chief,
Pacific, Admiral Nimitz. Admiral Ghormley discounted the requirement
that raider battalions be formed as regimental forces and stated:
The organization of Raider Battalions from the organic
troops of the 7th and 8th Marines should be withheld pending a
declaration of policy by the Commandant of the Marine Corps. (16)
Admiral Nimitz
also opposed the reorganization to put one raider battalion in each
regiment on grounds that raiders should remain corps troops, and
noted that all Marine units are basically capable of raider type
operations. Admiral Nimitz stated:
The Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet is of the
opinion that Raider Battalions are specialized troops and should be
reserved for appropriate tasks--and that extemporized organization of
Marine Forces should be made only in the case of dire necessity.
(17)
The position of
the Commandant of the Marine Corps was well known on this point. As
recently as 2 September, General Holcomb had advised the Chief of
Naval Operations that he opposed the formation of added raider
battalions because all available personnel were required for the
three Marine divisions then forming or in the field, because the
results of the raider operations were of questionable value, and
because the raider units had taken some of the best leaders from
existing units.
Edson's
Ridge near Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. (USMC Photo 50007)
Raider
patrol with native guides, Guadalcanal. (USMC Photo 51728)
He observed that
the commanders in the field seemed, however, to favor the formation
of more raider units and that he would interpose no objection as the
threat to Samoa seemed to have eased and a 3d Raider Battalion could
be formed from volunteers in the two regiments and three defense
battalions then on Samoa.(18)
In replying to
Admiral Nimitz, General Holcomb noted "with much concern"
Admiral Turner's order regarding the formation of temporary
battalions based on units of the 2d, 7th, and 8th Marines. General
Holcomb "noted with regret" that Admiral Turner had failed
to discuss the matter with the Commanding General, 1st Marine
Division.
In light of this
controversy, the "2d Provisional Raider Battalion" was
disbanded within two days of the arrival of the authentic 2d Raider
Battalion at Espiritu Santo. The overriding importance of the episode
is the clear reiteration, at several senior command levels, of the
principle that raiders were to be separate, permanent, and distinct
combat units. In the aftermath, the 3d Raider Battalion was activated
at American Samoa on 20 September 1942, and the 4th Raider Battalion
was organized on 23 October 1942, initially at Camp Linda Vista,
California with a move in early November to Camp Pendleton. The
Commandant of the Marine Corps directed that the 4th Raider Battalion
be organized in excess of its authorized strength, the overage to be
used to form a Raider Training Detachment for replacement training
purposes. As a result, Raider Company, Training Center, Camp
Pendleton was organized effective 5 February 1943.
During
mid-September, while Carlson's raiders were recovering from the Makin
raid and moving to their permanent camp on Espiritu Santo (the two
companies from Midway had since rejoined), Edson's 1st Raider
Battalion was heavily engaged in Guadalcanal. Edson's raiders had
crossed over to Guadalcanal on 31 August after the mop up on Tulagi
had been completed. The 1st Raider Battalion, with the 1st Parachute
Battalion attached, went into bivouac west of the Lunga River behind
Kukum. On 2 September, two companies of the raider battalion embarked
on high speed transports for what proved to be an uneventful patrol
on neighboring Savo Island. Following this action, the raiders and
parachutists were organized into a provisional battalion and moved
into defensive positions on the southern rim of the perimeter below
Henderson Field, the strategically located airfield behind Marine
lines.
Meanwhile,
Edson was developing plans for an amphibious raid behind enemy lines
near Tasimboko where a Japanese buildup was reported. Just before
dawn on 8 September, Companies A, B, and C went ashore east of
Tasimboko and moved west toward the enemy rear. With the support of
Marine Aircraft Group (MAG) 23 aircraft and naval gunfire from the
USS Manley
(DD-74)
and USS McKean
(DD-90), the raiders moved against the enemy, finally encountering
stiff resistance at 1045. The parachute battalion arrived and, in a
coordinated attack with the raiders, overran the Japanese positions.
The enemy forces, however, estimated at 4,000, elected to break
contact, permitting the destruction of their abandoned encampment. As
it developed, these enemy forces were part of the Kawaguchi
Force
which was preparing a strong counterattack on the airfield and which
would be blocked by the determined resistance of Edson's raiders in
the Battle of Bloody Ridge four days hence.
The
raider-parachutist force was withdrawn and placed in division reserve
until 12 September when General Vandegrift ordered it into a
4,000-yard defense line maintained by the 1st Marines east of the
Lunga. Sporadic contact marked the night of 12 September along the
ridgeline which had been assigned to the raiders and parachutists.
Throughout the daylight hours of the 13th, while under periodic
sniper fire, the Marines dug in for another night.
Shortly
after dark, Kawaguchi launched his first attack against the center
and right of the line. By 2200 it was estimated that two
understrenqth parachute companies plus Company B (less one platoon)
of the raiders were facing at least two enemy battalions. Through the
night, Kawaguchi initiated at least a dozen assaults in an attempt to
break the Marines on Bloody Ridge. By daylight the attacks dwindled
and the stragglers were bombed and strafed during their retreat. This
action destroyed the unity of the Kawaguchi
Force;
the remnants withdrew around Mount Austen toward Kokumbona and were
never again a viable threat. Colonel Edson, who commanded the joint
raider-parachutist force, was awarded the Medal of Honor for the
Bloody Ridge action. Major Kenneth D. Bailey, killed in a later
engagement on Guadalcanal, was awarded the Medal of Honor
posthumously for leading his troops in hand-to-hand combat for over
ten hours on the Ridge.
On 20 September
Colonel Edson took over command of the 5th Marines while the 1st
Raider Battalion executive officer, Lieutenant Colonel Griffith,
replaced him as battalion CO. The raider battalion sailed from
Guadalcanal, arriving at Noumea, New Caledonia on 17 October to rest
and reorganize.
After
its respite at Espiritu Santo, the 2d Raider Battalion, still
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carlson, moved to Guadalcanal and, on
4 November, spearheaded a landing at Aola on the northeast coast,
starting the famous "Thirty Days behind the Lines." After
covering the landing of a construction battalion and a defense
battalion at Aola, the raiders moved inland and to the west to
intercept enemy units reportedly operating near Gogende and Reko.
After intermittant contact, the battalion moved to the area between
the Balesuma and Metapona Rivers where company-size patrols were sent
out from the base camp at Binu. During the period 11-17 November, the
raiders engaged in repeated and heavy exchanges with a large force of
Japanese which had eluded an envelopment by the 2d Battalion, 7th
Marines west of Tetere. After destroying the main enemy force and
scattering the remnants, the raiders were ordered to a position on
the upper Tenaru River. From here they could patrol south in the
direction of the Lunga in order to locate a suspected trail over
which the enemy was moving up reinforcements.
Lieutenant
Colonel Carlson divided his force into three combat teams of two
companies each. One team plus headquarters set up a base camp while
the other two teams were deployed on the flanks several miles out.
These teams in turn sent out patrols to search for the supply trails.
This arrangement permitted Lieutenant Colonel Carlson to maintain
close control over the operation and made possible rapid
reinforcement of either team by the team remaining at base camp.
Several trails were discovered, three major bivouac areas were
destroyed, and company-size forces of enemy troops were engaged. This
operation near the Tenaru accounted for approximately 175 enemy dead
against raider losses of 6. The battalion returned and entered 1st
Marine Division lines near Matanikau on 4 December.
General
Vandegrift cited the battalion for "outstanding service"
and noted the heavy enemy losses in men and materiel attributed to
the raiders. The battalion had, for the most part, eradicated the
scattered enemy positions in the hinterland behind the Marine
positions along the Matanikau.
Shortly
after the excursion behind the lines, Lieutenant Colonel Carlson took
time to discuss at some length the organization of the 2d Raider
Battalion.(19) The organization was based on a squad of one corporal
and nine riflemen. The men were organized into fire teams of three
each, and each team had a BAR, an M-1 , and a Thompson submachine
gun. Carlson noted that this arrangement enhanced fire control as the
squad leader had to deal with three fire team leaders rather than
with nine individuals. Also, it permitted better observation of
leadership potential prior to rating. The 2d Raider Battalion
companies were organized around two rifle platoons of three squads
each and a weapons platoon. The weapons platoon had two sections of
1919A4 light machine guns (two guns per section) and one section of
60mm mortars. Carlson firmly believed that the location of weapons
platoons within companies, instead of weapons companies within the
battalions, resulted in better liaison and improved coordination. He
also reiterated his desire for a third rifle platoon but noted that
the long-standing limit of 143 men per raider company (the capacity
of an APD) precluded this addition. In partial compensation for the
missing rifle platoon, he set up a utility group of 14 men in
headquarters company. Composed of snipers and demolitions men, the
group also functioned as a company reserve.
The 2d Raider
Battalion was itself organized around six line companies and a
headquarters company. The companies could be used individually, or in
groups as was the case on Guadalcanal when the battalion had been
split into three groups of two companies each. Total battalion
strength was 46 officers and 1,062 enlisted men. General Vandegrift
concurred in the opinion that this organization was superior to that
of the 1st Raider Battalion.(20)
The 3d Raider
Battalion was organized in American Samoa on 20 September 1942 and
moved to Espiritu Santo in early 1943. The new raider battalion was
commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Harry B. "Harry the Horse"
Liversedge. Lieutenant Colonel Liversedge had served in Santo
Domingo, Haiti, and China, and had been an active participant in a
variety of international athletic events, including the Olympic Games
of 1920 and 1924.
During the period
10-18 February 1943, the battalion moved to Guadalcanal to stage for
a planned operation in the Russell Islands (Operation CLEANSLATE).
The 3d Raider Battalion was to land at Pavuvu Island in support of a
U. S. Army force which would assault the neighboring island of Banika
simultaneously. The raiders moved by Transport Division 12 from
Guadalcanal to Pavuvu during the night of 20-21 February and made an
unopposed landing at 0700 on 21 February along beaches on Pepasala
Peninsula. Patrols occupied the islands in West Bay and fanned out
over the main island. It was found that all enemy forces had been
withdrawn and, after an uneventful month of garrison duty, the
raiders were taken off on 20 March.(21) For some months thereafter
the raiders were involved in training until, in September 1943, the
3d Raider Battalion joined the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional) at
Noumea in preparation for the Bougainville operation.
The
2d Raider Battalion, withdrawn to Espiritu Santo after its extended
operation behind Japanese lines on Guadalcanal, also underwent an
extended period of rest and training. The battalion spent two weeks
in Wellington, New Zealand in February 1943, then returned to
Espiritu Santo where it conducted amphibious training exercises in
conjunction with the Nautilus
during
March. On 25 April, the battalion embarked on the USS Tryon
(APH-1)
for movement to Noumea. At this time, due to the shortage of
replacements, the battalion strength had slipped to 23 officers and
653 enlisted men.
The
4th Raider Battalion formed on 23 October 1942 under Major James
Roosevelt. The battalion embarked on the USS President
Polk (AP-103)
and arrived at Espiritu Santo on 26 February 1943. Throughout the
spring of 1943 the battalion was busy with training exercises. On 4
May command of the unit passed to Lieutenant Colonel Michael S.
Currin.
Raiders
go over the side to rubber boats prior to occupation of Russell
Islands. (USMC Photo 54763)
Final
honors for those who fell at Viru Harbor, New Georgia. (USMC Photo
57581)
On 15 March 1943,
the 1st Raider Regiment, I Marine Amphibious Corps (I MAC) was
organized at Espiritu Santo, consisting of a Headquarters and Service
Company and the four raider battalions. Colonel Liversedge became
regimental commander while Lieutenant Colonel Samuel S. Yeaton
replaced him as 3d Raider Battalion CO. The regimental headquarters
was located at Espiritu Santo, as were the 2d and 4th Raider
Battalions. The 3d Raider Battalion joined them on 20 March after the
Pavuvu operation. The 1st Raider Battalion, although organizationally
attached, remained in Noumea.
The
1st Raider Regiment (minus the 2d and 3d Battalions) was designated
as part of the New Georgia Occupation Force and, during late May,
completed preparations for moving to staging areas on Guadalcanal.
The Headquarters and Service Company, 1st Raider Regiment plus the
4th Raider Battalion embarked on the USS John
Penn (AP-51)
on 31 May and arrived at Tetare, Guadalcanal on 2 June. The 1st
Raider Battalion sailed from its base in Noumea aboard the USS
President
Hayes (APA-20)
on 7 June, arriving in Guadalcanal on 11 June.
Under Operation
ELKTON a drive was to be mounted which aimed at overrunning the
Northern Solomons and, if possible, capturing Rabaul, the Japanese
area headquarters on New Britain. ELKTON was tentatively scheduled to
begin on 30 June 1943, but was stepped up to 21 June when a message
was received from an Australian coastwatcher on Segi Point, New
Georgia requesting assistance in opposing an approaching Japanese
force. The message reached Admiral Turner at Guadalcanal and he
decided to dispatch the 4th Raider Battalion which was then staging
for the planned 30 June offensive against New Georgia. Companies O
and P and half of the Headquarters Company under Lieutenant Colonel
Currin went ashore at Segi Point at 0530 and moved inland toward Segi
Plantation where the coastwatcher met them. On the next day, two Army
companies and an airfield survey party came ashore to start work on
developing a limited fighter landing strip.
Lieutenant
Colonel Currin next turned his attention to Viru Harbor, the best
protected anchorage on the New Georgia coast. The harbor would be
required as an operating base for small patrol craft during the
assault on Munda. The harbor entrance is through narrows only 300
yards wide between coral cliffs. Previous reconnaissance had
indicated that the Viru defenses were centered around the village of
Tetemara on the west side of the narrows, and included a 3-inch
coastal gun. An occupation force was scheduled to enter the harbor on
30 June to secure it for operations, and the approaches would have to
be taken by that date. Currin embarked his force in rubber boats at
Segi Point and led the flotilla himself in a Melanesian war canoe.
Paddling eight miles across the bay formed by the mouths of the Akuru
and Choi Rivers to Regi , it went ashore at 0100 on 28 June. After
two days of intermittent contact with Japanese patrols and
interminable mangrove swamps and heavy rains, Lieutenant Colonel
Currin split his force, sending two platoons from Company P to secure
Tombe which was across the narrows from Tetemara. On the 30th, the
occupying force embarked on three transports at Guadalcanal and
steamed to the entrance of Viru Harbor where they were briefly
engaged by the coastal guns which had not yet been silenced by the
raider force. The transports took up positions off-shore and out of
range, but close enough to come to the raiders' assistance if needed.
The
raiders arrived outside Tetemara near midnight of 30 June-1 July
after an exhausting trek through waist deep water in another mangrove
swamp. At 0900 on 1 July, the two platoons sent to capture Tombe
attacked their target and carried it with no Marine casualties. The
firing alerted the Tetemara garrison, but Lieutenant Colonel Currin
attacked on schedule and, after almost six hours of strong
resistance, moved as far as the edge of the village. A final banzai
attack
by the Japanese defenders was beaten back and by evening of 1 July
the position was secure. After being relieved, the raider force
withdrew to Guadalcanal .
Another prelude
to the primary New Georgia landings at Munda occurred on 30 June when
the remainder of the 4th Raider Battalion – Companies N and Q
and half of the Headquarters Company – went ashore at Oloana
Bay on Vangunu Island. The raiders were to contact a scouting party
already ashore, then establish a beachhead for Army forces which
would land one-half hour later. The seizure of Vangunu would permit
establishment of a base along the supply route which connected
Guadalcanal with the main landing area. After a difficult landing in
which poor weather, heavy seas, and communications breakdowns
resulted in a scattered force, the Marines regrouped on shore and,
together with Companies F and G of the 103d Infantry, moved toward
Kaeruka where the main enemy garrison was located. The force reached
the Kaeruka River bank by midafternoon and engaged Japanese units in
the main enemy camp on the far side. Heavy fighting ensued during
which contact between raider and Army companies was broken, but by
nightfall the position was carried and hasty defense lines were set
up on the beach. This was fortunate as a Japanese supply convoy of
three barges approached at 0200 on 2 July and attempted to come
ashore, not realizing that the position had changed hands. The
raiders made short work of the barges, sinking one and forcing the
other two to beach.
After
mopping up a pocket of survivors at Cheke Point, the raiders returned
to Oloana Bay on 4 July. They remained there until 8 July when they
crossed the strait to neighboring Gatukai Island in search of a
reported Japanese force occupying the island. No contact was made and
on 12 July the raiders withdrew to Guadalcanal where they joined up
with Lieutenant Colonel Currin's force which had just returned from
the Segi Point-Viru Harbor operations. The 4th Raider Battalion
regrouped and was reequipped at Tetere, Guadalcanal until 17 July
when it embarked for Enogai to reinforce the 1st Raider Battalion
which had landed there on 5 July.
The landings at
Enogai were intended to support the Munda campaign then underway to
the south. It was discovered that a primitive but passable jungle
trail connected Bairoko, at the southern end of Leland Lagoon, with
Munda, thus raising the possibility that the Japanese forces at Munda
might be reinforced and resupplied via Bairoko. The 1st Raider
Regiment, less the 2d and 3d Battalions, had been designated ready
reserve for the Munda landings at Zanana Beach but after discovery of
the trail from Bairoko, it was decided to make a landing near Enogai
and move into blocking positions between Bairoko and Munda.
Designated the
Northern Landing Group of the New Georgia Occupation Force, Colonel
Liversedge's force consisted of the Headquarters Company of the 1st
Raider Regiment, the 1st Raider Battalion, the 3d Battalion, 148th
Infantry (U.S. Army) and the 3d Battalion, 145th Infantry (U. S.
Army). The last named was added just before departure when it was
discovered that the 4th Raider Battalion would not be able to
withdraw from operations at Segi/Viru/Vangunu in time to join the
force. The landing group was given a multiple mission: after landing
proceed southwest, capturing and killing enemy forces; establish
roadblocks severing connections betwen Bairoko and Munda; block
withdrawal of Japanese garrison forces at Bairoko.
The
landing was made on 5 July 1943 on beaches about 500 yards upstream
from the mouth of the Pundakona River at Rice Anchorage on the
northwest coast of New Georgia, across the Kula Gulf from
Kolombangara Island. Fortunately, the landing was unopposed, as the
landing area was only wide enough to permit four boats at a time to
unload. After regrouping the force started to move south along
parallel trails. The first night's bivouac was established at the
Giza Giza Ri ver. The force split on 6 July; the 3d Battalion, 148th
Infantry continued to the south to set up a block on the Munda trail
while the remainder of the force turned to the west in the direction
of the Dragon's Peninsula, a spit of land between Enogai Inlet and
Bairoko Harbor. Reinforced patrols wiped out small garrisons on the
coast of Enogai Inlet as the main body continued westward toward the
main enemy concentration. The force reached the outskirts of Enogai
in the late afternoon of 9 July. An initial assault was repelled and
Colonel Liversedge called off further attacks until the next morning.
After a 60mm mortar barrage at dawn, Colonel Liversedge renewed the
attack and overran the enemy positions by early afternoon. Over 300
Japanese dead were counted, but 47 raiders had been lost.
Once in
possession of Enogai, the raiders sent out patrols for the next week
to scout Japanese positions at Bairoko. Reports indicated that
Japanese working parties were observed constructing emplacements east
of the harbor and generally improving their defensive positions
around Bairoko. Colonel Liversedge's force was reinforced on 18 July
when the 4th Raider Battalion came ashore from four transports off
Enogai Point. The raider forces moved toward Bairoko on 20 July and
encountered the first opposition at 1015. Within minutes the Marines
were in violent battle, pinned down by withering automatic weapons
fire and harassed by snipers. The enemy positions centered around a
series of log and coral bunkers built under sprawling banyan roots on
a ridge forward of the raider positions. The enemy defenses could
only be overcome with intense small arms fire and demolitions; 60mm
mortars could not be used due to the thick jungle canopy and
flamethrowers were not available. Throughout the early afternoon the
raiders continued to press the attack, suffering debilitating
casualties. The 4th Raider Battalion was committed to the line to
assist the 1st Raider Battalion and the advance continued, but the
progress was measured in yards. At 1445, the enemy 90mm mortars
opened up and found the range, inflicting further casualties. This
barrage was followed by an enemy counterattack, directed at the
Company D sector. The raiders in turn mounted an attack with Company
Q but the unit was repulsed with losses so heavy as to render it
ineffective. At this point the raider units had suffered about 30%
casualties (250 men) and 150 men were required to assist in the
evacuation of the wounded. Colonel Liversedge had no alternative but
to order the withdrawal of his men. The wounded were carried out
during the night of 20-21 July and by 1400 on 21 July all troops had
retired to defensive positions around Enogai.
Aggressive
patrols were mounted over the next week to reconnoiter enemy
positions. Also during this period PT boats and destroyers shelled
Bairoko from offshore and on 2 August, the enemy defenses were bombed
by B-17s. On 3 August, XIV Army Corps reported enemy positions were
being overrun at Munda and requested that units be dispatched south
toward Zieta to intercept retreating Japanese. Scattered contact was
experienced around Bairoko until 24 August when one company from the
3d Battalion, 145th Infantry entered the village unopposed; the
Japanese had evacuated the position by barge.
During
the night of 28-29 August, the raiders embarked on transports and
returned to Guadalcanal. Lieutenant Colonel Griffith's 1st Raider
Battalion had suffered 74 killed and 139 wounded; Lieutenant Colonel
Currin's 4th Raider Battalion had lost 54 dead and 168 wounded. Of
the 521 men remaining in the 1st Raider Battalion, only 245 were
judged effective; the 4th could count only 154 effective of 412. The
last entry in the 1st Raider Regiment Journal, on 31 August 1943, at
2400, is significantly eloquent: "1st Raider Regiment relaxes
(bunks, movies, beer, chow)."(22) Unbeknown to the men, this was
the final operation for the 1st and 4th Raider battalions. They
entered rest and reorganization schedules in September and saw no
further action.
Raiders
cross a river on approach to Enogai, New Georgia. (USMC Photo 59009B)
Captured
Japanese 6-inch gun near Enogai, New Georgia. (USMC Photo 59009B)
The final step in
the capture of the northern Solomons was the Bougainville operation,
and on 12 September 1943, the 2d Raider Regiment (Provisional),
Lieutenant Colonel Alan Shapley commanding, was activated at Noumea
specifically to coordinate raider participation in the landings. The
regiment consisted of a Headquarters Company and the 2d and 3d Raider
Battalions, and was assigned to the 3d Marine Division on 3 October.
Headquarters Company, 2d Raider Regiment and the 2d Raider Battalion
were attached to the 3d Marines and the 3d Raider Battalion was
attached to the 9th Marines.
Bougainville is
the largest of the Solomon group, nearly 30 miles wide and 125 miles
long, and it sits astride the northern end of "the Slot"
which separates the two chains of the Solomons. The contiguous
islands of Bougainville, Buka, and Shortland had six large Japanese
airfields and numerous naval installations. The area was used as a
major staging and supply point for support of operations against the
Allies in the southern Solomons. As the isi and-hopping front moved
northward, Bougainville became an important link in the defenses of
Rabaul . The island is dominated by a series of mountain ranges
starting at the northern end and gradually lowering into a broad
plain in the southern extreme. The landing zones were around Cape
Torokina at the extreme north of Empress Augusta Bay on
Bougainville's southwest coast.
The 2d Raider
Regiment participated in landing exercises and rehearsals on Efate
Island in the New Hebrides on 16-18 October then embarked on
transports and proceeded via Guadalcanal to a rendezvous with the
remainder of the assault force on 31 October. D-Day was 1 November
1943.
The
2d Raider Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Joseph P. McCaffery) was one
of the four landing teams and went ashore on Green Beach, flanked by
the 1st and 2d Battalions, 3d Marines. The 3d Raider Battalion
(Lieutenant Colonel Fred S. Beans), less Company M, landed on the
offshore island of Puruata where an estimated reinforced rifle
platoon of Japanese was overcome and the island secured by 1800 on 2
November. Company M landed with the main force over Green Beach 2 and
moved inland on the trail leading to the Buretoni Mission,
establishing a roadblock some 1,000 yards from the beach. The raiders
reinforced the 1st Battalion, 3d Marines in overrunning enemy
defenses on Cape Torokina then took up positions at trail blocks on
the Piva Trail, one of several paths leading inland. On 9 November,
the raiders launched an attack to clear the enemy from positions
forward of the raider lines. By 1500, despite stubborn enemy
resistance, the raiders had advanced to the intersection of the Piva
and Numa Numa Trails. On 13 November, the 2d Raider Battalion took up
positions to support the supply lines extending to the 21st Marines,
engaged at the time in the Battle of Coconut Grove. The 3d Raider
Battalion, attached to the 3d Marines on 17 November, relieved the 3d
Battalion, 3d Marines during the night of 18 November, permitting the
latter unit to attack enemy positions above the Numa Numa trail
block. On 29 November, Company M of the 3d Raider Battalion
participated with the 1st Parachute Battalion in a raid on Japanese
positions 10 miles south of Cape Torokina on Empress Augusta Bay (see
the Parachute Chapter for more detail).
The raider units
continued to support the 3d, 9th, and 21st Marines until 22 December
when, in conjunction with elements of the 1st Parachute Regiment, it
relieved the 3d Marines in the line. On 11 January 1944, the raiders
were in turn relieved by the 132d Infantry of the Americal Division
and the 2d Raider Regiment withdrew to Guadalcanal.
By early 1944 the
face of the Pacific war had changed and the demand for raider units
was not sufficient to justify maintaining special units for the
purpose. Senior Marine officers had never really taken to the concept
of separate "elite of the elite" units, and as the
requirement for such units came into question, this opposition became
more effective.
In December 1943,
a memorandum emerged from the Pacific Section of the War Plans
Division, Office of the Chief of Naval Operations which summed up the
opposition:
The Marine Corps has always felt that its infantry
elements are essentially raiders and that Pacific conditions are
different from the European which resulted in the establishment of
commandos. It would like to end its raider program so as to make all
infantry organizations uniform and to avoid setting up some
organizations as elite or selected troops. It feels that any
operation so far carried out by raiders could have been performed
equally well by a standard organization specially trained for that
specific operation. In lieu of abolishing raiders the Marine Corps
proposes to organize them as a separate regiment which will be
specially trained for raider operations but will be organized and
equipped so it can be effectively employed as a standard infantry
regiment. Experience has shown that such a separate regiment will
find frequent employment in contemplated Pacific operations,
primarily as shock troops or to augment divisional troops. (23)
One
day later, the Chief of Naval Operations approved in principle the
transfer of the 1st and 2d Raider Battalions to the 4th Marines, and
authorized deletion of the 5th and 6th Raider Battalions from the
Current Force Operating Plan.(24)
Plans
were already underway to form the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade to
assist the 3d Marine Division in the recapture of Guam and to provide
a basis for the 6th Marine Division. The brigade was to include two
reinforced regiments, one of which was to be the 22d Marines. The
other was to be the 4th Marines which would be a new organization
bearing the name and honors of the original regiment which was lost
in the Philippines in 1942. The raider units were selected to form
the new 4th Marines. On 26 January 1944, the 2d Raider Regiment was
disbanded and the 2d and 3d Raider Battalions were attached to the
1st Raider Regiment. On 1 February, the Headquarters and Service
Company, 1st Raider Regiment, and the 1st, 3d, and 4th Raider
Battalions were redesignated as Headquarters and Service Company and
the 1st, 3d, and 2d Battalions, 4th Marines respectively. At the same
time, the 2d Raider Battalion was disbanded and its personnel
assigned to the Regimental Weapons Company, 4th Marines. The Raider
Battalion, Training Center, Camp Pendleton was disbanded and its
personnel assigned to the 5th Marine Division.
Marine Parachute Battalions (25)
As had been the
case with the raider units, the Marine Corps parachute units (*)
could trace the impetus for their development to the employment of
special purpose forces by the European powers during World War II.
[* – During World War II, the Marine parachutists
were popularly known as "paramarines" but the term has
fallen into disuse due to the possible connotation of para-marine
(i.e. part or sometimes Marine). The Navy's submarine crews have this
same name problem (i.e. submariner meaning less than a mariner).]
Although the
Marines had had limited previous experience with parachutists (as
early as 1927 a group of 12 Marines parachuted from a transport plane
over Anacostia in Washington, D. C.), realization of the parachute
concept on an enlarged scale occurred only after the outbreak of the
Second World War.
In May 1940,
Major General Holcomb, Commandant of the Marine Corps, tasked the
Division of Plans and Policy with the preparation of a plan for the
utilization of Marine parachute troops. For planning purposes the
force would consist of:
One battalion of infantry at full strength
One platoon
of 75mm pack howitzers (2 guns)
Three units of fire for all
arms
Three days rations and water
No vehicles other than
hand-drawn
Added light antiaircraft and antitank protection as
appropriate (26)
The resulting
paper envisioned the employment of parachute units in three distinct
tactical situations:
- As a reconnoitering and raiding force with a limited
ability to return to its parent organization. This assumed that the
objective was sufficiently important to warrant the sacrifice of the
force.
- As a spearhead or advance guard, to seize and hold
strategic installations or terrain features until arrival of larger
forces.
- As an independent force operating for extended
periods, presumably in a guerrilla role in hostile territory. (27)
The Marine plans
for parachute units gained added impetus after inspection of Army
training facilities by several Marine officers in the summer of 1940,
and after naval attaches began to collect reports on the use of
parachute forces by the Germans, Russians, and French. By October of
1940, the Commandant had decided that one battalion of each infantry
regiment would be trained as "air troops" to be transported
and landed by aircraft. Each air troop battalion would include a
company of parachutists, with an estimated requirement for 750
parachute personnel for the entire Corps.
An initial
detachment of 40 trainees (2 officers/38 enlisted) arrived at the
Naval Air Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey on 26 October 1940 where
they were quartered while in preliminary parachute training. Using
towers in nearby Hightstown, the detachment completed tower training
on 6 November and moved to the Marine Base, Quantico, Virginia for
added physical conditioning prior to making jumps from aircraft.
Concurrently, the
Commandant indicated that the training of parachutists should proceed
"as fast as facilities and personnel are available" in
order to train the estimated 750 men in the shortest time.(28) In
implementation of this decision, a second detachment of 3 officers
and 44 enlisted personnel underwent tower training at Hightstown from
30 December 1940 to 15 January 1941. On 26 February, both classes
graduated together, the first qualified as parachute jumpers and
riggers while the second were jumpers. Training of subsequent groups
continued throughout the spring and by July 1941, a total of 225
jumpers had graduated from the Lakehurst course.
Unfortunately,
the facilities at Lakehurst, and the available towers at Hightstown,
were inadequate for the demands of the Marine Corps and Captain
Marion L. Dawson was sent to San Diego in February 1941 to prepare
additional facilities there. In March, the entire second class
together with six riggers, from the first transferred to San Diego
too, and formed the 1st Platoon, Company A, 2d Parachute Battalion.
The third class from Lakehurst was subsequently transferred as well,
forming the second platoon of Company A.
Company A, of
what would become the 1st Parachute Battalion, was formed at Quantico
on 28 May 1941 and the Headquarters Company was formed on 10 July.
The battalion itself was officially organized effective 15 August
1941, Captain Marcellus J. Howard commanding. On 20 September,
Company A of the 2d Parachute Battalion was redesignated Company B of
the 1st Parachute Battalion. On 28 September, the battalion moved
from Quantico to New River for further training and there, on 28
March 1942, the battalion was completed with the formation of Company
C.
Company B, 2d
Parachute Battalion was formed on 23 July 1941 at San Diego, and the
battalion organization became effective on 1 October, Captain Charles
E. Shepard, Jr., commanding. A new Company A, to replace that
detached in September, was formed 7 February 1942, and the battalion
went to full strength on 3 September 1942 when Company C was
organized.
There was no
shortage of volunteers for parachute training although the
qualifications were stiff. An applicant was required to be unmarried,
athletically inclined, above average in intelligence, 18-32 years of
age, and have no physical or mental impairments. Extra pay amounting
to $50 per month for enlisted personnel and $100 per month for
officers was authorized in June 1941 and surely resulted in increased
numbers of volunteers. Nevertheless, the aura of adventure
surrounding the parachutists and the promise of action seemed more
important to most applicants.
In May 1942, the
Parachute School Detachment was formed within the Marine Barracks,
Naval Air Station, Lakehurst but the war had so increased the Marine
Corps' training requirements that it was decided to establish two
Marine parachute schools. The Commandant received approval from the
Secretary of the Navy to establish Parachute School, Marine Corps
Base, San Diego effective 6 May 1942, and Parachute School, New River
effective 15 June 1942.(29)
Facilities were
so tight at San Diego that tent quarters at Bern camp were utilized
for initial classes. Even so, the school was able to plan on classes
of 36 students at an entry rate of one class per week for the ten
week course. The first group entered on 27 May 1942 and was followed
by a second on 1 June. This schedule would be maintained until
September when the new training facility at Camp Gillespie was ready.
Once established at Camp Gillespie, the school standardized its
course at 361 hours (6 weeks), with a new class entering weekly. The
training was in three phases. The first was ground training which
included instruction in parachute tactics, map reading, demolitions,
techniques of fire, scouting and patrolling, combat swimming, and
weapons training. Phase two concerned parachute materiel and included
training in parachute packing, flotation gear, and cargo containers.
The final phase was jump instruction which started with controlled
and free tower jumping, covered the use of suspension lines, and led
to six actual jumps after which parachutist's wings were presented.
The course was difficult: a 40 per cent washout rate was standard.
Organization
of the school at New River was beset by difficulties and delays from
the beginning. Initial attempts to locate qualified instructors were
unsuccessful and finally resulted in a request to the Commandant for
permission to select personnel from the 1st Parachute Battalion,
assigned at the time to the 1st Marine Division, Fleet Marine Force.
Greater problems arose concerning facilities. The camp was built from
the ground up and, although the parachute towers were scheduled for
completion by late August, heavy rains and a shortage of contract
labor delayed them until 25 September. Similar delays afflicted the
parachute building and the training building, neither of which was
ready until November. Of a total of 250 parachutes requisitioned,
only 50 had arrived by October and most had to be sent on to the
Marine Corps Air Station at Cherry Point for repair prior to use.
The New River
facility never did attain the size of that at Camp Gillespie although
it did turn out 50 graduates per month. Camp Gillespie produced 70
per month, and increased this to 100 per month by early 1943. This
increase, coupled with a relatively static demand for parachutists,
permitted the closing of the New River parachute school on 1 July
1943, after which all training was accomplished at Camp Gillespie.
The
1st Parachute Battalion left New River on 7 June 1942, travelling by
train to Norfolk, Virginia where it embarked on the USS Mizar
(AF-12)
on 10 June. It sailed via the Panama Canal, arriving at Wellington,
New Zealand on 11 July. One week later the battalion, less a rear
echelon, embarked on the USS Heywood
(AP-12)
and sailed to Koro, Fiji Islands where it participated in rehearsals
prior to the Guadalcanal landings.
The 1st Parachute
Battalion, together with the 1st Raider Battalion and the 2d
Battalion, 5th Marines, made up that portion of the Guadalcanal
landing force which, under Brigadier General William H. Rupertus
(Assistant Division Commander, 1st Marine Division) was scheduled to
land in the Florida Island group, across the Sealark Channel from
Guadalcanal. The 1st Parachute Battalion, under Major Robert H.
Williams, went ashore on Gavutu at H-plus four hours. The delay
resulted from a shortage of landing craft--the parachutists had to
wait until the raider landings on Tulagi had been completed and those
landing craft available. The landing was made in three waves each of
company strength. The first landed against light opposition and made
limited progress inland. The next two waves met heavier fire and were
pinned on the beach until Company B overran enemy positions on and
near Hill 148, Gavutu's lone hill. Reinforced by Company A, Company B
then captured the remaining Japanese positions atop Hill 148 and by
nightfall the parachutists were engaged in mopping up the island.
Shortly after the initial assault, Major Williams was wounded and
relieved as CO by Major Charles A. Miller. On 9 August, two days
after the landing, the battalion moved from Gavutu to Tulagi where it
took up positions as a security force near the government buildings.
On 8 September,
the 1st Parachute Battalion and the 1st Raider Battalion, both under
Lieutenant Colonel Merritt A. Edson, carried out a raid in the
vicinity of Taivu near the village of Tasimboko, Guadalcanal. The
raiders landed at Taivu Point and advanced toward Tasimboko, while
the parachutists landed some 2,000 yards east of the village and took
up positions to protect the flank and rear of the raider advance.
After an intense fire fight with enemy forces defending the village,
the raiders and parachutists entered the base area and destroyed
food, medical equipment, and military stores left by the fleeing
Japanese. By evening of 8 September all units had reembarked and
returned to the Kukom landing area.
Several
days after this raid, the 1st Parachute Battalion, again in
conjunction with the 1st Raider Battalion, was ordered to occupy the
ridge southeast of Henderson Field, Guadalcanal. Enemy activity
increased starting on 11 September and reached a peak during the
night of 13-14 September when the Marine lines repulsed strong and
repeated assaults by determined enemy units. Known afterward as the
Battle of Bloody Ridge or Edson's Ridge, this action scattered the
Kawaguchi
Force against
which the earlier Tasimboko raid had been staged.
On 18 September,
the 1st Parachute Battalion was withdrawn from Guadalcanal,
proceeding by ship to Noumea, New Caledonia, where it was quartered
in a temporary camp while constructing a new camp to be named Camp
Kiser. After moving into Camp Kiser on 8 November, the battalion
picked up a rigorous two-phased training schedule. The parachutists
were reindoctrinated in jump techniques, parachute packing, and
patrolling/scouting. They also received tactical training in the form
of platoon, company, and battalion problems. This training period
lasted into 1943.
The 2d Parachute
Battalion, at full strength after the organization of Company C on 3
September 1942, sailed from San Diego on 20 October 1942 and arrived
at Wellington, New Zealand on 31 October. The battalion went into
camp at Titahi Bay, south of Wellington, until 6 January 1943 when it
sailed to Noumea to undergo further training with the 1st Parachute
Battalion.
The
3d Parachute Battalion (Major Robert T. Vance) was organized on 16
September 1942. Initially composed of Headquarters Company and
Company A, it was assigned to the new 3d Marine Division, then
forming in San Diego. Company B was activated on 10 November and
Company C on 10 December 1942. The battalion was attached to
Amphibious Corps, Pacific Fleet, at Camp Elliott on 4 January 1943,
and on 5 and 13 March it departed for Noumea in two echelons. All
units had arrived and settled in Camp Kiser by 27 March, there to
continue training with the 1st and 2d Parachute Battalions.
On 1 April 1943,
the 1st Parachute Regiment was activated at Tontouta composed of the
1st, 2d, and 3d Parachute Battalions, Regimental Headquarters and
Service Company, and Regimental Weapons Company. Companies A, B, and
C of the 2d Parachute Battalion were redesignated Companies E, F, and
G, while Companies A, B, and C of the 3d Parachute Battalion were
redesignated Companies I, K, and L. Lieutenant Colonel Robert H.
Williams, recovered from wounds suffered on Gavutu, was appointed
regimental commander.
The 4th Parachute
Battalion was organized starting 2 April 1943 with the formation of
Company B at Camp Elliott. On 1 July the New River Parachute Training
Battalion was reorganized and designated Headquarters Company,
Company A, and Company C of the 4th Parachute Battalion. These units
joined Company B at Camp Pendleton where the entire battalion
(Lieutenant Colonel Marcellus J. Howard) remained in a training
status until disbanded on 19 January 1944.
After
an extended period of training, the 1st Parachute Regiment started
movement in September 1943 to Guadalcanal. On 18 September, the 2d
Parachute Battalion with advance elements of the 1st and 3d Parachute
Battalions, sailed from Noumea on the USAT Noordam,
arriving at Tassaforanga on 22 September. The remaining units of the
regiment embarked on the USS American
Legion (APA-17)
and sailed from . Noumea on 26 September, arriving at Guadalcanal on
28 September. On 29-30 September, the entire regiment reembarked and
sailed to Vella Lavella.
Shortly after the
arrival of the regiment on Vella Lavella, Lieutenant Colonel Victor
H. Krulak, commanding officer of the 2d Parachute Battalion was
summoned to I Marine Amphibious Corps Headquarters on Guadalcanal. He
was advised of the impending (1 November) Bougainville landings, and
ordered to land with a raiding force on the island of Choiseul, there
to create as great a disturbance as possible in order to confuse the
enemy and to mask the true location of the major assault. Krulak
returned to Vella Lavella to map out a plan for the raid and was
joined on 24 October by an Australian coastwatcher who supplied last
minute information on enemy forces and locations. Prior to becoming a
parachutist, Lieutenant Colonel Krulak had served in Shanghai as a
company commander with the 4th Marines and was with the Amphibious
Force, Atlantic Fleet from 1941 until he volunteered for parachute
training.
The
raiding force consisted of Companies E, F, and G, reinforced by a
communications platoon, a regimental weapons company with eight light
machine guns, and a detachment from an experimental rocket platoon.
Total strength was 30 officers and 626 men.
Paratroop
raiding party awaiting relief on the beach at Koiari, Bougainville.
(USMC Photo 69793)
Machine
gun position near Piva Trail roadblock, Bougainville. Note enemy dead
at upper right. (USMC Photo 70771A)
Embarked
in four high speed
transports (USS McKeon,
Gosby,
Kilty,
and Ward)
, the force left Vella Lavella in the evening of 27 October, escorted
by the destroyer USS Conway
(DP-507).
The battalion landed unopposed near Voza and moved inland a mile and
a half to set up a base camp. On 28 and 29 October, patrols were sent
out to reconnoiter Japanese positions at Sangigai to the south and on
the Warrior River to the north.
The attack on
Sangigai started at 1100 on 30 October when Company E opened fire on
enemy forces in the village. The Japanese defenders quickly retreated
toward the mountains, directly into positions prepared by Company F
which had executed an enveloping movement through the mountains in
order to attack the enemy flank. On the heels of the retreating
Japanese, Company E entered the garrison area and destroyed all
buildings and facilities, a barge, and about 180 tons of supplies. By
0800 the raiding party had returned to its base camp having suffered
6 dead and 12 wounded while killing at least 75 of the enemy.
On 31 October, a
second raiding party (Major Warner T. Bigger) was sent north to
Nukiki and then overland to the Warrior River. This group bombarded
Japanese installations on nearby Guppy Island with 143 mortar rounds,
starting several large fires. After encountering strong enemy
resistance near the Warrior River, the party was withdrawn aboard
personnel landing craft (LCPs). On 1 and 2 November, Krulak continued
to send out patrols from the base camp and maintained aggressive
contact with the enemy. By 3 November, the Japanese were slowly
realizing the limited size of the raiding force and started closing
in on the beachhead area. The battalion was taken off Choiseul during
the night of 3-4 November after laying extensive minefields and booby
traps.(*)
[* – The commander of one of the relief craft which
returned the raiding party to Vella Lavella was Lieutenant, later
President John F. Kennedy.]
The proximity of
the approaching Japanese was attested to by the sounds of exploding
mines as the last parachutists boarded LCIs.
On
22 November, the 1st Parachute Battalion (Major Richard Fagan)
embarked 23 officers and 596 enlisted personnel on four infantry
landing craft (LCIs) and departed Vella Lavella for Bougainville. It
arrived off Empress Augusta Bay the next day and, after going ashore,
was attached to the 2d Raider Regiment in I Marine Amphibious Corps
reserve. On 27 November, the 1st Parachute Battalion, with attached
units, was designated the task organization for a raid on Japanese
supply facilities near Koiari, south of Cape Torokina. In addition to
the parachute battalion, the group included Company M of the 3d
Raider Battalion and a forward observer team of the 12th Marines.
Major Fagan's
force embarked on landing craft at Cape Torokina early in the morning
of 29 November and, after a one hour voyage southward, moved in
toward the beach at Koiari. It had been intended that the Marines
would land a short distance from known Japanese forces and attack
from the rear but, immediately after landing, it was discovered that
the raiding force had come ashore in the midst of a major enemy
supply area. The Marines dug in after forming a hasty perimeter. They
were surrounded on three sides by Japanese and had their backs to the
ocean. A fierce battle raged for several hours during which the
parachute forces were under almost constant fire from mortars and
machine guns. By afternoon casualties were mounting and ammunition
was nearly exhausted. Shortly before 1800, three destroyers arrived
off the beach after having been diverted from escort duty. They
opened fire directly to the flanks of the Marine beachhead while
155mm guns from Cape Torokina fired parallel to the shore. Thus
protected by a three-sided box of fire, the battalion was able to
board rescue boats which dashed in to the beach. Total Marine
casualties were 15 killed, 99 wounded, and 7 missing of a landing
force which had numbered 24 officers and 505 enlisted personnel.
On 3 December,
the 1st Battalion on Bougainville was joined by the rest of the 1st
Parachute Regiment (less the 2d Battalion which stayed in camp at
Vella Lavella). Two days later the regiment was sent to the 3d Marine
Division front and for the next four days fought off enemy patrols,
snipers, and ambushes. On 10 December the force was relieved by
elements of the 9th and 21st Marines and moved to the 9th Marines
regimental reserve position. Later, on 22 December, the 1st Parachute
Battalion, Weapons Company, and a Headquarters and Service platoon
were attached to the 2d Raider Regiment and relieved the 1st
Battalion, 3d Marines near Eagle Creek. The unit remained there,
generally strengthening the positions, until it was in turn relieved
by elements of the 132d Infantry Regiment, Americal Division on 11
January 1944.
This would be the
final combat role for the 1st Parachute Regiment. The 2d Parachute
Battalion moved from Vella Lavella to Guadalcanal on 2 January 1944
and remained there until 18 January when it embarked for San Diego.
On 15 January elements of the regiment on Bougainville started
embarkation, also destined for San Diego and reorganization.
The disbandment
of the parachute units had been under study for many months at
Headquarters Marine Corps. The requirement for trained parachutists
had been met fully by Spring 1943 and training quotas were revised
and lowered. Earlier the weekly student assignment quota at the
parachute school, Camp Gillespie, had been reduced from 70 to 50 and
in midApril it was further reduced to 30. Later in April, the
Commandant determined that the Marine Corps then had enough trained
parachutists to meet any current or projected requirement. It was
suggested that the New River parachute school be disbanded, an action
which subsequently was taken when, on 1 July 1943, the school was
closed and the personnel used to form the 4th Parachute Battalion. By
the Fall of 1943 it became apparent that abandonment of the parachute
program would release some 3,000 troops and save $150,000 monthly in
payments to parachutists who were unable to jump for lack of
aircraft. On 30 December 1943, the Commandant ordered the disbandment
of all parachute forces. The 1st Parachute Regiment, minus air
delivery section, was assigned to Fleet Marine Force, San Diego where
it would cadre the then-forming 5th Marine Division. The
reorganization was effective on 29 February 1944.
There were no
combat jumps by Marines during World War II. During the summer and
fall of 1943, consideration had been given to drops at Kolombangara
and Kavieng, but plans were never developed. This failure to utilize
the parachutists was the result of four factors, three of which were
peculiar to the Pacific war. First was a lack of sufficient airlift
capability--at no time did the Marines have resources to airlift more
than one battalion (i.e. six transport squadrons). Next, land-based
staging areas were not available for mass flights. A third factor was
the long distances involved, both from the ConUS and among the island
targets. Finally, the objectives assigned to the Marine Corps were
generally small, densely defended islands unsuited for large-scale
parachute operations. Although determined to be a "luxury"
which the Marine Corps could not afford, the parachute units had made
noteworthy contributions to the tradition of the Corps, and the
esprit and high state of professionalism inculcated in their
personnel would be apparent one year later when the 5th Marine
Division went ashore on Iwo Jima. (*)
[* – The Marine Corps
continues to qualify limited numbers of parachutists, primarily for
reconnaissance operations, but the development of the helicopter and
vertical envelopment techniques have made the parachute entry of
combat forces into battle obsolete.]
The Glider Group (30)
The Marine Corps'
interest in gliders was closely associated with its parachutist
program. Both programs grew out of high-level interest in the
successful German invasion of Crete in May 1941 which was
accomplished largely with airborne forces. Secretary of the Navy Knox
was particularly impressed with this new facet of modern warfare and
directed that the Marine Corps determine whether it held any promise
as a tactic in amphibious operations. Although interest was focused
primarily on the parachute delivery of personnel and equipment, the
Crete invasion force had included 75 gliders carrying 750 troops.
Therefore the Marine Corps also studied gliders as an element of
airborne operations.
The Commandant of
the Marine Corps, General Holcomb, had indicated in October 1940 that
one battalion of each Marine regiment would be designated as "air
troops," to be transported by aircraft. Each of these air troop
battalions would include one company of parachutists. The remaining
troops in each battalion would be air-landed, and it was as an air
delivery system for these forces that Marine interest in gliders
developed. The glider idea offered economy over powered aircraft, and
permitted the landing of forces on terrain unsuited for general
flight operations.
Although the
Marine Corps had been approached by an industrial source as early as
1930 with an offer to develop a radio controlled glider filled with
explosives as a type of guided bomb, it was only after the Crete
invasion that serious glider studies were undertaken.(31) Once
committed, however, the Marine Corps wasted no time in exploring all
approaches to developing a viable glider force.
The Navy
Department's Bureau of Aeronautics was assigned responsibility for
the procurement of gliders and support equipment while the Marine
Corps would be responsible for personnel training. The Commandant of
the Marine Corps advised the Chief of Naval Operations that a call
would be issued for volunteers, preferably 2d Lieutenants, to enter
glider pilot training and that, ultimately, non-commissioned officers
would be selected for training as copilots. (32)
Concurrently the
Bureau of Aeronautics was looking into glider development but was
somewhat less than enamoured with the whole idea. The Navy had
experimented with gliders at the Pensacola Naval Air Station in 1933
to check on the feasibility of utilizing gliders in primary flight
training. The results were inconclusive but indicated that gliders
did not make any substantial contribution to flight training as long
as sufficient
47
numbers of powered aircraft were available. The Chief of the Bureau
of Aeronautics recalled these experiments when, in June 1941, he
advised the Chief of Naval Operations that towed glider design
studies were underway at the Naval Aircraft Factory.(33) The BuAer
chief noted that, although projects had been assigned for the
development of both land and seabased gliders, he had serious
reservations about the practicality and economy of gliders.
The Commandant of
the Marine Corps issued his call for volunteers in July 1941,
advising all officers through the grade of captain that the Marine
Corps intended to train 50 officers and 100 non-commissioned officers
as pilots and copilots during fiscal year 1942 (July 41 - June
42).(34) Initially training would be at civilian schools and would be
restricted to officers until service schools were set up.
The Marine Corps
planning at this time indicated a requirement for about 75 12-man
gliders, each with pilot and copilot, to transport one "Air
Infantry Battalion." The largest glider constructed in the
United States to that time had a capacity of four people, crew
included. Although large gliders had been built in Europe, the United
States was at a distinct technological disadvantage, having never
considered gliders as anything but items of sport. The limited
domestic glider production capability was oriented toward that demand
and consisted of one- and two-man sport models. Likewise, glider
instruction was available only through a small number of gliding
clubs and schools, usually equipped with only a few gliders and
located at civilian airports. Hence, not much was known about glider
design or glider pilot training.
To assist the
Bureau of Aeronautics in its design study, the Marine Corps set forth
those features which it believed to be desirable in a transport
glider. These included:
a. A capability to take off from land or water.
b. A capability to transport equipment, including light
cars and 37mm antitank guns, and light tanks if possible.
c. A capability to be configured for static line
paratroop jumping.
d. Machine gun mounts to permit defense while airborne.
e. A transport capacity of at least 12 men figuring 250
lbs per man. (35)
The Bureau of
Aeronautics had two different types of gliders under consideration,
both of which fulfilled Marine Corps requirements. One type was an
amphibious, float-wing model capable of transporting 12 troops which
had, by August 1941, reached the stage where manufacture could be
opened to bids. It was intended that three would be procured
initially, one for static tests and two for flight testing. The
second type was a twin-hulled seaplane glider, the development of
which was being delayed pending the revision of drawings to reflect
two 12-man hulls rather than two 6-man hulls. To permit interim
training prior to delivery of the three prototypes of the float-wing
model, the Bureau of Aeronautics issued procurement orders for eight
smaller one- and two-seat commercial gliders.(36)
As with glider
design and development, glider pilot training presented unaccustomed
problems. Lieutenant Eschol M. Mallory was sent to the area near
Elmira, New York in early July 1941 when it was learned that a
soaring school was in operation there and that several Army officers
had been enrolled as students. Later it was learned that the Army
also had six students enrolled in a course offered by the Lewis
School of Aeronautics in Lockport, Illinois. Lieutenant Mallory went
out to the Chicago area in August, stopping at the Lewis facility and
at another school, located in Harvey, Illinois, called the Motorless
Flight Institute. Marine Corps thinking at this time envisioned
training a cadre of pilots at a suitable civilian facility with a
transfer of activities to a service school once the initial cadre had
been trained and a few of the military gliders delivered. With this
in mind, Lieutenant Mallory, himself a naval aviator, inspected the
schools and prepared a report for the Commandant.(37) The report
reflected an understandable prejudice in favor of restricting glider
training to qualified naval aviators, observing that control
problems, navigation, and night/instrument flying precluded safe
operation with inexperienced pilots. Nevertheless recognizing that
the required 150 glider pilots could not be siphoned from existing
resources, Lieutenant Mallory urged that novice pilots be sent to the
Lewis School where more extensive facilities and better primary
training devices were available, while the qualified pilots be sent
to the Motorless Flight Institute. The latter school could offer
25-35 glider flying hours in a four week course to four students at a
time with an approximate cost of $500 per man. The Lewis school was
capable of handling 20 students at a time for a nine week course
aimed at those with little or no prior flight training. The tuition
was $775 per man with an added housing and messing charge of $2.00
per day for officers and $1.50 per day for non-commissioned officers.
A
series of conferences was held in September 1941 at Headquarters
Marine Corps to evaluate the progress thus far and to re-evaluate the
Marine Corps glider program. The general consensus which emerged was
that the prognosis was favorable and that steps should be taken to
procure the equipment necessary for the airlift of two air infantry
battalions. Assuming that both the 12- and 24-man models proved
feasible, one battalion would be placed on the east coast and
equipped with one model while the other battalion was on the west
coast, equipped with the second model.
By early October,
the Headquarters position had been fully developed and was enunciated
by the Commandant.(38) Marine Corps planning on the tactical
employment of gliders envisaged the use of amphibious models with
outboard motors which would permit them to land and maneuver in
lagoons and other protected areas. Airborne forces would be augmented
by adding an air infantry battalion to each division, thereby
doubling the strike capability represented by the single parachute
battalion in each division.
Basing facilities
presented a problem as the gliders had to operate in areas where they
would not interfere with powered aircraft and where other activities,
such as barrage ballons, would not endanger gliders. A study of the
facilities at New River indicated that the upper reaches of the New
River Inlet and a planned adjacent auxiliary landing field would be
appropriate. For cross-country flights, another base in the vicinity
would be required, and in this case Parris Island could be used after
the January 1942 move planned for barrage balloon units then at
Parris Island.
Despite the
variety of problems concerning equipment, training, and facilities,
the Marine Corps was on record by October 1941 as favoring expanded
development of a glider capability. The Commandant's position
emphasized both the inability to foresee all tactical situations
which could develop in a war, and a reluctance to preclude future
utilization of gliders by reason of inadequate experimentation and
training in peacetime.
Actual training
got underway in November when four Marine officers, led by Lieutenant
Colonel Vernon M. Guymon, enrolled in the glider pilot course at
Motorless Flight Institute. Lieutenant Colonel Guymon had been
awarded the Navy Cross for his part in the air evacuation of sick and
wounded Marines during the Nicaragua hostilities in 1929. During the
years prior to the outbreak of World War II, he occupied a variety of
air and staff positions.
At
the same time, eight officers went to the Lewis School for glider
pilot training. The four officers at Motorless Flight Institute, all
naval aviators, took the basic glider qualification course which
included 30 flying hours. Fifteen hours were airplane tow time while
the remaining fifteen were split between winch towing and car towing.
The course included cross-country towing, towing to strange airports,
and release and landing in simulation of tactical maneuvers.
Training
gliders behind tow plane over Parris Island, South Carolina. (USMC
Photo 15893)
Gliders
on the flight line at Parris Island, South Carolina. (USMC Photo
517610)
By mid-December
the officers had graduated and were anxious to maintain their
proficiency. The one- and two-man gliders previously ordered by the
Bureau of Aeronautics were due to arrive at Parris Island shortly,
and the Commandant requested that all necessary support equipment,
including three Navy aircraft (two NAF “Yellow Peril" N3Ns
with tow gear and a North American "Texan" SNJ) be in
position by 10 January 1942. Pending the completion of more adequate
facilities elsewhere, the initial training would be at Parris Island.
Nevertheless, the
program was apparently under close scrutiny again because in early
January, the Director of the Division of Aviation recommended a
temporary allowance to form a Glider Detachment rather than the
organization of a permanent glider structure.(39) The Commandant
concurred with this position and, on 15 January, approved an
authorization of 14 officers/56 enlisted men for the new Glider
Detachment.
By mid-March
1942, the one- and two-man gliders had been delivered and were in
use. More importantly, the delivery of the first 12-man gliders was
expected shortly. For these reasons, it was decided to enlarge the
glider organization and provide for a more permanent
authorization.(40) On 16 March, the Commandant requested approval of
the Chief of Naval Operations to form Glider Group 71, to be
initially composed of Headquarters and Service Squadron 71 and Marine
Glider Squadron 711 (VML-711). This approval was granted and,
effective 24 April 1942, the Glider Detachment was disbanded and
Glider Group 71 was organized with 20 officers and 218 enlisted men
(9/64 in the H&S Sq and 11/154 in VML-711).(41) Concurrently with
the reorganization, the unit was transferred from Marine Base, Parris
Island to the Marine Corps Air Station, Parris Island and assigned to
the Fleet Marine Force.
Training
continued during the spring and early summer of 1942. The Glider
Group was equipped with three N3N-3 trainers, one SNJ-2, one J2F-3
(Grumman "Duck"), one JE-1 (Bellanco "Pacemaker"),
five two-man gliders, and two additional gliders in reserve. The
two-man gliders were utilized fully for training purposes, but
Lieutenant Colonel Guymon, Group-71 commanding officer, noted a
growing trend of thought that such training was a waste of time. He
felt that, since all pilots so far were naval aviators, only
transitional flying was required and that this could best be
accomplished in the 12-man gliders. Unfortunately, these models
remained undelivered, apparently sidetracked in the wake of more
pressing wartime requirements.
During the summer
of 1942, a number of studies were made, and inspection trips taken,
to locate suitable sites for development as glider bases. After
reviewing a number of areas, three locations were tentatively chosen.
The first was Eagle Mountain Lake, Texas, which eventually did become
the main glider training base for the Marine Corps. A second was
located at Edenton, North Carolina but was never actually used by
gliders. The third location was at Shawnee, Oklahoma. Although this
site was never used by gliders either, it was used as an auxiliary to
the Navy's primary training base at Norman, Oklahoma. A fourth site,
at Addison Point, Florida, was selected but never developed.
Construction contracts were let for facilities at Eagle Mountain
Lake, calling for completion by 1 January 1943, with progress by 1
November 1942 to the point where the site could be occupied by an
advance party.
Glider Group-71
left Parris Island on 21 November 1942, arriving at Eagle Mountain
Lake on 24 November. Training continued although the 12-man gliders
still had not been delivered.
The
lowered priority of the glider program became more apparent in
February 1943 when it was ordered that no further steps be undertaken
in the glider program until more pressing needs in the Pacific were
met. As would be the case with the parachute troops, it became
apparent to senior Marine Corps planners that gliders were not suited
to the Pacific war. In the aftermath of the Guadalcanal battle,
attention was focused on planning for other island campaigns, and it
was recognized that gliders would be impractical except under the
most favorable conditions. After securing approval of the Secretary
of the Navy, the Commandant ordered the termination of the Marine
glider program, effective 24 June 1943. The glider orders, few of
which had been filled, were assigned to the Army as were ten LRW-1
gliders which had been delivered but never flown. The Eagle Mountain
Lake facility was utilized as a night fighter training base for the
remainder of the war.
Barrage Balloon Squadrons (42)
The first balloon
unit in the Marine Corps was a Balloon Detachment organized on 28
June 1918 under Captain Arthur H. Page (first Naval Academy graduate
to enter Marine aviation). The detachment was intended for spotting
duties in support of the 10th Marines' heavy artillery which was then
being prepared for deployment to Europe with the American
Expeditionary Force. The unit never went overseas, however, and was
finally disbanded in April 1919.
The Marines
experimented with balloons intermittently after World War I. In 1924
the Corps established a balloon observation squadron, ZK-1M, and
disbanded the unit in December 1929.
During the spring
of 1940, military planners became increasingly aware of the problems
involved in defending bases against air attack. That summer, the
Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark, designated a
board to conduct a "continuous study" of all phases of air
defense. The Navy Department Antiaircraft Defense Board, in
conjunction with the Joint Board, went on to formulate the policy
which was eventually approved by the Secretaries of the Navy and War.
One agreement to emerge from the two boards was a division of
responsibility for barrage ballon and kite defenses protecting U.S.
military installations. By Joint Board Action # 137 of 12 December
1940, the Army was assigned responsibility for barrage balloon
defenses at permanent naval bases while the Navy was responsible for
similar defenses on shipboard and "such advanced bases as are
not defended by the Army."
The Secretary of
the Navy disseminated further guidance to all bureaus and offices of
the Navy on 27 December, directing that "the operation of
balloon and kite elements of the antiaircraft defenses of such naval
bases as are not defended by the Army is assigned to the Fleet Marine
Force."(43) As it developed, the bases which would be Marine
responsibilities were: Guantanamo, Midway, Johnston Island, Palmyra,
Samoa, Wake, Guam, and any advanced bases which might be seized in
the event of a war. The Chief of Naval Operations requested all
divisions within the Navy Department to comment on the program and
offer suggestions on the extent to which the Marine Corps should
enter the barrage balloon field. Opinion varied and finally settled
into two distinct views.
The
first, enunciated chiefly by the Director, War Plans Division, held
that balloons were not a reliable antiaircraft defense in the role
intended. This view noted that the small size of several of the
islands meant that balloon defenses would be ineffective except
against dive bombers. The placement of balloons on small islands so
as not to interfere with friendly air operations would probably
require moveable barge bases, and this would present difficult
anchorage problems. Finally, in an observation noteworthy for its
shortsightedness, the opponents held that "all bases for which
the Fleet Marine Force is now responsible are located at great
distances from the bases where enemy shore-based aircraft could be
maintained."(44) Nowhere was any mention made of attack by
carrier-based aircraft.
The other view,
expounded by the Director of the Fleet Training Division, reflected a
strong confidence in the effectiveness of balloons. Relying on
British experience with balloons over London (the Battle of Britain
had started in August 1940), it appeared that 50-100 balloons were
required to provide adequate area defense. Based on this presumption,
the Marine Corps would require two to four squadrons of 24 balloons
each, with about 200 men per squadron. Industrial balloon
manufacturing capacity would soon be devoted to production for the
Army, but the Marine Corps could get 150 balloons immediately if it
acted quickly before the extended Army factory run started. On the
basis of these factors, the proponents of barrage balloons
recommended organization of two squadrons comprising a total of 48
balloons, manned by 20 officers and 400 enlisted personnel.(45) The
Chief of Naval Operations concurred and approved the formation of two
squadrons of 10 officers and 200 enlisted personnel each by the
Marine Corps.(46 )
The Commandant of
the Marine Corps immediately took steps to procure the balloons.
Although the two active squadrons would actually require only 48
balloons, the technology of balloon manufacture was newly developed
and it appeared that replacement balloons would have to be maintained
at squadron level in a 1:1 ratio to those actually flying. Thus 96
balloons would be required in addition to those used at the training
facilities or under repair. In light of these requirements, the
Marine Corps initiated procurement of all balloons scheduled to be
available from private industry until the Army run started in August
1941.(47)
The
next step was the recall to active duty of Major Bernard L. Smith,
USMCR, and his designation as Officer in Charge of Barrage Balloon
Development and advisor to the Commandant on matters pertaining to
the barrage balloon program. During World War I, Major Smith was an
assistant naval attache in France, and had studied lighter-than-air
craft in that country. He had been trained by French experts, he had
piloted a number of balloon flights, and, by the time of his recall
to duty, was considered the authority in the field.
In late April
1941, Major Smith, Captain Aquillo J. Dyess, USMCR, Captain Robert S.
Fairweather, USMC, and 10 enlisted men arrived at the Marine Base,
Quantico, Virginia to establish a school staff. After a brief period
of administrative organizing, the group went to the Naval Air
Station, Lakehurst, New Jersey for a two-week course in flying the
British-made Mark-5 and Mark-6 balloons. After returning to Quantico,
the group moved the school—yet to receive its first student—to
the Barrage Balloon Training School there on 12 June 1941. Over a
year later, in September 1942, the school was moved to New River,
then in January 1943 it was transferred to Training Center, Camp
Lejeune.
The school
existed initially as a sort of research and development center for
balloons. The first of the Marine Corps balloons had not arrived by
early summer 1941, so classes were not possible, but the staff kept
busy with a number of tests and evaluations. The Navy Department
Antiaircraft Defense Board sent several varieties of British defense
kites, of the type flown by merchant vessels at sea, to Parris Island
for study by the school. Several months later, the Navy's Bureau of
Ordnance utilized the Parris Island facility to test some rockets and
special fuzes on targets suspended from balloons.(48)
The necessary
balloons and support equipment began arriving at Parris Island in
late summer and by September classes were underway. The Commandant
authorized the formation of the 1st and 2d Barrage Balloon Squadrons,
and they were organized effective 1 October 1941. Concurrently, the
Commandant emphasized his desire that "every opportunity be
taken to train barrage balloon units with defense battalions in base
defense operations, and that a report be made covering...the lessons
learned."(49)
By
early December, the school was able to advise Headquarters, Marine
Corps that the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron (ZMQ-1) under Lieutenant
Charles W. May would be ready for overseas duty by about 15 January
1942. This was none too soon as the Army had requested deployment of
a Marine barrage balloon unit to the Canal Zone. The final training
was compressed and on 16 December the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron
entrained for Norfolk, Virginia where, on 23 December it embarked in
the SS William
J. Bradley
(ex-Exeter).
Arriving at Fort
Randolph, Canal Zone on 30 December, the squadron was attached to the
15th Naval Distrit and remained under the Navy Department although
assigned to the Army's Panama Artillery Command.
It
had originally been understood that the squadron's sojourn in the
Canal Zone would be short, but the months passed and finally, in late
April 1942, the Navy Department requested that the Army relieve the
unit as soon as possible.(50) In response, the Army noted that the
defense of the Canal Zone centered on two barrage balloon squadrons,
one Army and one Marine Corps. A new Army unit had been authorized
for Panama and would be formed during the summer—the Marine
squadron could expect relief 15 days after the arrival of that
unit.(51) In September the squadron was finally able to return to New
River (the school had moved to New River by this time).
Inflated
barrage balloon ready for ascent, Samoa. (USMC Photo 51553)
Barrage
balloon in background ready in case of air attack on unloading area.
(USMC Photo 51110)
The 2d Barrage
Balloon Squadron (ZMQ-2) under Captain Henry D. Strunk remained in
training at Parris Island until late March 1942 when it was orders to
San Diego for deployment overseas. It embarked in April and joined
the 2d Marine Brigade in Samoa.
With the outbreak
of war, interest in barrage balloons rapidly outstripped the
initially authorized total of two squadrons. For fiscal year 1942, a
total of eight squadrons was authorized and $5.4 million appropriated
for necessary equipment. Long-range plans developed during this
period set an ultimate goal of 20 squadrons by January 1944, 12 of
which would be ready by January 1943.
In light of this
new interest, the school and supporting activities were enlarged. By
March 1942 the school was authorized a staff of 5 officers and 43
enlisted men. The Barrage Balloon Base Group, also located at Parris
Island and responsible for the support of the school and maintenance
of the equipment, was authorized an additional 3 officers and 44
enlisted men.
On
16 April 1942 the 3d Barrage Balloon Squadron (ZMQ-3) (Captain Robert
C. McDermound)
was organized at Parris Island with a strength of 12 officers and 214
enlisted men. The squadron moved to Norfolk on 4 July where it
embarked on transports and joined a convoy for the Pacific. One month
later, it arrived at Wellington, New Zealand and unloaded its gear.
After a brief respite the squadron embarked in the USS Fuller
(AP-14)
and sailed on 26 August for Tulagi, calling en route at Noumea and
Espiritu Santo. The squadron arrived at Tulagi on 8 September but
repeated enemy air attacks precluded unloading the transport--each
time an air alert sounded the ship had to clear Tulagi Harbor for the
open sea. Finally, on 14 September, the Fuller
was
forced to leave the area completely, with most of the unit's
equipment still on board. Some of the arms had been unloaded,
permitting the squadron's four sections to equip and man defensive
positions centered around eight .50 caliber machine guns, eight .30
caliber machine guns, two 37mm guns, and five light Lewis machine
guns. The Fuller
returned
on 9 October and all remaining equipment was unloaded. The 3d Barrage
Balloon Squadron prepared to fly its balloons,
but senior officers in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area resisted the
balloons, fearing that they would draw enemy attention to the
facilities on Tulagi which had, to date, escaped the heaviest
bombing.(52) As a result, the squadron did not function as a barrage
balloon unit during
its time on Tulagi. Depending on the tactical situation, the
personnel of the squadron were used as infantry or as antiaircraft
gunners. On 6 April the USS Crescent
City (APA-21)
entered the harbor and all gear and personnel were loaded.
On
9 April the unit arrived at Noumea where it joined the 1st Barrage
Balloon Squadron which had been ordered to the South Pacific in late
1942 after returning from its extended duty in the Canal Zone. Also
at Noumea were the 5th and 6th Barrage Balloon Squadrons, formed
after the expansion of the school at Parris Island.
On 1 June 1942
the 4th Barrage Balloon Squadron was formed at Parris Island. The 4th
Squadron left in early July for Samoa where it stayed until disbanded
on 20 February 1943.
The 5th Barrage
Balloon Squadron was organized on 1 July 1942 at Parris Island, and
two months later embarked at San Diego for Noumea. Arriving on 22
September, the squadron was ordered to positions in defense of the
inner anchorage at Noumea. By 17 October several balloons were
flying, but the limited helium supply (helium was used to inflate the
balloons until hydrogen generators were operational) precluded full
operation so it was decided to maintain an alert, launching balloons
only when attack was imminent. By late December the hydrogen
generator was functioning and the unit was in full operation when the
1st and newly formed 6th Barrage Balloon Squadrons arrived on 22
December 1942.
The 6th Barrage
Balloon Squadron was formed on 9 November at New River by detaching a
cadre of officers and men under Captain Charles E. Ferree, Jr. from
the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron after the latter's return from
Panama. Brought up to full strength by drawing on recent enlistees,
the squadron left New River on 15 November 1942 for San Diego where,
on 2 December, it embarked with the 1st Barrage Balloon Squadron for
Noumea. At the time of its arrival in Noumea, the 6th Barrage Balloon
Squadron comprised 10 officers, 223 enlisted men, and 2 corpsmen.
A number of
command and materiel problems had plagued the barrage balloon
squadrons during 1942. These problems were rooted primarily in the
questionable role of such units in an island war. It is noteworthy
that as of the end of 1942, four of the six squadrons (the 1st, 3d,
5th, and 6th) were in static defense positions around the support
facilities at Noumea while the other two (the 2d and 4th) were
similarly employed at American Samoa. Among the results of this
situation were extended requisitional lead time and long periods of
time during which the units were under Army operational control.
The more serious
problem involved supply of necessary materiel. For example, although
the Operating Force Plan for fiscal year 1943 provided for eight
barrage balloon squadrons, and the first revision to that plan called
for seven more, the Bureau of Aeronautics was hard-pressed to keep
the existing units supplied. The most critical shortage was
high-pressure hydrogen cylinders, 4,000 of which were required for
each squadron. A total of 120,355 were contracted for in June 1942,
but peak deliveries of 14,500 per month would not be realized until
January 1943. (53)
On 10 January
1943, partly in an attempt to remedy some of the problems while
fostering improved coordination and control among the barrage balloon
units, the Marine Barrage Balloon Group was activated at Noumea. The
commanding officer was Major Charles W. May.
Gradually, in the
spring of 1943, it became apparent that antiaircraft guns offered a
greater defense against air attack than barrage balloons did. The
disenchantment with barrage balloons became manifest at Headquarters
Marine Corps in June 1943 and the Commandant decided to ask the Army
to take over full responsibility for balloon activities. This was a
logical step, especially in light of the fact that the four squadrons
at Noumea were all under operational control of the Army. Also,
during the summer and fall of 1943 the Marine Corps was inspecting
the functions of all of its units very closely, attempting to
reorganize where indicated and disband those units which were
superfluous to the Marine mission. On 26 June 1943, the Army agreed
to assume full responsibility, gradually freeing the approximately 60
officers and 1,200 enlisted men involved in Marine barrage balloon
duties. (54)
Starting in
March, 90mm antiaircraft guns had been assigned experimentally to
selected barrage balloon squadrons. The first unit to receive the
guns was the 5th Squadron which took over four 90s located on Mount
Coffin above Noumea. In late April the 6th Squadron was assigned a
90mm battery. In June the same squadron was reorganized as a
composite defense unit consisting of a balloon section, a 90mm gun
battery, and a headquarters and service section. By July it became
necessary to limit balloon flying in order to free added men for the
antiaircraft batteries. Finally, on 6 August, the 6th Squadron was
ordered to secure all balloons and devote full time to the 90mm guns.
The other squadrons shared essentially the same experience so that,
by the fall of 1943, all were devoting most of their time to
antiaircraft gun instruction and test firing.
The
2d Barrage Balloon Squadron was disbanded on 21 August 1943 on Samoa,
and all personnel were transferred to the 2d Defense Battalion. The
4th Barrage Balloon Squadron, also on Samoa, had been disbanded on 20
February 1943. At Noumea, the 1st Squadron was disbanded on 15
December 1943, the 3d on 9 December 1943, the 5th on 7 December 1943,
and the 6th on 8 December 1943. Most of the personnel were
transferred to defense battalions.
Defense Battalions (55)
The
origins of the defense battalions reach much further back into Marine
Corps history than fhose of most other World War II special units.
Marines had traditionally been charged with the capture and defense
of bases which were required by the Navy in time of war. On 8
December 1933, the Fleet Marine Force was established as an integral
part of the fleet organization. The primary responsibility of the
Fleet Marine Force was "the seizure and temporary defense of
advance bases, in concert with operations of the Fleet."(56)
Previously, it had been clearly set forth that "[it is] the
fundamental
war
function of the Marine Corps to assist the Fleet in the seizure and
initial defense of such advanced bases as the Fleet may require in
its war operations."(57) Thus, a long-standing Marine Corps
responsibility was formalized in a variety of policy statements.
A second thread
in the origins of the defense battalions may be traced to the series
of disarmament conferences which met in the United States and abroad
during the Twenties and early Thirties (e.g. London Naval Conference,
Washington Naval Conference, Kellogg-Briand Pact). In the hopeful
euphoria of the day it was assumed that international limitations on
armaments, especially naval vessels, would assure lasting peace. At
the same time, with a stroke of the pen, the great powers eschewed
warfare as a tool in international relations. The result of all this
was that Congress, at least, started thinking in largely defensive
terms. Increased manpower authorizations were not approved, and
budgetary requests were subjected to very careful scrutiny. Of even
more importance to the Marine Corps, the requirement to maintain a
ready force to seize and defend naval operating bases was called into
question. Rather than thinking simply in terms of seizing and
defending an advanced base, a new frame of reference emerged in which
the Marine Corps would defend already existing temporary and
permanent overseas bases.(58) Significantly, this change in roles did
not disrupt the Marine Corps to the extent that might have been
expected, despite the Corps' previous role as a predominately
offensive force. The long string of United States possessions and
territories stretching out across the Pacific to Manila was vital to
the Navy, and the security of these areas was perceived as a
legitimate Marine Corps responsibility.
Another thread in
the development of defense battalions originated with the review of
the military duties assigned to the Army and the Navy. Throughout the
early 1930s, the division of responsibilities was studied by a
variety of boards, essentially with a view to preventing duplication
of effort. One school of thought, generally associated with the Navy
and Marine Corps, held that the Army should be responsible for
continental land defense while the Navy (and presumably the Marine
Corps) would be responsible for all "overseas defenses (59)
All of these
threads seemed to merge by about 1937 when Marine Corps Security
Detachments were first discussed. These Security Detachments were to
be established on certain vulnerable islands immediately upon
implementation of the early phases of Plan Orange (Orange was the
code name assigned to the basic plan for operations against Japan).
The planning for Security Detachments indicated that at least a
battalion-sized force was envisioned.(60)
By 1938, O-1 Plan
Orange specifically called for the establishment of Defense
Detachments (ex Security Detachments) on Midway, Wake, and Johnston
Islands, "on or before M-Day, in sufficient strength to repel
minor naval raids and raids by small landing parties."(61) The
proposed Midway detachment would consist of 5-inch coastal defense
guns, 3-inch AAA guns, a machine gun battery, a searchlight battery,
and 28 officers/482 enlisted men. The Wake group would include the
same armament with 25 officers/420 enlisted men. A smaller group on
Johnston Island was planned to include the 3-inch AAA guns, a machine
gun section, a searchlight section, and 9 officers/126 enlisted men.
The Commandant
authorized an inspection trip of facilities on the three islands in
the Fall of 1938. A full survey was made with special attention to
fields of fire, possible gun positions, and required personnel
support.(62)
By the summer of
1939, the proposed units were known as defense battalions, and
tentatively were to be equipped with:
12 - 3-inch AA guns
48 - .50-caliber AA machine
guns
48 - .30-caliber AA machine guns
6 – searchlights
6
- sound locators
6 - Navy 5-inch guns (*)
[* – A single Table of
Equipment (T/E) and Table of Organization (T/O) were never developed
for the defense battalions. Weaponry and personnel assigned reflected
the specific requirements of the unit's assigned destination. During
the war, defense battalions, on occasion, included infantry units and
tank platoons although variations on the machine guns, AAA guns, and
5-inch guns reflected above were most common.]
The enlisted
complement of each battalion would total 711 and each man would be
assigned a battle station as on shipboard. Under this arrangement,
the battalions would be essentially immobile after they were landed,
but a mobile antiaircraft battalion could be organized if the heavy
guns and searchlights were left behind. A total of four such
battalions was planned initially, and their relative importance in
relation to the total Marine Corps is noteworthy. A request to
increase the personnel ceiling from 19,000 to 27,000 had been
submitted with indications that, of the new total, 9,000 would be in
the Fleet Marine Force, and 2,844 of these would be in the four
defense battalions.(63)
The actual
formation of defense battalions started in late 1939 and, by the time
of the attack on Pearl Harbor, seven were in existence. The 1st, 2d,
6th, and 7th were formed at the Marine Base, San Diego while the 3d,
4th, and 5th were organized at the Marine Base, Parris Island.
The first defense
battalion to operate in what would be considered a potentially
hostile environment was the 5th (Colonel Lloyd L. Leech) which was
deployed to Iceland in June 1941 as part of the 1st Marine Brigade
(Provisional). The brigade, which also included the 6th Marines, the
2d Battalion, 10th Marines, and various supporting units, was sent to
Iceland in support of British forces there to block any attempt by
the Germans to invade the island country. The defense battalion's
.30-caliber and .50-caliber machine guns and its 3-inch antiaircraft
guns were integrated into the British air defense system deployed
around the airfield and harbor at Reykjavik. This arrangement
provided the battalion personnel with invaluable training and spared
them from the labor and construction duties which befell the 6th
Marines.
As time passed,
it became less likely that a German offensive was planned for the
north Atlantic, especially in light of the stiffening resistance
offered by the Soviets on the eastern front. Relief of the Marine
Brigade in Iceland was, however, contingent upon the arrival of Army
forces, and statutory provisions in effect prior to Pearl Harbor
prohibited the assignment of non-volunteers to posts outside of the
western hemisphere. In the aftermath of Pearl Harbor, this legal
restriction was swept aside by Congress and an Army force was
organized. With its arrival in March 1942, the 5th Defense Battalion,
along with the remainder of the 1st Marine Brigade (Provisional),
returned to the United States for reassignment.
Of the remaining
six defense battalions which had been organized by the time of Pearl
Harbor, all but one, the 2d, were deployed on station in the Pacific
at the time of the attack. The 2d (Lieutenant Colonel Raymond E.
Knapp), although still in the United States in December 1941, joined
the 2d Marine Brigade and arrived in Samoa in January. Already set up
in Samoa was the 7th Defense Battalion (Lieutenant Colonel Lester A.
Dessez) which had arrived the previous March--its arrival on 15 March
gave it the distinction of being the first Fleet Marine Force unit to
operate in the South Pacific. Both the 2d and 7th Battalions had been
formed in 1940 at San Diego, but while the 2d had crossed the country
to spend a half year at Parris Island, the 7th shipped to Samoa where
it set up preliminary defenses and undertook the training of the 1st
Samoan Battalion, a native reserve unit.
The 3d Defense
Battalion had been formed in late 1939 and, after an extensive
training period, embarked for Pearl Harbor in April 1940. In
September an initial increment left Hawaii for Midway where it made
preparations for the arrival of the remainder of the battalion in
February 1941. The 3d remained on Midway until the following
September when it was relieved by the 6th Defense Battalion. At this
point, the 3d returned to Hawaii and was at Pearl Harbor at the time
of the attack. The 6th Defense Battalion, which had been organized in
March 1941, stayed on Midway, further developing and improving the
defenses in preparation for its baptism by fire on 7 December.
Also at Pearl
Harbor, in addition to the 3d, were the 1st (Lieutenant Colonel Bert
A. Bone) and 4th (Colonel Harold S. Fassett) Defense Battalions. The
4th had been formed at Parris Island in February 1940 by splitting
off personnel from the 3d shortly before the latter's departure for
Hawaii. The 4th Battalion moved to Guantanamo in June 1941, remaining
there until October when it embarked for Pearl Harbor, arriving a
scant seven days before the attack.
The 1st Defense
Battalion had been formed by a redesignation of the 2d Battalion,
15th Marines in November 1939. The unit remained in San Diego until
February 1941 whenit moved to Pearl Harbor. Shortly after its
arrival, a portion of the battalion, designated Detachment A,
departed Pearl Harbor and, after stopping to leave six Marines and
two Navy enlisted men on Johnston Island, continued on to Palmyra
Island, arriving on 10 March. Work immediately got underway on gun
emplacements and barracks buildings.
On 12 April 1941,
the 5-inch battery of the Palmyra Island group was redesignated
Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, Palmyra Island. Similarly,
the Marine Detachment, 1st Defense Battalion, Johnston Island was
formed at Pearl Harbor and transferred to Johnston Island in July
1941. Finally, in August, the Marine Detachment, 1st Defense
Battalion, Wake Island was organized and immediately deployed to
Wake. Thus, at the time of the 7 December attack, the 1st Defense
Battalion had detachments at three locations in addition to the
parent unit which, remained at Pearl Harbor.
By early December
1941, Midway, Johnston, Palmyra, Samoa, and Wake were defended by
Marine defense units. The global war plan then in effect,
redesignated Rainbow 5, called for the development of bases,
primarily airbases, at all of these sites. Only Guam, located in the
center of the Japanese-occupied Marianas, had been written off in the
war plan. The early capture of the island and its small Marine
barracks detachment was conceded to the Japanese. The intention
behind the decision to establish these forward bases was two-pronged.
First, the Samoan base would assist in protecting the routes of
communication with the Southwest Pacific; second, the other bases
would provide forward defense for the Pearl Harbor installations.
In large measure,
the form which a defense battalion assumed depended on the place to
which it was sent. By December 1941, the standard organization
reflected a total of 900 men, and consisted of a headquarters
battery, three 5-inch coastal defense batteries, three 3-inch
antiaircraft batteries, a sound locator and searchlight battery, a
.50-caliber antiaircraft battery, and a battery of .30-caliber
machine guns for beach defense. Nevertheless, specific island
requirements varied, and while Midway received a full complement,
Johnston and Palmyra were so small in land area as to physically
preclude assignment of anything more than a defense detachment.
As of early
December 1941, personnel were deployed as reflected below:
|
UNIT
|
Pearl
|
Johnston
|
Palmyra
|
Midway
|
Wake
|
|
O
|
EM
|
O
|
EM
|
O
|
EM
|
O
|
EM
|
O
|
EM
|
|
1st
Def Bn
|
20
|
241
|
7
|
155
|
7
|
151
|
|
|
16
|
406
|
|
3d
Def Bn
|
40
|
823
|
|
|
|
|
|
1
|
|
|
|
4th
Def Bn
|
38
|
780
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
6th
Def Bn
|
4
|
17
|
|
|
|
|
33
|
810
|
|
|
The island
detachments were armed as shown in the following table:
|
WEAPONS
|
Midway
|
Johnston
|
Palmyra
|
Wake
|
|
5-inch
guns
|
6
|
2
|
4
|
6
|
|
3-inch
AA guns
|
12
|
4
|
4
|
12
|
|
.50
cal MG
|
30
|
8
|
8
|
18
|
|
.30
cal MG
|
30
|
8
|
8
|
30
|
The 7th Defense
Battalion on Samoa was configured somewhat differently. Organized
with a strength of 25 officers/392 enlisted men, its table of
organization called for a headquarters, an infantry company, and an
artillery battery. The artillery consisted of four 6-inch naval guns
and six 3-inch antiaircraft guns.
The Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor started at 0755 on 7 December, and during the
two hours that it raged, the defense battalions were able to offer
limited but generally ineffectual opposition from their stations in
and around the navy yard. There were several reasons for this poor
showing, none of which was really the fault of the defense
battalions. First, and most obvious, the surprise nature of the raid,
and its timing early on a Sunday morning, resulted in a haphazard
response. Second, and closely tied to the first, was the "peace
psychology" of the U.S. forces which meant that certain advance
preparations necessary to mount an effective defense had not been
taken. For example, ammunition stores had been dispersed and secured,
thus precluding a ready supply of ammo to the gun crews. Shortly
after the attack began, ammo trucks were dispatched to the Lualualei
Depot for 3-inch antiaircraft ammunition but the trucks did not make
it back until 1100, an hour after the last enemy planes departed.
Finally, not all of the defense battalions' weapons had been unloaded
from the ships and set up ashore.
Nevertheless,
within six minutes of the start of the attack, eight machine guns
were set up and firing. Within one half-hour of the start, 13 machine
guns were in action, and this total climbed to 25 over the next hour
and a half. Three planes were downed, one of which was jointly
claimed by a shipboard gun crew. None of the defense battalions'
heavier weapons were ever fired.
In
the immediate aftermath of the attack, steps were taken to reinforce
the outlying island garrisons. Substantial forces got underway for
Midway, Johnston, and Palmyra. Drawn from the 1st, 3d, and 4th
Defense Battalions at Pearl Harbor, these reinforcements of men and
equipment were in place by the end of December. Included in Midway's
strengthened defenses were 17 scout bombers which made the over water
flight from Hawaii on 17 December. These planes were being ferried to
Midway aboard the aircraft carrier Lexington
(CV-2)
when the attack occurred and the carrier was recalled to Pearl. The
resulting over water flight from Hawaii to Midway (1,137 miles) was
the longest single engine landplane massed flight then on record.
The situation on
Guam was bleak. The defenders included Lieutenant Colonel William K.
McNulty's 122 Marines of the Sumay barracks plus 28 Marines who were
assigned to the island's police force. Within hours of the attack on
Pearl Harbor, Saipan-based Japanese bombers were over Guam. On 10
December a Japanese landing force came ashore in the dark and by 0600
the island was surrendered to the overwhelmingly superior number of
Japanese.
Although too
small in area and too near Hawaii to be worthy of risking an
amphibious assault, Johnston Island was a tempting target for
Japanese submarines. The partially completed airfield and the
temporary seaplane facilities on nearby Sand Island made the atoll an
inviting target for surface shelling. The outbreak of hostilities
found Major Francis B. Loomis, Jr., Executive Officer of the 1st
Defense Battalion on Johnston as part of an inspection trip. As
senior Marine officer present, he assumed command. The first contact
with the Japanese occurred after dark on 12 December when a submarine
surfaced 8,000 yards off Sand Island and began firing green star
clusters which exploded high overhead. The fire was returned by the
5-inch battery and the sub stopped firing. On the night of the 15th,
two ships were detected off-shore. The enemy opened fire, damaging a
number of buildings and an oil storage facility. The 5-inch guns
ashore delivered searching fire but the Japanese withdrew before
suffering any apparent damage. Enemy submarines returned on the
nights of 18, 21, and 22 December to fire sporadically at the Marine
defenders. By the end of the month, reinforcements had arrived from
Hawaii, including an additional 5-inch battery, another 3-inch
battery, and 16 more machine guns. This apparently dampened further
Japanese interest as no new raids were made on Johnston Island for
the duration of the war.
Palmyra Island's
lone attack came on 24 December when a Japanese submarine surfaced
3,000 yards offshore and began firing its deck guns at a dredge
located in the lagoon. The 5-inch battery immediately drove the
raider away. By the end of the month, Lieutenant Colonel Bert A.
Bone, Commanding Officer of the 1st Defense Battalion, arrived with
men and equipment to reinforce the garrison. In March, the Palmyra
garrison was redesignated the 1st Defense Battalion and other
detachments of this unit located elsewhere were absorbed by the local
commands.
Prior to this
time, however, the attention of the world had been riveted on Wake
Island. People everywhere were electrified by the exploits of the
isolated Wake Detachment of the 1st Defense Battalion, as it opposed
the Japanese.
On
7 December 1941, the Wake detachment totalled barely 400 Marine
officers and men. This included 9 officers and 200 enlisted men
who had been ashore only one month, having arrived aboard the USS
Castor
(AKS-1)
on 2 November. The detachment commander, Major James P. S. Devereux,
had arrived in mid-October. Air support was built around the 12 F4F-3
Grumman Wildcats of Major Paul A. Putnam's VMF-211 which had been
ferried out on the USS Enterprise
(CV-6),
arriving on 4 December.
Major Putnam was
responsible to Major Devereux who, in turn, reported to the island
commander, Navy Commander Winfield S. Cunningham.
The situation on
Wake was not promising. The detachment was so understrength that one
3-inch battery was entirely unmanned while the other two could man
only three of the four guns assigned to each. Battery E had no
height-finder gear. The ground and antiaircraft machine guns were
only half manned. There was no radar and no sound locator equipment.
At the time that
word of the Pearl Harbor attack was received on Wake, the dawn
air patrol was already up. The remaining planes were dispersed on the
ground and the defense battalion personnel manned their posts.
Shortly before noon an attacking force of 36 Japanese bombers
appeared and dropped their bombloads, mostly on the airstrip where
seven of the eight Wildcats on the ground were destroyed. Aviation
gas storage tanks were fired and 23 of the 55 aviation personnel on
Wake were killed. During the following days the bombers returned,
always at the same time of day, and continued to inflict casualties
and destroy equipment.
Finally,
at 0300 on 11 December a Japanese assault force appeared offshore. It
was nearly dawn before the Japanese warships moved in to initiate
their firing runs. By 0615 the Marine guns opened fire and in the
ensuing exchange, the enemy cruiser Yubari
was
badly damaged and the destroyer Havate
sunk. A light cruiser, two destroyers, and a transport were lightly
damaged. The Japanese force withdrew in tatters to Kwajalein. It was
subsequently confirmed that the purpose of the Japanese assault had
been to land a 450-man force on Wake. Thus did the Wake garrison
drive
off the initial enemy attack.
Enemy bombers
continued their runs over Wake, sometimes missing a day, other times
returning several times on the same day. Within the next week, the
Marines suffered the loss of three more fighters (by 22 December only
two could still fly), half of their trucks and engineering equipment,
most of the diesel fuel and dynamite plus the complete destruction of
the garage, warehouse, machine shop, and blacksmith shop. The last
two Wildcats were lost on 22 December while trying to defend against
another flight of enemy bombers. Wake was without eyes in the sky.
Ominously, this last flight of bombers had been carrier-based,
suggesting that it was only a matter of time before another landing,
this time with carrier air support, would be attempted.
In
the early dawn of 23 December, another enemy assault force
materialized offshore. Among the troops aboard the Japanese ships
were 1,000 naval landing force personnel and 500 sailors in a reserve
capacity, available for
committment ashore if needed. The first units came ashore near the
end of
the airfield at 0245 and were immediately engaged by defenders
manning the .50-caliber machine guns at that point. Unfortunately,
the 5-inch batteries were so positioned that they could not take the
destroyer-transports under fire. The 3-inch batteries opened fire but
gradually more enemy troops made it ashore and forced the Marines
back. It was very apparent at this point that one of the major
weaknesses of the defense battalion organization was the lack of
infantry units. Only by neglecting their heavy weapons could the
guncrews defend themselves against the Japanese attackers. By 0500 it
was clear that the situation was deteriorating. The Japanese had a
large force firmly established ashore and were moving rapidly to
exploit their advantage. Shortly after daybreak the enemy forces were
supported by the arrival of fighters and dive-bombers from the
carriers Soryu
and
Hiryu.
At this point the issue was no longer in doubt and, at 0700, Major
Devereux advised the island commander, Commander Winfield S.
Cunningham, that organized resistance could not be maintained much
longer. At 0730, Major Devereux walked out of his command post with a
white flag to meet the Japanese.
Defense
battalion personnel man a sound locator unit, Guadalcanal. (USMC
Photo 59371)
40mm
antiaircraft qun emplacement on Bougainville. Note five enemy flags
on gun barrel. (USMC Photo 74010)
The fighting on
adjoining Wilkes Island had raged fiercely through the early morning
hours and had developed so well that at daybreak Captain Wesley McC.
Platt ordered a counterattack which completly destroyed the landing
force on Wilkes. By 0800 Platt was reorganizing his men and trying to
re-establish contact with Wake, unaware of the surrender there.
Unable to raise Wake, Platt set out with his men to find the enemy.
At 1330 he spotted Devereux approaching with a Japanese officer and
only then learned of the surrender. All resistance ended and the
island complex was in Japanese hands.
On
Midway, Lieutenant Colonel Harold D. Shannon's 6th Defense Battalion
was ordered to general quarters as soon as word of the attack
had been received from Pearl Harbor. No action developed during the
day, but shortly after dark, two Japanese destroyers, the Akebono
and
the Ushio,
arrived and
prepared for their first firing run. Early rounds hit the island's
power plant and disrupted the communications center. (*)
[* – First Lieutenant George H. Cannon, although
severely wounded in the initial shelling, refused evacuation until
the communication center, located in the power plant, had been
reestablished. First Lieutenant Cannon died shortly after reaching
the aid center. For his bravery he was awarded the Medal of Honor
posthumously, the first Marine to receive the medal in World War II.]
As
the enemy destroyers closed for their second run, Lieutenant Colonel
Shannon's crews were ordered to engage targets of opportunity.
Battery A's 5-inch guns remained silent due to a communications
breakdown, but Battery B's 5-inch tubes opened fire as did Battery
D's 3-inch antiaircraft guns. The .50-caliber machine guns were also
firing as the targets were well within their range. Both destroyers
departed shortly thereafter.
Reinforcements
poured into Midway and by late December the bastion included the 6th
Defense Battalion, heavily reinforced by elements of the 4th from
Hawaii. Also operating from the island’s airfield were a
scout-bomber squadron (VMSB-231
with the 17 SB2U-3 Vindicators which had flown over water from Pearl
Harbor); a fighter squadron (VMF-221 with 14 F2A-3 Brewster Buffaloes
which flew in off the Saratoga
(CV-3)
on 26 December after an abortive attempt at relieving Wake Island);
and a patrol-bomber squadron (VP-21 with 12 PBYs). Among the heavy
weapons to arrive were several 7-inch guns. These old weapons had
been removed from pre-World War I battleships and been in storage in
navy yards until shortly before the outbreak of war. Midway's
defenses were thus well armed and manned by early 1942. The defenders
had frequent opportunities to test their skills against enemy naval
and air units which
raided the island throughout the winter and spring, but these actions
were insignificant in comparison to the developments which would
unfold on and near the island in June.
The bastion was
further reinforced during the spring, culminating in the arrival,
during May, of three more 3-inch batteries, a 37mm antiaircraft
battery, a 20mm antiaircraft battery, and two rifle companies from
the 2d Raider Battalion. Also sent in for good measure was a platoon
of five light tanks. In March, Midway's air arm, still organized
around the Brewster Buffaloes and the aging Vought Vindicators, had
been redesignated Marine Aircraft Group 22 (MAG-22). In May it was
strengthened with the arrival of 16 SMD-2 Douglas Dauntless
dive-bombers and 7 Grumman Wildcat fighters.
As the battle of
Midway unfolded on 4 June 1942, it became apparent that the defense
of the atoll was of secondary importance in comparison to the air
engagement then shaping up. Nevertheless, the atoll was the bait
which had drawn the Japanese task force into range of the U. S.
carrier-based planes and the Marines ashore were ready for any
eventuality.
A patrolling PBY
spotted enemy naval units approaching Midway at 0900 on 3 June. This
sighting was reported and resulted in a B-17 raid that afternoon, but
none of the enemy ships were hit. At 0545 on 4 June another PBY
spotted a Japanese air attack force of over 100 "Kate"
torpedo planes, "Val" dive-bombers, and "Zero"
escort fighters approaching Midway from the northwest.
Planes
were in the air within ten minutes, flying to intercept the flight.
The Zeroes took a heavy toll of the less maneuverable Buffaloes, but
a number of bombers and Zeroes were shot down. The survivors arrived
over Midway at 0630 and started their bomb runs despite heavy
antiaircraft fire from the defense battalion units. The attack was
over by 0700, the only air strike that would hit Midway. Sources are
conflicting but the defense battalion's guns apparently claimed at
least 10 enemy planes. The battle, anticlimatic as it was for the men
of the 6th Defense Battalion, was of critical importance in the naval
war. Coming as it did on the heels of the Japanese reversal at Coral
Sea, Midway marked the end of the defensive phase and permitted the
U. S. to assume the offensive in the Pacific. The 6th Defense
Battalion had made its contribution to this turn of events.
As the war moved
into the offensive stage, increasing numbers of Marines arrived in
the South Pacific. These were men that had enlisted after Pearl
Harbor, and many found their way into defense battalions. The Corps
continued to form these units after the outbreak of war, in fact, by
the end of 1942 their number had doubled to a total of 14. By early
1944, the total had grown to 20. All but two of these units saw
service overseas before the end of the war.
During
the first major amphibious assault of the war, the Guadalcanal
operation, defense battalion forces were drawn from the more
experienced units. It fell to the veteran 3d to provide support to
the 1st Marine Division landings. During late June and early July,
the battalion engaged in amphibious exercises in Hawaii. Shortly
thereafter the unit embarked in the USS Zeilin (APA-3) and the USS
Betelgeuse
(AKA-11)
and joined the Guadalcanal assault forced The battalion's units were
split between Guadalcanal and Tulagi. The machine guns and 90mm
antiaircraft batteries (*) went ashore almost with the first waves,
but the 5-inch guns were not finally brought ashore until late
August.
[* – The 90mm antiaircraft guns, which were
gradually replacing the World War I vintage 3-inchers, fired a 23-lb
projectile with a maximum range of 39,500 feet.]
In early
September, the 90mm battery on Tulagi was relieved by elements of the
5th Defense Battalion, permitting it to rejoin its parent unit in the
defense of Henderson Field on Guadalcanal. At this point the entire
3d was on Guadalcanal except for one 5-inch battery remaining on
Tulagi. The battalion manned Defensive Sector One straddling the
Lunga River during the mid-October Japanese counteroffensive. Later
in the month the 3d's 5-inch guns scored three hits on a Japanese
destroyer which approached too closely. These guns were again
employed in November against grounded enemy transports.
Toward the end of
the year, the 3d was joined by elements of the 9th Defense Battalion
which had been formed at Parris Island the previous February. The
defense forces remained in positions around Henderson Field and Koli
Point until February 1943 when the 3d departed for New Zealand and a
much deserved rest. The 9th stayed on until June when it joined the
Rendova assault force and, subsequently, the New Georgia force. On
Tulagi, the detachment of the 5th which had relieved the 3d in
September, together with the 3d's 5-inch battery which had remained
on Tulagi, were redesignated the 14th Defense Battalion in January
1943.
During the New
Georgia phase of the Northern Solomons campaign, various defense
battalion units were utilized. In August, six tanks of the 10th
Defense Battalion were detached from the parent unit and assigned to
the Headquarters XIV Corps, U. S. Army at Rendova. These tanks,
together with those of the 9th and 11th Defense Battalions, supported
infantry elements of the 43d Army Division in assaults against
entrenched enemy positions on New Georgia.
The 9th Defense
Battalion supported the assault on the Munda Peninsula, initially
with its 155mm gun batteries on Rendova. In July, four of its 40mm
guns and four .50-caliber machine guns were sent to Zanana Beach on
New Georgia to provide antiaircraft and beach defense. Shortly
thereafter, twin 20mm guns and two .50-caliber machine guns went to
Liana Beach for similar purposes. The accuracy of the battalion is
attested to by the fact that, in one group of 16 enemy bombers, 12
were shot down with 88 rounds of 90mm ammunition. When New Georgia
was declared secure on 5 August 1943, the 9th was promptly moved to
new positions near Munda Airfield. Battery A with its 155mm guns was
sent to Piru Plantation from where it could fire on the Vila region
of Kolombangara Island.
Also indicative
of the accuracy attained by the antiaircraft units of the defense
battalions is the 4th's record on Vella Lavella. Designated part of
the Northern Landing Force in the Vella Lavella operation, the 4th
Defense Battalion got most of its light antiaircraft units ashore on
D-Day, and had all remaining units in position within a week. The air
defense units, during the period 15 August to 6 October 1943, met 121
separate air attacks and shot down 42 Japanese planes.
In
planning for the Bougainville operation, the 3d Defense Battalion was
again selected to provide air defense. The unit's 90mm batteries
landed right behind the initial wave, and by nightfall of D-Day, 20
40mm guns, 8 20mm guns, and all .30-caliber and .50-caliber machine
guns were ashore and ready for action. The guns were used in their
intended AA role as well as in coastal defense (the 90mm battery
successfully opposed enemy barges supporting the Japanese
counterlanding near the Laruma River), while the 155mm guns
protectively bracketed the raiders and parachutists caught on the
beach during the Koiari raid. The 3d was finally withdrawn from
Bougainville in June 1944, the last of the initial assault units to
be relieved.
Defense
battalion searchlight at dusk. (USMC Photo 51539)
Among the last of
the major operations in which defense battalions participated was the
assault on Guam in July 1944. Elements of both the 9th and 14th went
ashore on D-Day. One 90mm group of the 14th was in position by
nightfall and firing on the left bank of Red Beach in direct support
of the 3d Marines. Ultimately the battalion assumed responsibility
for the defense of Orote Peninsula and Apra Harbor.
The 9th had been
relieved on New Georgia in January 1944 and moved to Banika Island to
prepare for the Guam operation. On D-Day, the battalion went ashore
at Agat Bay and took over responsibility for beach and perimeter
defenses within the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade's zone. The second
echelon, consisting of the Heavy Antiaircraft Group and the Seacoast
Artillery Group, arrived in late August.
By the spring of
1944, there were 20 defense battalions in the Marine Corps-designated
the 1st through the 18th, and the 51st and 52d. The last two were
composed of Negro Marines, and were organized at Camp Lejeune. The
51st was organized initially around a Headquarters and Service
Battery and Battery A, but was later enlarged with the addition of a
90mm group, a 155mm battery, a 75mm pack-howitzer battery, and a
reinforced rifle company. The battalion saw service in the Ellice and
Marshall Islands.
The 52d Defense
Battalion was organized in December 1943, and after several
reorganizations, it departed for the Pacific. Detachments of the unit
were variously located on islands in the Marshalls and Marianas
groups.
As the war
progressed in the Pacific, it slowly became apparent that, once an
island was secured from the enemy, attempts at its recapture were
very unlikely. The Japanese were increasingly hard-pressed to defend
the areas they already occupied, and were unable to assume the
offensive. As a result, the defense battalions gradually lost their
mission. When engaged, they were primarily concerned with an
occasional marauding Japanese aircraft. The 5-inch guns went unused.
In line with this development the defense battalions were slowly
phased out, starting in April 1944. By 1 July 1944, only 5 of the 20
remained. The others were either phased out entirely or redesignated
as antiaircraft units. The heavy guns were detached and sent to
artillery units, and the remaining armaments were beefed up with the
addition of more 90mm antiaircraft guns.
In
large measure, the demise of the defense battalions grew out of the
fact that the enemy was incapable of threatening an area effectively
once the area had been secured by Marines.
|
Unit
designation
|
Activation
|
Location
|
Redesignation
|
New
designation
|
|
1st
Defense Bn
|
1
Nov 39
|
San
Diego
|
7
May 44
|
1st
Antiaircraft Bn (+)
|
|
2d
Defense Bn
|
1
Mar 40
|
San
Diego
|
16
Apr 44
|
2d
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
3d
Defense Bn
|
10
Oct 39
|
Parris
Island
|
15
Jun 44
|
3d
AA Artillery Bn
|
|
4th
Defense Bn
|
1
Feb 40
|
Parris
Island
|
15
May 44
|
4th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
5th
Defense Bn
|
1
Dec 40
|
Parris
Island
|
16
Apr 44
|
5th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
6th
Defense Bn
|
1
Mar 41
|
San
Diego
|
1
Feb 46
|
NM,
NOB, Midway Is.
|
|
7th
Defense Bn
|
16
Dec 40
|
San
Diego
|
16
Apr 44
|
7th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
8th
Defense Bn
|
1
Apr 42
|
Samoa
|
16
Apr 44
|
8th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
9th
Defense Bn
|
1
Feb 42
|
Parris
Island
|
15
May 44
|
9th
AA Artillery Bn
|
|
10th
Defense Bn
|
1
Jun 42
|
San
Diego
|
7
May 44
|
10th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
11th
Defense Bn
|
15
Jun 42
|
Parris
Island
|
16
May 44
|
11th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
12th
Defense Bn
|
1
Aug 42
|
San
Diego
|
15
Jun 44
|
12th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
13th
Defense Bn
|
25
Sep 42
|
Guantanamo
Bay
|
15
Apr 44
|
13th
AA Arti11ery Bn
|
|
14th
Defense Bn
|
15
Jan 43
|
Tulagi
, BSI
|
1
Sep 44
|
14th
AA Artillery Bn
|
|
15th
Defense Bn
|
1
Oct 43
|
Pearl
Harbor
|
7
May 44
|
15th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
16th
Defense Bn
|
10
Nov 42
|
Johnston
Is.
|
19
Apr 44
|
16th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
17th
Defense Bn
|
22
Mar 44
|
Kauai
, T.H.
|
19
Apr 44
|
17th
Antiaircraft Bn
|
|
18th
Defense Bn
|
1
Oct 43
|
New
River, N.C.
|
16
May 44
|
18th
AA Artillery Bn
|
|
51st
Defense Bn
|
18
Aug 42
|
New
River, N.C.
|
31
Jan 46
|
Disbanded
|
|
52d
Defense Bn
|
15
Dec 43
|
New
River, N.C.
|
15
May 46
|
3d
AA Artillery Bn
|
The basic idea of
base defense had been and continued to be sound. Although the units
disappeared, the function remains, even today, an important Marine
Corps responsibility. Most notable at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, Marines
continue to defend an advanced naval base, a mission not unlike that
assigned to Marine defense battalions of World War II.
FOOTNOTES
1. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is derived
from:
1st Raider Regt War D, Mar 43
– Feb 44;
1st Raider Regt AAR, (New Georgia) 4 Jul 43- 29
Aug 43;
1st Raider Regt R-2 Jnl (New Georgia) Jun-Aug 43;
1st
Raider Bn AAR (Guadalcanal) 7-9 Oct 42;
2d Raider Bn WarD, 1 May
43-31 Aug 43;
3d Raider Bn WarD, 15 Jun 43 - 31 Jul 43;
USPacFlt
AR (Makin) 17-18 Aug 42;
3d Raider Bn AAR (Russell Islands) 9 Apr
43;
T.U. 7.15.3 AR to ComSubPacFlt, 21 Aug 42;
T.U. 7.15.3
OpOrder #1-42, 7 Aug 42;
T.G. 7.15 AR to CTF-7, 24 Aug 42;
2d
Raider Bn AAR (Guadalcanal), 4 Nov – 4 Dec 42;
Raider Bn
Subj Files, Ref Br, Hist Div, HQMC;
Maj John L. Zimmerman, The
Guadalcanal Campaign,
(Washington, HistDiv, HQMC, 1949)
Lt Col Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I.
Shaw, Jr., Pearl Harbor to
Guadalcanal---History of U.S.
Marine Corps Operations in
World War II,
v. I (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958)
Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj
Douglas T. Kane, Isolation
of Rabaul---History of Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
v. II (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1963)
Benis M. Frank and Henry I.
Shaw, Jr., Victory and
Occupation---History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in
World War II, v. V
(Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1968).
2. Capt James Roosevelt ltr to CMC, dtd 13 Jan 42 (Raider
folder, CentFiles, HQMC).
3. Ibid.
4. MajGen Holland M. Smith ltr to CMC, dtd 16 Jan 42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
5. MajGen Charles F. B. Price ltr to CMC, dtd 16 Jan 42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
6. CMC ltr to CG, PhibForLant, dtd 11 Feb 42 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
7. CMC ltr to MajGen Clayton B. Vogel, dtd 10 Feb 42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
8. CNO memo to CMC, dtd 27Mar42 (CentFiles, HQMC).
9. Gen Alexander A.
Vandegrift, USMC (Ret), with Robert B. Asprey, Once
a Marine (New
York: Norton, 1964), p. 100.
10. CG, PhibForPacFlt ltr to CMC, dtd 30Mar42 and CO, 1st
Raider Bn ltr to CMC, dtd 7Apr42 (CentFiles, HQMC).
11. CO, 1st Raider Bn ltr to CMC, dtd 7Apr42 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
12. CO, R. Ech. 1st Raider Bn Itr to CMC, dtd 14Mar42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
13. CO, TU 7.15.3 rpt to ComSubPacFlt, dtd 21Aug42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
14. General Holland M.
Smith, USMC (Ret), Coral
and Brass (New York:
Scribner’s Sons, 1949) p. 132.
15. ComPhibForSoPac ltr to ComSoPacFor, dtd 29 Aug 42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
16. ComSoPacFor ltr to CMC via CinCPac, dtd 6 Sep 42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
17. CinCPac ltr to CMC, dtd 24Sep42 (CentFiles, HQMC).
18. CMC memo to CNO, dtd 2Sep42 (CentFiles, HQMC).
19. CO, 2d Raider Bn memo to CG, I MAC, dtd 28Dec42
(CentFiles, HQMC).
20. CG, 1st MarDiv ltr to CG, I MAC, dtd 5Dec42 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
21. CO, 3d Raider Bn rpt to CO, 1st Raider Reg, dtd 9Apr43
(CentFiles, HQMC).
22. 1st Raider Reg Jnl , 31 Aug43 (Raider File, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
23. Asst, PacSec, WarPlansDiv, CNO memo to ACS, Plans, dtd
24Dec43 (CentFiles, HQMC).
24. CNO ltr to CMC, dtd 25Dec43 (CentFiles, HQMC).
25. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from:
1st Parachute Reg WarD, Sep-Dec 43
1st Parachute Bn
AAR Guadalcanal, 13-14 Sep42
1st Parachute Bn AAR, Gavutu, n.d
1st
Parachute Bn AAR Lunga Ridge, n.d.
2d Parachute Bn Hist
May41-Feb43
"2d Parachute Battalion" in SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC
"U. S. Marine Corps Parachute Battalions in
World War II" dtd 16 Dec 53 in SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv,
HQMC
"1st Marine Parachute Battalion and 1st Marine Parachute
Regiment" dtd 15 Feb 49 in SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC
Maj John H. Johnstone,
United States Marine
Corps Parachute Units,
Marine Corps Historical Reference Series pamphlet #32 (Washington:
HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1962)
LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj
Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw, Jr., Pearl
Harbor to
Guadalcanal, History of U.S.
Marine Corps
Operations in
World War II, v. I
(Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958)
Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj
Douglas T. Kane, Isolation
of Rabaul ,
History of
U.S. Marine Corps Operations in World War II,
v. II (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1963).
26. Internal memo, Division of Plans and Policy, HQMC, dtd
14 May 40 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
27. Internal memo, Division Plans and Policy, HQMC, 15 May
1940 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
28. CMC ltr to Chief, Bureau of Navigation, dtd 22 Oct 1940
(SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
29. CMC ltr to SecNav, dtd 22May42 (Central Files
1520-30-135 HQMC); SecNav ltr to CMC, dtd 22May42 (Central Files
1520-30135, HQMC).
30. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from information and reports in the Unit and Subject
Files, Reference Branch, Historical Division, HQMC.
31. E. F. McDonald, President, Zenith Radio Corp. ltr to
Admiral W. A. Moffett, BuAer, dtd 28 Apr 30 (CentFiles, HQMC).
32. CMC memo to CNO, dtd 25Jun41 (CentFiles, HQMC).
33. Ch, BuAer memo to CNO, dtd 19Jun41 (CentFiles, HQMC).
34. CMC Circular ltr, dtd HJul41, Subj: Glider Pilot
Training (CentFiles, HQMC).
35. CMC ltr to Ch, BuAer, dtd 25Jul41 (CentFiles, HQMC).
36. Ch, BuAer ltr to CMC, dtd 2Aug41 (CentFiles, HQMC).
37. Lt E. M. Mallory report to CMC, dtd 12Aug41 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
38. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 1 Oct41 (CentFiles, HQMC).
39. Dir, DivAviation memo to CMC, dtd 6Jan42 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
40. Dir, DivAviation ltr to CMC, dtd 13Mar42 (CentFiles,
HQMC).
41. CMC ltr to CNO, dtd 16Mar42 and CNO Itr to CMC, dtd
30Mar42 (CentFiles, HQMC).
42. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is
derived from:
1st BB Sq RcdsFile, 1940-41
3d BB Sq OpLog, 16 Oct42-
16 Mar43
3d BB Sq OpRpts, Jul42-Jul43
3d BB Sq RcdsFile,
May42-Jun43
3d BB Sq Daily Log, Jul42-Dec43
5th BB Sq WarD,
Jul42-Jun43
6th BB Sq WarD, Nov42-Dec43.
43. SecNav ltr to all Bureaus and Offices of the Navy Dept,
dtd 27 Dec 40 (SubjFiles, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
44. Director, War Plans Div memo to Director, Naval
Districts Div, dtd 26 Feb 41 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
45. Director, Fleet Training Div memo to CNO, dtd 15 Mar 41
(SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
46. CNO ltr serial 026612 dtd 21 Mar 41 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
47. Director, DP&P memo to CMC, dtd 29 Mar 41
(CentFiles, HQMC).
48. Senior Member, Navy Dept Antiaircraft DefBd memo to CNO,
dtd 29 May 41 and Ch, BuOrd ltr to CMC, dtd 25Sep41 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
49. CMC ltr to CG, MB Parris Island dtd 70ct41 (SubjFile,
RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
50. CinCUSFlt ltr to CSA, dtd 26 Apr 42 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
51. Asst CSA memo to CinCUSFlt, dtd 20 May 42 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
52. 3d BB Sq OpRpt, 15-31Dec42, dtd 14 Jan 43 (RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
53. Ch, BuAer ltr to CMC, dtd 31Mar42 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
54. CSA Itr to CinCUSFlt, dtd 26Jun43, and CinCUSFlt Itr to
CMC, dtd 1 Jul 43 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
55. Unless otherwise noted, the material in this section is based
on information and reports contained in the unit files, Reference
Branch, Historical Division, HQMC and on material contained in:
LtCol Frank O. Hough, Maj Verle E. Ludwig, and Henry I. Shaw,
Jr., Pearl Harbor to
Guadalcanal—History
of U.S. Marine Corps
Operations in World War II,
v. I (Washington HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1958)
Henry I. Shaw, Jr., and Maj
Douglas T. Kane, Isolation
of Rabaul—History
of U.S. Marine
Corps Operations in
World War II, v. II
(Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1963).
56. AsstSecNav memo to SecNav, dtd 24Sep35 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
57. Rpt of the General Board, dtd 10Aug32, noted in CMC memo
to SecNav, dtd 25 Sep 35 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
58. Div P&P memo to CMC, dtd 120ct32 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv (HQMC).
59. CMC memo to SecNav, dtd 13Apr33 (SubjFile, RefBr,
HistDiv, HQMC).
60. CO, MB, Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor ltr to CG, DepPac, MCHQ,
San Francisco, Cal, dtd 23Dec37 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
61. Dir DivOps&Tr memo to CMC, dtd 21Sep38 (SubjFile,
RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
62. CMC ltr to CG, FMF, MCB, San Diego, dtd 30 Sep 38
(SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv, HQMC).
63. CMC
memo to the President, dtd 27 Jul 39 (SubjFile, RefBr, HistDiv,
HQMC).
Appendix A –
Unit Commanding Officers
Commanding Officers, Marine
Raiders
|
|
1st Marine Raider Regiment
|
|
Col Harry B. Liversedge
|
15 Mar 1943-26 Dec 1943
|
|
LtCol Samuel D. Puller
|
27 Dec 1943-25 Jan 1944
|
|
LtCol Alan Shapley
|
26 Jan 1944- 1 Feb 1944
|
|
2d Marine Raider Regiment (Provisional)
|
|
LtCol Alan Shapley
|
12 Sep 1943-26 Jan 1944
|
|
1st Marine Raider Battalion
|
|
LtCol Merritt A. Edson
|
16 Feb 1942-19 Sep 1942
|
|
LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II
|
20 Sep 1942-26 Sep 1942
|
|
Maj Ira J. Irwin
|
27 Sep 1942-13 Jan 1943
|
|
LtCol Samuel B. Griffith, II
|
14 Jan 1943- 8 Sep 1943
|
|
Maj George W. Herring
|
9 Sep 1943- 2 Oct 1943
|
|
Maj Charles L. Banks
|
3 Oct 1943- 1 Feb 1944
|
|
2d Marine Raider Battalion
|
|
LtCol Evans F. Carlson
|
19 Feb 1942-21 Mar 1943
|
|
LtCol Alan Shapley
|
22 Mar 1943-30 Aug 1943
|
|
LtCol Joseph P. McCaffery
|
1 Sep 1943- 1 Nov 1943
|
|
Maj Richard T. Washburn
|
1 Nov 1943-25 Jan 1944
|
|
Capt Bernard W. Green
|
26 Jan 1944-31 Jan 1944
|
|
3d Marine Raider Battalion
|
|
LtCol Harry B. Liversedge
|
20 Sep 1942-14 Mar 1943
|
|
LtCol Samuel S. Yeaton
|
15 Mar 1943-15 Jun 1943
|
|
LtCol Fred D. Beans
|
16 Jun 1943-14 Jan 1944
|
|
Maj Ira J. Irwin
|
15 Jan 1944-31 Jan 1944
|
|
4th Marine Raider Battalion
|
|
Maj James Roosevelt
|
23 Oct 1942-28 Apr 1943
|
|
Maj James R. Clark
|
29 Apr 1943- 3 May 1943
|
|
LtCol Michael S. Currin
|
4 May 1943-14 Sep 1943
|
|
Maj Robert H. Thomas
|
15 Sep 1943- 1 Feb 1944
|
Commanding Officers, Marine
Parachute Troops
|
|
1st Parachute Regiment
|
|
LtCol Robert H. Williams
|
1 Apr 1943-15 Jan 1944
|
|
Maj Richard Fagan
|
16 Jan 1944-29 Feb 1944
|
|
1st Parachute Battalion
|
|
Capt Marcellus J. Howard
|
15 Aug 1941- 1 Oct 1941
|
|
Capt (Maj) Robert H. Williams
|
2 Oct 1941- 7 Aug 1942
|
|
Maj Charles A. Miller
|
8 Aug 1942-17 Sep 1942
|
|
Capt Harry L. Torgerson
|
18 Sep 1942-26 Sep 1942
|
|
LtCol Robert H. Williams
|
27 Sep 1942-31 Mar 1943
|
|
Maj Brooke H. Hatch
|
1 Apr 1943-27 Apr 1943
|
|
Maj Robert C. McDonough
|
28 Apr 1943- 9 May 1943
|
|
Maj Richard Fagan
|
10 May 1943-10 Jan 1944
|
|
Maj Robert C. McDonough
|
11 Jan 1944-29 Feb 1944
|
|
2d Parachute Battalion
|
|
Capt (Maj) Charles E. Shepard, Jr.
|
1 Oct 1941- 4 May 1942
|
|
Maj (LtCol) Richard W. Hayward
|
5 May 1942-31 Mar 1943
|
|
LtCol Victor H. Krulak
|
1 Apr 1943- 7 Nov 1943
|
|
Maj Warner T. Bigger
|
8 Nov 1943-29 Feb 1944
|
|
3d Parachute Battalion
|
|
Maj Robert T. Vance
|
16 Sep 1942- 9 Dec 1943
|
|
Maj Harry L. Torgerson
|
10 Dec 1943-29 Feb 1944
|
|
4th Parachute Battalion
|
|
LtCol Marcellus J. Howard
|
1 Jul 1943-30 Sep 1943
|
|
Maj Tom M. Trotti
|
1 Oct 1943-19 Jan 1944
|
Commanding Officers, Glider Units
|
|
Marine Glider Detachment
|
|
LtCol Vernon M. Guymon
|
10 Jan 1942-24 Apr 1942
|
|
Marine G1ider Group 71
|
|
LtCol (Col) Vernon M. Guymon
|
24 Apr 1942-23 Jun 1943
|
|
Marine Glider Squadron 711
|
|
Capt (Maj) Eschol M. Mallory
|
24 Apr 1942- 7 Feb 1943
|
|
Capt (Maj) Barnette Robinson
|
8 Feb 1943-23 Jun 1943
|
Commanding Officers, Marine
Barrage Balloon Squadrons
|
|
1st Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
1stLt (Maj) Charles W. May
|
1 Oct 1941-22 Aug 1943
|
|
Maj Karl W. Kolb
|
23 Aug 1943- 9 Dec 1943
|
|
Maj Robert C. McDermond
|
10 Dec 1943-14 Dec 1943
|
|
2d Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
Capt Henry D. Strunk
|
1 Oct 1941-14 Jan 1942
|
|
2dLt William W. McKinley
|
15 Jan 1942- 5 Feb 1942
|
|
Maj Chester R. Allen
|
6 Feb 1942-28 Aug 1942
|
|
Capt John P. Brody
|
29 Aug 1942- 7 Feb 1943
|
|
Capt Claude Davidson, Jr.
|
8 Feb 1943-20 Aug 1943
|
|
3d Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
Capt (Maj) Robert C. McDermond
|
16 Apr 1942- 8 Dec 1943
|
|
4th Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
Maj Claude W. Stahl
|
1 Jun 1942-19 Feb 1943
|
|
5th Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
1stLt Ralph C. Margeson
|
1 Jul 1942-17 Sep 1942
|
|
Capt William W. McKinley
|
18 Sep 1942- 6 Aug 1943
|
|
Capt Harold P. Katherman
|
7 Aug 1943- 6 Dec 1943
|
|
6th Barrage Balloon Squadron
|
|
Capt Charles E. Ferree, Jr.
|
9 Nov 1942-26 Apr 1943
|
|
Capt George F. Vaughan
|
27 Apr 1943-23 Oct 1943
|
|
Capt Gordon C. Piatt
|
24 Oct 1943- 8 Dec 1943
|
Commanding Officers, Defense
Battalions
(*) – Effective date of unit redesignation.
|
|
1st Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Bert A. Bone
|
1 Nov 1939-28 Feb 1940
|
|
Maj Augustus W. Cockrell
|
1 Mar 1940-15 Jul 1940
|
|
LtCol Bert A. Bone
|
16 Jul 1940-23 May 1942
|
|
Col Curtis W. LeGette
|
24 May 1942-22 Sep 1942
|
|
LtCol John H. Griebel
|
23 Sep 1942-31 Oct 1943
|
|
LtCol Frank P. Hager, Jr.
|
1 Nov 1943- 4 Dec 1943
|
|
Col Lewis A. Hohn
|
5 Dec 1943-20 Apr 1944
|
|
LtCol Jean H. Buckner
|
21 Apr 1944- 7 May 1944 (*)
|
|
2nd Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Bert A. Bone
|
1 Mar 1940-14 Jul 1940
|
|
Maj Lewis A. Hohn
|
15 Jul 1940-31 Jul 1940
|
|
Col Thomas E. Bourke
|
1 Aug 1940-24 Nov 1940
|
|
LtCol Charles I. Murray
|
25 Nov 1940-28 Feb 1941
|
|
LtCol (Col) Raymond E. Knapp
|
1 Mar 1941-26 Sep 1942
|
|
LtCol Norman E. True
|
27 Sep 1942- 2 Oct 1942
|
|
Col Raymond E. Knapp
|
3 Oct 1942-24 May 1943
|
|
Col Norman E. True
|
25 May 1943-16 Apr 1944 (*)
|
|
3d Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Robert H. Pepper
|
10 Oct 1939-27 Aug 1940
|
|
Col Harry K. Pickett
|
28 Aug 1940- 6 Feb 1941
|
|
LtCol (Col) Robert H. Pepper
|
7 Feb 1941-14 Mar 1943
|
|
LtCol Harold C. Roberts
|
15 Mar 1943-14 May 1943
|
|
LtCol Kenneth W. Banner
|
15 May 1943-12 Aug 1943
|
|
LtCol Samuel G. Taxis
|
13 Aug 1943-25 Aug 1943
|
|
LtCol Edward H. Forney
|
26 Aug 1943-14 Jun 1944 (*)
|
|
4th Defense Battalion
|
|
Maj George F. Good, Jr.
|
1 Feb 1940- 3 Apr 1940
|
|
Col Lloyd L. Leech
|
4 Apr 1940-30 Nov 1940
|
|
LtCol Jessee L. Perkins
|
1 Dec 1940- 4 Feb 1941
|
|
None listed
|
5 Feb 1941-18 Oct 1941
|
|
Col William H. Rupertus
|
19 Oct 1941- 3 Nov 1941
|
|
Col Harold S. Fassett
|
4 Nov 1941-15 May 1944 (*)
|
|
5th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Lloyd L. Leech
|
1 Dec 1940-13 Nov 1942
|
|
Col George F. Good, Jr.
|
14 Nov 1942- 4 Dec 1943
|
|
LtCol Willis E. Hicks
|
5 Dec 1943-16 Apr 1944 (*)
|
|
6th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Charles I. Murray
|
1 Mar 1941-14 Mar 1941
|
|
Col Raphael Griffin
|
15 Mar 1941-14 Oct 1941
|
|
LtCol (Col) Harold D. Shannon
|
15 Oct 1941- 5 Aug 1942
|
|
LtCol Lewis A. Hohn
|
6 Aug 1942- 9 Sep 1942
|
|
LtCol Rupert R. Deese
|
10 Sep 1942-26 Oct 1942
|
|
Maj Robert E. Hommel
|
27 Oct 1942- 3 Nov 1942
|
|
LtCol Lewis A. Hohn
|
4 Nov 1942- 3 Nov 1943
|
|
LtCol John H. Griebel
|
4 Nov 1943-25 Dec 1943
|
|
LtCol Charles T. Tingle
|
26 Dec 1943-27 Mar 1944
|
|
LtCol Frank P. Hager, Jr.
|
28 Mar 1944-30 Dec 1944
|
|
LtCol Robert L. McKee
|
31 Dec 1944-29 Apr 1945
|
|
LtCol Herbert R. Nusbaum
|
30 Apr 1945- 1 Jul 1945
|
|
LtCol Wilfred Weaver
|
2 Jul 1945- 4 Oct 1945
|
|
Maj Bruce F. Hillam
|
5 Oct 1945-24 Jan 1946
|
|
Maj George R. Helmer
|
25 Jan 1946- 1 Feb 1946(*)
|
|
7th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol (Col) Lester A. Dessez
|
16 Dec 1940-21 Dec 1942
|
|
Col Curtis W. LeGette
|
22 Dec 1942- 6 Dec 1943
|
|
LtCol Henry R. Paige
|
7 Dec 1943-16 Apr 1944(*)
|
|
8th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Augustus W. Cockrell
|
1 Apr 1942- 3 Aug 1943
|
|
LtCol Earl A. Sneeringer
|
4 Aug 1943-17 Aug 1943
|
|
Col Clyde H. Hartsei
|
18 Aug 1943-20 Oct 1943
|
|
Col Lloyd L. Leech
|
21 Oct 1943-16 Apr 1944(*)
|
|
9th Defense Battalion
|
|
Maj Wallace 0. Thompson
|
1 Feb 1942-27 Jun 1942
|
|
None listed
|
28 Jun 1942-30 Sep 1942
|
|
Col David R. Nimmer
|
1 Oct 1942-17 Apr 1943
|
|
LtCol William J. Scheyer
|
18 Apr 1943- 2 Nov 1943
|
|
LtCol Archie E. O'Neil
|
3 Nov 1943- 1 Sep 1944(*)
|
|
10th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Robert Blake
|
1 Jun 1942- 8 Aug 1943
|
|
LtCol Wallace 0. Thompson
|
9 Aug 1943-28 May 1944(*)
|
|
11th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Charles N. Muldrow
|
15 Jun 1942-15 May 1944(*)
|
|
12th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col William H. Harrison
|
1 Aug 1942- 1 Feb 1944
|
|
LtCol Merlyn D. Holmes
|
2 Feb 1944-15 Jun 1944(*)
|
|
13th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Bernard Dubel
|
25 Sep 1942-14 Feb 1944
|
|
Col Richard M. Cutts, Jr.
|
15 Feb 1944-15 Apr 1944(*)
|
|
14th Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Galen M. Sturgis
|
15 Jan 1943-23 May 1943
|
|
None listed
|
24 May 1943-22 Jun 1943
|
|
LtCol Jesse L. Perkins
|
23 Jun 1943- 2 Mar 1944
|
|
LtCol William F. Parks
|
3 Mar 1944- 1 Sep 1944(*)
|
|
15th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Francis B. Loomis, Jr.
|
1 Oct 1943- 3 May 1944
|
|
LtCol Peter J. Negri
|
5 May 1944- 7 May 1944(*)
|
|
16th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Richard P. Ross, Jr.
|
10 Nov 1942- 5 Jul 1943
|
|
LtCol Bruce T. Hemphill
|
6 Jul 1943-14 Mar 1944
|
|
LtCol August F. Penzold, Jr.
|
15 Mar 1944-16 Apr 1944(*)
|
|
17th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Thomas G. McFarland
|
22 Mar 1944-19 Apr 1944(*)
|
|
18th Defense Battalion
|
|
LtCol Harold C. Roberts
|
1 Oct 1943-16 Jan 1944
|
|
LtCol William J. Van Ryzin
|
17 Jan 1944-16 May 1944(*)
|
|
51st Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Samuel A. Woods
|
18 Aug 1942-10 Mar 1943
|
|
LtCol William B. Onley
|
11 Mar 1943-20 Apr 1943
|
|
LtCol Floyd A. Stephenson
|
21 Apr 1943-26 Jan 1944
|
|
Col Curtis W. LeGette
|
27 Jan 1944-13 Dec 1944
|
|
LtCol Gould P. Groves
|
14 Dec 1944-31 Jan 1946(*)
|
|
52d Defense Battalion
|
|
Col Augustus W. Cockrell
|
15 Dec 1943-11 Jul 1944
|
|
LtCol Joseph W. Earnshaw
|
12 Jul 1944- 9 Jan 1945
|
|
LtCol David W. Silvey
|
10 Jan 1945- 9 May 1945
|
|
LtCol Thomas C. Moore, Jr.
|
10 May 1945-21 Apr 1946
|
|
LtCol Alfred L. Booth
|
22 Apr 1946-15 May 1946(*)
|
Appendix B – Unit Battle Honors
Raider Battle Honors
1st Raider Regiment
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (5 Jul 1943
– 28 Aug 1943)
2d Raider Regiment
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (1 Nov 1943 – 15 Dec
1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
1st Raider Battalion
Guadalcanal – Tulagi Landings (7 – 9 Aug 1942)
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (10 Aug 1942 – 16 Oct
1942)
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (5 Jul 1943
– 28 Aug 1943)
Presidential Unit Citation (attached to 1st Marine Division)
Solomon Islands (7 Aug 1942 – 9 Dec 1942)
2d Raider Battalion
Midway (4 – 6 Jun 1942)
Makin Island Raid (17 – 18 Aug 1942)
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (4 Nov 1942 – 17 Dec
1942)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (1 Nov 1943 – 15 Dec
1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
Presidential Unit Citation (attached to 1st Marine Division)
Solomon Islands (7 Aug 1942 – 9 Dec 1942)
3d Raider Battalion
Consolidation of Southern Solomons (21 Feb 1943 – 20 Mar
1943)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (1 Nov 1943 – 15 Dec
1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
4th Raider Battalion
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation: (21 Jun
1943 – 11 Jul 1943) and (18 Jul 1943 – 28 Aug 1943)
Parachute Battle Honors
1st Parachute Regiment
Vella Lavella Occupation (4 – 16 Oct 1943)
Choiseul Island Diversion (28 Oct 1943 – 4 Nov 1943)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (4 – 15 Dec 1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
1st Parachute Battalion
Guadalcanal – Tulagi landings (7 – 9 Aug 1942)
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (10 Aug 1942 – 18 Sep
1942)
Vella Lavella Occupation (4 – 16 Oct 1943)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (23 Nov 1943 – 15
Dec 1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
Presidential Unit Citation (attached to 1st Marine Division)
Solomon Islands (7 Aug 1942 – 18 Sep 1942)
2d Parachute Battalion
Vella Lavella Occupation (1 Sep 1943 – 16 Oct 1943)
Choiseul Island Diversion (28 Oct 1943 – 4 Nov 1943)
3d Parachute Battalion
Vella Lavella Occupation (7 – 16 Oct 1943)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (4 – 15 Dec 1943)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 12 Jan
1944)
4th Parachute Battalion
None – in training status until disbanded.
Defense Battalions – Battle
Honors
1st Defense Battali on
Defense of Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941)
(less Wake Detachment)
Defense of Wake Island (8 – 23 Dec 1941)
(Wake Detachment
only)
Defense of Wake Island (15 – 22 Dec 1941)
(Johnston
Island Detachment only)
Occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls (1 – 8 Feb 1944)
Occupation of Eniwetok Atoll (17 Feb 1944 – 2 Mar 1944)
Presidential Unit Citation (8 – 22 Dec 1941)
(Wake Island
Detachment only)
2d Defense Battalion
Gilbert Island Operation (24 Nov 1943 – 8 Dec 1943)
3d Defense Battalion
Defense of Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941)
Battle of Midway (4 Jun 1942)
(3-inch AAA Group only)
Guadalcanal – Tulagi landings (7 – 9 Aug 1942)
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (10 Aug 1942 – 8 Feb
1943)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (1 Nov 1943 – 15 Dec
1943)
(1st Echelon only)
Occupation and Defense of Cape Torokina (11 Nov 1943 – 15
Dec 1943)
(2d Echelon)
Consolidation of Northern Solomons (15 Dec 1943 – 15 Jun
1944)
4th Defense Battalion
Defense of Pearl Harbor (7 Dec 1941)
Occupation of Vella Lavella (15 Aug 1943 – 16 Oct 1943)
5th Defense Battalion
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (8 Sep 1942 – 15 Jan
1943)
(Detachment only)
Gilbert Islands Operation (2 Oct 1942 – 8 Dec 1943)
6th Defense Battalion
Defense of Midway Island (7 Dec 1941)
Defense of Midway Island (3 – 6 Jun 1942)
Navy Unit Commendation (Midway) (Jun 1942)
7th Defense Battalion
Gilbert Islands Operation (20 Nov 1943 – 8 Dec 1943)
8th Defense Battalion
Gilbert Islands Operation (28 Nov 1943 – 8 Dec 1943)
9th Defense Battalion
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (30 Nov 1942 – 8 Feb
1943)
Consolidation of Southern Solomons (8 Feb 1943 – 30 Jun
1943)
Rendova – New Georgia Area (30 Jun 1943 – 31 Aug 1943)
Capture and Occupation of Guam (21 Jul 1944 – 15 Aug 1944)
Navy Unit Commendation (Guadalcanal) (30 Nov 1942 – 20 May
1943)
Navy Unit Commendation (Rendova – New Georgia) (30 Jun 1943
– 7 Nov 1943)
Navy Unit Commendation (Guam) (21 Jul 1944 – 20 Aug 1944)
10th Defense Battalion
Consolidation of Southern Solomons (24 Feb 1943 – 20 Jun
1943)
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (26 Jul
1943 – 13 Oct 1943)
(Tank platoon)
Occupation of Eniwetok (21 Feb 1944 – 2 Mar 1944)
11th Defense Battalion
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (17 Jan 1943 – 8 Feb
1943)
Consolidation of Southern Solomons (21 Feb 1943 – 8 Mar
1943)
(Detachment only)
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (14 Jul
1943 – 31 Aug 1943)
(Battery "E")
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (4 –
31 Aug 1942)
(Tank platoon)
New Georgia – Rendova – Vangunu Occupation (7 –
31 Aug 1943)
(Battery "K")
12th Defense Battalion
Assault and Occupation of New Guinea (Woodlark Island) (30 Jun
1943 – 7 Dec 1943)
Cape Gloucester, New Britain (26 Dec 1943 – 1 Mar 1944)
13th Defense Battalion
Remained At Guantánamo Bay until shortly before disbanding.
14th Defense Battalion
Capture and Defense of Guadalcanal (15 Jan 1943 – 8 Feb
1943)
Admiralty Island landings (20 – 25 Mar 1944)
(One 40mm
platoon and two 90mm platoons)
Capture and Occupation of Guam (21 Jul 1944 – 15 Aug
1944)
(Less Seacoast Artillery Group)
15th Defense Battalion
Occupation of Kwajalein and Majuro Atolls (2 – 8 Feb 1944)
16th Defense Battalion
None.
17th Defense Battalion
None.
18th Defense Battalion
None.
51st Composite Defense Battalion
None.
52d Composite Defense Battalion
None.
Appendix
C
Unit Tables of Organization
Table of Organization
(1st
Raider Battalion)
(24 September 1942)
|
|
Sub-Unit
|
USMC
|
USN
|
Total
|
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
|
Raider Bn (T/O D-175)
|
36
|
843
|
2
|
20
|
38
|
863
|
|
------Headquarters
Co (T/O D-174)
|
9
|
129
|
2
|
10
|
11
|
139
|
|
-------------Bn
Headquarters
|
7
|
72
|
2
|
10
|
9
|
82
|
|
-------------Communications
Plt
|
1
|
22
|
|
|
1
|
22
|
|
-------------QM
and Motor Transport Plt
|
1
|
35
|
|
|
1
|
35
|
|
------Weapons
Co (T/O D-173)
|
7
|
202
|
|
2
|
7
|
204
|
|
-------------Co
Headquarters
|
2
|
29
|
|
2
|
2
|
31
|
|
-------------Demolition
Plt
|
2
|
74
|
|
|
2
|
74
|
|
-------------60mm
Mortar Plt
|
1
|
35
|
|
|
1
|
35
|
|
-------------Machine
Gun Plt (2)
|
1
|
32
|
|
|
1
|
32
|
|
------Rifle
Co (4) (T/O D-172)
|
5
|
128
|
|
2
|
5
|
130
|
|
-------------Co
Headquarters
|
1
|
15
|
|
2
|
1
|
17
|
|
-------------Weapons
Plt
|
1
|
29
|
|
|
1
|
29
|
|
-------------Rifle
Plt (3)
|
1
|
28
|
|
|
1
|
28
|
Table of Organization
(1st
Parachute Battalion)
1 July 1942
|
|
Sub-Unit
|
USMC
|
USN
|
Total
|
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
|
Parachute Bn (T/O D-83)
|
25
|
540
|
3
|
15
|
28
|
555
|
|
------Headquarters
Co (T/O D-82)
|
10
|
96
|
|
|
10
|
96
|
|
-------------Bn
Headquarters
|
9
|
48
|
|
|
9
|
48
|
|
-------------Demolition
Plt
|
1
|
33
|
|
|
1
|
33
|
|
-------------Co
Headquarters
|
|
115
|
|
|
|
15
|
|
------Parachute
Co (T/O D-81) (3)
|
5
|
148
|
1
|
5
|
6
|
153
|
|
-------------Co
Headquarters
|
2
|
34
|
1
|
5
|
3
|
39
|
|
-------------Parachute
Plt (3)
|
1
|
38
|
1
|
|
1
|
38
|
|
----------------------Plt
Headquarters
|
1
|
3
|
|
|
1
|
3
|
|
----------------------60mm
Mortar Sq
|
|
5
|
|
|
|
5
|
|
----------------------Parachute
Sq (3)
|
|
10
|
|
|
|
10
|
Table of Organization
(Barrage
Balloon Squadron)
10 April 1942
|
|
Sub-Unit
|
USMC
|
USN
|
Total
|
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
Off
|
Enl
|
|
Barrage Balloon Squadron (T/O D-160)
|
12
|
214
|
|
2
|
12
|
216
|
|
------Sq
Headquarters
|
8
|
30
|
|
2
|
8
|
32
|
|
------Comm
& Aerology Sec
|
|
21
|
|
|
|
21
|
|
------Gas
Section
|
|
11
|
|
|
|
11
|
|
------Maint
Section
|
|
28
|
|
|
|
28
|
|
------Balloon
Section
------------(4
sections w/6 balloons each)
|
1
|
31
|
|
|
1
|
31
|
Appendix D
Unit Tables of Equipment
Raider Battalion Equipment
(1st Raider Battalion)
24 September 1942
|
|
|
HQ Co
|
Wpns Co
|
Rifle Co (4)
|
|
Carbine, .30-caliber, M1
|
43
|
62
|
20
|
|
Gun, machine, .30-caliber Browning, M1919A4
|
2
|
8
|
2
|
|
Gun, submachine, .45-caliber
|
200
|
—
|
—
|
|
Mortar, 60mm
|
4
|
3
|
2
|
|
Pistol, .45-caliber
|
2
|
24
|
10
|
|
Rifle, Antitank
|
4
|
2
|
2
|
|
Rifle, Automatic, .30-caliber
|
22
|
—
|
18
|
|
Rifle, M1
|
89
|
123
|
76
|
|
Rifle, M1903, w/telescopic sight
|
4
|
—
|
9
|
|
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, cargo
|
1
|
—
|
—
|
|
Trailer, 1-ton, 2-wheel, water, 300 gal
|
1
|
—
|
—
|
|
Truck, 1/2-ton, 4x4
|
12
|
—
|
—
|
|
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, light repair
|
1
|
—
|
—
|
|
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, reconnaissance
|
4
|
—
|
—
|
|
Truck, 2-1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo
|
2
|
—
|
—
|
Parachute Battalion Equipment
(1st Parachute Battalion)
1 July 1942
|
|
|
HQ Co
|
Prcht Cos
|
Total
|
|
Gun, machine, .30-caliber, Johnson, light
|
6
|
81
|
87
|
|
Gun, submachine, .45-caliber, w/folding stock
|
106
|
459
|
565
|
|
Launcher, rocket, AT, M1
|
—
|
9
|
9
|
|
Mortar, 60mm
|
—
|
9
|
9
|
|
Pistol, .45-caliber
|
2
|
—
|
2
|
|
Parachute, set
|
75
|
414
|
489
|
|
Truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4
|
2
|
3
|
5
|
|
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, cargo
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
|
Truck, 2 1/2-ton, 6x6, cargo
|
3
|
—
|
3
|
Barrage Balloon Squadron
Equipment
10 April 1942
|
|
|
Sq HQ
|
C/A Sec
|
Gas Sec
|
Maint Sec
|
Ball Sec
|
Total
|
|
Carbine, .30-Caliber M-1
|
15
|
7
|
2
|
2
|
9
|
62
|
|
Gun, Machine, .30-caliber Browning, M1917A1
|
12
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
12
|
|
Gun, Machine, .50-caliber Browning, M-2, water-cooled,
flexible
|
12
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
12
|
|
Pistol
|
1
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
|
Rifle
|
22
|
14
|
9
|
20
|
23
|
157
|
|
Rifle, Automatic
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
6
|
—
|
6
|
|
Balloon, Barrage, (27,000 cu ft)
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
6
|
6
|
30
|
|
Winch, Balloon
(Furnished by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
6
|
24
|
|
Cart, Hand, M-1 (Comm)
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
|
Reel Cart, RL-35
|
—
|
4
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
4
|
|
Tractor, Medium
(Furnished by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
|
Tractor, Medium, rubber-tired, gen purpose
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
|
Trailer, 1-ton , 2-wheel , elec lighting unit
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
|
Trailer, 1-ton , 2-wheel , water 300-gallon
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
4
|
—
|
4
|
|
Trailer, 2-ton, 4-wheel, 12 ft platform body
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
2
|
—
|
2
|
|
Trailer, 10-ton, generator, hydrogen gas
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
|
Trailer, 10-ton, machinery, low bed, 8x16 ft
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
2
|
—
|
2
|
|
Truck, 1-ton, 4x4, recon, radio-shielded
(Furnished
by Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
4
|
—
|
4
|
|
Truck, 3-ton, 4x4, cargo
(Furnished by
Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
2
|
—
|
2
|
|
Truck, 3-ton, 4x4, wrecking
(Furnished by
Navy.)
|
—
|
—
|
—
|
1
|
—
|
1
|
Appendix E
U.S. Naval Ships Named For Men of the
1st Raider Battalion
|
CLASS
|
NAME
|
NAMED FOR
|
DATE
|
|
DD-575
|
USS Ahrens
|
PFC Edward H. Ahrens
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DDR-713
|
USS Kenneth D. Bailey
|
Maj Kenneth D. Bailey
|
KIA 27 Sep 1942
|
|
APD-39
|
USS Barr
|
PFC Woodrow W. Barr
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-450
|
USS Joseph E. Connolly
|
Cpl Joseph E. Connolly
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
APD-136
|
USS Carpellotti
|
PFC Louis J. Carpellotti
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
APD-130
|
USS Cook
|
Sgt Dallas H. Cook
[Named jointly for Dallas Cook and his brother
2d Lt A.F. Cook, USMC.]
|
KIA 18 Aug 1942
|
|
DD-946
|
USS Edson
|
Maj Gen Merritt A. Edson
|
Died 1955
|
|
DDR-829
|
USS Myles C. Fox
|
1st Lt Myles C. Fox
|
KIA 8 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-367
|
USS French
|
Cpl Neldon T. French
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
DE-508
|
USS Gilligan
|
Pvt John J. Gilligan
|
KIA 8 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-444
|
USS Goss
|
MG Angus R. Goss
|
KIA 20 Jul 1942
|
|
DDG-1
|
USS Gyatt
|
Pvt Edward E. Gyatt
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-449
|
USS Hanna
|
Pvt William T. Hanna
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
DE-510
|
USS Heyliger
|
PFC George Heyliger
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
DE-583
|
USS George A. Johnson
|
Pvt George A. Johnson
|
KIA 10 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-348
|
USS Key
|
1st Lt Eugene M. Key
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-577
|
USS Alexander J. Luke
|
Plt Sgt Alexander J. Luke
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-587
|
USS Thomas F. Nickel
|
Pvt Thomas F. Nickel
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-578
|
USS Robert I. Paine
|
Pvt Robert I. Paine
|
KIA 7 Aug 1942
|
|
DE-369
|
USS Thaddeus Parker
|
PhM2 Thaddeus Parker
|
KIA 20 Jul 1942
|
|
DDR-863
|
USS Steinaker
|
PFC Donald B. Steinaker
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
DD-721
|
USS Woodrow R. Thompson
|
Sgt Woodrow R. Thompson
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|
|
APD-129
|
USS Donald W. Wolf
|
Sgt Donald W. Wolf
|
KIA 9 Oct 1942
|